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ANNEX

THE

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UNIVERSALIST QUARTERLY

AND

GENERAL REVIEW.

Article I.

The Religion of Zoroaster.

[Continued from Volume xvii.]

The Bull and Cow. — The original Mazdayasnas were evidently a very simple pastoral people. Their wants are few, and their aspirations seldom lofty. In their earliest prayers and hymns their desires are for rain and fruitful seasons, for health, strength, long life, numerous children, and sometimes for immortality. They adore the Deity as the Creator of the cow,[1] and pray for pastures and fodder "*for the well-created cow.*" This peculiar regard for the most useful of all the brute creation is evidenced alike by the earliest and the latest monuments of the faith. On pressing occasions they even declare themselves "*worshippers of the cow,*"[2] but in this they entirely overstate the point, being under puculiar duress of circumstances. Another statement of theirs, however, is true, that they use a product of the cow in their purifications.[3] The actual male animal is comparatively seldom mentioned, but there is a mythic character, the primal bull, which makes a great figure in the Zend books, and equally in the later works. He is one of the first things created; but he is soon pierced and killed by the deevs, when from his dead or dying body is produced

[1] Yasna, xxxi. 9, xxxvii. 1. [2] Parsees, p. 12. [3] Ibid.

all the animal and vegetable creation.[4] We have not the means of demonstrating what we are yet pretty confident of, that this myth is entirely a figurative representation of the productiveness of the earth and of Nature. In the cognate hymns of the Veda, the clouds are represented as cows, whose milk falling in showers fertilizes the earth; and in the Yasna the cow is named in connection with the sun.[5] The same word, *gau*, signifies both a cow and the earth,[6] and thus we have the usual double meaning and a constant fluctuation between a literal and metaphorical signification. The same term, too, which in the early Zend signifies the soul of the world, the later Parsee books use to denote the soul of the primal bull. Also in the mysteries of Mithra, the bull was interpreted to represent the earth. Such are a few of the indirect evidences that we have here the very common phenomenon of an early poetic figure gradually hardened into a dogma by subsequent misconception.

Ritual. — It will only be possible to give here a very cursive and general outline of what was an extremely intricate and burdensome ceremonial. The original division of the people was into priests, warriors, and tillers of the soil, which was precisely identical with the primitive three-fold distribution of castes in India; but these castes do not appear to have ever been strictly hereditary. At least, the office of the priesthood, which alone has preserved its distinctness, is not now transmissible from father to son. All the public and more important ordinances of religion were confined to the priests. They were the ancient Magi, whom Herodotus recognized as a distinct tribe of the Medes. Their peculiar wisdom consisted in an ability to repeat the sacred hymns and formulas, perform the established ceremonies in their proper order, and a similar acquaintance with the provisions and distinctions of the law; to which was gradually added a mass of arbitrary and fanciful interpretations and traditions, and some pretensions to astrology. Confronted with European science, all the vaunted wisdom of the East becomes unmitigated folly. The principal acts of public worship bore a strong general resemblance to the celebration of the mass. The liturgy was not read, but repeated

[4] Boundehesh. [5] xxxii. 10. [6] Zeitschrift D. M. G. ix. 692.

from memory, and mostly in the sacred Zend tongue. As that, however, has now been for about fifteen hundred years a dead language, it affords comparatively little edification to the unlearned hearer. The priests, at least, should be able to understand and interpret it; but this, we are assured, they very seldom are. An intelligent Parsee says of them:

"Very few of them understand their liturgical works, although able to recite, parrot-like, the chapters requiring to be repeated on occasions of religious ceremonies; for which services they receive the regulated fees, and from them mainly they derive a subsistence. . . . Ignorant and unlearned as these priests are, they do not and cannot command the respect of the laity. The latter are more enlightened and educated than the former, and hence the position of the so-called spiritual guides has fallen into contempt. . . . The present dastoors or bishops among the Parsees are intelligent and well informed men, possessing a considerable knowledge of their religion; but the mass of the priesthood are profoundly ignorant of its first principles. . . . It is, however, very gratifying to notice an attempt that is now being made to impart a healthy stimulus to the priesthood for the study of their religious books. In memory of the late lamented high priest of the Kudmi sect of the Parsees, an institution styled the 'Mulla Firoz Mudrissa,' has been established under the superintendence of competent teachers. Here the study of Zend, Pehlvi, and Persian, is cultivated, and many of the sons of the present ignorant priests, it is confidently hoped, will occupy a higher position in the society of their countrymen than their parents now enjoy."[7]

The general name for priest among the Parsees of India is Mobed. The Destours, or doctors,—originally only another name for the same office, are now a superior rank selected for their learning and respectability. Above all is the primate or metropolitan, the Destouran Destour, known so early as the composition of the Vispered, as the Zarathustrôtema, the successor of Zarathustra.

Herodotus asserts that the Persians used no temples,[8] but in this he was obviously mistaken. Darius Hystaspes claims to have restored the temples after the rebellion of Gomates the Magian.[9] The places of worship called fire-

[7] Parsees 277. The Sadder, Porta viii. enjoins upon the faithful the duty of paying tithes to the clergy, who at that time had attained an extraordinary power. [8] Herodot. i. 131. [9] Behistun Inscription.

temples do not differ materially in their outward appearance from the dwelling houses of the country. They are built of wood, stone, or other ordinary materials. Taking one examined by Anquetil du Perron as a fair specimen, we will give such general idea of it as we can without a plan. It is an oblong quadrangle, standing north and south, having the entrance through a porch on the middle of the east side. A centre aisle leads westward, in which aisle the Parsees say their prayers. Immediately to the left of this entrance is an apartment in which the sacred fire is kept. The receptacle of the fire is a chafing dish or vase of copper or brass, usually set on a flat stone. The vase is filled level to the brim with ashes, on the surface of which a few sticks of wood are kept burning day and night. The tending of this fire is a very essential part of the service, and requires the care of two priests, for it is only in cases of necessity, and after undergoing purification, that a layman may enter this chapel to lay wood on the fire. Even the priest may not enter with shoes on, yet his bare feet would contaminate the earth; so he adroitly slips his shoes off and puts on sandals or slippers at the same instant at the door. A bell hangs at the side of the fire vase, which is rung at each of the five divisions of the day, when the fire is replenished. The principal other utensils are a pair of tongs, and a ladle for putting perfumes on the fire. The fire-wood is strictly required to be dry, and some part of it should be of an odoriferous kind; and although it has been carefully selected and stored, the priest is required to inspect each piece three times when he puts it on, lest any impurity should adhere to it. This he does with mittens on to prevent the possibility of his bare hands defiling the fuel. All the while he recites his appropriate prayers.

To the right of the aisle just mentioned is the chapel for reciting the liturgy. Here are a number of seats and stands for the use of the officiating priests, and a variety of articles of which the principal are,—a small chafing dish for fire; the beresma, or barsom, already described, laid upon a stand bearing some resemblance to a towel rack; a mortar and pestle to bruise the haoma, a vessel with a perforated bottom to serve as a strainer, and a cup to collect the juice; a plate on which flowers and fruits are laid; several wash-bowls of various sorts, and vessels used for purification. This apart-

ment is without windows, should be at least ninety feet from any habitation, and must have the door so situated that no one can see the officiating priest within. Any Parsee, who is not unclean, may enter this chapel. There is still a large space in the west side of the edifice which does not seem to be appropriated to any special purpose, in which public meetings are sometimes held.[10] To the west of the temple is an enclosure planted with a variety of trees, vines and flowers, and furnished with seats. This garden serves as a place of recreation, and as a place for the washings and ceremonies of purification.

The ordinary service may be called a sacrifice, with accompanying hymns and prayers. The sacrifice is a very simple one, consisting of a few cakes, like small crackers, on each one of which a little morsel of meat is laid. The priest recites appropriate portions of the Avesta, arranged for the purpose, and constituting the *Vendidad Sade.* The recitation is in a sing-song tone, like that of the Jews in their synagogues, and accompanied by a rude music on several instruments. Among the parts recited are the invocations mentioned above to all the good spirits and beings of the universe to be present and partake of the sacrifice. As they do not come, at least visibly, their non-appearance is deemed sufficient authority, and the priest eats the crackers himself. A precisely similar course is followed in respect to the drink offering, the parahoma. The only person usually present at the service at the present time is a functionary called a Raspi, whose duty is to make the proper responses and give assistance generally. There is little doubt that this is a gradual encroachment of the priesthood, and that originally the services were more public. As it is, the presence of the laity is not required; and a liturgy is deemed just as efficacious though the person in whose behalf it is celebrated be many miles away, or even be among the dead. A pious Parsee hires a priest to perform a number of services for him, just as a devout Catholic would bargain for so many masses. There are, of course, many services, ceremonies and prayers for particular occasions, but this is the general character of the ritual. There are prayers intended for universal use to which we shall refer hereafter. Nor is any one forbidden to keep a sacred fire in his house, which some

[10] Parsees, 117.

few do. Yet no one can do this except those whose wealth and piety are equal to the support of two family chaplains to attend the fire[11]

There are three fire-temples in Bombay, each built by the liberality of a single individual. The first was erected in 1780, and the last in 1844 at a cost equal to about one hundred and twenty-five thousand dollars.[12]

Great care is required to guard fire from the contact of anything impure; but as this is not always possible in the case of fires applied to the ordinary uses of life, some provision must be made for purification. The principal means for purifying a fire is to bring it to another fire. For this purpose, there is, or ought to be, in each village a public fire called *Aderan*, which is merely the plural form of *Adar*, fire. To this each domestic fire ought to be brought once every two or three days; that is, as we suppose, a burning brand is brought from each house, thrust for a few moments into the fire Aderan, and then carried back. In like manner there is in every province a metropolitan fire, Behram, to which each village fire is required to be taken every three months.[13]

Purification.—Nothing will illustrate better than this the futility of attributing to Orientals our European and matter-of-fact sanitary ideas. If any indistinct notions about health or cleanliness were ever at the foundation of their multifarious rules respecting defilement and purification, unclean animals and articles, they soon fell into the background or were altogether lost sight of. The reason present to their mind had no foundation in fact, but was a mere fancy. In the religion of Zoroaster every possible thing belonged either to the good or the evil creation, between which two there was perpetual war. The contact of a creature of Ahriman was always more or less contaminating. The degree depended on the relative rank which the particular object held in the kingdom of darkness. The defilement emanating from some creatures was so slight that it required no particular attention. A wolf, for instance, was unclean, and its touch the cause of uncleanness in others; but, what seems strange to us, its dead body was not impure in the same sense. The beast had now fallen in the great world's

[11] Spiegel's Avesta Einleitung 11. lxiv. [12] Parsees 258. [13] Spiegel's Avesta ii. Einleitung lxx.

battle; its death was a victory of good over evil; and by some unaccountable necromancy, that purged away its peculiar uncleanness.[14] Carrying out the same principle, it would seem that the corpse of an unbeliever was not in a religious sense impure. These objects might be offensive and require removal; but the touch of them did not render necessary a solemn religious purification. On the other hand, the death of man, that is, of a good and true mazdayasna, or of any creature belonging to the good creation, was a victory of the Evil One; and that circumstance caused its contaminating character. But, as the Vendidad justly determines, there had to be some limit to this or the whole world would soon become defiled. So the ceremonial law took no notice of the death, unless it were of a dog or of a human being; but in that case the principle was logically followed out, and the resulting degree of impurity was directly proportioned to the importance of the animal or eminence of the man. The corpse of a magus disseminated a wider pollution than that of a peasant.[15]

The remedy was as fanciful as the evil itself, and as little consistent with our ideas of cleanliness. The great purifying agents were wood-ashes and the urine of the cow. In some very grave cases that of the male animal was employed for its superior efficacy. The two elements were used together or the latter one separately. Their application was, of course, generally external; but there were cases, as when a woman had been delivered of a still-born child, where they were administered internally.[16] It will be readily seen that this course could have little in common with our ideas of cleansing. Its object was by these powerful sacred agents to drive away the deevs, which were the real cause of impurity. The more essential ceremonies are then followed by various rubbings with earth and washings with water. All the performances are accompanied by elaborate formalities and long prayers and recitations. Not only persons but also articles of clothing and domestic utensils require purification. Thus if a garment, composed in whole or in part of the skins of animals, had come in contact with a dead body it required to be washed six times with "one of the products of the cow," as Mr. Framjee

[14] Vd. v. 114 to the 122. [15] Id. v. 83 and following. Spiegel's Avesta II. Enleitung xlii. and following. [16] Vd. v. 149.

designates it, rubbed six times with earth, washed six times with water, and aired for six months, before it was again fit for use.[17] Earth, fire and water were all susceptible of this defilement, and even the celestial luminaries; but no purification could, of course, be applied to the latter, except the recitation of prayers and formularies.[18] It naturally follows rom the burdensome consequences entailed by impurity that whosoever contributes to its spread is guilty of a very grave offence. So the casting abroad of a recent bone, canine or human, so large as the tip of one's little finger, was a sin of the same enormity as to smite and grievously wound a righteous man.[19]

The most efficacious ceremony of this kind is the *Barashnom nuh shava*, or Purification of nine nights, which, being the most elaborate and important observance of the religion, will merit a passing description. The place used for the performance is a retired spot destitute of trees or water and surrounded by a high wall to exclude observation. The priest who officiates should be distinguished for his learning and purity of character, and where a woman is the subject, he must be an aged man. He prepares himself for the solemn occasion by three nights of prayer and recitation. It is also to be observed that in the services of purification, tending the sacred fire, and many others, the acting functionaries wear over the nose and mouth a piece of cloth shaped like a little apron, which is as indispensible as the *tiphillin*, or prayer-straps, worn by the Jews in their devotions. The priest commences by digging nine little holes in the ground and placing in them as many little heaps of stones, which he surrounds and partitions off by twelve or thirteen furrows scratched with a knife tied on the end of a stick that has nine knots. The person requiring purification enters the circles in a state of complete nudity, accompanied by a friend leading a dog, and takes his stand on the first heap of stones. The priest stands without all the furrows, and even outside the wall when the impure is a woman. The purifier ties a leaden ladle on the nine-knotted stick, and with this pours upon the head of the impure of the aforesaid "product of the cow," with which the patient is to wash himself thoroughly. When that is done, laying his right hand on his head and his left hand on the dog, he

[17] Vendidad vii. 36. [18] Id. xi. 3. [19] Id. vi. 19.

passes successively to each heap of stones. At the sixth heap he rubs himself over fifteen times with dry earth poured in the same manner on his head, on the three last he washes himself with water, then dresses and leaves the enclosure. All this is, of course, accompanied by no end of prayers and recitations. As the patient is not yet perfectly pure, he is required to remain apart from all other persons for nine days, repeating his ablutions on the evening of the third, sixth and ninth. Then is he clean.[20]

How it Works.—There is joy in the Parsee's house when a child is born into the world, for children, brought up to virtue and usefulness, were regarded by the Persians as not only an honor and comfort in this world, but, as they expressed it, the very steps of the ladder to heaven. The jewels of Cornelia were never more prized than the sons and daughters of the Parsee matron. If a man died without issue, a wife and child were assigned to him, that he might not be childless in Paradise. The Achemenian kings gave annual prizes to the fathers of the largest families.[21] This love of offspring has in Persia adhered to the race notwithstanding the change of religion. Sheikh Ali Mirza, son of Futteh Ali Shah, was esteemed the proudest and happiest man in the empire, because when he rode out on state occasions he was attended by a body-guard of sixty of his own sons.[22] Nor has this distinctive feature been obliterated by a change of country, but equally characterizes the present Parsees of India.

The new-born babe is cleansed from original impurity by means analogous to those already described, and a few drops of the sacred *para homa* are introduced between its lips, before any kind of nourishment. Yet it is probable that these are comparatively recent inventions, since the directions in the Vendidad[23] for the treatment of infants make no mention of either observance. Until the end of the seventh year the child is incapable of sin; but the guilt of all his wrong actions rests on the parents. From the seventh to the tenth year the parents and child divide the sin between them. When the child is three years old the father must bring an offering to Mithra, on the day and month bearing

[20] Vendidad ix. Anquetil's Zendav. ii. 545. Spiegel's Avesta ii. Einleitung lxxxv. [21] Herodot. i. 136.
[22] Rawlinson's Herodotus vol. i. 214, *note.* [23] Fargard xvi.

the name of that Ized.[24] At the age of five he begins to be taught the common prayers and a knowledge of good and evil; until the eighth year he may not be struck in punishment or otherwise; and at ten he should be instructed in the law.[25] Like the offspring of Christian parents, the infant Parsee is without the pale of the church until, with the proper ceremonies, he is girt with the *Costi*, or sacred girdle. This took place anciently at the age of fifteen, but has been brought down to the tenth year in Kirman, and the seventh in India. This ceremony is primeval and identical with the initiatory rite of the Brahmins. Great importance is attached to the costi; it is a card composed of seventy-two threads of woolen, in which there must be no element of black, and said to represent the seventy-two chapters of the Yasna. It is passed three times round the waist and tied with four knots. The ceremony is accompanied by a due measure of prayers, and by a declaration of the fundamental doctrines of the faith,—the unity of God, the divine mission of Zoroaster, and the necessity of a virtuous life.[26] The costi is worn alike by both sexes, and must never be laid aside except in undressing or changing the apparel.[27] The later books assign to it a mystic significance, and say that it typifies the fraternal bond of unity which embraces all Zoroastrians, and makes each one a partaker in the righteousness of all the others.[28] The newly admitted member must at this juncture select a patron genius among the Izeds, and from the body of the clergy a spiritual adviser to whom he thenceforth owes an obedience as strict as to his father and mother.[29]

At the age of fifteen the youth is ready to enter into the full communion of his church by a rite which holds the relative place of confirmation in the Church of England. For this purpose he ought to be able to read the Vendidad, repeat the Yasna, go through the ceremonies prescribed by the law and understand the doctrines of his religion. In point of fact, however, few reach, or even aspire to, so high a standard, except candidates for the priestly office; and the lay neophyte is allowed, for a suitable fee, to perform his part by proxy. It is at this juncture that the trade or profession is chosen, the religion of the Mazdayasnas being

[24] Anquetil's Zendav. ii. 551. [25] Ibid. [26] Parsees 67. [27] Vd. xviii. 115. Sadder, Porta xii. [28] Spiegel's Avesta ii. Einleitung xxi. [29] Ibid.

everywhere closely connected with the industrial pursuits of life.[30]

The most universally important middle point of life is marriage, which the Magian religion has invested with great sanctity and guarded with peculiar care. The ancient canonical books do not appear to have given any precise directions concerning this ordinance, and the various regulations in regard to it are of comparatively recent date. The ceremony is very simple, unobjectionable, and differing but little from that in use among Europeans. The marriagable age for youth of both sexes, appears to have been anciently fifteen or upwards[31]; but according to the prevailing custom of the East, it is now much earlier, and varies in different countries. In Kirman, girls are betrothed at the age of nine and married at thirteen. In India, matters are hastened still more. It is common for children of two or three years to be affianced[32]; and in Bombay and Guzerat twenty years ago it was not uncommon to betroth infants who were yet only in expectancy, and had not seen the light of day.[33] This precipitancy, no doubt, had its origin in the example of the surrounding Hindoos, and its folly is now frankly acknowledged by intelligent Parsees. "A great change," says Dosabhoy Framjee, "has taken place within the last fifteen or twenty years in Bombay, and though the majority of marriages are still celebrated while the children are very young, instances frequently occur of marriages of grown up boys and girls. The feeling of shame, which, in common with the Hindoos, was for a long time shared by the Parsees, has, to a great degree, disappeared, and it may, with some degree of confidence, be asserted that ten or twenty years hence, early marriages among the Parsees will be a thing of the past."[34] As the Zend religion is eminently practical, it offers no encouragement to celebacy or other monkish austerities. A bachelor is not deemed a citizen.[35] A girl of suitable age may demand of her parents or guardians that they procure her a husband; and they are guilty of heinous sin if they fail to comply.[36] Nay, more than all, if a lady should wilfully and of her own malice aforethought, persist until her

[30] Einleitung xxiii. Anquetil's Zendav. ii. 555.
[31] Vd. xiv. 65. Parsees 76. [32] Spiegel's Avesta ii. Einleitung xxix.
[33] Parsees 77. [34] Id. 78. [35] Anquetil's Zendav. ii. 556. [36] Ib. 557.

eighteenth year in evading the nuptial bands, however exemplary her life might be in other respects, she would by that one error have incurred a guilt for which there is no earthly atonement, which could only be purged away by the fires of the world to come.[37] The present writer, however, is not aware that such a case has ever actually occurred.

The marriage of first cousins was especially affected by the Persians, a custom common to many nations, whose object was, probably, the maintenance of family and caste distinctions, and the modern objections to which, we think much over-stated. At Athens it was no scandal for Cimon to wed his sister, because such things were common.[38] The six sons of Hippotades had their six sisters for wives, and were the pride and pleasure of their venerable parent;[39] and the Incas of Peru regularly married their sisters.[40] And this wide-spread usage, however objectionable in a moral point of view, does not appear to have entailed any physical degeneracy.

Another custom of the Parsees deserves notice in this connection. If a man dies without having a son, his daughter or sister, if he have one, when the proper occasion arrives, is married under the condition that her first-born son, if she have one, shall be called the son of the deceased. When there is no female relative eligible, a stranger is hired or induced to undertake the obligation of nominally resigning the first son. In either case, the adopted child or the mother for him, inherits as a son.[41] And this mode of maintaining the integrity of family descent certainly accords better with our ideas of moral purity than that of the Hebrews, prescribed Deuteronomy xxv. 5.

The marriage, however contracted, is a solemn compact, under the care of Mithra, the guardian of covenants, and is forever indissoluble.[42] Circumstances which would generally among Christian nations be considered cause for divorce, are held to justify a man in taking a second wife. But for

[37] Anquetil's Zendav. ii. 557. [38] Cornelius Nepos Praef. Diodorus Sic. Lib. i. 27. "Jus est apud Persos misceri cum matribus. Ægyptiis et Athenis cum sororibus legitima connubia." Minucus Felix Octav. [39] Odyssey x. 6.

[40] Prescott's Peru i. 113. [41] Anquetil's Zendav ii. 560.

[42] Spiegel's Avesta ii. Einleit. xxvi.

this purpose he has to obtain the consent of the first, and furnish her alimony.[43] The Avesta is extremely careful of the conjugal relation and denounces all vices which tend to impair its sanctity or disturb its harmony, with a severity extended to no other offences. Even acts which our lax morality whitewashes with the euphemism of youthful indiscretion, are, to the Zoroastrian, sins of a very grave character. Scores of citations to this effect might be given from the Vendidad, but that they may be found almost anywhere. Bigamy, except in the case just mentioned, is unlawful.[44]

The duties enjoined by the Zend religion are numerous and important; and its precepts, by a liberal interpretation, are easily made to embrace all the relations and events of life. The daily existence of the Mazdayasna, like that of the primitive Christian, is represented as a warfare. He is to destroy the works of the Evil One and combat his hosts in whatever shape they may present themselves. He is to wrestle not only against flesh and blood, but against principalities and powers, and the spiritual rulers and servants of darkness. In this daily conflict the arm of one man is weak, and he has every moment need of help from on high, to be procured through the medium of prayer. Prayer is his "vital breath," "his native air," the inseparable accompaniment of almost every act. Awaking with the first crowing of the cock, he rises from his couch with prayer, his morning ablutions and dressing are accompanied with many prayers, he washes and prays before every meal, and at night, after carefully reviewing all the actions of the day, to see if he had sinned in thought, word, or deed, he retires to rest with prayer.[45] There are besides special prayers for particular days and for particular hours of every day. There are prayers to be repeated on sneezing, on paring the nails or cutting the hair, and for a number of other acts that need not be specified;—on approaching fire or water, or seeing an excellent or beautiful object.[46] There are prayers to make a refractory wife docile, and prayers to make one who has run away return to her home;[47] and all this aside from the public ordinances of religion. Moreover the Parsee, in his worship, professes to unite his prayers with those of all the faithful that are, or were, or shall be

[43] Spiegel's Avesta ii. Einleit. xxvi., Parsees 90. [44] Ibid.
[45] Spiegel's Av ii. Einleit. l. [46] Ibid. [47] Anquetil's Zendav. ii. 139.

hereafter; for the righteousness of all constitutes one common fund, from which every member draws profit alike,[48] —a notion that was anciently very widely spread, if it is not yet. The prayers for all these various occasions are of a very stereotyped character, the same ones being often deemed appropriate to almost every occasion. Some are very ancient, the Gâthâs, and supposed to possess extraordinary sanctity and efficacy. One in particular, the Ahuna Vairya is called the Word created by Ormazd before the heaven and the earth, the fire and the water[49]: it is equal in worth to a hundred other Gâthâs, and Paradise is promised to him who shall recite it without mistake.[50]

But all these daily and hourly prayers are to be accompanied by their appropriate fruit of good works. A pious, but idle, contemplation or a barren holiness finds no favor. Each man must take his place in society, perform its duties, and bear a share of its burdens. He is to wage war against the kingdom of darkness by destroying, as far as possible, whatever is injurious, and increasing what is good and useful. It is a religious duty to destroy noxious creatures, remove nuisances, drain and reclaim marshes and irrigate parched land.[51] The deevs are said to find no shelter in a house filled with the fruits of industry[52]; and it is declared that he who cultivates the earth in uprightness, does a work of as much merit as if he had celebrated ten thousand liturgies.[53] The door of the Mazdayasna should ever open to the knock of the traveller and the stranger, and the poor have a claim to share in his abundance.[54] But fasting and pennance are forbidden, as profiting no one.[55] Cruelty to, or neglect of, animals is strictly inhibited, and even the wanton injury of useful trees; for as every creature, not noxious, is under the protection of a celestial spirit and is part of the good creation, any wrong done to it is an offence against its angelic guardian.[56] Herodotus remarked that the Persian youth were carefully taught three things,—to ride, to draw the bow, and *to speak the truth*.[57] If there is one virtue more than any other enjoined by all the authorities, from the solemn memorial of Darius on the rock of

[48] Parsees 254. [49] Yasna xix. 5. [50] Id. xix. 10.
[51] Vd. xiv. 9, xviii. 144, iii. throughout. [52] Id. iii. 109.
[53] Id. iii. 99. [54] Patet of Iran, Sadder p; xxi., xxiii. [55] Id. xxv.
[56] Patet of Iran. [57] Lib. i. 136.

Behistun down to the latest commentary and pamphlet of the sect, it is veracity. In nothing do Christians commit a greater error or a greater wrong than when they would arrogate to themselves a monoply of all the morals of the world. Morality is the common property of mankind, differing widely indeed under different degrees and types of civilization, but always present in some form; and the Parsees, we think, may fairly be called a moral people. We have nowhere met in their books with the golden rule of Confucius and of Christ; not that the ideas seem to be wanting, but that they have not been so distinctly and beautifully expressed. Admirable moral precepts are not wanting. Thus it is forbidden to requite evil for evil [58]; and it is out of place to inquire whether such fine sentiments are always reduced to practice until we answer the nearer question if Christians always practice theirs. Nor is it a mere outward eye service that is required; but the purity of conduct so ceaselessly enjoined is to be accompanied by purity of speech, springing from an equal purity of thought. Yet as no human care can fulfil all righteousness, some means of expiation was necessary; and this was found in the performance of meritorious works, in order that, when fairly tested by the divine balance, the good actions of each individual might as far as possible outweigh his transgressions.

It is in the hour and article of death that religion usually asserts it chief supremacy; and we would here make a remark in reference to Magism which each reader is at liberty to carry out and apply to other systems as far as he thinks the facts will warrant. The remark is this, that while the reputed Zoroaster has, in reference to the practical affairs of daily life, often shown a clear perception, sound judgment, and statesman-like sagacity, the ceremonies and observances, strictly religious, attributed to him are superstitious, silly, and sometimes hardly decent. This is one of the thousand examples of the sacred intelligence being far behind the secular. We proceed, then, to consider with what consolations and solemnities this religion surrounds the death-beds of its votaries. When the Mazdayasna is seen to be near his latter end, prayers are recited in his hearing, some of which are prescribed in the Yasna, and others appear to be later additions. As soon as life is ex-

[58] Patet of Iran.

tinct the *Drukhs Nasûs*, or demon of destruction, or of decomposition, coming from the region of the North in the form of a carrion-fly, alights upon the body; but to prevent this a dog is brought into the chamber and caused to look upon the corpse,[59] for the eye of the dog has the power to drive away evil spirits. And now that the breath is out, what shall be done with the body? It is unclean, and all who touch it become unclean. To bury it would defile the earth, to burn it would pollute the fire, and to sink it in the sea would contaminate the water. In each house, or at least in each village, there should be three *catas* prepared for the temporary reception of the dead. These are low structures of stone or tiles, adapted to different ages, for they have a Procrustean quality, and must not be much larger or smaller than necessary.[60] Here the body lies until the necessary preparations are made for the funeral, and is covered for the time with an old cloth, for it is strictly forbidden to employ the smallest shred of new material for such a purpose.[61] Those who have occasion to lift the corpse must have on their hands mittens made of old rags[62] If the weather is favorable and the death did not occur at too late an hour, the funeral takes place the same day. In stormy weather it may be deferred even for a month.[63] When all is ready, and the friends are assembled, two priests recite a multitude of prayers and selections from the Avesta, which are not made more edifiying by the circumstance that they are in languages wholly unknown to the auditory, if not to the officiating clergy. The dog is introduced a second time to look on the body. The bearers then place the corpse upon an iron bier and proceed with it to the *dokhma*, or tower of silence, followed by the friends, until within ninety paces of the gate. At the entrance of the dokhma the ceremony with the dog is repeated for the third and last time, the body is taken in and laid on its back, but so as not to touch any other corpse, securely fastened, and left without any covering—if we understand the passage correctly,—and exposed to be devoured by the fowls of the air and the beasts of the wilderness. ("Zwei Männer sollen ihn nehmen, reine und kräftige. Nackt und ohne

[59] Spiegel's Avesta ii. Einleitung xxxiii., Vd. viii. 120.
[60] Vd. v. 36. [61] Id. v. 172, v. ii. 52, viii. 65, Sadder P. xii.
[62] Spiegel's Avesta ii. Einleitung xxxiii. [63] Vd. v. 42.

Kleider auf Ziegeln, Stein oder Mörtel hin zum Kata. Sie sollen ihn auf dieser Erde niederlegen. Wo am meisten auf ihn aufmerksam werden fleischfressende Hunde und fleischfressende Vögel." [64]) On this last point, so startling to us, the authorities are numerous, explicit, and unanimous.[65] The dokhma is usually placed on the top of some high, barren hill, is a round tower of variable height, without any roof, and with generally a single narrow entrance on the east side. The floor is a bed of cement two or three inches thick and several feet higher than the ground outside. In the centre is a pit, covered with an iron grating, into which the bones are annually collected. Chardin relates that there was in his time a cemetery, half a league from Ispahan, consisting of a round tower thirty-five feet high, without any door-way. Here the Guebres deposited their dead by means of a ladder, and left them to be devoured by the crows, which were seen in large numbers about the place. Such towers exist throughout India wherever the Parsees are numerous.

The very road that the funeral procession followed has now been defiled by their use, and is to be purified and made fit for the purposes of ordinary travel by leading over it three times "a yellow dog with four eyes,"—that is, we presume, having, like the Scotch colley, two spots over the eyes—"or a white dog with yellow ears."[66] The bearers, on returning from the dokhma have also to undergo purification, and their mittens are buried. All the proceedings are, of course, accompanied by continuous recitation of prayers; and alms are given to the poor or to the priests, for the benefit of the deceased. The first three days the relatives perform a number of religious serviecs in behalf of the departed soul, and during this time they cook no food; for immediately on the death of a man or a dog the fire and all sacred utensils are to be carried out of the house and are forbidden to be returned under nine days in winter and a month in summer.[67] According to some accounts the soul lingers the first day about the chamber of death, the second around the cata, or place of temporary deposit, and the third at the dokhma.[68] It is said to be at first as helpless

[64] Vendidad viii. 25. [65] Id. iii. 66, v. 128, vi, 94. Horodot. i. 140. Strabo xv. Agathias ii. p. 60. Parsees 97. [66] Vd. viii. 41.
[67] Vd. viii. 130. [68] Spiegel's Avesta ii. Einleitung xxxix.

as a new-born infant, ignorant of its way, and requiring as much care on its first entrance into the spirit-world as it had on its arrival in this: and the prayers of friends are for the protection of its weakness against the assaults of the Evil One. But Serosh, like a tender nurse, takes the infant soul in charge, and, together with Dahman, Astad and Rasne-rast, conducts it on its way.[69] At the dawn of the fourth morning they come to the bridge Tchinevad, which spans over the chasm between the top of Mount Albordj and the shores of the unseen world, while hell, like a dark flood, lies beneath it. Here the stranger is made to give an account of the deeds done in the body, and his past actions are weighed in a balance, the good against the evil.[70] If the latter preponderate, he is straightway dragged down to those darksome regions where Ahriman and the deevs receive him with ribald jests, entertain him with viands offensive to the palate, and take a malicious pleasure in making him wretched.[71] But if the scale of good actions prove heaviest, the soul passes on unharmed, accompanied by the heavenly Izeds and the dogs that keep watch at the bridge, thus guarding the gates both of heaven and hell, while the fravashis of the pure make intercession for him before the throne of Ormazd. "Then Bahman rises from his golden throne and says, 'How hast thou come, O pure one? From the perishable world to the imperishable.' The pure souls go in peace to the golden thrones of Ormazd and the Amshaspands, to Gorotman, the dwelling of Ormazd, the dwelling of the Amshaspands, the dwelling of the other pure beings."[72]

It is often urged by Dr. Spiegel that this judgment and award on the fourth day after death is inconsistent with the doctrine of a general resurrection, which cannot therefore have been an article of faith at the time when this part of the Vendidad was written. The conclusion, however, is not fully borne out by the premises, and presumes among the fragmentary remains of an ancient religious literature a severe consistency which we have no reason to expect. A precisely similar incongruity exists in the doctrines of the Christian Church, where it is generally held that the soul passes immediately to its account and reward, and yet is to

[69] Sadder, p. lxiii. Afrin of Dahman. [70] Boundehesh, Afrin of the Seven Amshaspands. Vd. xix. 91. [71] Yasna xxxi. 20. [72] Vd. xix. 100.

be united to the body, judged, and sent to its proper destination at the end of the world. And this paradox existed from the foundation of the Church.[73] By means of the testimony of Theopompus the Magian belief in a final resurrection is traced beyond the time of Alexander the Great, and it is several times referred to in the Yasna and Vendidad, the oldest books of the canon.

At the respective periods of four days, nine days, a month and a year after death, the relatives perform various rites, and make gifts and offerings for the benefit of the soul of the deceased. At the same time it is forbidden to mourn for the departed. On this point there is a very remarkable passage. The conducting angel says to Ardai Virâf:

"The river that you see before you is composed of the tears of mankind; tears shed (against the express command of the Almighty) for the departed; therefore when you return again to the earth, inculcate this to mankind, — that to grieve immoderately for the departed is, in the sight of God a most heinous sin."[74]

This precept, however, it is found impossible fully to enforce in practice.

On the last five days of the year, called the Farvardians, the spirits of the damned enjoy a temporary release from their gloomy prison-house, and are allowed to re-visit the scenes of their earthly sins and sorrows. At such times the prayers of the living may avail to redeem the lost; for the Persians, like the Japanese, would never accept the idea of a hell from which there was no redemption. Hence it is the duty of every one to pray for all the dead, kindred, friends, and strangers — for all who have worn the garment of flesh, and stained it with their deeds — for no one knows who has need of such intercession, or who may be profited thereby. Those who, from the enormity of their sins or the feebleness of the intercession, fail to obtain a release, are remanded back to their dungeon for another year, or even to the great resurrection.[75]

[73]Compare Luke xxii. 43, Acts vii. 59, 2Cor. v. 8, with John vi. 39, 40, 44, 54, 1 Cor. xv. 52, 1 Thess. iv. 16, Luke xiv. 14, John v. 29, Heb. vi. 2. [74]Ardai Virâf Nameh 53, also Sadder. Porta 97.

[75]Patet of Iran and Anquetil's Zendavesta ii. 131.

Alpha and Omega. — One of the first efforts of the awakening human mind is an attempt to form some short-hand and comprehensive system of all that was and is, and is to be, — some theory of the beginning and end of all things. What am I? where am I? who brought me here? whence came I? and to what shore am I drifting on this onward stream of time? are questions which all ages have asked. We are therefore not surprised to find many speculations and guesses in the Magian books respecting the origin and history of the universe. These speculations are for the most part comparatively late, the earlier books furnishing only occasional and scanty allusions. The Gâthâs recognize two twin deities, Ormazd and Ahriman, and do not look beyond them for any simpler first cause, the doctrine of Zervana-akarana being, as has been shown, a subsequent introduction. All authorities agree in ascribing to these two the origin of all created things. Ormazd produced first the celestial spirits,[76] and then, with their aid, created the world and its inhabitants. As the Jews limited the period of creation to the week, their cardinal measure of time, so the Mazdayasnas distributed it over a larger, but more natural and obvious cycle. According to them Ormazd made the world in a solar year of three hundred and sixty-five days beginning about the vernal equinox. In forty-five days he finished the heavens, in sixty days the waters, in seventy-five the earth, in thirty the trees, in forty-five the animals, and man in seventy-five days more.[77] On the completion of each section, he took a rest of several days which six periods of relaxation became the great yearly feasts. The principle here followed is precisely the same as that of the book of Genesis, the distribution of the work into six parts, even the order of the parts, the resting, and the institution of sacred days, are all identical — everything but the length of time.

As this analysis of creation is found only in compositions dating considerably after the Christian era, we have no doubt of its being an exaggerated imitation of the Hebrew cosmogony. Yet this is the older and simpler doctrine, while the Boundehesh extends the period of creation to three thousand years, and fills it with many grotesque and puerile details, which are not very clear, and appear often

[76] Yesht of Ardibihist. [77] Afrin of Gahanbar.

to be contradictory. Among them will be found many of the principal speculations of orthodox Christianity, as embodied in Paradise Lost. According to this account Ahriman remained idle in his abode of outer darkness all the while that Ormazd was creating the heavens and the earth; but when he saw the great works of his illustrious opponent, he bestirred himself and made the deevs. Ormazd then created the fravashis and proposed to clothe them with bodies and send them to inhabit the new-made earth, saying, by way of encouragement, "In the end I will re-establish you in your present estate; ye shall be happy, ye shall be immortal, without the infirmities of age, without ill. I will protect you forever against the enemy." Immediately the fravashi of the first man volunteered to enter the world. Ahriman in the meantime made a grand military review of all his deevs and marched to attack heaven. There the heavenly Izeds fought against the besiegers ninety days and nights, repulsed them, and drove them back to hell. The arch-enemy next approached the earth in the disguise of a serpent, and from his trail vermin and all evils spread. He infected every thing he touched, and there was nothing to which he did not affix some curse. He wounded the primal bull, — who appears to have been at that early period the only living inhabitant of the earth — so that venerable animal fell sick and died, leaving in his last words an injunction to treat with humanity the animal tribes that should spring from him. At the instant of his death Goshuroun, the Ized of the herds, sprang from his left fore leg, and Gaio-merethna, Gayomard, or Kaiomorts, the primal man, was produced from the corresponding member, while all other animal and vegetable productions were eventually formed from different parts of his decomposed body. Gayomard was a handsome young man, and lived and reigned a king without subjects thirty years, although Ahriman had assigned one thousand deevs to fight against him. Forty years after his death a tree sprang from a certain portion or relic of his body, and bore for fruit, according to one passage, ten varieties of human beings; but according to the principal account it was in some way transformed into two — Meshia and Meshiane, the first man and woman. Ormazd promised to receive them at last into heaven if they would faithfully keep the law and not trust or worship the deevs; but those evil genii came

and brought them fruit and persuaded them to eat. By this act of transgression they fell from their high estate, and all lost its peculiar advantages. For a long time they picked up a precarious subsistence by following the chase, and clothed themselves with the skins of the animals they caught. At the end of fifty years, Meshiane had a pair of twins, a boy and a girl, and subsequently seven similar pairs. The first parents died at the age of one hundred. No history is given of any but a single couple of their children — Siahmak and Veshak. These became the parents of a pair of twins, from whom in turn sprang fifteen pairs of twins the progenitors of as many races of men. No one will fail to recognise in all this, snatches of Jewish and Christian dogmas travestied and mingled with old myths that had undergone a gradual degradation by having a literal meaning forced upon their symbolic language. The idea that these points of resemblance, and a great number of others, were borrowed by Jew or Christian from the Persian is excluded by the single fact that the books which embody them were all composed several hundred years after the establishment of Christianity, and the Boundehesh, the principal one, not until the religion of Jesus had been published in the East and in the West seven hundred years.

The Minokhired and the Boundehesh attempt to account more particularly for the existence of evil by asserting that Ormazd and Ahriman entered into a covenant in the beginning which was to extend to nine thousand years, the total duration of the world. During that time Ormazd, although otherwise possessing the power, could not destroy Ahriman or his works on account of his promise; but why he ever made such a compact with the Evil One is, of course, not very clearly explained. But for the first three thousand years Ormazd and his works were to be undisturbed; this was the Eden time, or golden age of the world — in the Boundehesh the three thousand years of creation. During the second similar period good and evil were to be freely mingled together. This is the time of actual history. For the last three thousand years Ahriman was to reign unrestrained; and this period corresponded to the "*Messiah's woes*," and "time of great tribulation," expected in the last days by the Jews and Christians.[78] At the end of the

[78] Matt. xxv. Luke xxi. Rev. viii. to the end of the book. See

nine thousand years Ormazd was to assume the supreme power and subdue all things to himself. There was yet another doctrine held by a heterodox sect, the Zervanites, connected with Zervana and the Chaldean Astrology. According to this opinion the whole duration of the world was to be divided into twelve periods of one thousand years each, and each chiliad governed by one of the signs of the zodiac.[79]

The account which we shall now give of the last times is from the Boundehesh, and as far as practicable in the very words of that book. Near the end of the nine thousand years three important personages are to appear, Oshedarbami, Oshedar-mah, and Sosyans or Sosiosh. Of these Sosiosh, the Parsee Messiah, is the greatest, and has power over the resurrection. The other two are but his forerunners, and correspond to the Isaiah and Jeremiah of the fourth book of Ezra, the Moses and Elias of the talmudic tracts Debarim Rabba and Midrash Tanchuma, or the Elias and Messiah, son of Joseph, of the Pesikta Sotarta.[80] In either case it is but a rough copy of a Jewish doctrine. The three are represented as sons of Zoroaster, yet not to be born until near the end of the world, and then to be born of three virgins. It is foreign to our purpose to examine minutely the circumstances and physiological doctrines which reconcile these seeming inconsistencies. Oshedarbami is to appear during the last millennium and make the sun stand still ten days and nights; and in his days the second-quarter of the human race will be converted to the Law. Oshedar-mah will come four hundred years later, and will stop the sun twenty days and nights. The third-fourth of the world will be converted, and mankind will cease to eat of ordinary food, but will live on the spontaneous fruits of the earth and on milk. They will next abandon these and only drink water. Sosiash will make his appearance in the last year of the world, during which people will neither eat nor die. The sun will be arrested thirty days, and the rest of mankind converted. "After that Sosiosh will cause the

the Jewish authorities collected in Gfrörer's Geschichte des Urchristenthums II. 225 and following.

[79] Spiegel's Avesta ii. 218. [80] Id ii. 229 &c., Ghillany's Mesnchenopfer 553, Malachi iv. 5, Matt. xi. 14, xvii. 10, Mark vii. 15, ix. 12, Luke i. 17, John i, 21, 25.

dead to live, as it is said; Zoroaster asked Ormazd, saying: 'The wind scattereth the body, the water carrieth it away, how then shall it be restored? how shall the dead arise?' Ormazd made answer: 'I am he who hath established the starry heaven in celestial space, whose office is to reveal its light from afar. It is by me that the earth is established the earth whereon walketh the Lord of the world. I make the light of sun, moon and stars shine through the clouds. I have created the seed corn, which, falling into the earth, groweth anew, multiplying abundantly.[81]——I have created man whose eye seeth, whose life is in his breath; when he ariseth none can overcome him by force. Let the Wicked One appear and try to effect a resurrection. In vain would be his efforts. He could reanimate nothing. Yet surely shall thine eye see all things live anew. And when the resurrection shall have once taken place, there will be no need of a second; for then shall the glorified earth bring forth the trees, the fire, the water, the blood, the bones, the skin, the life, as at the Creation.'"

"Kaiomorts shall arise first, then Meshia and Meshiane, and after them, the rest of mankind. In fifty-seven years shall all the dead arise and re-appear upon the earth. The faithful and the unbeliever, each shall arise in the same manner; their souls first, then their bodies, scattered through the whole world, in the same order as they had been created.[82] Then one will recognize another and say: 'This is my father, this is my mother, — my brother, my wife — lo these are my neighbors, those my friends.' Then shall appear upon the earth the assembly of all the creatures of the world together with man. In that assembly each one will see the good or evil he may have done, and be consoled or ashamed accordingly. The unbeliever will appeal to the just man, and say: 'When I was in the world, why did you not teach me to act with uprightness? It is because you did not instruct me that I am excluded from the company of the blest.'"

"Then the faithful will be separated from the unbelievers. The just shall be conducted to heaven, the unbelievers, cast again into hell. Three days and nights they will be tormented in body and soul, while the righteous in heaven partake of all the joys of the blest." But Persian saints

[81] 1 Cor. xv. 37. [82] Ibid, verse 23.

when beatified, have still some feelings of humanity; and so the faithful will weep over the unbelievers, and these for themselves; for the believing father will have an unbelieving son, and of two sisters the one will be faithful and the other infidel. Then a comet will strike the earth, and by its heat the ores in the mountain mines will be melted and flow down like a river. All the race of man will pass through that fiery stream. On the righteous it will have no effect, but will purify the wicked from their sins; and all will be alike pure and excellent. The dark stream will roll on, washing out hell itself, and making it a fruitful land. Ahriman and his deevs will be regenerated, and men, angels, and converted devils will unite in hymns of common adoration. Ormazd, having brought all things to perfection, will create no more. There will be no more evil or pain, the blest will do no more servile labor, but continue in holiness and peace and happiness forever more. And with this sublime scene the curtain falls, and the vision of the eternal world is closed. S. R.

Art. II.

Limitations of Human Nature as an Authority in Religious Doctrine.

Our confidence in the stability of essential Universalism is never stronger than when we reflect on its unequivocal appeal in behalf of human nature. Whatever theoretical difficulties may be involved in its defence, (and every human interpretation of Christianity must be conceded to involve difficulties of some sort or other) it is to us a real satisfaction, that its defenders are never driven to the necessity of vilifying God's image in man. Grant that it may be a difficult question (and we presume that no one will deny that in some respects the question is difficult) to determine with completeness what human nature is; grant that it is a perplexing task to discriminate between what is the essen-

tial soul, and what its incidental accompaniments; grant that the genuine affirmations of the soul on the one hand, and its utterances under perversion and the influence of tradition on the other hand, are not always clearly distinguishable; still, it gives us great comfort to know, that in all particulars in which the essential nature of the soul is unquestionable, Universalism is never forced to dispute, evade, or modify its averments.

With orthodoxy, we hardly need say the case is different. Its whole literary history is a dogmatic crusade, direct or indirect, upon the nature of man. The instincts of the soul have been traduced persistently and systematically from the very advent of the theology which enunciates the dogma of endless sin and suffering. We need not say that every cause naturally strives to break down the witnesses who testify most strongly against it. No fact of history is more palpable than that orthodoxy and human nature are irreconcilable foes. Mr. Mansel's masterly and learned sophistry in proof of the incompetency of reason to testify aught on the subject of Christian doctrine (a sophistry which, in its lauddable aim to shield Christianity from the assaults of infidelity, has, in effect, conceded everything to the infidel) would never have been written, had not the despairing call of Calvinistic theology, to invalidate the testimony of reason, been imperative. In Mr. Mansel's Limits of Religious Thought, we reach a land-mark in the career of the self-styled evangelical creed; and the fact stands confessed: *If human nature stands, the creed of orthodoxy falls.* Regarding human nature as the work of God, and so deeming its genuine testimony as the voice of God, we can harbor no doubt as to the issue. And we repeat, it is to us a source of profound satisfaction, that Universalist interpretations of the Gospel have never involved the necessity of resisting or even modifying the testimony of the human soul in things sacred. And we think the time has fully come when we may rest in the proposition: *If human nature stands, essential Universalism has an indestructible basis, and cannot be overthrown.*

But while we gladly and unequivocally acknowledge the authority of human nature in religious matters, we must be careful to remember that much room remains for discrimination. We are not to assume that because the spiritual na-

ture of man is a legitimate witness in matters of Christian doctrine, its authority is therefore unrestricted. Possibly the sphere within which it gives testimony is limited. Possibly it is but one out of many witnesses, having coördinate, but not paramount authority. In the more complicated cases tried before judicial bodies, it seldom happens that any one witness has knowledge of all the points on which evidence is demanded. One witness, it may be, testifies on a matter of locality; another settles a question of date or identity; another recollects important particulars in a conversation to which he was accidentally an ear witness; and other persons give various items of information bearing more or less directly on the great question at issue. It is frequently the case, that no one of the many persons brought on to the witness-stand, if considered alone, could give the requisite evidence to determine the whole question. The final agreement is built upon an aggregate of testimony—an aggregate in which all the particulars so blend one with another, so converge upon a single point as to induce conviction and secure the true verdict. May it not be similar in the matter of Christian theology? May not *this* rest upon the conjoined and blending testimony of many witnesses, each one testifying within a limited sphere, and no one, if considered by itself alone, sufficient to justify rational conviction? May it not be that Christian theology is a system, that its constituent elements come from divers sources; *one* of which sources is the rational, moral and religious nature of man?

Assuming, as we shall do, the authority of the soul in matters of religion, we may still consider such questions as these: Is the testimony of this soul negative, by virtue of which we may be assured of the falsity of certain theological dogmas? or, is it positive, by virtue of which certain points are specifically determined to be truths? or, is its testimony both negative and positive? Is the negative authority of the soul so complete that every false notion may be tested by it? or, is this power of repudiation limited to a class of errors? In its positive testimony does it originate theological ideas, or only confirm ideas originating elsewhere? or, does it originate in some particulars and simply confirm in others? It will be seen that these are legitimate and important questions; and we trust that they sufficiently

explain our statement, that, conceding the fact of the authority of human nature in the things of religion, great room remains for careful discrimination.

As we read the writings of those who confidently and, as we think, justly make their appeal to the authoritative soul, we still feel that there is a general lack of the discrimination which we have now explained. It has seemed to us that modern theology, even as set forth by our favorite authors, is too much a jumble,—intuitions, facts of revelation, and the deductions of reason huddled together, instead of being assorted, and put into their logical relations. Our theology, considered as an aggregate of items, is needlessly confused. It ought to exist in our understandings as a system, in which each part has its true place, and is viewed in its true relations with all the other parts. And particularly as respects what is contributed by the soul in its authoritative character, we ought to determine, as far as we may be able to do, *precisely what*, and only what, comes from this source; in what condition it comes; and how it blends with these portions which may be presumed to have a specifically different origin. Let us hasten to say, that to determine those important questions is by no means our present intention. Such a labor would require volumes; even were we competent to execute so great a task, the undertaking could hardly be commenced within the narrow limits of an essay. It will be something, however, if we succeed in calling attention to the necessity of such a work—if we can, in any degree, with even a small number of minds, awaken a consciousness of the need. Meanwhile we will endeavor to give, in a small way, and by introducing a simple analysis, a *specimen* illustration of the work which it will rejoice us to see done better, and on a scale somewhat proportioned to the importance of the general theme.

Our special purpose now is to determine the limits within which human nature is an authority in religious doctrine. The mere statement of such a purpose implies the existence of elements in religious doctrine, which do not at least *originate* with human nature. Let it then be our first task to determine the specific sources of the several elements of truth, which, when systematically combined, make a theology. We shall not here attempt a very minute analysis of the contents of theology; for this would lead us into a field of

inquiry far beyond the space now at our command. Let a simple and somewhat general classification suffice as a specimen of the greater work, which the full importance of the subject would justify.

There are, then, at least three distinct kinds of matter in every theological scheme, namely: Intuitions, Facts of Revelation, and Inferences drawn either from intuitions or revealed facts. A word of each class in its order.

Intuitions are those first truths which are given as elementary by the nature of man under the stimulus of the proper occasion. Such, for example, are the axioms of mathematics, perceptions of the necessary relations of space and time, self-existence, the fundamentals of right, of obligation and of worship. The distinctive mark of intuitive matter is, that it is given outright, is elementary—admitting of no analysis, and, as self-authenticated, cannot be proved by appeal to anything prior to itself.

Facts of Revelation are those truths which are given by inspiration, in that special and restricted sense, which distinguishes it from any gift inherent in man. Such are those moral and spiritual truths contained in the Bible which are presumed to be beyond the perception of unaided reason; and particularly such matters as come in the words and example of Jesus of Nazareth.

But the logical faculty takes up alike the facts of intuition and of revelation, and educes therefrom doctrinal inferences. In this process, though nothing is added to the substance of theology, important additions are made in the way of form. What is primitively chaotic assumes relations—what comes at first isolated is seen in its sequences and grows into a system; and the mind, instead of holding an aggregate of items, sees in them an organic unity—each part sustaining a vital connection with all the parts, and in the various relations of dependence and of mutual affiliation.

Now taking into the account this simple analysis (the correctness of which, as far as it goes, will not, we presume, be questioned), saying nothing of the various sub-divisions into which it would be easy to classify the several matters, it is obvious that human nature cannot be an *unqualified and unrestricted* authority in every particular of religious doctrine. Its authority in matters which it originates must of course be direct and positive—in a way and to an extent in which

it cannot authenticate matters which originate at a different source. It is therefore a primary question of our present discussion, What elements in religious doctrines does the human soul *contribute?*

The general answer to the question here propounded, is sufficiently obvious. The soul contributes certain of its *intuitions* (whatever these may be) to the common stock of elementary religious matter. These intuitions are *known* facts—known in the strictest sense in which the word knowledge can have a meaning. Revealed facts, in so far as they depend upon evidence external to man—in so far as they require testimony addressed *to*, and not coming *from*, man—in so far as any flaw in the chain of testimony can render the facts uncertain—cannot come to man as absolutely known. They may command his belief, and this to an extent so great as *practically* to amount to knowledge; yet speculatively they can never, and very seldom practically, be averred with that absolute certainty which characterizes facts strictly known. The soul is therefore an authority in the intuitional matter of religious doctrine in a much higher sense in which it can be an authority over revealed matter.

Again; that element of doctrine which is denominated *Inferential* cannot find its authority in human nature, in the more restricted sense of the word. Inferences may be educed alike from the facts of intuition and also of revelation. So far as they are educed from revealed data, they of course involve necessarily all the uncertainty which pertains to those data—an uncertainty which speculatively *must*, and practically, generally does, pertain to whatever rests upon testimony external to man. The authority of human nature over its own contributions, its own intuitions, it must all along be remembered, is direct, absolute, and without appeal. And this unqualified authority, we have seen, it cannot have over facts strictly within the province of revelation; nor, by consequence, over the inferences of which such facts are the data.

But how is it with regard to those inferences which are educed from the facts of intuition? As respects these, the soul's authority, as we have seen, is absolute; is not the authority the same as regards the inferences of which intuitional facts are the data? To this question, if we view it in

any *practical* light, the answer is plainly in the negative. We must keep in mind, that when we speak of inferences, as elements of religious doctrine, we are not speaking of such as are *absolutely* logical, but of such as the human intellect, in the best use of its logical faculties, *may be able* to educe. The distinction here is unequivocal. We know that there is such a thing as the logical faculty; we concede that in the skilful use of this faculty, conclusions have been educed worthy of being called demonstrations. Yet we never concede a demonstration to be absolutely, unqualifiedly such. We never concede infallibility to any *process* of the finite intellect—never concede absolute certainty to any result of such a process. From data absolutely known, and absolutely known to be *all* the data belonging to the question, the conclusion, *if absolutely logical*, is undoubtedly absolutely certain. But the finite intellect when engaged upon real subject matter, cannot claim to be *absolutely* logical—cannot claim that it has not erred in the process—in short, cannot claim infallibility.

The distinction on which we insist is that between logic itself and any finite specimen of the use of logic as applied to a real question. Take for illustration the abstract syllogism—the syllogysm as disconnected from any real problem. Thus: Every A is B; C is A; *therefore* C is B.

In this example, there can be no question that human nature is as absolute an authority for the conclusion, C is B, as for the two propositions,—A is B, C is A,—which are its data. The testimony of the logical faculty as respects the inference, is as direct, as unequivocal, and as final, as the testimony of the intuitional faculty to either or both of the propositions which, as data for the inference, may be supposed to be within the province of this faculty. But in place of the abstract syllogism, if we substitute a corresponding solution of an actual problem; if in place of the two abstract premises, we have two special affirmations; so that the conclusion, instead of being virtually stated, must be *evolved* by an intellectual *process*, the case presents a different aspect. It may happen that in one or both of the premises, we have intuitional matter—unequivocally such, so that it may be said to be *known* in the strictest use of the term; but it will never happen where an intellectual process is involved—at least outside of the exact sciences—

(and religious doctrine is of course outside of these) that the conclusion will be equally, that is absolutely, certain. In the abstract syllogism reason *sees* the relation of premise and consequent—sees this as directly and absolutely, as the understanding sees the facts stated in the premises; but in the actual solution, the case rightly supposes that the conclusion is not an object of *sight* but of *deduction*—is not directly and absolutely affirmed by *reason*, but mediately reached by an act of *reasoning*. And it is in this act of reasoning, as distinct from an affirmation of reason, that the fallibility of man is pre-eminently obvious, and universally conceded.

We cannot therefore speak of any logical conclusion as resting upon the *authority* of human nature. For though in innumerable cases, the approach to certainty in logical deductions is so near as practically to amount to certainty,—and, in point of fact, we every day trust our lives and the lives of those dearest to us to a logical deduction,—yet speculatively, absolute certainty cannot be affirmed of any proposition wrought out by human reasoning. The term authority, as affirmed of human nature, has no application to matters of the truth of which uncertainty is even conceivable; and we rob the term of its special and distinctive force if we give it a wider latitude of signification.

The general conclusion, then, which we reach may be stated thus: Human nature is the authority for the validity of its own intuitions; for those elements in religious doctrine which, as its intuitions, it has contributed; for of these intuitions, of these elements of doctrine, it has direct, absolute knowledge; and while human nature is not, strictly speaking, an authority for its beliefs, it is authority for what it knows. If, therefore, there is in our religious doctrine, matters specially revealed, and requiring external evidence,—for such matter the soul is not an authority. Again, if in our religious doctrine, there is matter which our reasoning has evolved—no matter whether from intuitional or from revealed data,—over this matter human nature is not authority, in any proper use of the term.

While, however, the authority of the soul of man is thus restricted from certain revealed matters, and from all the results of reasoning, it does not follow that such authority is restricted to the intuition it directly contributes. It will presently appear, we trust, that beyond the intuitions direct-

ly contributed, there are at least two spheres in which human nature may speak with authority—that strict authority which admits of no appeal.

First of these we may distinguish that authority which is simply negative. In this act of the soul, though no substance of truth is brought into, or even secured within, the mind, serious errors are *kept out*. Though in certain cases the soul may be unable to ascertain what the special truth is, or where to find it, in every case where special dogmas are brought into direct contact with it, the soul may absolutely know, and authoritatively affirm, what is *not* true.

We do not forget that this is a disputed point. We are aware that orthodoxy, commonly so called, systematically denies the right of the soul to resist any dogma coming to it with the apparent sanction of external evidence. A recent school of Calvinistic theologians, of whom Mr. Mansel is the great leader, make this their distinctive tenet—the incompetency of human nature to pronounce aught against dogmas assumed to rest on certain extrinsic testimony. And we are not disposed to deny the plausibility with which this tenet is argued, especially by the author of The Limits of Religious Thought. Yet are we confident that such extreme ground is taken, only because a desperate cause compelled it. An absurd theory can rest only on assumptions equally absurd.

It is a significant fact, that outside of theology no one would pretend to make a similar assault upon the integrity of the soul of man. No theory of philosophy, of politics, of anything, religion alone accepted, could find one intelligent devotee, if formally as well as in fact, maintained in opposition to acknowledged human instincts. Arguments and external evidence to prove that two added to two make five, though ever so specious could not weigh with any well-organized mind. No canon of criticism in the department of thought, of literature, of art, would be deemed worthy of notice, if acknowledged to be in conflict with the known laws of human intelligence and taste. No outward authority could impose doggerel rhymes as poetry on any person in whom the poetic sensibility is at all vivid. The noise accompanying the grating of a file will never be acknowledged as

music, let the argument therefor rest upon any conceivable evidence.

In all of the matters named, the inherent faculties of the soul are assumed—assumed as a *matter of course*—to have a final and absolute authority, so far at least as to pronounce against whatever dogmas are set up in defiance of them. And shall not the moral and spiritual faculties be conceded to have equal dignity? Shall they alone, of all the endowments of human nature, be subjected to outrage—forced to accept and to foster what is intrinsically hateful to them? We, at least, cannot appreciate the wisdom of that philoso phy, which dares not thwart the instincts of man's musical faculty, while it presumes to trample with impunity upon the far nobler powers which indentify the soul as the image of the Creator. With great confidence, therefore, we claim for human nature an unlimited negative authority, whereby its verdict against religious dogmas is conclusive, and admits of no appeal.

We come now, in the second place, to specify another particular in which human nature has a rightful authority in religious doctrine. We take it that all will concede, that there are in the Scriptures at last two widely distinct classes of facts. One class embraces facts of a historical, biographical, and a local character. It is clear that these must rest entirely upon external proofs. Human nature has no positive authority over them whatever. Another class embraces facts of an essentially spiritual nature; facts which appeal directly to the human soul—we mean in the sense of meeting and satisfying inherent spiritual wants. Now human nature has a positive authority over such facts, in the sense of *confirming* them.

That the Bible does reveal facts of this nature will, we suppose, be promptly conceded by every person who believes in revelation at all. These facts are not intuitions; for they have been brought *to*, not given *by*, the spiritual nature. And yet they do not wholly depend upon the authority of external evidence; for though revealed by a process external to the soul, they are, as soon as appreciated, sanctioned by the soul, and henceforth may be said to rest upon its authority. When the young tree is transplanted, it will first require external props to sustain it against the fury of the wind. But in due time the roots strike into the congenial soil, put

the tree in vital contact therewith, and this force strengthening with its growth, the tree is finally able to stand by its own strength, and so discard the assistance of artificial support. So a doctrine which the soul could not originate, comes to it, at first, as something foreign to it. For the time, it can be held in human belief only by the artificial support of an outward authority. But soon it sinks its roots into the spiritual nature, finds there a congenial soil, an organic, living union is effected; and so, in time, the revealed fact comes to rest in this interior confirmation as its authoritative basis.

The result to which our present investigation has led us, may be succinctly summed up as follows: Human nature in matters of religion is authoritative,—

First, over its own intuitions which it directly contributes to the substance of doctrine;—

Secondly, over all revealed spiritual truths, which, though not intuitions, and not within the soul's power to originate, human nature has nevertheless grown to appreciate, and hence to confirm—thus finally becoming the support of truths, which, at first, it could receive only on external authority;—and,

Thirdly, over all dogmas which are palpably and directly at war with the soul—over these in the negative sense of pronouncing them false, and this without appeal.

Looking next at the limitations of this religious authority, we reach the following results:—

First, Human nature has no authority over any of the facts of Scripture which do not appeal directly to it, in the sense of meeting inherent wants (such for example, as local and narrative facts); which therefore rest entirely and always upon external testimony;—nor

Secondly, over any of the intrinsically spiritual truths of Scripture, until the period of inner growth is reached, when these truths are appreciated and so apprehended as truths—prior to which period, such truths depend upon external testimony; nor

Thirdly, over any of those portions of religious doctrine which are inferential in their character — having been evolved by the logical faculty from data either intuitional or revealed.

In stating this summary we may add, that every possible scheme of Christian doctrine, must be made up, in large measure, of the three kinds of matter enumerated as without the province of the soul's authority. Hence we may claim that the analysis we have given exhibits the necessity of that careful discrimination in appealing to this authority which we announced at the outset of our inquiry.

An application of the leading results, now summed up, to the contents of Christian theology, would lead us into a large field of thought, and demand a very special and extended inquiry. Yet as without the addition of something in this direction, our labor must seem extremely bald, we shall present a few specimen particulars of such an application, with a view to greater clearness, if not comprehensiveness. Our analysis of religious doctrine has presented for elementary matters: 1. Spiritual intuitions; 2. Facts of revelation appealing directly to the soul; 3. Facts of revelation having no direct application to the soul; 4. Inferential matter logically educed. We will now specify a few particulars of these several kinds of doctrinal matter.

The being of God, the soul's immortality, the fundamental laws of right and obligation, and a sense of dependence on a higher power, may be named as among the soul's intuitions. None of these truths can be proved by *a priori* argument; they are all gloriously confirmed by *a posteriori* argument. It is now agreed on nearly all hands that man being naturally religious must necessarily have a religion;—not merely be capable of having but *actually have* a religion. But it is impossible to conceive of a religion, no matter what its form, that does not substantially include the four particulars named; and to say that man naturally has (as distinct from being capacitated to have) these particular truths, is but another way of saying that these truths are intuitions. Of course, it will not be said that we are indebted to revelation for facts which were in the world ages before there was a Bible; and which are still accepted, in some form or other, in regions of the globe where no knowledge of the Bible as yet exists. We must add, that we here use the revelation in the restricted sense already explained—as expressing the fact of a *special* communication of truths by means distinct from the natural operation of the inherent power of man.

As a matter of valuable instruction, and as tending to fortify and consolidate religious convictions, it is well to present the numberless *a posteriori* sanctions of the doctrine of God, of the fact of immortality, and of moral responsibility. But, strictly speaking, *proof* of them is not needed. The soul knows them, will never be robbed of them, will forever assert them. Keep the soul pure, and doubt on these fundamental doctrines will be as unnatural, as doubt of the existence of sunlight in a cloudless day to a person whose vision is clear. We apprehend that our statement here would not be called in question, if the distinction was observed between the truths named considered as elementary on the one hand, and as held in concrete relations on the other. The Indian's notion of deity, the Mahometan's notion of paradise, and the Tartar's notion of duty, are not intuitions, are not elementary, are, we may assume, not true. In each case the notion is not simple — various elements are compounded with the intuition. But eliminate these other elements, and determine that which is the nucleus with which the several matters composing the notion have been compounded, and *this* will be, in the nature of the case it cannot otherwise than be, a primative fact, or intuition.

2. That God sustains a paternal relation to man; that his providence watches over him for good; that chastisement is salutary; and that the Divine purpose includes the greatest good of all souls, — these are facts of revelation. Whether or not revelation, in the enunciation of them, has anticipated the intuitional faculty, or has proclaimed things beyond the power of human nature ever to have discovered, may be a question. Yet the historical fact stands, that they have been specially revealed, and therefore are not to be classed as intuitions. Yet they speak directly to the human heart; they meet intrinsic wants; and the spiritual nature, when it shall have reached a certain stage of culture, and a certain degree of vision, will apprehend them as truths, and ever after sustain them by its own authority. Of course, all that we thus state will not be obvious to every person. We can only express our confidence in the position we thus assume; and leave it with those whose spiritual experience best qualifies them to determine the question.

3. We believe, on the authority of the Scripture, that there was such a person as Jesus of Nazareth; that he spoke sub-

stantially the words recorded by the Evangelists; that he was crucified by unbelieving Jews; and that he rose from the dead. For the truth of these facts, human nature can be no authority. There is nothing in instinct or reason to identify these as facts. They rest wholly and forever upon external evidence. To us the evidence is satisfactory; it compels our belief. The Scriptures contain numerous facts kindred with these. They all have a place in Christian theology; but the authority on which they rest is not inherent in man.

4. The numerous instances of wise and benevolent adaptation in the world of mind and of matter; the primary facts given outright by the awakened soul; the revelations of divine wisdom and love given through the mouths of prophets, evangelists, and apostles; more particularly the words and the life of Jesus, — all furnish the human reason with abundant material out of which religious convictions may be wrought. The possession of these valid truths leads us to attribute to the Creator a vast plan, whereby all experiences and all events are made to contribute to a common issue, in which the highest good of every human soul shall be forever secured. The progress of the world, "the logic of history," the lessons of individual experience, the clear intimations of providence, all blend in the development of a system of faith the central promise of which is the ultimate regeneration of all the souls that God has made. To us, the same promise is clearly expressed in revelation, and we can rejoice in it on the strength of that authority. It finds a confirmation in the aspirations and yearnings of our spiritual nature; and on this foundation the promise can securely rest. But, so far as it is a deduction of our reason, we will only say, that we firmly believe in it — we will not claim for it, *as deduced*, an absolute certainty — by no means the authority of human nature.

In conclusion, we will add, that in every sense in which human nature is an authority, that authority, with us at least, is *final* — the word implies as much as this. Hence, we affirm, that no creed, no dogma, no interpretation of Scripture, which does palpable violence to our spiritual instincts, is entitled to our belief; and that, too, no matter by what external authority it may *seem* to be supported. Concede for argument's sake (what, in point of fact, we do by

no means concede), that the last verse in the twenty-fifth chapter of Matthew, that the verses which speak of the Sin against the Holy Ghost, that the account of the Rich Man and Lazarus, and any number of other Scripture passages, — concede that these *seem* to teach the dogmas of a vindictive God, of a personal Devil, of total depravity, and of endless sin and suffering; concede for argument's sake, that we are utterly unable, by our exegetical skill, to resist these interpretations of Scripture; what then? We answer, these dogmas are loathesome to the soul which God has made — are at war with every divine instinct, with every spiritual aspiration and desire; and hence are repudiated by an authority which is final — are declared false by a verdict, the correctness of which no conceivable form of external evidence has the right to question.

Understand, the conclusion is not that these several Scriptures are untrue — nothing of the kind. The conclusion is, that as all human interpretation is universally conceded to be fallible, and so may mistake in the instances of interpretation under notice, the falsity of the interpretation must be *assumed* — assumed, no matter how futile all critical skill may be to discover in what the falsity consists. The interpretation, by the concession of all, *may* be false — the voice of the soul, which is the voice of God himself, cannot be false.

We should do violence to our feeling in this connection, did we fail to state, that, in point of fact, none of the Scriptures specially referred to trouble us on even exegetical grounds. The fallacy of the interpretations which have become traditional, is to us palpable in every instance. No dogma which violates our moral and spiritual sense, even seems to have the warrant of Scripture. Reason, the soul and revelation, all blend harmoniously, and by concurrent voice proclaim doctrines which honor God and glorify man. But, as matter of supposition, if in any instance an interpretation of Scripture seemingly obvious — irresistable as seen in the light of all available critical skill — does unequivocal violence to the spiritual instincts of our being, our course is plain. We shall concede the truth of the Scripture, and *assume* — in the exercise of the spiritual prerogative inherent within us, *authoritatively* assume — that the interpretation must be false which dishonors the Bible, and outrages the image of God in man. G. H. E.

Art. III.

A Preacher on Preaching.

A lively pen-painter or critic, L. Bungener, in one of his vivacious books, has portrayed a scene that stands in the imagination invested with dramatic interest. The enterprising Frenchman has not adhered to the literal verity of history, in the event he describes; but the heroic fidelity, attributed to the central personage, radiates an inspiration that justifies the poetic license. The scene is located in the Royal Chapel at Versailles, where, on a certain good Friday, Bourdaloue—then in the meridian of his great fame—is about to deliver a searching sermon before Louis XIV. It has been rumored throughout the Court, that this sermon is charged with some special amunition, to be aimed at the royal conscience; and the auditory palpitate with reasonable excitement. In order to appreciate the anxious interest gathering around the event, it is necessary to consider, in the first place, that Louis XIV. is a most imperious, despotic, and licentious Sovereign. He rules with an iron sceptre, and there are few that can face his frown. His immoralities are the scandal of European society; and the license of the monarch scorns decorum and defies rebuke. The preachers share the servility of the Court; wink at the king's vices; and refresh the royal person with showers of flattery whenever he is pleased to listen to their florid eloquence. What man, then, dare rise above the obsequious monotone of adulation, and launch the terrors of truth upon this crowned sinner? What man dare lay his hand upon the sacred ermine of Etiquette, rend asunder the imposing pageantry of Versailles, and reveal the judgments of God silently marshalled round the haughtiest throne in Christendom? Bourdaloue is the man for the occasion. Not that *he* has been guiltless of adulation: he has flattered the pride of the king, and soothed his conscience, agreeably to the bare fashion of the day. It is pleasant to please the royal patron; to have one's genius nourished in the glass-house of court favor; to see brave knights, bronzed in the storm of battle, surrender

to the charms of rhetoric; and to receive notes from the fairest lilies of France applauding the eloquence that never made them ashamed of their sins. But how does the King of kings regard the sycophancy that shelters the royal beast from the thunders of his Word? It is this pertinent query that troubles the popular preacher. His mind is agitated by conflicting impulses. He dreads to rasp his tender reputation upon that rough imperious will; and he fears, also, to ignore longer the obvious requirement of God. Before entering the pulpit, he commits to memory two perorations — one, laudatory and faithless; the other, pungent and terrible — being unable to decide *which* the occasion will call forth. The monarch sits with clouded brow. The courtiers are hushed in breathless expectation. The preacher's brain burns with excitement, as he reaches the line where he must *decide* whether he will please God or the king. The stringency of the crisis suspends his breath. There is an instant's pause,— a final conflict between interest and duty. Now, his head is raised in triumphant resolution; his voice resounds like a trumpet; his burning glance darts its fervid lightnings on the king, and the sovereignty of righteousness grapples with the sovereignty of the sceptre. The conscience of the great Bourbon responds to the minister of heaven. Pale, confounded, and self-condemned, the haughty sinner bends in momentary contrition, and suffers the magnanimity of the prince to plead for the virtue of the preacher.

This scene—so impressive to the imagination, and so consistent with the proper dignity of the pulpit—serves well to introduce the observations we propose to make on Preaching. Indeed, this picture of Bourdaloue rebuking in public the greatest monarch of his age, suggests the first consideration we desire to present—namely, the fidelity the preacher is obligated to manifest.

In assuming his office, he makes a solemn engagement to announce God's law, and to communicate the Divine will, irrespective of human favor. Speaking the truth in love, and blending the humanity of the servant with the authority of the Master, he is not to esteem the favor of men any farther than that may be consistent with the approval of God. He is, primarily, in God's employment, ordained to make known his pleasure, to vindicate his law, to obey the

incentives of his spirit, to apply his truth to the various needs of his people; and, by these instrumentalities, to aid in creating a kingdom of practical righteousness in human society, to be expanded, in due time, round the world, and to become the paramount authority of mankind. Now, where the pleasure of God is matched with the toleration of men, the preacher has, what would be esteemed in the judgment of this world at least, "a goodly heritage." But how much more frequently must it come to pass, that the Divine will — which the preacher represents — and the will of men, are displayed in open opposition. So long as he confines his discussion to the abstract region of the *credenda*, the hostility of the heavenly and the human may be veiled in the mists of speculation; but when the regenerating word enters the better defined sphere of the *agenda*, the preacher may expect either passionate protests from wilful supporters of wrong, or an overwhelming effusion of the Holy Spirit, bearing down opposition in the force of conviction.

Some social wrong is being meditated; somebody's self-interest is choking a public good; truth is down in the street, and the mob are pelting it with sophistries. There is nothing surprising in this emergency; for we all confess that evil is yet in the ascendent; that men are passionate, impulsive, selfish and unjust; and that even the best sometimes go astray. The preacher looks out upon the scene; apprehends the state of the case, or believes that he does; and his conscience impels him to declare what God's law and the truth of Christ have to do with these things. He may err, in the opportunity he selects, and in the spirit he manifests; for he is fallible, and must act under human limitations. But he is as liable to be correct — to apprehend the business in its proper relations, and to discuss it with discretion — as those who are mining in the dark for gain, or casting the horoscope of ambition in the political sky.

The *office* of the preacher, as the expositor of Divine truth, and the herald of the Divine kingdom, brings him into *collision* with the passions and interests of the world. Whenever an issue is raised between the eternal truths and some lying tradition; between the eternal justice and some ruffainly wrong; between the eternal purity and some scandalous license — *he* must either desert his colors, and commit

treason against Almighty God, or put himself into an attitude of hostility toward those who are leagued with the interest and passion of the hour. Here is a *dilemma* in which every preacher is *liable* to be placed. Then comes a struggle that tries the fibre of his moral nature and decides whether he is qualified to become a standard-bearer of the Lord, or only a tool of popular caprice. Those who are pelting truth, or putting out the eyes of righteousness, will find leisure to instruct a Christian man how to preach the Gospel. No professor of moral science will be found so eager to instruct the preacher as those whose most intimate relation to the Christian religion is that of a pressing *need* of it, — those who would have the word of God dodge and double, tack and scud, and by all means *avoid* a collision with tangible sins. Offer to attack their idols, and they rival Demetrius with their uproar. What renders the case still worse, is, that many well-disposed persons, who have no interest in Diana or in her shrines, but who have a nervous abhorrence of noise, agitation and tumult, side with the adverse party from a short-sighted love of tranquillity. Now, he who administers an anodyne is not so liable to have his fingers bitten, as he who uses a caustic; but the latter may do the patient infinitely the most good. If we must be roused out of our rest by any unseemly disturbance, we better spend our resentment upon the *disease* that makes the man restless, than turn out the *physician*, who irritated only that he might cure.

What should a preacher *do*, in such a crisis as we have supposed? "Preach the Gospel, and let disturbing questions alone." He should, indeed, preach the Gospel; but *his own conception of it* — not the Gospel as it appears after sophistry has dipped its flowing symmetry, until — like the minister's wig which had been successively trimmed by every pair of scissors in the parish — it no longer resembles anything in heaven or earth. The Gospel, primarily, is the most disturbing of all questions, for it *involves* the complete re-construction of society, on the basis of universal justice, equality and love. And the wisdom by which we pray to have it *administered*, is "first pure, then peaceable, without hypocracy and without partiality." The situation of the preacher, who feels himself summoned by his sense of duty to declare what is repungnant to many of his congregation,

is critical in the extreme. It is presumed that he loves truth and righteousness, else why is he here at all? It is presumed that he loves and reveres God, else why has he consecrated himself to this peculiar career? At the same time, he is more a *man* than a minister; and *as* a man has domestic claims to support, and social sympathies to be played upon; is susceptible to censure and applause; falls into illusions and commits errors; and wants the benefit, as much as any man, of large charity and liberal constructions. Like all men of elevated tastes, he loves tranquillity, and would not rashly provoke dissension. Like all intellectual men, he finds in society at once a solace and an inspiration, and would not needlessly forfeit the least of its privileges. How can he utter the word that will probably offend? — the word that wounds his own heart before it flies from his lips, and may rend the tent from over his head if it fail to hit the mark.

While he hesitates, all the sophistries come up and tempt him. "My dear Fanatic, bleed your conscience a little; it may be bad blood that incites you to this business." "Consider that self-preservation is the first law of nature, and that if you provoke a few men in your parish you may lose your bread and butter." "He that provides not for his own household is worse than an infidel; *can* you provide for yours, if you cease to be popular?" "We are commanded to avoid the appearance of evil; but can you obey this requirement if you drive people out of church, or provoke them to call you hard names?" From which happy specimens, it appears that the devils can reason as well as the metaphysicians, and cite Scripture as pertinently as the prince of them all did to our Lord in the wilderness.

Is it to be accounted at all surprising that so many preachers are unfaithful to the stern requirements of their office? that timidity takes counsel with expediency, and the knightly valor of Achilles, invested with a servile garb, spins out the paltry web of prudence for the traffic of the hour? Is it surprising that so many tame-spirited, lactescent ministers drone in the treadmill of church routine, and exemplify every day how the weak things of the world confound the wise, when we reflect what stupendous premiums are offered for time-servers; how the love of principle is offset against congregational patronage, and domestic comfort and social peace thrown into the scale to outweigh a trembling conscience?

Any society may secure a timid, deferential *servant*, who shall repeat the truisms of morality and the pass-word of the sect, in the dull monotone of a soul caged up from heaven's liberty; but, how much better to have a self-poised, conscientious *teacher*, whose formula of ministerial duty is not borrowed, but fashioned by his own creative instinct; and who stands, not by human sufferance only, but by a divine sanction, witnessed by personal force, influence and success. A society may find "a beloved pastor," trained in all the proprieties of clerical prudence, who holds no opinions that are not marketable, and who dares not confess what ticket he votes at the presidential poll; but is it an *automaton* that people deliberately choose, to dispense for them the mysteries of the kingdom of God? When they come to the altar of prayer, burdened with the labor of life; when they fly to the tents of faith, seeking refuge from over-mastering trouble; the only soul that can speak *effectively* for them, wisely administering the sacrament of care and sorrow, must be one in habitual alliance with the spirit of God, and in the daily exercise of that liberty which invites the expression of all its convictions.

Grant that possible abuses are involved in the freedom of pulpit utterance; they are also involved in the freedom of voting. Shall we therefore abolish the ballot box? A free government invites the notorious abuse of demagogueism; but it is better to bear with the abuse than exchange it for an Austrian police; for there grows in the land, *besides* this cumbrous weed, a superabounding affluence of social good, that no military despotism is allowed to trample out. So, a free pulpit may sometimes vex the pews; but people know that the man who stands in it is giving them his honest thought — the latest child of his wedded heart and brain; and that he confides it to their courteous hospitality, for the time being, whether they are capable of loving it or not.

We suppose that no Protestant preacher assumes infallibility, or claims to be exempt from practical errors; but it seems to us that the man who makes it the business of his life to study the Gospel, and to consider the application of moral principles to the affairs of this world, ought to be *expected* to hold clear convictions, and to announce them with boldness and energy. His very dogmatism may grow out of the fervor of his convictions; and it would be wiser to

trace the *processes* where his reason has travelled, at the lofty behest of the spirit, than rashly rebel from a *conclusion* that he may even defend with rhetoric as rough as brickbats. What we want, in the Christian churches, is *not* ductile ecclesiastics, polished up as Sunday reflectors of the average decency; but long-armed thinkers, who can reach sardonic infidelity asleep in the pew; and broad-breasted evangelists, who dare fire a celestial volley into a wicked caucus or cabinet — not fearing the stain of the powder on their raiment, so long as the *lead* carries terror into the fortress of the devil. We want, in the churches, bold men, who can face the heat of occasions, and strike when the iron is hot; loving men, who regard their congregations too tenderly to flatter their pride or foster their caprices; faithful men, who wed their faculties and their fame to the principles of Christianity, and abide whatever fortune these may involve; *consecrated* men, who — drawing their vitality from the life of God — stand on the mountain of faith like cedars, winning vigor from the tempest, and everlasting verdure from the sky.

We pass now to some remarks on the increasing demand of our time for a higher intellectual quality in preaching. There has been much said, in the spirit of complaint and in the language of satire, concerning the growing fastidiousness of congregations. People no longer go to the meeting house to worship, (it is alleged,) but to be entertained: if they miss the entertainment, they esteem themselves defrauded. They do not go to a consecrated place to confess their sins, or to join a great assembly of fervent souls in the solemn petition for broader charity and stronger faith; feeling how the silent Sabbath heaven, brooding over them, opens up to the shining thrones of saints and martyrs, and to the Eternal Majesty that crowns the pyramid of life. But they go to an ecclesiastical theatre to hear the new soprano wed the airs of the opera to the psalms of David, or to see what excitement a jaded fancy may find in the latest exhibition of a Gospel theme.

There is doubtless some ground of censure in these particulars; and yet, the evil deprecated many admit of extenuating reflections. It is undeniable that the preacher of our day addresses an audience widely different from that which

occupied the meeting house thirty years ago. At that time, there were only a few persons claiming to be *educated*, in the great mass of our congregations, or who were conscious of any standard of *taste*, by which to estimate the literary worth of a sermon. If a man spoke with fluency and earnestness, he secured the attention of his auditory. If his elocution favored the higher notes, and if he nailed a sound conclusion with a fist that might have demolished a prize fighter, he was applauded as eloquent — though the grammarian might have been as hopelessly lost in the mazes of his rhetoric, as a bewildered traveller in a tropical jungle.

These remarks would be quite misconstrued if they were suspected of undervaluing the seniors in the ministry, many of whom exhibited a grasp of intellect, a faculty for reasoning, and a knowledge both of books and men, that will not soon be either excelled or forgotten. In alluding to the comparatively crude taste of those days, one finds a more effective illustration in the ignorant ranters who won the public favor, than in the cultivated preachers who were wiser than their generation. At that time, there were but few books in general circulation, even newspapers were rare, and the popular lecture was not invented. The Sunday services, particularly the sermons, furnished about the only mental stimulus, as well as spiritual nutriment, available to the great majority of the congregation. People often went to the meeting house hungering for mental food: even a stale homily was better than no bread; and, if the doctrine was false — the premises assumed, and the conclusion hypothetical — reason enjoyed a kind of gymnastic exercise in boxing the drivelling sermon back to chaos.

All those conditions are now changed. The process of popular education has at once elevated the taste, extended the information, and augmented the mental resources, of the entire American community. We now find, in our most secluded congregations, an enlarged capacity, a more critical appreciation, and a more vigorous standard of mental excellence. Words no longer exhilarate, unless freighted with ideas, and declamation is wisely regarded as a paltry substitute for eloquence. People desire weight of thought rather than vehemence of passion, and they esteem a live heresy better than a dead truism.

Thus ministerial success is being brought, every year, to

a more vigorous ordeal. The pulpit meets a million-armed rival in the press; the preacher, a popular competitor in the perambulating lecturer. The best authors are now found in most of our homes; the best seed grain of the age, (not without a large per centage of tares, however,) is sown broadcast in the daily journals; and the leading statesmen and men of letters offer their richest thoughts, crystalized into a lecture, to the obscurest rural auditory. Since our parishes are permitted to banquet with kings, is it surprising that they esteem country ministers, like the writer of this paper, indifferent caterers? There is some difference, however, between the care required to get up a choice dinner once a year, and that which is involved in feeding a pampered household two or three times a week. It is very unfair to the preacher to compare the *sermon* which he was obliged to write in two days, and for which he is paid some ten dollars, with the *literary lecture* whose composition occupied a fortnight, and whose remuneration is counted by thousands of dollars. A series of average sermons may seem tame, compared with a series of able editorial articles; but it is only an act of justice to remember, that, while our weary brain has been drilled for the former, under numerous interruptions and deprivations, a whole staff of writers have contributed to the latter, with every aid that overflowing resources could furnish.

The advancing taste of cultivated communities seems to justify the demand for improvement in the quality of preaching. But, if the preachers yield one point, congregations should yield another. *If the* QUALITY *be enhanced, the* QUANTITY *must be diminished.* On this position we plant ourselves, before our people. We will try to improve the *color*, since you seem to require it, but we shall not give you so much *canvas*. We will weave the tissue a little more compactly, but you must not expect so many yards of cloth.

The fact is, the intellectual demand made upon preachers, by the ecclesiastical and parochial customs of this country, is out of all proportion with what is expected of other men who conjure a livelihood out of their brains. To write two sermons a week, one must compose twelve hundred pages a year, equal to two volumes of Prescott's Histories, and, if these productions range over a liberal variety of topics, and

are treated with even respectable ability, they comprise a monument of diligence that might dignify an exclusively literary career. It is said that the fame of a lawyer will grow with only one powerful plea in a year; but, unless a preacher produces at least one superior sermon a month, he will never be heard of beyond his own parish—unless the report of his *dismissal* goes further, or his name is heralded by some quack who has treated the poor man's pulmonary or bronchial difficulties. From a philosophical point of view, it is evident that a man should write only when his mind acts spontaneously, impelled by an interior force, quickened by an irrepressible vivacity. When the fluids of the brain, that turn the wheels of thought, are full to the brim, a man *writes* as he *breathes*—with a certain freedom of spirit, affluence of ideas, and felicity of expression, that form the requisite conditions of true eloquence, and blossom at the same time into the natural ornaments of style. The happiest intellectual conceptions are doubtless born of this mood, and it is as true of sermons as of any other productions, that the most favorable conditions must conspire to produce the most vigorous and vital efforts. Woe to him who must grind when the stream is dry and when the wheels are still,—who must apply the whole force of his will to the dormant mechanism of the brain,—knowing, all the while, that many will mark the crudity of his thought, but none be aware of the disadvantages under which it was elaborated. It is well known that the brain is *double;* and it has been conjectured that, while one side treasures the ideas and purposes of our wakeful life, the other aggregates and discloses the "baseless fabric" of dreams, during our sleeping hours. Perhaps we are here favored with a *clue* to the fact that so many sermons partake of the nature of *visions*, and predispose the hearers to an unconscious bowing of the head—not the infallible sign of either devoutness or assent. They were wrought out of *that side* of the brain which is devoted to dreams, and which ministers to slumber. We often expect eloquence, when the best a man can give us is *somniloquence*—because he has been cultivating the night side of his mind!

There are but few persons out of the ministry who appreciate the embarrassments, under which the preacher must often make his preparation for the pulpit. The ordinary

cares of man are his, besides some *gratuities* furnished by his peculiar profession. Of course, the sick and afflicted have claims upon him, before which all others must give way. All the *bores* that thrive by the sufferance of amiable men, quarter themselves upon his time, as lawlessly as runaways graze upon a common. There have been instances, if we are to credit parochial reminiscences, in which unpaid bills have been presented at the study door, and the ascending train of meditation brought suddenly down to the level of a grocer's account! But the Sunday draws nigh with inexorable precision, and our friendly hearers go to the meeting-house, to taste the fruit of our diligence. Happy the preacher who does not disappoint reasonable expectations; but who mounts the pulpit stair with his soul's best thought well crystalized in glowing words,—in whom the first peal of the organ, as it "launches silver music on the air," sounds the key note of a purpose tranquilly girded for the work of that solemn day.

It would be interesting to speculate on the wide diversity of tastes, dispositions, and wishes of those whom the preacher addresses. Of the hundreds who take cognizance of his words, no *two*, perhaps, are impressed precisely alike. No two occupy exactly the same *relation* to his mind. Many are occupied with things remote from the occasion, and inconsistent with the place. The measured cadences strike the ear, but do not always penetrate to the interior sense, where the word of wisdom is justified by the witness in the soul. The positive physiologists tell us where the *heart* of man lies, but we suspect that preachers do not always find it. Sometimes one must probe through hundreds of acres of real estate, or an invoice of Parisian millinery, or all the old clothes of church traditions that the Middle Ages have bequeathed, before he *finds* that vital organ whose wavering helm steers the ship of life.

The discerning philosopher, without a wink from Mephistophiles, may well marvel at the incongruous features that play under our Sunday masquerading. While the preacher repeats—"Lay not up for yourselves treasures upon earth"—the business man may be dwelling on his latest speculation. While the preacher declares—"Man shall not live by bread alone"—the epicure grows impatient for the *amen*, that he may get home to his dinner. And while resound

the monitory words—"The fashion of this world passeth away"—what secret envy of the best bonnet may occupy some female auditor, the masculine fancy dare not conjecture.

Among those most seriously disposed, what conflicting tastes there are to pacify! One hearer wants "doctrine," but five others unite in a petition for practical sermons. One admires "logic," cold and keen as a damascus blade, and thinks that people are to be got *into* the kingdom of heaven by a mathematical demonstration of the foolishness of staying *out*. Another wants the pungent gospel mollified in a solution of lubricated sentimentalism. In one pew sits a man who would metamorphose his preacher into a gladiator, and keep him perpetually fighting some theological beast. But his neighbor in the adjoining pew regards "dogmas" as an abomination, and finds controversy a thorn in the flesh. What can the preacher do but give ear to all friendly counsel, and—reconciling the incongruities in his congregation by the grand solvents of reason, patience and experience—go forward in his rugged course, "with a heart for any fate?"

We close our remarks, without having exhausted our theme. And we conclude by expressing the conviction, that the law of *compensation* works in the pastoral relation, as everywhere else. The churches that are most liberal, tolerant, enlightened, and zealous in good works, will have the best preaching; for, if the surroundings of a plant affect its growth, its vigor, and its fruit, how much more do the surroundings of a human *soul* influence the splendor of its bloom, the energy of its efforts, and the affluence of its harvest! And those preachers who bring to their calling the most bountiful resources,—whose thought is most vigorous, whose spirit is most enlarged and tender, whose imagination is vaulted over the broadest fields of meditation,—will attract the richest-freighted congregations, build for themselves a broad communion of spiritual sympathy, rising rank from rank, till they touch the hierarchal splendor of ascended saints. E. W. R.

Article IV.

Jephthah and his Daughter.

There is scarcely to be found, even in the rich storehouse of sacred history, a narrative combining more points of deep and varied interest than that contained in the eleventh chapter of the book of Judges, concerning Jephthah's remarkable vow and the fate of his daughter. Scenes from this story have been represented on canvas, and woven into poetry, and amplified and embellished in song and romance. The melancholy interest which the story is naturally adapted to excite, has been heightened and aggravated by the supposition that Jephthah's vow required him to sacrifice his daughter as a burnt-offering. On this account it has been the perpetual theme of the poet and painter, who have vied with each other in their respective arts to illustrate the supposed tragical fate of Jephthah's daughter, and the struggle in the bosom of the father between the sense of duty, in fulfilling a solemn religious vow, and the natural instinct and tender pleadings of paternal love, when, as it has been supposed, he gave up his daughter as a sacrifice in accordance with a rash and imprudent vow. The sacrifice of Jephthah's daughter is the subject of oratorios by Handel (1751) and Reinthaler (1855)[1]. It forms the subject of one of Willis's Sacred Poems, of which we shall have something to say, further along. It is beyond all question true that much that has been written about Jephthah's vow, and much of the interest which the story has excited, have originated in a misconception and mistranslation of the Hebrew text; nevertheless, on account of the intrinsic interest of the story, it is important, and perhaps by reason of the erroneous translation it is all the more important, that an effort should be made to set this subject in its true light.

In passing in review Jephthah's singular vow and the fate of his daughter, we may first recount some of the chief points of interest in his history.

From the time of the death of Joshua to the election of

[1] New Amer. Ency. ix. 779.

Saul as king, the Israelites were ruled by judges; but often during this period they relapsed into idolatry, for which they were punished by being delivered into the hands of the surrounding nations. But from time to time the Lord raised up good and valiant men—Othniel, and Ehud, and Barak, and Gideon, and Jephthah—who successively delivered them from the power of their enemies. Jephthah filled the office of Judge of Israel for about six years. He belonged to the tribe of Manasseh. His father's name was Gilead; his mother was not a Jewess, but probably a Canaanite. Gilead's lawful wife bore to him other sons, who were ill-disposed toward Jephthah, the son of the strange woman, and thrust him out of their father's house and excluded him from any share in the paternal inheritance. Being thus treated by his kindred as an alien and an outcast, he wandered into the land of Tob, beyond the Jordan, and there became the captain of a band of rovers, freebooters, or "vain men." It happened at this time that the Jews beyond the Jordan were oppressed by the Ammonites, and were in quest of a leader who should be able to redress their grievances and punish their foes. As Jephthah had already distinguished himself as "a mighty man of valor," his countrymen relented toward him, solicited his aid, and even offered to him the leadership of their affairs if he would assist them in the Ammonitish war. But the treatment which he had received at their hands made him reluctant to trust in their promises. The Israelites therefore entered into a solemn covenant with him, pledging themselves to submit to him as their captain, and on this condition he took upon himself the conduct of the war and continued in power until his death.

When Jephthah set out on his expedition against the Ammonites, he "vowed a vow unto the Lord, and said, If thou shalt without fail deliver the children of Ammon into mine hands, then it shall be, that whatsoever cometh forth of the doors of my house to meet me, when I return in peace from the children of Ammon, shall surely be the Lord's, and I will offer it up for a burnt-offering." So at least reads our common version, (Judges, xi. 30, 31.) What was the nature and purport of this vow? What did it require him to do in case he should return victorious from the Ammonitish war? And what, in fact, did he do,

in fulfilment of his vow? It is an old tradition of the Jews, reported by Josephus, that "Jephthah sacrificed his daughter as a burnt-offering: thus making such an oblation as was neither conformable to the law, nor acceptable to God; not weighing with himself what opinion the hearers would have of such a practice."[2] This interpretation of Jephthah's vow seems to have been generally assented to by the Jews, who tell us that it was made a statute in Israel that no man should offer his son or daughter for a burnt-offering, as did Jephthah the Gileadite, who did not consult Phineas the priest, for had he consulted him, he would have redeemed her with money.[3] Among the Christian fathers, Ambrose and Augustine, in the fourth century, while admitting the sacrifice, disapprove of the conduct of Jephthah, and say that in this particular he did what was forbidden by the law of Moses; and Chrysostom and Jerome, their contemporaries, declare that God permitted the performance of it to punish the imprudent father for his temerity. Josephus, being a Jew and learned in the Hebrew Scriptures, was implicitly followed, and with little reflection, by the early Christian fathers. And perhaps it is not strange that his opinion, improbable and revolting as it was, should have been acquiesced in, in an age of superstition, when nothing was too monstrous to be received as a truth of Divine revelation, provided it only had the sanction of a great and venerable name. Several of the first Christian centuries were characterized by remarkable simplicity, credulity and superstition. Tertullian says that "The true disciples of Christ have nothing more to do with curiosity or inquiry, but when they are once become believers, their sole business is to believe on!"[4] Nay it is reported that he said of some notion of his, "certum est quia impossibile est," it is certainly true because it is quite impossible! Many a divine of the Romish Church has gone as far as Tertullian in defence of the dogmas of his sect. Thus Calmet vindicates King Solomon for putting to death Adonijah, son of David by Haggith, simply because Adonijah, after Solomon's accession to the throne, desired Abishag, David's widow, for his wife. Calmet says, "A

[2] Ant. Jud. v. 7. [3] Dr. Adam Clarke's Note. [4] De Praescript. Haeret. § 8. in Middleton on Miracles p. 226, n.

prince, in his judgments, can not always follow the rules of the most perfect morality: policy and the good of the state often require things to be done which are contrary to the counsels of the Gospel." On which Adam Clarke justly exclaims, "What a diabolic maxim!" It is useless to attempt to defend and justify what is wicked, monstrous or irrational, even if it appears to be sanctioned by an inspired writer. We must never yield our sober judgment to the mere dictum of authority, but hearken ever to the still small voice of reason and conscience. Notwithstanding the opinion of the Jews, of the fathers of the church, and of modern interpreters, that Jephthah's vow required him to make a burnt-offering of his daughter, yet we think it morally impossible that he did any such thing, or that his vow required him to do it.

I. In the first place, we should be justified in rejecting the common interpretation by an ambiguity in the text. Instead of Jephthah's saying, "Whatsoever cometh forth of the doors of my house to meet me, when I return in peace from the children of Ammon, shall surely be the Lord's, *and* I will offer it up for a burnt-offering,"—the marginal rendering of the last clause in our common version, is,—"*or* I will offer it up for a burnt-offering." The Hebrew particle *vau* may without violence be rendered by the copulative *and* or the disjunctive *or*, as the translators admit by their marginal note, which is of equal critical authority and value with the reading admitted into the text. So that if Jephthah's daughter did come forth first to meet him on his safe return from his campaign against the Ammonites, yet there is no necessity for supposing that his vow laid him under obligations to imbrue his hands in the blood of his innocent daughter or of any human being. At the most, according to the marginal reading, it only bound him to consecrate to the Lord, in some way, whatsoever should first come forth to greet his return from the war. Dr. William Hales renders Jephthah's vow thus,—"Whatsoever cometh out of the doors of my house, to meet me, when I return in peace from the children of Ammon, shall either be the Lord's, or, I will offer it up [for] a burnt-offering." "According to this rendering of the two conjunctions, *vau*, in the last clause is '*either*,' '*or*,' which is justified by the Hebrew idiom; (thus, 'He that curseth his father *and* his

mother, shall surely be put to death,' Exod. xxi. 17, is necessarily rendered disjunctively, 'his father *or* his mother,' by the Sept., Vulg., Chald., and English, confirmed by Matt. xv. 4;) the paucity of connecting particles in that language making it necessary that this conjunction should often be understood disjunctively. The vow of Jephthah consisted of two parts: 1. that what *person* soever met him, should be the Lord's, or be dedicated to his service; and, 2d, that what *beast* soever met him, (if clean,) should be offered up for a burnt-offering unto the Lord."[5] That Jephthah actually vowed to make a burnt-offering of the first creature, human or brute, of the first animal, clean or unclean, that should come forth to meet him, is not within the bounds of probability. For suppose a dog had chanced to meet him on his return home, it would have been a heinous offence to offer an unclean beast in sacrifice, and so abominable a thing would not have passed without rebuke. Suppose it had been his neighbor, or his neighbor's wife or daughter, who had first come forth to meet Jephthah, his vow could not give him any right or authority to slay them for a burnt-offering—or, in other words, to commit a murder. The sacrifice of his own daughter would have been no less a crime than the sacrifice of any other person.

II. But it is to be observed, further, that human sacrifices were positively forbidden by Moses' Law and were opposed to its whole tenor and spirit. One of the chief reasons for driving the Canaanites out of the land was that they offered their sons and daughters to Moloch, and the Israelites are warned against such abominable practices. "Thou shalt not do so unto the Lord thy God; for every abomination to the Lord which he hateth, have they done unto their gods: for even their sons and their daughters have they burned in the fire to their gods." (Deut. xii. 31.) "They have shed innocent blood, even the blood of their sons and of their daughters, whom they sacrificed unto the idols of Canaan, and the land was polluted with blood." (Ps. cvi. 38.) Can any one, in view of these declarations, believe that Jephthah, a Judge of Israel, a born Jew,—at least on his father's side,—well acquainted with Moses' law, and bound by the strongest personal and official obligations

[5] New Analysis of Chronology, London, 1811, vol, ii. p. 319.

to observe and enforce that law, did under any circumstances presume to offer a human sacrifice, against the express prohibition of the Divine Ordinance, and not one word of condemnation or rebuke of such impiety and cruelty be found recorded in the Bible? For ourselves we think it a most incredible and absurd supposition, and one requiring something more than an ambiguous text of Scripture, or the consent of ever so many Christian fathers, to induce us to believe it to be true. For it violates the probability and consistency of history and does equal violence to our sense of justice and to the instinct of parental love.

III. But this subject is happily relieved of all uncertainty and ambiguity by the researches of Hebrew scholars whose names are a guaranty of their fidelity and of their critical accuracy. Instead of the rendering in the common version, —"And I will offer it up for a burnt-offering," Bishop Lowth says the proper rendering is, "And I will offer unto him, (i. e. unto Jehovah) a burnt-offering," by what is called an ellipsis of the preposition, of which there are so many examples in the Hebrew Scriptures.

"The happy application of this grammatical rule to the passage relating to Jephthah's vow, has perfectly cleared up a difficulty which for two thousand years had puzzled all the translators and expositors, had given occasion to dissertations without number, and caused endless disputes among the learned, on the question, whether Jephthah sacrificed his daughter or not; in which both parties have been equally ignorant of the meaning of the place, of the state of the fact, and of the very terms of the vow."[6]

It is to be further observed that there are two kinds of vows mentioned in the Bible. One was called the *cherem*, a Hebrew word signifying *anathema*, or "the accursed thing"; by which vow things and persons were devoted to destruction, and could not be redeemed, but must be put to death or destroyed. Moses lays down the law in regard to vows of *devotement* in Lev. xxvii. 28, 29. "Notwithstanding no devoted thing that a man shall devote unto the Lord, of all that he hath, both of man and beast, and of the field of his possession, shall be sold or redeemed: every devoted thing

6 Lowth's Note on Isaiah xiii. 16.

is most holy unto the Lord. None devoted which shall be devoted of men, shall be redeemed, but shall surely be put to death." This devotement of a thing to destruction seems to have been an ancient custom, a relic of a barbarous age, which Moses retained on account of the necessity at times of giving an example of formidable severity. If this vow of *cherem*, or irrevocable curse, were uttered in respect to an enemy, it implied an utter destruction, and it was sacrilege for the conquering army to appropriate to itself any of the plunder or spoils thus devoted to destruction. Sometimes fields, animals, and men were thus devoted. It was apparently a custom which originated in a state of war, and was designed in its operation to bear only against enemies or the wicked, who were thereby made an example to others. We find the Israelites making such a vow against the Canaanites. The former said, "If thou wilt indeed deliver this people into my hand, then I will utterly destroy their cities. And the Lord hearkened to the voice of Israel and delivered up the Canaanites; and they utterly destroyed them and their cities." (Num. xxi. 2.) In this way the city of Jericho was devoted to destruction. "The city shall be accused, even it, and all that are therein, to the Lord: and Moses commanded the Israelites to keep themselves from the accursed thing, lest they should make themselves accursed by taking the accursed thing, and make the camp of Israel a curse, and trouble it." (Joshua vi. 17, 18, compare vii. 1–26.) The covetous Achan took and secreted a Babylonish garment, two hundred shekels of silver, and a wedge of gold of fifty shekels weight, which were among the things devoted to destruction in the city of Jericho. For this trespass Achan was stoned and his family with him, and all his possessions burnt up. Again, when the men of Jabesh-gilead refused to go out to Mizpeh at the requisition of Moses, they were all devoted to destruction by the vow *cherem*, or anathema. It was an incident of war, like letters of marque and reprisal. It did not relate to private property but only to aliens or public enemies. (Judges, xxi. 3–11.) No father, merely by his own authority, could put an *offending* child to death, much less an innocent one, upon any account except in pursuance of the sentence of the court of magistrates.

It was held by the Jews that if a Jew should devote his

son or daughter, his man-servant or his maid-servant, who were Hebrews, the devotement would be void, because no man can devote what is not his own, or of whose life he has not the absolute disposal.

But Jephthah's vow was totally different in its nature and in all its circumstances from the *cherem* or devotement of an enemy or an enemy's goods to destruction. It was an act of thanksgiving and religious homage in return for the Divine favor in granting him the victory in the Ammonitish war.

It was called *Neder*, or vow of consecration, by which money, lands, any species of property, servants, children, or even the person who made the vow, might be consecrated to a sacred and religious use.

Animals thus given by vows to the Lord were offered as a burnt-offering if fit for sacrifice; if unclean, they were to be sold, or might be redeemed to the use of him who made the vow, by an additional payment of one-fifth part of their value.

When men were thus given to the Lord by vow, they became servants of the temple, unless redeemed; and money, lands, houses, thus vowed, became the property of the temple, excepting that the land might be redeemed before the year of Jubilee. (Lev. xxxii. 2–27.) Jephthah's vow, being by its very terms intended as an act of thanksgiving, we are forbidden to suppose that it embraced within its scope anything so revolting as human sacrifice, which was condemned as impiety, sacrilege and murder, alike by the Law of Moses, by natural justice, and by the instinct of paternal love. Besides, if Jephthah had made so rash a vow as is generally supposed, the Law allowed a way of escape; for it had wisely placed the impulse of devotion under check, and provided for redeeming anything that had been thus offered up by vow, by paying a pecuniary equivalent. Bush says, "Individuals might sometimes, under the influence of extraordinary zeal, be induced to consecrate themselves, their children, or their estate unto God, by what is termed a singular vow; and yet upon reflection, in a cooler moment, they might regret the step they had taken, or particular circumstances might render the literal performance of the vow inconvenient or unsuitable; in which case provision was made for the redemption of the persons or things thus consecrated; and the Mosaic Law prescribed the rates

to be paid, according to the age and sex of the person making the vow."[7]

In order to keep alive a solemn memorial of the Providence which delivered the nation from Egypt by the death of the Egyptian first-born, the Law required that every first-born male, both of man and beast, should be sacred to the Lord; but the beast was to be sacrificed, *and the child was to be redeemed.*[8] Thus the spirit and purpose of the Law were carried out, though the form of the offering was changed in particular cases. (Ex. xiii, 15.) "The Lord slew all the first-born in the land of Egypt, both the first-born of man, and the first-born of beast: therefore I sacrifice to the Lord all that openeth the matrix, being males; but all the first-born of my children I redeem."

But if Jephthah's daughter was not sacrified, the questions may be asked, What was her fate, and why did her father so lament her coming forth to meet him?

These questions are answered in the following passage: "And Jephthah came to Mizpeh unto his house, and, behold, his daughter came out to meet him with timbrels and with dances: and she was his only child: beside her he had neither son nor daughter. And it came to pass, when he saw her, that he rent his clothes, and said, Alas, my daughter, thou hast brought me very low, and thou art one of them that trouble me: for I have opened my mouth unto the Lord, and I cannot go back. And she said unto him, My father, if thou hast opened thy mouth unto the Lord, do to me according to that which hath proceeded out of thy mouth; forasmuch as the Lord hath taken vengeance for thee of thine enemies, even of the children of Ammon. And she said unto her father, Let this thing be done for me; Let me alone two months, that I may go up and down upon the mountains, and bewail my virginity, I and my fellows. And he said Go, and he sent her away for two months; and she went with her companions, and bewailed her virginity upon the mountains."—(verses 34–38.) Now this language does not leave on our minds the impression that she died, but that she was consecrated as a vestal virgin for life; and this view is corroborated by the two following verses:

"And it came to pass at the end of two months, that she

[7] Note on Lev. xxxii. 3–8. [8] Ware's Life of the Saviour, p. 13.

returned unto her father, who did with her according to his vow which she had vowed: *and she knew no man.* And it was a custom in Israel, that the daughters of Israel went yearly to lament the daughter of Jephthah the Gileadite four days in a year."—not to lament her death, but her seclusion from society, and the hardship of her condition in being cut off from every domestic enjoyment.

We can easily understand that the unhappiness of Jephthah arose from the consideration that there was no one left to inherit and perpetuate his name. With that daughter his family would become extinct.

This he doubtless felt as a calamity. There was a peculiar solicitude felt by the Jews that when they should leave the stage there might be children to fill their places and to keep the line of descent unbroken. Solomon thanked God for the great kindness shown to David in giving him a son to sit on his throne. (1 Kings, iii. 6.) To have one's family cut off and be compelled to die childless is represented in the Bible as a sore calamity. It was a heavy judgment which was denounced upon Baasha: — "Behold I will take away the posterity of Baasha, and the posterity of his house; and will make thy house like the house of Jeroboam, the son of Nebat." (1 Kings xvi. 2–3.) Jephthah erred in the strictness with which he interpreted his vow. In consequence of a too literal interpretation of it, his daughter was devoted to a life of celibacy and his name and family became extinct. Thus the grief of the father is accounted for, and we avoid the revolting and absurd idea of a Judge of Israel making a burnt-offering, and that of an only daughter, when the law of the land not only plainly forbade the sacrifice but provided a pecuniary equivalent by which she could be redeemed, and yet the vow he religiously fulfilled.

The Jews were very much addicted to putting themselves under special restraints, and "instead of leaving everything to the free movements of the disposition, they said a man should force himself to do this or that good by a direct vow." "Vows are the enclosures of holiness," say the Rabbins.[9] This tendency had been encouraged by the Mosaic Law, which had made vows to be very sacred and very binding.

[9] Neander's Hist. Plant. Christ, p. 81, Bohn's Lib.

"If a man vow a vow unto the Lord, or swear an oath, to bind his soul with a bond; he shall not break his word, he shall do according to all that proceedeth out of his mouth." (Num. xxx. 2.) "He that sweareth to his own hurt and changeth not" is commended (Ps. xv.4); but it is nowhere said that he that voweth to do a wrong act, an inhuman, diabolical act, is under any moral obligation to keep such a vow.

Shakspeare tells us, very justly, that

> "Unheedful vows may unheedfully be broken,
> And he wants wit, that wants resolved will
> To teach his wit to exchange the bad for better."[10]

And again,

> "'Tis a great sin to swear unto a sin,
> But greater sin to keep a sinful oath."[11]

The story of Jephthah and his daughter is the subject of one of Willis' Sacred Poems, which is very touching and beautiful, but it is essentially marred by the author's adherence to the old traditional notion of Jephthah's actually offering up his daughter in sacrifice, thus:

> "The sun had well nigh set,
> The fire was on the altar; and the priest
> Of the High God was there. A pallid man
> Was stretching out his trembling hands to heaven,
> As if he would have prayed, but had no words —
> And she who was to die, the calmest one
> In Israel at that hour, stood up alone,
> And waited for the sun to set. Her face
> Was pale but very beautiful — her lips
> Had a more delicate outline, and the tint
> Was deeper; but her countenance was like
> The majesty of angels. The sun set —
> And she was dead — but not by violence."

But we think the poet does considerable violence to the sacred narrative; he plainly draws on his imagination for the *dénouement;* for the notion that the Judge of Israel and the Priest of the Most High God joined in the execution of the Judge's daughter is so revolting to his muse and so utterly destitute of solid Scripture evidence, that he chooses to

[10] Two Gent. Verona, Act ii. Scene vi. [11] Pericles, v. 3.

avoid it by inventing circumstances which are as baseless as any dream, and the chief interest of the poem is made to depend on an incident which is purely fictitious.

We observe, in conclusion, that this discussion will not be wholly in vain, if it shall lead any of our readers to a renewed perusal and study of the Scriptures of the Old Testament; and especially will it be useful if it reminds them that the Bible was not given to teach us anything without study, and was not designed to supersede the exercise of our moral judgment, nor to be a clog on our faculties of understanding, nor to smother and crush out our instincts of reason, of right and of justice, but to aid us in our inquiries after truth and to instruct us in regard to our duties. The common version of the Scriptures is a human and therefore fallible work; and we are not called to sacrifice to the letter of Scripture any rational conclusion, well-founded conviction or honest sentiment of the heart. We are to believe what is true, just, consistent; and accept of nothing merely because great and good men have believed and taught it; but prove all things, and with an honest, candid spirit and an intelligent faith hold fast the good, while we cast the bad away. This course only can be worthy of the human mind or be acceptable to God, who made the human soul to be superior to creeds and traditions, however venerable with age, and who esteems sincerity and purity in the inward parts as better than all burnt-offerings. J. O. S.

Art. V.

What shall we be?

This question naturally divides itself into two parts, one relating to our intellectual capacities, the other to our moral character, in the future life. In the last volume of the *Quarterly* the first part received such attention as we could give it: the present paper will be devoted to the second part.

We cannot but be desirous, nay, anxious, to know what

our future character will be; and what influence our present culture will have on our future selves. When we think seriously of this subject, as we must quite often in life, we shall earnestly wish to know what we shall be. If we are now forming characters for eternity, or, rather, if our present moral character is to attend us in the future state, so that we shall be there precisely what we are here, it is desirable to know it; or if we are to enter the future state in a superior moral condition, it will be pleasing to be assured of it. Much of our present happiness is derived from the contemplation of a future which appears better and more desirable than the present. A future state which is in the highest degree desirable and attractive, which fills the heart with joyful emotion as we contemplate upon it, must have a good influence upon us here. We cannot contemplate on a lovely scene in nature, or study a beautiful picture, without having pleasant emotions excited. Again, it may be said, if our present attainments in moral culture are to constitute our moral possessions at the beginning of the future life, a knowledge of this fact will stimulate us to make the greatest improvement possible in the present time. We may rest assured, however, that the correct view will have the best effect on men; for the truth must always exert a better and happier influence than error.

Before appealing to the Scriptures to ascertain what they teach, we may reason upon the subject, to ascertain what is probably true. We may reason from analogy in searching for the truth; or we may assume that certain laws here established will continue in force beyond death. Indeed, it is reasonable to suppose that we shall be governed by moral laws as nearly the same in the two modes of being as our moral nature and outward circumstances are the same in the two states of being. If there is any essential difference in these, it is highly probable that our future character will be unlike our present character. For we have no reason to suppose that the same moral character will be developed, or will even exist, under circumstances widely different, or in conditions very dissimilar. We do not expect a man who was born in a benighted land, and has spent his days in a state of heathen ignorance, will possess that culture and refinement, and will have that nice moral sense which he will who has dwelt among enlightened people, and whose character has been formed in the school of Christ.

We assume that so far as the circumstances and conditions of the two worlds are essentially the same, so far shall we be essentially the same in character, both here and hereafter. But so far as the condition and circumstances of the two states are essentially unlike, we shall possess a character essentially different in one form the character possessed in the other. To determine, then, what we shall be, we must ascertain what are the condition and circumstances of the future life as compared with those of the present life. Were it necessary to argue this point at any greater length, we would present the well-known and admitted fact that circumstances have a decided influence in moulding the character as well as in forming the manners. He who has lived in almost total ignorance of the Christian religion, who has not enjoyed the refining and elevating influence of Christian worship, but has devoted his Sabbaths to sensual pleasures and entertainments, will not possess that clear moral character, that elevated tone of feeling, that warm love of the chaste and the pure, and will not have that strong dislike of the low, vulgar and obscene, which he will, who has been educated in a truly Christian home, and whose character has been developed in harmony with the precepts of the Gospel. The society in which one lives, the companions of his busy and his leisure hours, will have a great influence on his character and manners. He who associates with the low and vile; who has been familiar from his earliest years with language of profanity and vulgarity; whose teachers have been vice and impiety, will possess a different character from him who has lived in good and refined society, and whose teachers have been virtue and piety. We would also adduce the well-known and admitted fact that all are not constituted alike morally. Some are naturally selfish, others benevolent; some are merciful, others revengeful; some appear to have an innate love of goodness and truth, but others seem naturally inclined to vice and sin; some are religiously inclined from their earliest years, but to others the whole subject of religion is distasteful; some are naturally meek and lowly of heart, but others are naturally haughty and overbearing. With the same care and training all cannot be made morally and socially alike.

Is it not highly probable that the circumstances and the society of the future state will be far more favorable to puri-

ty and holiness than they are here? Will not goodness and purity have an advantage there which they do not have here? These questions may, indeed, be answered differently, answered according to the ideas entertained of the future state; yet it is believed that nearly all look upon that state as far more favorable to purity and holiness than this. In the degree that it is so, we shall be purer and holier there than we are here.

Again, these earthly bodies, these material forms, are not to accompany us across the dark valley. We leave them at death; we go out from them when the time of our departure comes; hence they constitute no part of our future selves. The body returns to the earth as it was, and the spirit to God who gave it. The spirit will undoubtedly have a body, or vehicle, suited to its new circumstances and its superior state. But all that is peculiar to the body will perish with it; it is all of the earth, earthy. The spiritual body will be composed of spiritual elements, and it will be adapted to the heavenly world in which the spirit dwells. Our moral character is, to a great extent, in harmony with the nature of the body which we inherit. It is so here. We now have appetites, passions and desires which often lead us astray, making us depraved and sinful.

How great is the power of appetite, causing one to be a glutton, a wine-bibber, a drunkard! The appetite for intoxicating drinks is, in some instances, too strong to be resisted. Men of culture, of education, of superior intellect, have been ruled and ruined by it, and hastened to a drunkard's grave; and those of weaker intellect and less culture have been reduced to the most abject and grovelling condition, becoming objects from which we turn away in pity and disgust. There are few, probably, who always subject the appetites to the restraints of reason and judgment.

The passions are "an imperious crowd," and they often cause us to do work for repentance. In many instances they are not governed, but do themselves have the mastery, and lead us a terrible way. What shameful language, what contention and cruel deeds proceed from anger! Temper is the parent of much evil and sin. And who can describe the wickedness, the beastial, loathesome sins which proceed from lust? We think of the enormities of which men are guilty through lust with shame, nay, with horror. What other sins are more awful and revolting?

If we now assume that the appetites, passions and lusts have their seat in the flesh, the moment we leave the body we shall be delivered from their power. They can no longer hold dominion over us, and our warfare will be at an end. All these appetites and passions have an appropriate place and use here; and when properly governed and duly exercised, they promote our welfare. We could not do without them. But in the future state we cannot perceive how they can subserve our interests or promote our happiness. It is believed that spiritual bodies possess no appetites which will endanger our morality. It is believed that spiritual beings are not subject to anger and similar passions, but that they are happily exempt from them all. It would do violence to our ideas of spiritual beings to represent them as subject to lust, like men in the flesh. There is no marrying nor giving in marriage in heaven; the relation of parent and child does not exist there, because spirits are immortal, and no loss caused by the ravages of death has to be supplied. Indeed, there is no reason to believe that the distinction of sex exists among spiritual beings. Wherefore that loathesome sin which abounds in this world is not witnessed there. The earthly body is earthly and sensual; the spiritual ministers to purity of desire and holiness of life. Hence the moment we leave this body of flesh and blood, which has numerous appetites, passions and lusts, and assume a spiritual body, which ministers to purity of thought and feeling, we shall be changed; our character will no longer be the same. We shall be subject to different influences; we shall possess different emotions; different desires will be in exercise; different aspirations will be cherished; different motives will influence our acts, and we shall not, consequently, be the same in character. If such a difference exists, as has now been supposed, between the earthly and the spiritual body, — and probably no one doubts it — men will possess a moral character in the future life greatly superior to that which they now possess, because they will be in a condition far more favorable to purity and holiness. Take the most depraved and abandoned, those that have lead the most grovelling lives; place them in circumstances favorable to virtue; make the associations and companionships of their lives pure and holy; divest them of a body which is the seat of various lusts, appetites and passions; clothe them

with a body which is spiritual in its essence and which ministers to purity of thought and holiness of desire, and they will be changed in their motives, feelings, aspirations, and in all things which help to make up the character. And this change in them will be effected as soon as the change of condition and circumstances is effected. The same person cannot be made to conduct in the same manner in both of these widely different conditions. If the present body is to be resuscitated, in possession of its desires and passions, then our future character must be much the same it is now. But such a restoration of the body must be regarded as exceedingly unreasonable and improbable. It is contrary to the statement of the apostle who says Christ "shall change our vile body, that it may be fashioned like unto his glorious body."

Assuming now that all will be spiritual beings in the future state—and this is thought to be the general belief of Christendom—let us inquire what capacities or endowments they must possess, and what character they must consequently have. Without pretending to name every attribute of character or endowment of mind, which may be possessed, we think a spiritual being must have intellect, conscience and will, for these are necessary to constitute one an intelligent and moral being. It may not be difficult, mayhap, to decide what the character will be in the future state, in the proper exercise of these faculties. Let us consider them separately.

The intellect can not lead one into sin, for purely intellectual exercises have no moral character. In multiplying and dividing numbers; in solving a problem in algebra or geometry; in unfolding the laws of the solar system; in searching for truth in philosophy or metaphysics, no moral quality is necessarily involved. We may admire and honor the man of great intellectual power, yet for this alone we do not esteem him as morally better than the man of feeble intellect. The possession of great mental powers does not necessarily affect the moral character, nor does the normal exercise of these powers. If an intellectual effort is made from a good or a bad motive, then that effort may have a moral quality, but not otherwise. If a man devises means to promote some benevolent or charitable object, or the general good of the community, he is worthy of approba-

tion; but if he exercises his mental powers to accomplish some selfish end, or to get revenge, or to injure another, he is worthy of censure. But the gifted and highly educated mathematician, linguist, sculptor, painter, metaphysician and theologian, are made neither moral nor immoral by the possession of those intellectual endowments which enable them to become eminent. No moral quality attaches to the intellect itself, or to purely intellectual efforts and exercises.

The conscience is that power, or moral sense, which enables us to distinguish between right and wrong, and which approves the right and condemns the wrong. The conscience never furnishes any incentives to sin; it never tempts one to do wrong; but always restrains from evil and incites to good, to the extent of its power. No man ever did that which he knew, on the whole, to be wrong or wicked, with an approving conscience; and no man ever felt guilty for doing that which he knew to be right. The conscience may be overcome, or borne down by passion, inordinate desire or selfishness; yet it never yields to the stronger power as in the right, but continues to resist, feebly it may be, yet persistently to the end.

We are not prepared to say that the will has in itself any moral character; yet it has something, perhaps much, to do in the development of character. When one wills or chooses to do that which is right and good, he is an upright, good man; but when he wills to do that which is wrong and evil, he is an unjust and wicked man. The will is determined by the stronger motive; or one always chooses that which, at the moment of choice, seems preferable. A man can not choose that which, all things considered, seems to him the least desirable. If two objects seem equally desirable; if one does not appear in the least preferable to the other in any respect, then no choice can be made between them. Again, we may be so constituted morally that we shall choose this pursuit or that, or be inclined to this course or that in life. To ascertain how the power to choose will affect our moral character in the future life, we must find what the circumstances of that life are, and what are the moral qualities or endowments of a spiritual being. If they possess the passions and inordinate desires, as these are possessed here, then they may, at times, make wrong

seem preferable, whereupon it will be chosen; otherwise that which is right will be chosen.

The desires and passions natural to men here, were given because they are necessary here. We have selfishness which moves us to provide all things needful in our present condition. Were we not subject to want, there would be no occasion to exercise selfishness; but now we must exercise it daily, and the proper exercise of it is to be approved. All men also have propensities, passions, loves; and these also must be exercised in a proper manner. Our interest and welfare depend much upon their proper use.

If, then, spiritual beings are subject to wants, as food and clothing, which they must supply by their own efforts, we infer they will be possessed of selfishness. But if the arrangements of the future state are such that its blessed inhabitants have no wants to supply by their own labor, we conclude they will not possess selfishness; and as a consequence none of those sins can there be committed which proceed from selfishness in excess, or from selfishness unduly exercised. By a similar mode of reasoning we are led to the conclusion that spiritual beings possess no desires and passions like those which, being possessed here, lead men into sin. If we assume that propensities, passions and inordinate desires, like those of earth, are possessed in the future state, we must also assume that they will be exercised there. But this can not be; for it would make heaven an impossibility. We must conclude that the desires and passions which are possessed here, become necessary here, will not be possessed there. Hence we also conclude that spiritual beings do not have a moral nature, do not possess any qualities or gifts, which will influence them to choose evil.

Nor can we, with reason, suppose that the circumstances of the future state will determine one to choose evil. We can not suppose there are any temptations or inducements to sin there. How can one possibly do any wrong which has its root in selfishness, when no selfishness is possessed? Or how can one be influenced by circumstances to commit a sin which has its root in inordinate desire, when no inordinate desire is possessed? It is plainly impossible.

If, then, there is no inherent depravity in the will itself;

and neither the circumstances of that state nor the moral qualities of spiritual beings move the will to choose evil, they can not be led into sin by the will. The intellect, the conscience and the will, will be exercised in beautiful harmony, and in such a manner as to secure the purest morality and the most exalted virtue.

We will now turn to the Scriptures to see if the views now advanced accord with the teachings of Revelation. There are several passages in the New Testament which seem to teach that the flesh is the seat of the inordinate desires and passions, against which the spirit contends, though often without success. The apostle addresses this exhortation to the Galatians: "Walk in the spirit, and ye shall not fulfil the lusts of the flesh: and these are contrary the one to the other; as ye cannot do the things that ye would." The same apostle also says to the Romans: "I delight in the law of God after the inward man; but I see another law in my members, warring against the law of my mind, and bringing me into captivity to the law of sin which is in my members.—So then with the mind, I myself serve the law of God, but with the flesh the law of sin." These passages seem to teach in plain language, that the mind, or spirit, does not sin and does not consent to sin; but loves and strives for purity and holiness; that sin is committed only when the lusts of the flesh are too powerful for the spirit. The Gospel enables those who receive it in sincerity to overcome the fleshly desires, and to live in obedience to the divine command. Hence St. Paul says: "For what the law could not do, in that it was weak through the flesh, God sending his own Son in the likeness of sinful flesh, and for sin, condemned sin in the flesh; that the righteousness of the law might be fulfiled in us." He also says to the Gentile converts: "We all had our conversation in times past in the lusts of our flesh, fulfiling the desires of the flesh and of the mind;" not the mind by whose law he served God; but on becoming Christians, "the body was dead in respect to sin," because Christ reigned in them. True Christians had "put off the body of the sins of the flesh, by the circumcision of Christ."

If these passages were designed to teach what they seem to, then we may expect to find statements in the New Testament to the effect that when one goes out from the body

and enters upon the future life, he will no longer be the same he was here, nor possess the same character. And such statements, we think, are found. In discoursing with the Sadducees, Jesus said: In the resurrection "they are equal to the angels; and are the children of God, being the children of the resurrection." To be a child of God, is to be Godlike, or to possess a character like his. The sons of God possess a heavenly character; they are pure and holy in an eminent degree. The participial clause at the close of the verse, gives a reason for the statement that in the future life all are the children of God. They are so, being the children of the resurrection; or because they are raised from the dead. They are not the children of God there because they were here, but because they are raised from the dead. Therefore, when we leave this body which is the seat of inordinate desires and passions—necessary indeed in the present state, though they often lead into sin—and have a spiritual body adapted to the risen state, we shall no longer feel the influence of sinful passions; but emotions and aspirations will be possessed which will incline us to acts of worship, and to deeds of holiness.

St. Paul, in his masterly argument on the resurrection, when contrasting this with the future state, says: "It is sown in corruption; it is raised in incorruption; it is sown in dishonor; it is raised in glory; it is sown in weakness; it is raised in power; it is sown a natural body; it is raised a spiritual body." And in further illustration of this doctrine he writes, "The first man was of the earth, earthy: the second man is the Lord from heaven. As is the earthy, such are they also that are earthy; and as is the heavenly, such are they also that are heavenly. And as we have borne the image of the earthy, we shall also bear the image of the heavenly." Thus it is, "that as in Adam all die, even so in Christ all shall be made alive."

There are many statements and allusions, found in different parts of the New Testament, which teach the same doctrine: but we have not room to give them here. Yet passages enough have been cited to show that the argument presented in this paper is supported by the teachings of Revelation. So we think there is good reason to believe, that when "our earthly house of this tabernacle is dissolved, we shall have a building of God; a house not made

with hands, eternal in the heavens;" in which we shall be free from the inordinate desires and passions, to which we are more or less subject here; and that we shall be widely different at the beginning of the future life from what we are here; though we may not all be alike in character and attainments hereafter, and may continue to make progress in knowledge and culture for ever. W. R. F.

Art. VI.

Rawlinson's Herodotus: The Ancient Empires.

The History of Herodotus. A new English Version, edited with Copious Notes and Appendices, illustrating the History and Geography of Herodotus, from the most recent sources of information; and embodying the Chief Results, Historical and Ethnographical, which have been obtained in the progress of Cuneiform and Hieroglyphical Discovery. By George Rawlinson, M. A., assisted by Col. Sir Henry Rawlinson, K. C. B., and Sir J. G. Wilkinson, F. R. S. In four Volumes 8vo., with Maps and Illustrations. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1860.

It will not, we think, be questioned that in the noble volumes, the full title-page of which is given above, we have one of the great literary works of the age. We may assume, that however much open to criticism certain portions of it may be (and it would be a marvel indeed if a work of a nature so vast, so varied, and so complicated, could be executed in a way not to be open to criticism); whatever fallacies future investigations may detect; and whatever the degree of uncertainty that must be felt in the present stage of the interpretation of ancient inscriptions,—there will be found enough of ingenious criticism, enough of probability in fresh statements of the early history of the early nations, and enough of reasonable certainty in at least a few particulars of vast importance in the world of curious archæology, to place Rawlinson's Herodotus high in the list of the literary achievements which are destined to live.

We cannot name the other historical work that promises as much as is here attempted. To do anything like justice

to the early history of any one of the great nations of antiquity, is enough to employ a single author during an average life-time. Mr. Grote had been engaged full thirty years upon his history of Greece by the time his twelfth volume appeared. Dr. Arnold attempted a history of Rome in conjunction with other literary labors, and was able to leave but a fragment—an invaluable one indeed, as far as it goes. Mr. Rawlinson, in conjunction with his two co-laborers, has attempted a history of *all* the ancient empires—Egypt, Chaldæa, Babylonia, Assyria, Lydia, Medea, Persia, Greece! The nine books of Herodotus indeed make but a small proportion of the work under notice. For every page from the Greek author his three modern annotators give at least five. A simple statement of the old historian is made the text for an extended and elaborate essay, in which all the research and scholarship of the age, so far as they bear upon the question, are brought into requisition. A few sentences tell us all Herodotus knew, and in some cases what he conjectured, relative to the early history of a now extinct empire; our modern authors supply a series of essays confirming or modifying, and in most cases adding to, the meagre sketch of their author. And in this way the new edition of the "Father of History" has reached the large proportions of four closely-printed octavos. But we must specify a few particulars of the distinctive character of the new work.

Mr. Rawlinson has evidently established the *veracity* of Herodotus; and he has done this by a critical examination of the contents of his author, by confronting him with the testimony of other and nearly contemporary authors, and by comparing his statements with what in some cases may be deemed certain, and what in other and more numerous cases may be deemed simply probable, in the interpretations of recently discovered inscriptions on the ruins of ancient cities. No one at all familiar with the literature of ancient history need be reminded of the vacillating fortunes of Herodotus considered as an historical authority; at one period confidently quoted as if his statement admitted of no appeal; at another period treated with contempt as a dotard, remarkable only for his credulity and lack of critical judgment; once more re-instated as a respectable author, only to be ousted again when the new school of critics should come

into place; and so on through successive epochs of historical criticism. It has been Mr. Rawlinson's pleasant task to establish the *complete veracity* and the *general reliability* of the historian of Halicarnassus. It is indeed obvious that our modern author has, in this particular, an affection for his work; that his defence of the old historian sometimes reads more like the plea of an attorney than the cool decision of a judge; that his censures of the critical enemies of Herodotus, particularly of Col. Mure—foremost among these—betray not a little of the warmth of impatience. Nevertheless, his careful reader must feel the force of his argument; and will afterwards read Herodotus with the conviction that he *meant* to be truthful, and that in all instances where he gives the fruit of his own observation, he *is* truthful.

In submitting a succint statement of the *sources* whence Herodotus derived the materials of his work, Mr. Rawlinson enables the unlearned reader to determine for himself, in very many instances, what portion of these materials is reliable,—that is, on the supposition that the historian's veracity is conceded. Thus, we are informed, either by Herodotus himself or by his editor, when the authority for an alleged fact is that of personal observation, when tradition, when mythology, when that of some prior author whose value is also discussed. Hence, no reader need be perplexed because of the very marked credulity of the ancient author, of his numerous inconsistencies of statement, of his absurd notions in the matter of physical science, or of the very numerous geographical blunders which mar his narrative. On all such matters Herodotus merely tells what was *told* him, or what he had read; fortunately for his reputation, in none of these cases does he tell us what he himself *saw* or *heard*. When he tells what he himself witnessed, his narrative is uniformly within the limits of rational probability.

A very satisfactory chapter on the merits and defects of Herodotus as an historian and a writer, furnishes a valuable qualification for the prompt appreciation of the history. The very great industry of Herodotus,—"that unwearied spirit of research, which led him in disturbed and perilous times to undertake at his own cost a series of journeys over almost all parts of the known world—the aggregate of

which cannot have amounted to less than from ten to fifteen thousand miles—for the sole purpose of deriving, as far as possible," information from the fountain-head; his impartiality evidenced by examples of remarkable candor; his freedom from party bias—apparent in the fact (to name but one example) that though a devotee of democratic institutions, he points out instances wherein they have worked mischief; his rare merit of freedom from national vanity, whereby, though a Greek, he sees and commends the excellences of peoples not Greek; the picturesqueness, the dramatic charm, the humorous tinge, and the artistic concentration or unity of his pages;—with these and kindred excellences the reader is made acquainted, and so prepared to *enjoy* as well as profit by the work, at the very commencement of the task of reading it.

We come now to what is by many odds the most valuable feature—to what, in fact, is the distinctive excellence of Rawlinson's Herodotus;—we of course allude to the annotations and the supplementary chapters and essays based upon the recently discovered and interpreted inscriptions—the Hieroglyphs in Egypt and the Cuneiform inscriptions in the Mesopotamian valley of the Tigris and the Euphrates. It is to this feature of the work, therefore, that we now propose to give a more special and extended consideration.

In commencing the task thus specially designated, we may confess that we have a two-fold aim. While, on the one hand, we desire to do something of justice to the volumes we have had under review, by giving prominence to the feature on which their distinctive merit rests, we are glad to find that we can make the realization of this desire subserve another end. It is a commendable curiosity which leads mankind to cherish a desire to know somewhat of the history of their remote ancestry. The interest felt in the experiences—social, political, intellectual and religious—of the most ancient empires has always been profound. It has been with painful sensations that the reading world was debarred the privilege of exploring the realities of the early times. And he has ever been sure of the heartfelt gratitude of his fellows, who should succeed in opening to their gaze the once living realities of the first ages of the civilized habitable globe. The names which comprehensively represent these ages and empires of mystery are three,— Egypt, Babylonia, Assyria.

With regard to Egyptian matters, Mr. Rawlinson's work —we should rather say the portion contributed by Sir J. G. Wilkinson (perhaps first among living authorities on that special subject)—does at least proportionate justice; and the reader will look elsewhere in vain for as complete and satisfactory a statement, within the same limits, of the chronology and early history of Egypt. Nevertheless, the Egyptian department of Rawlinson's volumes has, necessarily, less of freshness and originality than the notes and essays which treat of the Chaldæan and Assyrian monarchies. The affairs of the ancient dynasties ruling in the valley of the Nile have indeed been shrouded in mystery, but not as much so as the dynasties of the Tigris and the Euphrates. The ancient historians are far more explicit as respects Egyptian than as respects Assyrian and Chaldæan antiquities. Herodotus, devoting but a few paragraphs to the latter,[1] gives a whole book to the former. Again, the existing monuments and inscriptions of Egypt are far more numerous, and in a much better state of preservation than in the seats of the Asiatic empires; while the clue to the interpretation of the hieroglyphs (so far as we may claim to have a clue—which claim unfortunately time does not seem to strengthen) was discovered several years before much progress had been made in the discovery of Assyrian *inscriptions* even, to say nothing of progress in the *interpretation* of them. The result has been, that while, through the labors of Champollion, Young, Bunsen, Lepsius, Wilkinson and others, the reading community has for several years been in possession of nearly everthing that can claim to be authentic in Egyptian antiquities, it is comparatively very recent that anything at all corresponding has been developed respecting Chaldæa, Assyria and Later Babylonia. To nearly all persons outside the small circle of professional antiquarians, Rawlinson's disclosures respecting the last named empires, so far as predicated of interpreted inscriptions, will have all the novelty and freshness of

[1] Herodotus makes several references to his proposed history of Assyria, probably as a separate work; which fact explains the scantiness of Assyrian materials in his extant history. If the Assyrian history was ever written, it must have perished early, as no succeeding ancient author, so far as we may reasonably know, makes any reference to it. See Rawlinson, Vol. i., pp. 23, 192, 249.

original matter. At present desirous of bringing before our readers such particulars of Mr. Rawlinson's work as may be deemed of distinctive merit, we shall now give our attention to the chronology and early history of the great Asiatic empires of Chaldæa, Assyria and Later Babylonia;—taking the occasion, as we leave the special subject, to acknowledge the evident and perhaps very great priority[2] of Egyptian over all other known histories; and also the priority and leading influence of Egypt in civilization, science and art.

Preliminary to a statement of the Chaldæan and Assyrian chronologies, we must remind the reader that Rawlinson and his co-laborers have completely revolutionized all former popular theories on the general subject. They have not simply corrected and improved the old chronologies, but have set them aside, substituting others almost entirely new. With a view therefore to the better appreciation of their labors, we will first submit a compendious statement of the formerly accepted chronologies and early history of the dynasties under consideration.

The former chronology, connecting Assyria with Babylonia, was based upon a particular interpretation of Gen. x. 10, 11: "And the beginning of his (Nimrod's) kingdom was Babel, and Erech, and Accad, and Calneh, in the land of Shinah (Babylonia). Out of that land *went forth Asshur* [or, substituting in place of the words italicised, the translation given in the margin, and which has the preference with many of the learned, *he* (Nimrod) *went out into Assyria*]

[2] Authorities differ greatly in their opinions (and they claim to have nothing better than *opinions*) as to the time of Menes, the reputed founder of the first of the Egyptian dynasties. Bunsen places it at B. C. 3643; Lepsius at B. C. 3893; and Wilkinson, at first at B. C. 2950, though now he declines to name any date, on the ground that the chronology is too uncertain even for conjecture. He concludes, however, that Egyptian history precedes Babylonian by at least 500 years. See Rawlinson, vol. ii. pp. 1, 2. Wilkinson is, however, particular to state that the priority of Egyptian *history* does not imply a priority of the Egyptian *race*. The parent stock of the Egyptians he claims to have been Asiatic. "Their skull," he adds, "shows them to have been of the Caucassian stock, and distinct from the African tribes westward of the Nile; and they are evidently related to the oldest race of Central Asia." See pp. 234—236.

and builded Nineveh." Now the popularly received Scripture chronology, as given in the margin of our English Bible, assigns the birth of Nimrod to about B. C. 2218. Accepting, then, as most Biblical archæologists do, the marginal translation of Gen. x. 11, thereby making Nimrod the builder of Nineveh as well as of Babel, or Babylon, it will be seen that both Assyria and Babylonia, each being recognised in connection with its capital city, have very nearly a contemporaneous origin in not far from B. C. 2200.

Up to within a very recent period, the majority of antiquarians accepted this date, or one comparatively near it. Some, indeed, connecting with Babylon and Nineveh the three names of Nimrod, Ninus his son, and Semiramis, wife and successor of Ninus, and discarding the marginal reading of Gen. x. 11, make the chronology differ slightly. These represent Nimrod as building Babylon in about B. C. 2100, Ninus as building Nineveh in about B.C. 2000, and Semiramis, the great queen and conqueror, as either rebuilding or greatly adorning Babylon. It is important to keep in mind, that the authorities of which we are speaking recognized no political distinction between Assyria and Babylonia; both are considered as making the Assyrian empire; some kings making Nineveh, others, Babylon, the capital city. The same authorities, resting in part on the statements of Ctesius, and in part on a particular interpretation of Scripture, represent the empire as falling under the effeminate Sardanapalus; according to some, before an attack by the Medes in about B. C. 888 — according to others, before a combined attack by the Medes and Chaldæans in about B. C. 747. All authorities however are agreed that a *second* empire—more properly a second *dynasty*—followed, under which Assyria recovered for a brief period. Under the sway of a few enterprising monarchs, Assyria indeed more than rivalled its former greatness; soon however to be entirely destroyed by Chaldæans and Medes in about B. C. 605. Following the destruction of the second Assyrian empire,—which was final, for no third dynasty ever succeeded in Assyria,—the power passes into the hands of the Babylonians; and Babylon, the great capital—particularly under Nebuchadnezzar—rises to the pinnacle of greatness. This new supremacy, or Later Babylonian dynasty, in most of the old histories is distinguished as the Chaldæan—falsely, as will presently appear.

The term Chaldæan has very generally been assumed to have an ethnological signification; the Chaldæans being regarded as a distinct and dominant *race*, immigrating at some unknown period from the mountains of Armenia, and by their superior enterprise, skill, and learning, acquiring dominion over the Babylonians. Nebuchadnezzar, whose monster architectural achievements within and around Babylon are somewhat minutely described by Herodotus, is the leading monarch of this so-called Chaldæan dynasty. All are agreed that this dynasty, if not earlier displaced by the Medes, was certainly destroyed by the Persians, when Babylon yielded to Cyrus at the well-established historical date B. C. 538.

We do not forget or overlook the fact, that a minority of authors, following Herodotus and Berosus, have earnestly denied the reliability of the chronology which we have thus briefly sketched. We simply aver that this chronology has been the *popular* one, and the one which has had the approval of a majority of antiquarians.

In order to appreciate the bearing of the discoveries and interpretations of Sir Henry Rawlinson and others upon the old scheme of chronology and early history just described, we must ask the reader to distinguish the following five particulars:—

1. The old chronology makes the origin of Assyria very nearly simultaneous with Babylonia.

2. It politically blends both Assyria and Babylonia in one empire generally termed Assyrian.

3. It gives the first dynasty of Assyrian kings a duration of about 1200 or 1300 years, tracing it as far back, at least, as B. C. 2000.

4. It recognizes as historical the names of Ninus, Semiramis, and the effeminate Sardanapalus.

5. It recognizes the dynasty in Babylonia which succeeded the fall of Assyria, as Chaldæan; and it gives this word an ethnic meaning—Chaldæan supremacy being that of a distinct race over the Babylonian race.

If now Rawlinson and his co-laborers have shown that no one of these five positions rests on a particle of proof, and that some of them are positively disproved, it will be seen that the change they have wrought in the old scheme of chronology and history virtually amounts to the substitution of one almost entirely different; for, with the rejection

of each position specified, all the collateral and dependent particulars of the chronology are also rejected. And yet, thus much, at least, these authors claim has been accomplished.

As a help to the memory, and with a view to indicate in advance some of the leading features of the new scheme of Babylonian and Assyrian chronology, we will here classify the positions in opposition to those names above, which the Rawlinsons have shown to be either historically certain or historically probable; though, as the establishment of one of the positions may involve, in part at least, one or more of the others, we shall not find it practicable in amplifying the several positions, to follow the order of our classification,—if indeed it should be convenient to follow any particular order.

We collect, then, from the notes to the first Book of Herodotus and the appended essays: 1. That there are strong grounds for doubt and none for belief, that Assyria had as early an origin as Babylonia, within several centuries; 2. That the two empires instead of being politically one, were in the earlier time, at one period, rival and mutually aggressive monarchies, and that at a later period, when the two were blended, one bore to the other the relation of a conquered territory; 3. That there is no proof that the first Assyrian kingdom had a duration of more than 526 years; 4. That Ninus, Semiramis, and the effeminate[3] Sardnapalus are fabulous, unhistorical personages; and 5. That the term Chaldæan has a geographical and not an ethnological signification, and belongs to the very earliest epoch of the Babylonian monarchy, and not to the one of which Nebuchadnezzar is the great representative.

The authorities upon which the scheme of chronology, of which the above named particulars are comprehensive specimens, rests are Herodotus, Berosus, and in some cases the Hebrew Scriptures, as confirmed by recently decpihered inscriptions on the ruins discovered in the Mesopotamian valley bordering upon the Euphrates and the Tigris. As respects the chronological statements of Herodotus and Berosus, our authors, of course, give nothing new. Their

[3] We affix this epithet to the monarch's name to distinguish him from the conquering Sardanapalus of a much later period, who is undoubtedly historical.

peculiar work has been to establish the reliability of these ancient historians, by showing that their statements are confirmed by the new witness summoned from the ancient inscriptions. A word in reference to these.

The reading world is familiar with the discoveries of Layard and others upon and near the probable sites of Nineveh and Babylon. The ruins of temples and palaces, thus recently discovered and explored, exhibit innumerable inscriptions, principally upon slabs and sculptures, though nearly every brick and piece of pottery is stamped with the mysterious characters. The general resemblance of these characters to the arrow-head, or wedge, gave rise to the cognomen *Cuneiform.* A most important point in the history of the old empire was thus reached. In this cuneiform writing, lay concealed the real history of Babylonia and Assyria, — the witness at whose word, should it ever become intelligible, must stand or fall the historic credibility, not alone of Herodotus, and the Babylonian priest Berosus, but of large portions of the Hebrew Scriptures! Providentially, contemporaries of Layard, Botta and their co-discoverers, by severally independent researches, were gradually gaining a clue to the cuneiform alphabet; and, one by one, the hitherto mute slab was made to speak in an intelligible language. Chief among these last named explorers is the name of Major, now Sir Henry Rawlinson, who, in the supplementary essays in the first volume of the new edition of Herodotus, gives the results, thus far reached, as bearing upon the chronology, early history, ethnology, language, and religion of the Babylonian and Assyrian empires.

It is our misfortune, that, except so far as the interpretations of the cuneiform writing may be tested by appeal to undoubted historic authorities (and the cases wherein such appeal is possible are rare), or the intrinsic probability of truth or untruth in the interpretations themselves, we are compelled to take the statements of Rawlinson and his confederates at their word. With the exception of a very small company of professional decipherers of the characters, no reader can confront Rawlinson on his own ground. Whatever reasons we may give for or against his readings of the inscriptions, must come from intrinsic sources — not from the source that would be most pertinent could we make it available. It is impossible to feel perfectly safe in

accepting the new disclosures. The acknowledged difficulties in the way of discovering the phonetic values of the cuneiform characters; the frequent changes by the same author in the reading of the same inscriptions; the want of agreement between different interpreters; and the illusion to which the enthusiastic explorer so easily becomes the victim — giving examples of the operation of that mental law whereby the wish becomes father to the thought, — these and kindred reflections warn us not to accept, in every case, the recent alleged discoveries with a too unquestioning confidence. Yet we have rational grounds for the conviction that *something* is made certain by the cuneiform decipherers. Whoever reads what they have written will feel that they are honest — that their interpretations are *meant* to be reliable. Further, the new interpretations are, in at least a few instances, sustained by corresponding statements in authors who lived when the cuneiform character was in use. Perhaps most satisfactory of all is the fact of agreement between contemporary cuneiform tablets in Assyria and hieroglyphic inscriptions in Egypt, as independently interpreted. It weighs with us, that, saying nothing of the Hebrew chronology in which scholars are fast losing confidence, the sequence of events, as given in the Hebrew Scriptures, very generally accords with the deciphered readings of the Assyrian monuments.

The case, then, seems to stands thus: — the *probabilities* in favor of the authenticity of the cuneiform interpretations, as compared with the *possibilities* against these interpretations, warrant us in giving them at least a *provisional* acceptance — to receive them as authentic until fresh discoveries shall compel us to substitute other interpretations, should the sequel impose such a necessity upon us.

Proceeding now to give some of the *results* reached by Sir Henry Rawlinson (of course, we cannot give here the *processes* by which he reaches these results), a brief statement of the historic signification of the term *Chaldæan*, takes us to the root of whatever may be deemed historical pertaining to the ancient Asiatic empires. We have seen that most of the former antiquarians understood by the word Chaldæan, the recognition of a particular *race* in Babylonia distinct from Babylonians — which race immigrated, at some

indefinite period, from the Armenian mountains: and which, through superior culture and skill, gradually rose to importance; and finally, on the downfall of Assyria in about B. C. 747 (though possibly more than a century later) attained political ascendency in Babylon, founding the dynasty of which the greatest monarch was Nebuchadnezzar. The facts as now discovered, chiefly by philological means, both expose and explain the falsity of these beliefs. One of the tribes which inhabited Babylonia from the earliest time was the Akkad, of which tribe, or race, the Chaldæans were a branch. As the originators of science and learning—particularly the science of astronomy — the primitive Chaldæan or Akkad language became the *learned* language, the repository of the literature of Babylon; hence it was the *fixed* language of a *class*— "was in fact the language of science in the East as the Latin was in Europe during the middle ages[4]." The term Chaldæan, thus at first the name of a branch of the primitive race in Babylonia, became more particularly, in Nebuchadnezzar's time, the distinctive name of a learned class. The mistake was natural to confound this learned *class* with a supposed distinct and peculiarly learned *race*. The notion that this supposed race came from Armenia is attributable to the fact, that the Assyrian kings, in the period of Assyrian conquests in Babylonia, colonized portions of Armenia with captive Babylonians or Chaldæans. There *was* an immigration of Chaldæans, but involuntary, and not *from*, but *into*, Armenia. The real fact is, that the term in question has a geographical[5] application; Chaldeæa being the *special* name of the southern portion of the territory known by the *general* name of Babylonia. The Chaldæans were the people inhabiting this special portion of territory from the earliest known period.

With regard to the *relative antiquity* of Assyria and of Babylonia, the inscriptions, as Rawlinson reads them, completely set aside the old chronology. This chronology, as one party understood it, attributes both Nineveh and Babylon, and, by consequence, both Assyria and Babylonia to the same person — that is, to Nimrod, giving them an

[4] See Sir Henry Rawlinson's very interesting note to Herodotus, Book I., Chapter 185, pp. 247, 248. Of course, our references to Herodotus are, in every case, to Rawlinson's edition.

[5] See Appendix to the same book, Essay IX. Section 9, p. 464.

antiquity of about B. C. 2200; or, as another party understood it, attributes Babylon to Nimrod, and Nineveh to Nimrod's son Ninus. This date, however, if applied not to the city of Babylon, but to the first empire in Babylonia, is substantially confirmed by Berosus, whose exact date for such an empire is B. C. 2234; also by Callisthenes, who exactly agrees with Berosus; and also by the inscriptions in the region of ancient Chaldæa; but the notion which connected the origin of *Assyria* with that of Babylonia or which separated them by a period of less than a century, is not only without proof, but against all probability. Rawlinson speaks with great confidence on this point. "The first seat of government," he assures us, "was fixed in Lower Chaldæa, and Nineveh did not rise to metropolitan consequence till long afterwards."

With the notion of the nearly co-equal antiquity of Assyria and Babylonia, was associated another — that of the *political union* of the two under an Assyrian name or supremacy. This notion, so far as the point of supremacy is concerned, the inscriptions exactly reverse. There was indeed at first — that is, B. C. 2234, taking the precise date given by Berosus — one empire; its seat was Chaldæa; and its ruling dynasty was Chaldæan. From this seat, the Chaldæan empire *gradually extended towards the north.* It was about three centuries, however, before the empire had advanced sufficiently north—had been extended over enough of the general Babylonian territory — to exchange the special character of a Chaldæan, for the more comprehensive character of a Babylonian, supremacy; and it was full seven centuries more — that is, ten centuries later than the origin of the Chaldæan empire — before the growth of the empire had got so far north as to embrace so much of the Assyrian territory, as to make an Assyrian supremacy even possible.

A remarkable inscription, technically known as the "Bavarian Inscription," made by the Assyrian Sennacherib, in connection with a record made by Tiglath-Pileser, an Assyrian king, throws great light upon the relative periods of the Babylonian and the Assyrian empires, and also gives us a *fixed date*—a most important item —in Assyrian history. Sennacherib tells that in his tenth year he recovered certain gods which had been carried to

Babylon, on the defeat of Tiglath-Pileser by a Babylonian army, 418 years previously. Tiglath-Pileser records that he "rebuilt a temple in the city of Asshur (an Assyrian city) which had been taken down sixty years previously, after it had lasted 641 years from the date of its foundation by Shamas-iva, son of Ismi-dagon." The tenth year of Sennacherib was B.C. 692. To this, add the 418 years previously—the date of Tiglath-Pileser's defeat, conjecturally ten years for the interval between this defeat and the rebuilding of the temple, sixty years previously for the demolition of the temple, 641 years for the duration of the temple, and conjecturally forty years for the two generations of Ismi-dagon and his son; and for a total we have B. C. 1861 for Ismi-dagon's accession as king of Babylon. Further, the brick legends in Lower Chaldæa reveal at least twenty other kings in the same dynastic list with Ismi-dagon, some coming before, and some after, this monarch. Of those coming before the date B. C. 1861, there are enough to carry, by reasonable conjecture, the antiquity of Chaldæa as far back as B. C. 2234, the date given by Berosus for the origin of the Chaldæan dynasty. Berosus is thus sustained by Herodotus, by Callisthenes,—both of which authors apparently had good grounds for their chronological statements,—and by the above computation of the figures given by the Bavarian Inscription, and by Tiglath-Pileser's record—in which figures the conjectured elements are so slight as not to affect the practical value of the result. We are therefore, in the present state of our knowledge, under obligations to accept about the year B. C. 2234 as the date of the founding in Chaldæa of the first empire in Western Asia.

A third notion involved in the former chronology in connection with that of the co-antiquity and political unity of Babylonia and Assyria, may be considered in this connection. We refer to the belief based upon the authority of Ctesias, that the first [6] Assyria had *a duration of twelve or*

[6] We must all along keep in mind that there were *two* empires, or at least two *dynasties*, in ancient Assyria. When, therefore, Herodotus assigns 520 years, Berosus 526 years, and Ctesias 1306 years for the duration of Assyria, they all mean the duration of the *first* dynasty or empire—they never include in this period of duration the second much shorter dynasty or empire, embracing not far from two centuries.

thirteen centuries—to be precise, 1306 years. Now it is more than probable, and nearly all schemes of chronology substantially agree, that the first dynasty of the Assyrian empire came to an end about B. C. 747 (at which time Babylon established a qualified independence—the date being technically known as the "era of Nabonassar"); and that the second and last dynasty closed with the destruction of Nineveh in B. C. 625. If, then, we add the 747 years to the 1306 years, we have the date B. C. 2053 for the commencement of the Assyrian kingdom. Now against this scheme we have the positive testimony of Berosus and Herodotus, confirmed by the strong negative testimony, that the ruins brought to light do not recognize the existence, at this early date, of a city, even, north of the territory embraced in Lower Chaldæa. The first seat of empire was Hur or Ur, (the modern Mugheir, and probably the same referred to in Gen. xi. 31); and the site of this city is not far north of the Persian Gulf—in the southern part not simply of the general territory of Babylonia, but the special territory of Chaldæa. In the order of time, follow other Chaldæan cities, among which are Erech (the modern Warka) and Larsa (the modern Senkereh)—the advance being steadily towards the north. The city first namedas in Babylonia, north of Chaldæa proper, is Niffer, which name occurs in the titles of Ismi-dagon—an indication of the growing importance of Babylonia during the Ismi-dagon epoch of the Chaldæan supremacy. Whether the building of Babylon preceded or succeeded that of Niffer, does not yet appear; it is only probable that both cities were in existence as early as the fixed date B. C. 1861. It is exceedingly improbable that either city had metropolitan importance much earlier than this date.

The most noticeable fact in this connection, is the failure to discover a single legend recognizing the existence of any city or district in Assyria up to the time of Ismi-dagon. There is, at most, a simple notice, on what is called the "Kileh-Shergat Cylinder," of the building of a temple in Asshur (the modern Kileh-Shergat) by a son of Ismi-dagon. This record is indeed conclusive that Assyria was coming into notice; but it is extremely probable that during the whole period of the Chaldæan dynasty—a period of about

961 years—the entire region of Assyria was at first unrecognized, then obscure, and at the last a very humble province. Hence disappear these prominent particulars of the old chronology—the supposed co-antiquity, and the political unity under an Assyrian name, of Assyria and Babylonia, and the long duration of 1306 years for the first Assyrian dynasty.

The leading features, then, of the new scheme of chronology, which is entitled to at least a provisional acceptance, are 1. The establishment of an empire in the southern part of Babylonia, the proper Chaldæa, under a Chaldæan dynasty, as early as B. C. 2234; 2. The gradual growth of this empire towards the north, till it became, at about B. C. 1861, generically Babylonian, though still under the primitive Chaldæan dynasty; and 3. The at first unrecognized, then subordinate, and finally independent territory of Assyria—the ancient line of Chaldee-Babylonian monarchs, continuing in the south to about the year B. C. 1273; at which date this ancient dynasty is overthrown, and an independent Assyrian *kingdom* first emerges, soon to attain the proportions of an *empire*, and exercise a general sway over the whole region of the great Mesopotamian valley.

The date of Assyrian *independence* as a *kingdom*, must not be confounded with the date of the Assyrian *supremacy* as an *empire*. No legend gives any hint whereby the origin of Assyrian independence can be even conjectured. There is reason to surmise that the last two centuries of the Chaldee-Babylonian ascendancy was a troublous period. Berosus even speaks of an Arabian conquest during this period; and his list of dynasties gives an Arabian line of nine monarchs, displacing the old Chaldæan line in B. C. 1518, and reigning over all Mesopotamia to the date of the Assyrian epoch in B. C. 1273. The inscriptions give no account of such a dynasty. Yet there may have been Arabian invasions in Babylonia; and the Assyrians may have embraced the occasion of such a period of Babylonian trouble and weakness to assert their independence. The only point on which the inscriptions seem clear is the fact of an independent Assyrian kingdom as early as B. C. 1273.

A series of testimonies more or less reliable, yet strong in their conjoint force, determines this important date as the commencement of a separate Assyrian power. Herodotus

gives, in round numbers, 520 years for the duration of the first Assyrian dynasty—not, let it be kept in mind, for the *whole duration* of Assyria including its two dynasties,—and as he connects the commencement of this period with a date a generation earlier than the founding of the Lydian monarchy in B. C. 1229, and terminates the period within about a generation after a revolt of the Medes in B. C. 708, it follows that he believed the first Assyrian dynasty to commence at about B. C. 1273. Berosus gives the more precise number of 526 years as the full period of the first Assyrian dynasty; and it is shown by comparing some of his dates with certain well-established Scripture dates, that he regarded the 526 years as commencing about B. C. 1273; and this general date, various other coincidences confirm. A comparison of several inscriptions found upon Assyrian ruins favors the same conclusion; and hence it is safe to presume, that we have at least an *approximation* to the period when the first great Assyrian dynasty was established.[7]

The bricks of Kileh-Shergat disclose the name of probably the first four monarchs who ruled in Assyria,—we say probably, for though the legends recognize other and earlier rulers, their names are Babylonian, and their titles those of Satraps. The old history, as we have seen, gave graphic pictures of Ninus, the builder of Nineveh; of his great queen and successor Semiramis, who either built or adorned Babylon, and whose conquests made her name the terror of surrounding nations; of the effeminate Sardanapalus,—at a much later period however,—surprised in the midst of his revels by the approach of conquering hosts, and in his despair burning himself, and his confederates in debauchery, with his palace. We may state here, that while the chronological places of Ninus and Semiramis have been entirely removed by the new scheme of chronology, none of the monuments exhibit names or characters at all corresponding to such personages. In the list of the first four monarchs given by the Kileh-Shergat bricks, the names are every way dissimilar to those of Ninus and

[7] The very ingenious scheme of combinations and computations by which the general conclusion named above is made very probable, will repay the somewhat perplexing labor of a careful study. See Rawlinson's first volume, pp. 360—364.

Semiramis. They are also unaccompanied with events—an improbable circumstance, if they belonged to these personages. These names, therefore, with that of the licentious Sardanapalus, are banished into the region of myth. They do not belong to Assyrian tradition even; they are, says Rawlinson, the "invention of Greek writers."

The Assyrian legends record but little in the way of events, till we come to the time of Tiglath Pileser I., in about B. C. 1110. This is an important epoch, for at this period the *kingdom* of Assyria becomes the *empire* of Assyria; and the imperial power is extended over all Babylonia even. This monarch, in somewhat lengthy and most important inscriptions, gives an account of himself and his ancestors. He claims to have "subjugated all the earth;" that his father was a "subduer of foreign countries," and actually "reduced all the lands of the Magian world;" that his grandfather was "established in strength in the government of Assyria;" that his great-grandfather "ruled over the people of Bel;" and that his great-great-grandfather was "the king who first organised the country of Assyria."

Coming down to about B. C. 930, we meet with the great name of a real Sardanapalus — the builder of an enormous palace, 360 feet in length by 300 feet in breadth, and of numerous other buildings. With this name we enter upon a new phase of Assyrian history. The events are more numerous, and are more minutely described. Sardanapalus is succeeded by his son, Shalmaneser, who has a long reign, and whose name is connected with rapid conquests in all parts of Western Asia. We are now upon historical ground. Assyrian events begin to mix with others, familiar to the readers of the Bible, in Damascus, in Phœnicia, in Israel, in Judea, in Egypt. As the deciphered narrative proceeds, the names of Benhadad, of Jehoram, of Hazael, of Jehu, rise to view.

Passing on to about B. C. 741, the second Tiglath-Pileser, the Scripture monarch of this name, appears. He is probably the founder of the second dynasty; and the new empire, not included in the 526 years of Berosus, the 520 years of Herodotus, or the 1306 years of Ctesias, is established There is now a rebellion in Babylon, and the celebrated Nabonassar has either founded, or has prepared the

way for the foundation of, that splendid but short lived dynasty, which dazzles the world in the person of Nebuchadnezzar, and moves both its pity and contempt in the tragic fate of Belshazzar and the destruction of Babylon.

But though the defection in Babylon seriously reduces, for the time, Assyrian greatness, the nation speedily revives under the second Tiglath-Pileser. Successful war is carried on against Babylonia, whose prince flees into exile, and also against Damascus. He takes tribute from a king of Samaria and of Tyre; receives Ahaz, king of Judah, as a tributary, and has a personal intercourse with him[8] — the first event of the kind in Assyrian and Jewish history. Reaching the date about B. C. 721, we come to the enterprising Sargon, who conquers Babylon, defeats the prince of Gaza, and probably the Egyptian Sabaco I.; takes tribute from both, and from the queen of Arabia; carries on wars with the Syrians, Cappadocians, and Medes; and inaugurates, on a grand scale, the policy of carrying off Israelites to colonize other regions — in this anticipating, in the nature of the result, the great "Babylonish captivity" by Nebuchadnezzar.

A few years later and the great Sennacherib ascends the Assyrian throne. Now, for the first time, in about B. C. 700, mention is made of Nineveh as the *Capital.* Sennacherib rebuilds the city — employing in the work the enormous number of 360,000 prisoners from Chaldæa, Cylicia, Syria, Armenia, and other countries. He builds a palace which covers eight acres; carries on terrible wars in Babylonia, destroying 32 Chaldæan cities and 820 villages, and returns with 200,000 captives; next turns his power against the nations north and east, and compels the Medes to give tribute; then enters Phœnecia, the land of the Philistines, Judea and Egypt — in all places victorious; then beseiges Jerusalem, and extorts tribute from Hezekiah; and follows up his conquering career till he meets with the miraculous destruction of his army in Egypt, described in 2 Kings, xix. 35; after which "Sennacherib, king of Assyria, departed, and went and returned, and dwelt in Nineveh," (verse 36) till his murder by his sons — on which tragic fate the inscriptions throw no light.

Esar-haddon, son of Sennacherib, succeeds to the throne

[8] 2 Kings xvi. 10.

in about B. C. 680. He imitates his father's warlike career, and seems to repeat the same conquests in the same countries.[9] He reigns, in person, in Babylon and also in Nineveh; builds a great and gorgeous palace, answering, according to Mr. Layard "in its general plan, more than any building yet discovered, to the description in the Bible of the palace of Solomon."

With the disappearance of Esar-haddon, the glory and power of Assyria depart, never to return. The decline is rapid, fearful, and complete. A few weak, effeminate, helpless monarchs succeed; and at the approach of the Medes, and their confederates, in about B. C. 625, led by Cyaxares, Assyria falls, and Nineveh is given over to the flames. Since that hour there has never been an Assyria.

Of the empire of Later Babylonia,—which seems to have taken root in some mysterious way with Nabonassar in B. C. 747, and to have survived defeat, exile, and the demolition of cities during the second Assyrian dynasty, to spring into full life, greatness, and dominion on the fall of Nineveh in B.C. 625,—we shall not here descant. Sir Henry Rawlinson devotes to the subject an elaborate essay — the seventh appended to the first Book of Herodotus;—but as the epoch is so largely within the bounds of authentic history, his statements contain necessarily less of novelty than those which he has given us respecting the earlier empires. The reading world is already familiar with the warlike achievements of Nebuchadnezzar against the Egyptian Neco; his long, desperate and finally successful seige of Tyre; his prolonged seiges of Jerusalem, ending in its overthrow, the capture of King Zedekiah, and the transportation of the bulk of the population to the banks of the Euphrates; with his alleged succeeding triumphant invasions of Egypt, before whose march the Egyptian Apries flees, to be deposed and succeeded by Amasis; with the monster works of Neb-

[9] The nations conquered by Assyria and Babylonia were never *added to* the conquering nation. Their form of government was not changed, and their rulers were seldom deposed, or their local administration interfered with. They were only made to give tribute, generally in money, seldom in any other way. Of course, these nations, thus made tributary, seized every opportunity to throw off even this allegiance. Hence nearly every Assyrian monarch had occasion to repeat the conquests—if conquests they can rightly be called—of his predecessors.

uchadnezzar within and around Babylon, in the description of which Herodotus gives ample display of his credulity,—representing the walls built around the city as reaching a height of 400 feet, or about twice the height of the Bunker-Hill monument, and as enclosing an area of 130 square miles, nearly the area of a Massachusetts county! — and with the strange, sad, pitiable fate of the great monarch, after the long reign of forty-three years; with the rapid decline of the empire after the death of Nebuchadnezzar, ending in the great conquest by Cyrus — who turns the course of the Euphrates, enters by the bed of the river, surprises Belshazzar and his "thousand nobles" while at the impious banquet, so graphically described in the fifth chapter of Daniel, and by a complete conquest of the great capital, in B. C. 538, forever extinguishes the Babylonian empire. We may, indeed, thank the Rawlinsons for their clear and compact re-statement of the old story; for the light which they throw upon some points hitherto obscure; and for the criticisms, both expressed and implied, by which their readers will be enabled to form a rational conception of the most dazzling epoch in the world's history. Still, our great indebtedness to them is for the new information which they have given us respecting the earlier and generally mistaken chronology and history of the old empires of Chaldæa and Assyria.

We cannot close without taking occasion, by a brief word, to make our acknowledgements to Mr. Rawlinson and his assistants, for the great service they have rendered the Biblical student. The story of Abraham, migrating "from Ur of the Chaldees to go to the land of Canaan"; the Scripture accounts of the eventful history of Judah and Israel,—given minutely in the books of the Kings and the Chronicles,—all of which more or less mix up, or interpenetrate, the doings of the mighty empire of the Mespotamian plain; the frequent allusion to Assyria and Babylon by the prophets; the hardships which Samaria and Judea suffered at the hands of Assyrian kings; and the constant fear which the mention of these rulers always created among the nations within and near the land of the Bible; — all these interesting matters will be read with fresh interest, with clearer perceptions, and with increased confidence, by those who avail themselves of the light which Rawlinson's labors have thrown upon the Bible page. G. H. E.

Art. VII.

God's Presence. Ps. lxxxix.

How, O God, from thee
  Can my footsteps go
Where thine eye shall fail to see,
  Or thy thought to know?

Heaven's sublimest height,
  Deepest grave,—each lies
Plainly open to thy sight,—
  All their mysteries.

If on morning's wings
  To earth's farthest shore
I should flee, thy visitings
  There have been before.

If to night I say,
"Hide me from my God;"
Thy o'erpowering presence-ray
  Scatters night abroad.

Night is not with thee,
  Day is all thine own,
Shedding its intensity
  From thy burning throne.

Father! search and try
  All my thoughts and ways;
Be it mine to live or die
  In thy work and praise.

J. G. A.

Art. VIII.

Literary Notices.

1. Biblical Review: Intended as a new improved Commentary on the Bible: wherein the Author attempts to give more Rational Interpretations of Subjects and Passages, than are common in other books having the same general purpose: on a Plan that renders the book as well fitted for Reading as for Reference. By Rev. W. E. Manley. Vol. II. Boston: Abel Tompkins. 1860. pp. 394.

Universalists have done much to correct what they deem false in the so-called evangelical interpretations of the New Testament. Paige's Commentary does this work consecutively and exhaustively to the end of the Epistle to the Romans. Whittemore has been equally thorough in his treatise on the book of Revelation. And nearly all the leading passages of other portions of the New Testament have been treated, with more or less of thoroughness, by various writers in our denomination. But the Old Testament, as a whole, has been neglected; that is, the old interpretations of this department of the Scriptures, have been suffered to pass unchallenged. True, there has been less sectarian inducement to give the same attention to popular interpretations of the Old as of the New Testament; for the doctrinal points which separate the different sects, are predicated of New Testament passages to a far greater extent than of Old Testament passages. Still, we must think that our exegetical writers have not given the Old Testament a proportionate share of merited attention. Mr. Manley's work, therefore, supplies what has hitherto been a desideratum. It fills a place, up to this, unoccupied by Universalist literature.

His work, however, has a special merit on other grounds. Mr. Manley concedes, in fact, assumes as an authoritative principle, that any interpretation of the Bible to be accepted must be *rational*—rational in the sense of commending itself to the human heart and judgment. The Bible must ask no special favors. Human nature must not be called upon to concede any of its instincts, any of its primitive beliefs. It is something new for an Old Testament commentator to acknowledge the binding force of such a principle of interpretation. Mr. Manley has, in this, given his "Biblical Review" a distinctive character—a character that will command for it both attention and respect.

A leading feature of his plan is to consider the Bible, not in the tedious order of chapter and verse, but the economical and,

we think, more satisfactory order of *subjects*. The present volume "embraces all the historical parts of Exodus and Numbers, and the corresponding portions of Deuteronomy." The comprehensive subject is "Egypt and the Wilderness." We have dissertations on the Pentateuch; on all the special topics embraced under archæology; and on the doctrines of the portion of the Bible reviewed,—such as concern the unity of God, his sovereignty, and man's agency, rewards and punishments, and human nature. Much space is devoted to the special miracles brought under review. The bulk of the work treats of the Israelites—at first in Egypt, afterwards in the Wilderness. The work is executed with learning, with good sense, with a skilful destribution and classification of matter, and with an industry that will seem mysterious to men of only average patience. We sincerely trust that the author will get some pecuniary recompense for his service, not only to the denomination, but to the great cause of Biblical interpretation.

2. Living Words, by E. H. Chapin, D. D. With an Introductory Letter, by Rev. T. S. King. Boston: A. Tompkins. 1860. pp 360.

Some years since, we were struck with the force of a statement in a leading New York periodical, by a reviewer of one of Dr. Chapin's books, that the author has a remarkable faculty in producing what are technically called *aphorisms*. Every one who has heard and appreciated him, must have noted the completeness of his sentences. The whole thought, everything essential to the apprehension of his thought, is enunciated. Frequently he compresses into a short metaphor what will easily dilate into the proportions of a discourse. It is not alone the unction of his manner, but, in part, the sententious force of his phrase, that gives that *impetus* to his thought which his hearers always feel. We do deliberately believe, that the writings of no other American preacher produce so large a proportion of aphoristic sentences. We cannot, therefore, give the compiler of the handsome volume named above, credit for any extraordinary skill, simply for making selection of the gems which are set in its pages. This required only industry and an appreciation of the author. But we do concede that he has shown both skill and taste in the very complete, and significantly-worded Index of Subjects, covering fourteen pages, and placed, where it seems to us an index is most convenient, at the beginning of the book. We suspect that the principal labor of the compiler was in this; for, in our experience, a difficult work is to word a compact, yet comprehensive statement of a subject. The compiler has succeeded admirably in this difficult task. The

Introductory Letter by Rev. T. S. King, is a gem in its way—breathing a genuine affection for his once pastor; making frank and hearty confession of indebtedness to him for much that has been developed in his own intellectual growth; and forcibly suggesting the marked qualities in the character of Dr. Chapin, the thinker, the writer, and the orator. The book is handsomely gotten up; and is, what the title purports, a living book. We must not forget to add, that the friends of Dr. Chapin will find prefixed to this volume, the best portrait of their favorite yet published. The artist has caught the expression in his best mood; and has been eminently successful. We trust the book will have what its intrinsic value merits, and what compiler and publisher deserve, a prompt, extensive and remunerative sale.

3. The Pro and Con of Universalism, both as to its Doctrines and Moral Bearings. Sixth Edition. New York: Henry Lyon. 1860.

Like the greeting of an old friend after a separation of years, is the reception of this book. Years ago we made it a special study; and it was soon classed with our favorites. We knew the author—that quaint, plain-spoken, honest, toiling, self-sacrifising, profoundly original, both in thought and expression, and always eccentric genius. We know him intimately—have roomed with him, travelled with him, communed with him; and we know whereof we affirm, when we say, that to him was given a much larger proportion both of heart and of intellect, than to the average of his fellow creatures. The "Pro and Con" was his great argumentative, controversial work. It presents both sides of the argument—always states the popular objection to Universalism with full force, and then meets it with candid yet conclusive rejoinders. It has made many converts to the truth. We are glad to have the evidence furnished by a sixth edition, that the demand for it still continues. It has, we trust, much more work in store before it is destined to class with the obsolete and forgotten.

4. The Friendly Disputants; or, Future Punishment Re-conidered. By Aura, Author of "Ashburn." London: Arthur Hall, Virtue, & Co. 1860. pp. 490.

Strung on the thread of a fictitious dialogue, we have here a series of arguments in defence of a definite, unambiguous Universalism—somewhat after the model of the Winchester dialogues. An English production, it takes, on some minor points—particularly as regards Scripture interpretation—positions not commonly urged the American side of the water. For an example, we

may refer to the stereotyped Calvinistic reply to the Universalist denial of strict endlessness, as the equivalent of "everlasting," as the word appears in Matt. xxv. 46. This reply avers that inasmuch as the same word is affixed to the happiness of the righteous as to the punishment of the wicked, if the word does not express endless duration in the one case, it cannot necessarily in the other. American Universalists concede the point alleged, but deny the Calvinistic conclusion, by affirming that neither as respects the case of the righteous or the wicked, does the term in question distinctively express duration but *quality*—the *kind* of a condition but not the necessary continuance of it. But the authoress of "The Friendly Disputants" denies the allegation, that if the word everlasting expresses a limited duration in the one case, it expresses the same in the other case; and submits a learned and highly interesting argument in support of her position. We single out this specimen of the difference between the English style of Scripture interpretation and that which generally obtains here, because this peculiarity gives the book a special value to us. Our readers will find the Universalism in the book to be sufficiently identical with their own, but some of the argumentation will have for them the charm of freshness. The portions of the work which rest more directly upon reasoning—particularly as respects personal identity, the freedom of the will, the Divine Sovereignty, the mission of evil, the relations of justice and mercy—are presented with much clearness and force. We hail the appearance of "The Friendly Disputants" as an efficient aid in the work of giving the world the more cheering views of the nature and the purposes of God, and the ultimate destiny of human souls. We commend our English ally to the regards of the American brethren.

5. Optimism the Lesson of Ages. A Compendium of Democratic Theology, designed to illustrate Necessities whereby all things are as they are, and to Reconcile the Discontents of Men with the Perfect Love and Power of Ever-Present God. By Benjamin Blood. Boston: Bela Marsh. 1860. pp. 132.

The plan of this work is so comprehensive, it discusses so many distinct branches of the theological theme, that no mere notice can give the reader any clue to its special contents. We have never wavered from the blessed doctrine that *some how* (and the how is often mysterious) all events are for ulterior good. The reality of evil does indeed seem to us a palpable fact, but though this fact perplexes our reason it does not shake our faith. Mr. Blood's philosophy of evil is ingenious, and is apparently supported by good logic; yet it does not fully satisfy

our reason. We must continue to think, that there is a problem involved in this matter of evil, which the finite mind cannot solve. Our author has written something out of the beaten track. He does not disappoint his readers with mere common place. He, indeed, enounces some doctrines from which we heartily dissent; nevertheless we thank him for the book.

6. Methodism Successful, and the Internal Causes of its Success. By Rev. B. F. Tefft, D. D., LL. D. With a letter of Introduction by Bishop Janes. New York: Derby & Jackson. 1860. pp. 588.

An enemy of Methodism, though as well informed in the same facts as Dr. Tefft, would doubtless make out of the facts a very different book. We are fully convinced that the real merits of a sect cannot be stated by either its warm partisan or its warm foe. We have examined this book with some care, and in many cases the facts seem to us at war with the author's deductions. But we have an instinctive dislike of the peculiar instrumentalities of Methodism; the author has, perhaps, an instinctive preference for them. We are glad, however, to see a statement of the causes of the apparent success of Methodism, (and much of its success *we* deem only apparent) stated by one who has the prosperity of the sect so much at heart. We agree with the author, that love, rather than force, gives the Gospel its efficacy. Indeed, we build our whole theology upon this basis. Herein Methodism is by no means peculiar—we think not logically consistent. We confess ourselves instructed, if not in all particulars convinced, by Dr. Tefft's book.

7. Lectures on Logic. By Sir William Hamilton, Bart. Edited by the Rev. Henry L. Mansel, B. D., LL. D., and John Veitch, M. A. Boston: Gould & Lincoln. 1860. 8vo., pp. 731.

We should probably satisfy the publishers did we announce, in the briefest phrase, the appearance of this work; for the name of Sir William Hamilton as the author, is in itself a commendation to which our most enthusiastic word can but slightly approach. We cannot satisfy ourselves, however, without taking the occasion to congratulate the thinking world on so great a contribution to its solid literature. Logic as an abstract science is, by common consent, a dry theme. One would be expected to grow enthusiastic over a table of logarithms as soon as over a treatise on the art of reasoning. The popular orator scrupulously avoids its technicalities and its formulas. The logician, himself, when engaged upon real problems, is anxious to hide the mental machinery by which he works out the solution.

Students take to Logic as a necessity, a drill, very seldom with the anticipation that the labor in itself will prove agreeable. It may seem an extravagant promise, that even Sir William Hamilton has dis-enrobed the subject of its repulsive garb. We will, however, state a fact, and this at the risk of being suspected of affecting singularity: we have read 120 pages of Hamilton's Logic, and found the labor fraught with *pleasure* as well as with profit.

Possibly the surprise with which we have read these pages accounts, in part, for the interest the work has created in us; for, according to all rhetoricians, surprise in the perusal of a book is one of the elements which fascinate. We have been profoundly surprised, not so much at the allegations of ignorance which Hamilton brings against English writers upon Logic, as at the palpable justice of the allegations. He alleges that in Great Britain, "the nature of Logic has been most completely and generally misunderstood;" that "Bacon wholly misconceived its character in certain respects;" that with Locke the misapprehension was "total;" that even Dr. Whately "wrote his *Elements of Logic* in singular unacquaintance with all that had been written on the science in ancient and in modern times, with the exception, apparently, of two works of two Oxford logicians," neither of which rose above "a humble mediocrity," and one of them abounding with "the grossest errors;" and we are certified that Whately's work has simply this recommendation, that it is "the best book on the subject in a language which has absolutely no other deserving of notice!" Such allegations coming from the greatest philosophical authority of the century, and backed by his learned editors, may well surprise a reading public whose partiality has given Whately the post of an authority in the leading institutions of learning, in both Great Britain and America. The justness of the allegations appears in the process whereby Hamilton eliminates whatever has been illegitimately associated with pure Logic, in former definitions of the science. His own definition of the term is another added to those instances of analysis which have made the name of Sir William Hamilton immortal in the annals of pure thought. He strips off, one by one, the husks which under former tending have hidden the pure kernel, till we reach the final definition, that Logic is specifically not the science of thought, nor yet of thought as thought, nor yet of the laws of thought as thought, but the science of the Formal Laws of Thought as Thought.

The author proceeds to treat the whole subject under the two general divisions of Pure Logic and Modified Logic. From these a process of subdivision goes on, till the whole subject-matter is distributed and organized and developed into the

completeness and the symmetry of a system. In the limits of a notice we can not even enter upon a statement of the special contents of so great and so complex a work. For these, we must refer the reader to the book itself. We here take the occasion to record our thanks to the enterprising publishers, to whom we are indebted for so valuable a treatise in a form so attractive. The Lectures on Logic are uniform with the Lectures on Metaphysics. Let both works find their way into the libraries of all who make even the slightest pretensions to rank as students.

8. Prolegomena Logica: An Inquiry into the Psychological Character of Logical Processes. By Henry Longueville Mansel, B. D., LL. D. Boston: Gould & Lincoln. 1860. pp. 291.

A most fitting sequel to the Logic of Hamilton is this smaller work by his accomplished editor, Dr. Mansel. We say a *sequel*, for though psychological matters are prior to logical processes in the order of *nature*, they are subsequent to such processes in the order of *time*. In fact, without some knowledge of the science of logic, the "Prolegomena Logica," will be read to very little profit. Dr. Mansel has attempted to show some of the necessary relations of Psychology to Logic. The treatise distinguishes thought from other facts of consciousness, and then presents its different forms as the subject-matter of the logical process. It is a masterly work, and will richly reward the labors of the diligent student.

9. The Lake Regions of Central Africa. A Picture of Explorations. By Richard F. Burton, Capt. H. M. I. Army, Fellow and Gold Medalist of the Royal Geographical Society. New York: Harper & Brothers. 1860. 8vo., pp. 572.

This makes the sixth work published by the Harpers on African Explorations. They have given the public Livingstone on South Africa, Andersson on Lake Ngami and Southwestern Africa, Cummings' Interior Africa, Wilson's Western Africa, Barth's North Africa, and now Burton's Lake Regions of Central Africa, while a seventh work is promised, Du Chaillu's Equatorial Africa. It is a matter of interest to this age of adventure that not only these books, but the facts they contain, are the fruit of the last twenty years' travel and observation. It would do something besides gratifying an idle curiosity, to compare a map of Africa engraved a quarter of a century ago, with a map prepared with an eye to the present state of geographical knowledge. With the exception of the margin of the African continent, the two maps would show but few points of similarity —very many of dissimilarity. While the new diagram would

exhibit many localities formerly left blank, it would omit not a few—such for example as the Mountains of the Moon—which are laid down on all the old maps. We must confess that as yet we have been unable to examine the work of Burton on "The Lake Regions of Central Africa," with sufficient minuteness to record an opinion of its merit. We can therefore but announce its appearance; and direct to it the attention of those who are familiarizing themselves with the details of recent discoveries in Africa.

10. Philothea: a Grecian Romance. By L. Maria Child. A new and Corrected Edition. Boston: T. O. H. P. Burnham. 1861. pp. 290.

This is by many degrees the best production of the celebrated authoress. Pericles and his Aspasia, and others of the great names of the Periclean age in Athens, appear in the artistically wrought pages with wonderful fidelity to the truth of history. If there is an exception to this statement it appears in the character of Plato. Some readers, we apprehend, will find more of mysticism associated with her picture of the great philosopher than will suit their tastes. Possibly an appreciation equal to that of the authoress, would show that any criticism of this nature is without foundation. We doubt if any classical romance equals Philothea as a vivid picture of Athenian intellectual life in the brilliant age of the democratic ascendancy. The paper slightly tinted, and the clear, round type are worthy of the literary gem they enclose.

11. Coins, Medals, and Seals, Ancient and Modern. Illustrated and Described. With a Sketch of the History of Coins and Coinage. Instructions for Young Collectors, Tables of Comparative Rarity, Price Lists of English and American Coins, Medals and Tokens, &c., &c. Edited by W. C. Prime. New York: Harper & Brothers. 1861.

The editor assures us that "it is no idle employment, though it seems so, to sit quietly over Greek or Persian, Roman or Punic, French, Turkish, English or American coins, and seek to trace, in pure fancy, the history of one and another shining piece;" and he names, as one good result, that the "coins serve to fix historical facts with great firmness in the memory." With handsomely engraved pictures of the several coins and medals, the editor furnishes the corresponding history, and shows that in these "more than in any other movements, the past is preserved, and its heroes and great events kept memorable." The book is full of curious information, and will be eagerly welcomed by a certain class of antiquarians. It is issued in a very neat style of typography.

12. Travels in the Regions of the Upper and Lower Amoor and the Russian Acquisitions on the confines of India and China. With Adventures among the Mountain Kirghis; and the Manjours, Manquargs, Toungous, Touzempts, Goldi, and Gelyaks; the Hunting and Pastoral Tribes. By Thomas Witlam Atkinson, F. G. S., F. R. G S. With a Map and Numerous Illustrations. New York: Harper & Brothers. 1860. 8vo., pp. 448.

Hardly any region of the globe has been less known to Europeans than the vast valley of the Amoor separating Asiatic Russia from the Chinese Empire. And this ignorance has naturally been the occasion of much anxiety to British statesmen, inasmuch as this secluded region, touching the British Indian empire on the north, has given the Russians an opportunity to make secret advances towards the British possessions. Mr. Atkinson, the only European that has been permitted to enter this region, having spent several years in exploring the country, very properly presumes that his discoveries will have a peculiar value in the eyes of British rulers. But his work is not for statesmen only. His observations embraced very much of interest to men of science generally—particularly the ethnologist, the botanist, and the geologist. Further, the much larger class who have a passion for works of adventure, will have an immense fund of entertainment in Mr. Atkinson's feats of daring, hardship, and triumph over physical nature among the mountains and deserts, and along the rivers of the vast region drained by the Amoor. Commerce will owe much to his labors, which have opened "a field of almost incalculable extent, where enterprise, skill, and industry are sure to find a profitable investment." The author's reputation, placed very high by his former book of Siberian travels, will not suffer by this last issue. He takes rank considerably above the average of tourists. We must complain of the map as too crowded with details to be readily available for the ordinary reader. The wood-cuts are excellent.

13. Whims and Oddities, with One Hundred and Twelve Illustrations; and National Tales. By Thomas Hood. New York: Derby & Jackson. 1861. pp. 451.

The appearance of the "Whims and Oddities" demonstrated that even puns—usually the cheapest substitute for humor—could be made a basis of genial humor; that is, could be made so by *one* person, for we think it doubtful if any one but Thomas Hood ever displayed a faculty for such a work. We are pleased to see such a collection of fun-provoking miscellanies. He would be a stoic who can even look at the pictures without an accompanying smile. The "National Tales" have decided positive

merit; but they are the least satisfactory of Hood's literary productions. We learn with pleasure that the complete works of Thomas Hood, in the best style of print, are soon to appear.

14. The New American Cyclopædia: A Popular Dictionary of General Knowledge. Edited by George Ripley and Charles A. Dana. Volume xi. Macgillivray—Moxa. New York: D. Appleton & Co. Boston: Elliot & White. 1861.

Prominent among the articles in this volume are "James Madison," "Magnetism," "Horace Mann," (highly and deservedly eulogistic), "Mansfield," (the great British jurist) "Mechanics," "Mazzini," (whose history is traced to so recent an event as Garibaldi's expedition into Sicily), "Medicine," "Microscope," "Milk," (a particularly instructive paper), "Foreign Missions," "Mohammedanism," and "Mormons." The volume contains in all about 1800 articles. Our references to the New Cyclopædia have satisfied us that every word of the commendation we have heretofore bestowed upon the work, is richly merited. It has so greatly served us in our humble literary labors, that it has become a necessity to us. We urge it upon our readers—the clerical portion of them particularly—to avail themselves of the volumes as they appear. They will make few investments, if any, that will return them more satisfactory dividends. We are eager to see the volumes completed. In this instance, however, we realize that patience is essential to perfect work.

15. View of the State of Europe during the Middle Ages. By Henry Hallam, L.L. D. In Three Volumes. Boston: Crosby, Nichols, Lee & Co. 1861.

The dissolution of the Roman empire left the nations of Europe heretofore tributary to the empire, in a state of complete chaos. How the fragments were put together again; how some pieces were framed into a kingdom here; and other pieces into a kingdom there; how one aggregation made France, another Spain, another Italy, another Germany, and so on throughout Europe,—all together make as fruitful and as profitable a theme for the historian as can be conceived. Fortunately, a man equal to the task of treating the theme appeared in Henry Hallam. Profoundly versed in the lore of the Middle Ages; comprehensive in his judgments; fully appreciating and sympathising with the social and intellectual peculiarities of the ages which he describes; without a living equal on the score of impartiality; always terse, clear, and often eloquent in style, his View of the State of Europe during the Middle Ages has deservedly ranked

with the highest of the English classics. A Whig, though of the conservative school, Mr. Hallam was at first the subject of severe tory criticism, but time has shown the fallacy of objections coming from this quarter. To-day, no English historian is read with such general and unquestioning confidence as Henry Hallam.

The Boston publishers have put the history into its handsomest mechanical garb. Even London will give their edition the preference over every other. Such typography would make even a dull page inviting. We are happy to add that the three volumes noticed, are but the first instalment of the entire works of the same historian.

16. Recent Inquiries in Theology, by Eminent English Churchmen. Being "Essays and Reviews." Edited with an Introduction, by Rev. Frederic H. Hedge, D. D. Boston: Walker, Wise & Co. 1860. pp. 480.

It is difficult to realize that these essays are from clergymen of the Episcopal Church—that productions so liberal in some respects, so radical in others, and in not a few cases making a too near approach to rationalistic speculations,—are from an Establishment proverbially stolid and inflexible in its conservatism. The Oxford Tracts of twenty years ago, inaugurating a movement towards Romanism, and these Essays, pointing towards the very extreme of Protestantism, taken together, demonstrate the fact of a fatal schism in the English Church. The Tractarians are the most logical; but the Progressives have the sympathy of the great public. We have the same essential thing here in the antagonisms of Andover and Princeton — Princeton having the argument, and Andover the people! The truth is, humanity has got ahead of the old postulates of theology; and thinking men prefer inconsistency in theorizing, to further unequivocal acknowledgment of dogmas which outrage the human heart. The leading spirits of the book under notice are Rowland Williams, Baden Powell, and Benjamin Jowett. Jowett, in his essay "On the Interpretation of Scripture," makes the greatest contribution both as respects bulk and value. Whatever we may think of the extreme tendencies of this essay or of its logical implications, there is evidently something of truth in the position, that words and maxims spoken eighteen centuries ago, and to a peculiar people, cannot have an unqualified application to all people, and in all ages. To suppose that the creeds of modern Christendom were the formal beliefs of Christ and his apostless, is as preposterous as to suppose that they believed in the Hamiltonian metaphysics. Of Powell's essay

"On the Study of the Evidences of Christianity," we cannot speak in terms of commendation. It seems to us an unchristian assumption that man can receive the Christian doctrines without the aid of an external revelation. We regret that a book which contains so much of fresh thought, and has in it so much of the Christian unction, should have its mission for good impeded by speculations which, we must think, are subversive of the Christian revelation. As a whole, this book of "Essays and Reviews" is the most significant publication of our day.

17. The Conduct of Life. By R. W. Emerson. Boston: Ticknor & Fields. 1860.

Most of the papers in this collection we had the privilege of hearing read by the author—some of them more than once. The essays on "Fate," "Power," "Wealth," "Culture," and "Beauty," we recognize as quite familiar. They inspired us when we heard them — particularly the two on Power and Beauty. There is less of mysticism in Mr. Emerson's later productions; unless, indeed, he has educated his admirers to a higher appreciation of his thought—a very agreeable conceit indeed, if conceit it be. It is clear, that his mind is taking a more practical turn; his thought which once glittered without warming, now touches our sympathies and moves us to act. Mr. Emerson is the great American thinker; and to this conclusion his once hostile critics are being forced. The first emphatic recognition of his power was by Europeans; and to the unbiased judgment thus expressed, his countrymen, however unwillingly in some instances, must bow.

18. Home Ballads and Poems. By John Greenleaf Whittier. Boston: Ticknor & Fields.

For descriptive poetry with New England themes, as well as for the impetuous verse with philanthropic aim, Whittier ranks first among our poets. There are pieces in this fresh supply equal to any in his former publications. He never wrote anything better than "My Psalm," page 125. His friends will eagerly avail themselves of this new collection.

19. Hymns of the Ages. Second Series. Being selected from Wither, Cranshaw, Southwell, Habington, and other Sources. Boston: Ticknor & Fields. 1861.

There is a quaint grandeur, and at the same time an earnest simplicity in this collection of hymns. They are evidently compiled by one whose religious aspirations are strong and fervid,

and whose appreciation of sacred poetry is delicate and pure. Warm, pious hearts will thank the industry that has brought them together. The print is antique, and the paper slightly tinted. It makes an exquisitely beautiful volume, alike in its contents and its mechanical execution.

20. The Four Georges. Sketches of Manners, Morals, Court and Town Life. By W. M. Thackeray. With Illustrations. New York: Harper & Brothers. 1860. pp. 241.

If compelled to single out the literary treat of our life,—the one which by its peculiar zest has the pre-eminence over other intellectual entertainments,—we should unhesitatingly name Thackeray's lectures on the Four Georges, Kings of England. We gladly welcome their re-appearance in book-form. They are full of pictures—living portraits rather—of the celebrated men and women who flourished or fluttered in the presence of British royalty during the epoch of the Brunswick dynasty. In each lecture, except the last, the post of stupidity is filled by the king. The Republican most prejudiced against monarchies, could not give vent to more disgust and contempt than Thackeray evinces for the first three Georges. George the Fourth was not stupid, he was, in Thackeray's phrase, "a hog!" The rottenness of the British Court during this monarch's supremacy was probed and laid open to the gaze of an American audience, and this by a subject of the British crown! It seemed to us when we heard him, that Mr. Thackeray was *acquainted*, and on jocose terms, with Walpole, with Hervey, with the two Pitts, with Lord North and Mr. Wilkes. It is indeed a marvellous faculty which can make mere book acquaintances seem so real. To us the book will have value as a memorial of the pleasure we felt in hearing Mr. Thackeray.

21. Brief Biographies. By Samuel Smiles. With Steel Portraits. Boston: Ticknor & Fields. 1861.

The several Biographies were first published in English periodicals, and are now brought together at the suggestion of the American publishers. The book embraces one tolerably long sketch of James Watt, and very brief ones of Dr. Arnold, Francis Jeffrey, Thomas Carlyle, Leigh Hunt, Hartly Coleridge, Edgar A. Poe, Harriet Martineau, and other distinguished persons in the different walks of life. The author of "Self-Help" could hardly write a poor book. He has a sudden yet solid reputation in this country.

22. A Man. By Rev. J. D. Bell. Philadelphia: James Challen & Son. 1860.

If the title of this book is indefinite, its contents are not. It is divided into two parts; each part having several papers; and each paper several articles,—the whole classification being logical alike in form and in fact. We have a paper on Representative Invalids, another on the Senses, another on the Thinker, another on Tears: Then follow successively papers on Aspiration, Genius, the Inventor, and the Three Inspirations—embracing the poet, the orator, and the hero. "A Man" is indeed a "many-sided" creature, and it takes much philosophy to make a complete analysis of him in his nature, his infirmities, his capabilities, and his work. The author has been a studious reader; and his book proves that he knows how to make his attainments effective. The book abounds in wit, wisdom and wholesome advice.

23. Memorials of Thomas Hood. Collected, Arranged, and Edited by his Daughter. With a Preface and Notes by his Son. Illustrated with Copies from his own Sketches. In two volumes. Boston: Ticknor & Fields. 1860. pp. 310, 327.

Who will not rejoice at the reception of these Memorials of the inimitable punster. Memorials they indeed are, for from the beginning to the end, they are characteristic of the genius of that wonderful humorist, who found it difficult ever to be grave, but who was never buffoonish—in whom fun in its most etherial purity, seemed to dwell personified. Thomas Hood is better known through his writings than any modern author with perhaps the single exception of Charles Lamb; and with the same exception, no one is remembered with more sincere affection. He was the most kindly of humorists, and sadness and complaining fled before him as dew before the sun. And yet his life had in it much of severe trial. It was beset at every turn with obstacles, pecuniary and social, that would have broken down a less resolute and persevering spirit. Strange to say, his most humorous pieces were written during the season of his greatest troubles. His closing years brought trials that moved the sympathies of his friends, yet he himself was habitually cheerful, and his literary life flowed on in song and humor. The volumes before us have been prepared with filial affection; and with occasional exceptions, a remarkable exemption from those trivialities which the partiality of near relations too often magnifies into matters of importance. We shall receive few books the reading of which will give us so much pleasure.

Art. IX.

The Man Christ Jesus as a Teacher.

It may well be doubted if there has ever been on earth another personage so widely known and so little understood as the Man Christ Jesus. Unquestionably true that the world has always been divided in opinion concerning those who have acted the most conspicuous part in its history; and the rule would seem to be, that the more prominent the character and position of the man, the greater the diversity of opinion concerning him. Men are not yet agreed concerning the character of Mahomet, the founder of Islamism. Some think him an artful, crafty, ambitious and designing impostor, who sought his own profit and honor, and purposely imposed a system of falsehood upon the people, knowing it to be such; others think, that, in the outset of his career, at least, he was a sincere and honest man, ardently desirous of restoring the religion of his people to its purity and simplicity; of preserving the worship of the one only living and true God, and of redeeming the world from the horrible curse of polytheism and idolatry. This idea so possessed him, and became inwrought in every fibre of his soul, that he believed his mission to be divine, and mistook the fervor of his imagination for the inspiration of God. Which of these opinions is correct is of no consequence to our present purpose. The simple fact which we note is, that the men of this age differ in opinion in regard to the character of Mahomet.

But the peculiarity of the case of Christ is, that differences of opinion, in the premises, involve not so much his character as his *nature*, and the rank he holds in the scale of being. On all hands it is agreed that he was a lover of his race—a philanthropist of the highest type—a self-sacrificing reformer, who sought to do good, and whose life was pure and blameless. The question concerning him has therefore been, not so much whether or not he was a *wise* and good man, as whether he was indeed a man. Some hold that he was no other than God himself, veiled in flesh and blood; others, that his nature was super-angelic; and

others, that he was a man, exalted above his fellows, and endued with wisdom and power, such as have been given to no other man on earth. It is not our purpose to argue these points *pro* or *con*, in this article. Using the words of Paul, we have characterized him in our caption as "The Man Christ Jesus," and in that aspect, we could consider him. If any think this is degrading him let them reflect, that, it is no ordinary man, no common personage, that can, in a short mission of three years, so make his mark upon humanity, that, for eighteen centuries, the human mind shall war upon the question, whether he be indeed man, angel, or God. No such question as that ever arose concerning Moses, or the Prophets, or John the Baptist, or the Apostles, or any other man. The mere fact that such a question has been agitated concerning him of Nazareth is proof that he wrought as no other man wrought, and that there is in him a moral grandeur and glory that exalt him above other men. All the more glorious are his wisdom and power; and all the more interesting and lovely is his character, because he comes near to us, as an elder brother, and shows us what exaltation God has prepared for man. It is this man, Christ Jesus, that the world has failed to comprehend, and has practically degraded, by stripping him of his humanity and vainly striving to make him the equal of God.

The work he undertook to perform was one of immense magnitude. He was a Jew, and he lived among a people of all others most devoted to the religion of their fathers. That religion was associated in their minds with a long and eventful history—with all the pride and glory of their nation, and with a series of wonders which God had wrought in their behalf. It had in its favor the learning, the wealth, the influence, the popular feeling, and the temporal power of the people. And yet, this man, born of lowly parents, and in an obscure village, without wealth, learning or friends, announced his intention to work a radical change in their entire system—to do away with circumcision and burnt offerings and sacrifices—to abolish the Temple Service and set up instead, the spiritual worship of the Father, and inaugurate a system which should supersede Moses and the Prophets. Nay, more. He did not propose to confine his work to his own people, but to convert nations to God,

turn men from their idols, and bring them to the knowledge of the Father as God over all. How great a work this is may be inferred from the fact that Jeremiah says it was not known in his day that a nation had changed their Gods. Priestly says: "There is not a single instance in all history of a nation changing their religion from the force of persuasion or example. To subdue a nation by force of arms is a small thing compared with changing their religion. Calamities though awful and threatening and approaching to extermination have not been able to accomplish this work." But this Man, Jesus, proposed to change not only the religion of the Jewish people, but of the world also. And this he would do by the power of truth; and it is as a Teacher of truth that we propose to view him in this article.

I. *Of the Presence of the Man.* Of his personal address we know little or nothing. And yet, it is doubtless true, that we all have in our mind's eye some ideal of his personal aspect, as we have of every one of whom we hear or read. It is so with the writer of the present article. But that ideal is not the picture in books, of a sort of dignified marble man, with a halo of light about his head, and the humanity all blotted out of his countenance, in an attempt to make him look like a god. The best specimens of art in this line are, to us, perversions of truth as to his personal presence. To us, Jesus, in his external appearance, is a *man*, nothing more or less. He is bone of our bone and flesh of our flesh. He ate, he drank, he walked, he talked and slept, like other men. If the external corresponded with the internal, he was a man, the prominent expression of whose countenance was that of calm and placid benignity, so beaming with benevolence and kindness that one might go to him, though a stranger, in any trouble or difficulty and open to him the secrets of his heart, feeling sure that he would receive sympathy and a blessing. Should he appear in our midst as he was in the days of his earthly pilgrimage, we should expect to see in him nothing to *repel* but every thing to attract; a man not proud or haughty in his bearing, not apparently conscious of his own dignity, but meek, humble and mild—calm as the summer morning, his very look a benediction; a man whose aspect was so benignant and so *human* that every one of us would like to go and take him by the hand and

talk with him—whom even children would not fear, but pluck his garments as he went, if haply they might attract his attention and get a word from his lips or a smile from his countenance. If he were to speak, we should expect that same calm and serene benignity to dwell in the tones of his voice and breathe from his words—no display of oratory—none of the mandatory style of Moses, the sententious aphorisms of Solomon—the poetic imagery of David—the fire and fervor of Isaiah—the pathos of Jeremiah, or the austerity of the Baptist; but *simplicity itself*, uttering great principles in parables and appealing to what is in man, by the most pertinent and familiar illustrations. We should expect to go away feeling that we had communed with a spirit that was wise and good and pure, and that we had been made wise and better by that communion. Such is our idea of the personal presence of this wonderful man.

II. *Of his Method.* By the term method we intend to indicate the arrangement and adaptation of means to ends—the *way* in which he sought to teach divine truth. In his method of procedure there are several peculiarities.

1. His instructions were entirely oral. He taught with the living voice, and did not write at all. All precedent, whether among the religious or philosophical teachers of the world, would seem to have indicated to him the propriety and even the necessity of placing his new system, of so much value and importance to the world, in some permanent and enduring form, as Moses wrote the Law on tables of stone. Moses and Solomon and David and the Prophets all *wrote*. It is said of Jesus, on a certain occasion, "He stooped down and wrote with his finger upon the ground;" and besides the few unknown characters in the sand, he wrote nothing. Such was his confidence in truth and in the self-perpetuating immortality of the doctrines he taught, that he merely breathed them out upon the air, in the hearing of those that would listen, and left them to take care of themselves. He would impress them not on tables of stone, but upon the tables of the heart, and leave thom there to live by their own power or live not at all.

2. In his oral teachings, there is a peculiarity of method. "He spake unto them in parables, and without a parable spake he not unto them." Moses gave a long code of defi-

nite laws, and reduced the doctrines of his religion to set forms of speech. David taught in verse. Solomon embodied his wisdom in brief aphorisms and proverbs that can be easily remembered. The Prophets gave wings to the imagination and indulged in flights of poetic eloquence. But Jesus spoke in parables. He had mostly to do with great principles that could not well be embraced in set forms of words without being cramped and fettered. He therefore took the things with which the people were most familiar—introduced the actors into the scenes that he depicted, and thus held up the lesson that he would teach, not merely in *words*, but in a living picture, enacted, as it were, in their vision. Æsop's Fables have been greatly admired because they thus embody instruction in living forms and acts rather than in mere words and definitions. But Æsop's Fables are overstrained, uncouth and grotesque as compared with the beautiful simplicity and life-like truthfulness of the parables of Jesus. It would require a learned man, a philosopher and a metaphysician, to take the parable of the Prodigal Son and reduce all its lessons to scientific forms of faith and speech. But a child can understand it in the form in which it came from the lips of the Great Teacher. Whole volumes of dissertations on theology and disquisitions on ethical science could hardly teach as much, and vast libraries full of homilies could better be spared from the world than that single parable.

III. *He taught Authoritatively.* This peculiarity in his method was noticed by those who heard him, and said; "He teacheth as one having authority, and not as the Scribes." The idea may be illustrated as follows: logicians and philosophers have various modes of investigating and presenting truth. There is the analytical method, which examines the subject in all its parts separately, for the purpose of finding the original principles on which it rests. There is the synthetical method, which advances by a regular chain of reasoning, from principles admitted or propositions proved, or assumed, to the conclusion. And again, there is the inductive method, which rises from facts to general principles, and affirms of the whole what has been found true of the parts. In all these methods the effort of the teacher is to present the grounds on which he *rests* his instructions, and lead the mind to a perception

of the *process* by which truth is evolved; so that, in the end, conviction rests upon the presumption of the correctness of the logical process. But Christ adopted, as a general thing, none of these methods. It is true that, in his intercourse with his enemies, who sought to "entangle him in his talk," he manifested a remarkable degree of logical acumen and wonderful power of argumentation; so that, compared with him, Socrates is but a cunning questioner, or an artful dodger, alongside of a profound and fair reasoner. It is true, also, that he sometimes *reasoned* from nature up to nature's God. But this was not his general method of teaching. It could not have been so consistently with his professions. His avowed object was not to propound or construct a system of philosophy which should rest on the demonstrations of *science;* but it was to reveal a system of religion which should stand on the basis of faith. The first idea of a Divine revelation is, that the thing *revealed* is not attainable by any mere process of reasoning. There is no necessity that God should interpose by a special revelation, to teach men astronomy, botany, or chemistry, because these sciences are within our reach and may be learned by the simple exercise of the powers which the Creator has given us, and by methods of human invention. But God cannot be known except he reveal himself. *Man*, in his relations to the spiritual and the invisible—duty, as growing out of those relations, and *destiny* in the future—*these* are matters that we cannot approach by any scientific process. They cannot be proved by mathematical demonstration or by chemical analysis, by induction or synthesis, or any logical process; and for this reason they must be *revealed.* These were the matters of which Jesus treated; and for this reason he rejected the ordinary methods of men, and announced truth by authority. We do not, therefore, find him engaged in any metaphysical disquisitions, nor laboring, in profound philosophical discourse, to explain to his disciples how he had elaborated his doctrines from the principles of science, or reared them on the facts of experience or consciousness. But he speaks simply as one who knows whereof he affirms. He tells them that the Father has taught him and sent him to bear *witness* unto the truth; *not* to demonstrate it logically—that the seal of heaven is upon his commission; and the reason he gives is, "Verily

I say unto you, it is thus or so," and on the basis of that authority he challenges their faith.

Swedenborg has imitated him in this regard. In all his revelations, which he claims as coming from the spirit-world, he merely relates the things that he saw and heard, as if he never suspected that any body would doubt their truth or fail to receive them on his authority. In this he was consistent. He professed to be a seer of things which to other men were invisible; and he knew well enough that the nature of his revelations was such that they could not be demonstrated to others logically or stand on the basis of human science; and, therefore, his appeal must be to *faith*, and that faith must rest on authority. Spirits in the other world may appear and live, very much as they do here, but that fact, if it be a fact, cannot be proved by logic. It must rest on authority. Whatever may be said or thought of the validity of the authority of the Swedish seer, the very *method* that he adopted goes far to prove that he was honest and sincere, and not an intentional falsifier or deceiver. And this was pre-eminently the method of the Man Christ Jesus. He taught as one having authority, and his appeal was to faith. Much has been said against this characteristic of Christ, and objectionable as is the idea of believing on authority, to some minds, the *principle* is legitimate, and the Great Teacher would have failed in his mission if he had adopted any other method of teaching. The reason is that the faith of the *heart* is even more needful than the faith of the intellect, and to secure that, truth must be embodied in some living form, to which faith can cling, and on whose authority it can rely. The dying man cannot pause to review all his reasonings and test anew the logical aspects of his faith. But he wants the teacher, on whose authority he can rely, to stand by him, that he may look up into his face and hear the word of life fresh from his lips and believe them, with all his heart, *because* of him from whom they come. The mother who has laid her child in the dust and, in the woe of her bereavement, stands by its grave, does not want to receive the logic of her faith. But she wants some one, in whom she can confide, to stand by her, that she may lean her aching head upon his bosom, and feel the inspirations of a diviner life and holier faith flowing from her heart's confidence in his

authority. And this we have in Christ. And this is the reason that faith in him is often strongest and most blessed in its influence when the intellect is enfeebled by disease and approaching death, so that it would fail in any attempt to comprehend a syllogism of Aristotle or a problem of Euclid.

IV. *Christ's Method was positive and absolute.* In all mere human reasonings, whether conducted on the method of induction, analysis, or synthesis, there is a shade of uncertainty. Of the past, much is confessedly fabulous, and all history gives us no more than pictures of things that have been. The present is with us, indeed, but much of it is in the distance and uncertain, or unknown. And as for the future, we cannot penetrate its darkness, or, by any process of reasoning, announce one positive or absolute truth in reference to it. The result is that wisest teachers deal much in conjectures and hypothesis, and are often compelled to be content with possibilities and probabilities. But it is not so with Christ. His *method* was absolute. The truths he announced are not stated hypothetically, but positively. We find in him no timid reasonings from premises that are doubtful, or hypothesis that may not be made good. But with him, the past, the present and the future are alike in this regard; and he announces what *shall be* with as much assurance and as little doubt as what *has been* or *is now*.

1. God is a reality. He does not derive the fact of the Divine existence from any process of logic, nor attempt to defend it by any demonstrations of science. He assumes it as an absolute truth, and announces it positively and without hesitation or conditions. With him, God is no myth, but a positive existence; his *will* is the Supreme Law of the Universe; his character, the Eternal Father, and the Everlasting Friend. He does not speculate as other teachers, in reference to the disposition and purposes of God; nor propound his hypothesis of what *may be* and what *may not be*. But directly, and without equivocation, he announces the truth of God, sitting on his throne of thrones, holding all things under his supreme control, and reigning in an unchanging benignity, that "makes the sun to rise on the evil and the good, and sends rain upon the just and the unjust"—feeds the fowls of the air—decks the lilies of the

field—watches the sparrow when it falls, and numbers the hairs upon our heads. He yearns with inexpressible tenderness over the creatures that he has made, and even over the prodigals when they wander; and the rule by which he walks without deviation is, to *do* and to communicate good. On these simple, absolute and eternal truths, Jesus rears the whole fabric of religion. God's relation to man is not, as others teach, hypothetical or dependent upon circumstances, and changing with the changes that take place in man. But it is an attitude of unchanging benignity, which, amid all changes, remains the same, and nothing can turn away the great love wherewith he hath loved us. That love begins and ends and consecrates all the teachings of Christ, and he every where announces it as an absolute and eternal truth.

2. Duty is positive. Among men, there have been and still are, various and conflicting theories of duty and moral obligation; and the fault of the most of them is, that they are *relative* and *hypothetical*, not positive and absolute. They have respect to the external, rather than the internal, and their effort is to solve the problem of duty, not by an unvarying and immutable Law; but by circumstances and expedients. Hence the long codes of laws and rules for the regulation of men's hands, imposing what are called duties, and promising rewards, and annexing pains and penalties; all resting upon, and mistaking, expediency for duty. But Christ announces one positive and Eternal Law, as the reality of all moral obligation, and the practice of it the sum of all duty, and that is *the* Law of Love. The idea of duty is that of something *due* for something received. The absolute truth is, that all human beings have received and are continually receiving from God the abundance of his love, and on this indestructable basis rests the duty of love to him. If we love him we shall love our fellow men, because they are his children and our brethren. And on this immutable foundation of truth, namely, God's eternity and man's *fraternity*, rests the duty of love to God and man. Here, then, is the source of all moral obligation and the sum of all duty, and they are absolute and unchanging.

That was a great word which Newton uttered, when working his way through phenomena up to their causes, he

laid his finger upon the *one* law of universal gravitation, and, planting himself upon the summit of human thought, announced the truth, that the universe is governed by attraction; and that this one law *regulates* all the movements and distributes all the harmonies of the worlds that God has made. Whether the vapors rise or the rains fall —whether the earth moves or the ponderous orbs of Jupiter and Uranus sweep their mighty circles through the regions of space—whether the dew-drops glisten upon the flower or the mote dances in the sun beam, the rivers flow or the ocean heaves its tides; *all* these complicated movements proceed from, and are regulated by, *one* great law. But that was a greater word which was uttered by the Man Christ Jesus, when standing amid the mysteries of the moral universe, he announced the truth, that *that*, too, is governed by attraction, and that *one* absolute and eternal law regulates and pervades all its movements and activities —that in and by this law of love, God reigns over it, and conducts all its vicissitudes onward from Eden to the final consummation, and that, in all this course of discipline, he has not departed from it in any single instance. On this firm and absolute basis of the love of God, rests all moral obligation binding us to love him and our brethen, and in these, all duty is done. Christ thus gives us the great first principle, which is applicable to all times and all circumstances, and of that application we have yet much to learn. What we want is not codes of laws, and rules and regulations for the outward man; but we want conformity to this law of love in the inner man. We want to apply it to the family circle, and teach husbands and wives, fathers and mothers, brothers and sisters how to live by it, so that our homes and firesides may be consecrated by it, and become temples consecrated by the teachings of the Great Teacher, and hallowed by the sensible presence of the God of love. We want to apply this law of love to our social intercourse with our fellow men; so that social life shall be a life of love and kindness. We want to take it into the marts of trade and commerce, and the fields of industry, so that the antagonisms of business shall feel its power, and the counting-house and the work shop shall be pervaded by its presence, and become meet for the dwelling of Christ. We want this law infused into government and legislation,

so that rulers shall rule in its might, and all human laws be founded upon it, and the *lex talionis* shall be expunged from our statute books. We want the presence of this law, in the treatment of the criminal, the vicious and profligate; so that we may no longer view them as *things* to be crushed and blotted out, but men to be won back to God, and saved by its power. The nations have need to be taught this law of love, that they may beat their swords into ploughshares, and their spears into pruning-hooks, and study war no more. All this was taught rudimentally and founded on an absolute basis of truth by the "Man Christ Jesus."

3. Destiny is absolute. In this respect, other teachers fail. They are hypothetical and not positive. They suspend destiny upon contingencies, and do not announce the result. They tell us what destiny *may be*, if certain conditions are fulfiled, but whether they *will* or will *not* be fulfiled they do not know. Destiny is a problem yet unsolved, and they have no positive method for its solution. There is a heaven and there is a hell. If certain conditions are made good, men will go to the first, if not, to the last; and whether they will or will not be made good, is a point concerning which the oracles are dumb. If the individual soul faint and weary with the battle of life, and thirsting for life and immortal rest, goes to the wisest of the teachers of these systems and says, "Tell me, I pray you, what destiny is reserved for me?" The answer must be, "I do not know. That depends upon circumstances. It may be heaven or it may be hell, and I have no positive method by which I can determine which shall be your portion."

It was not so with Christ. But when he said of men in the resurrection, "They are equal unto the angels, neither can they die any more, and are the children of God, being children of the resurrection," he announced destiny, not hypothetically, but positively and absolutely. And so, when he said, "The Father loveth the Son and hath given all things into his hands;" "Of all that the Father giveth me I will lose nothing, but will raise it up again at the last day," he propounds no hypothesis, no unsolved problem, but a positive and absolute truth, which is based upon principles that are universal and unchangable.

We have thus taken a brief view of some of the peculiarities of the "Man Christ Jesus" as a teacher. If any are disposed to think that we have not given him a position of sufficient prominence as the founder of a spiritual kingdom and a ruler over men, let them remember that truth is mighty and must prevail; that Christ's Kingdom is not of this world, a kingdom of force—but that truth, *divine* truth is the sword of the spirit, by which he conquors, and his dominion is the dominion of love. Back in the ages, there was a man named Plato, who taught philosophy. He systematized human thought. And there grew up a school called the Platonic school. It spread far and wide, and Plato became the teacher of teachers. So wide has his influence been that, unto this day, there is scarcely a respectable school of philosophy on which there are not traces of the impress of his master mind. So true is this, that a recent writer has said, "He that would study philosophy must study Plato, for Plato is philosophy." How vast the dominion of this man over the intellects of the world! He had no visible crown or throne; and yet no king that ever reigned has swayed the sceptre of a kingdom half so wide or enduring. Why may not Jesus reign over human hearts without a throne or a sceptre, or the outward paraphernalia of government? It is to be noted that he *lived* as well as taught, and thus became the embodiment of that law of love which is the fulfilment of all law. From that life, closing as it did with a prayer for his murderers, and from his teachings there went out a mighty spiritual force, the power of which cannot be estimated, and which is yet destined to conquer the world. We do not bring Christ near to our hearts, when we seek to exalt him and place him upon a visible throne, with a sceptre in his hand, and a crown upon his head. Rather do we put him away from us. He comes near to us only, when we see him as "the Man Christ Jesus," a partaker of our nature, tempted as we are, and yet, conquering by the omnipotence of truth and love. I. D. W.

Art. X.

A Glance at the Arena.

When the scholarly Casaubon first visited Paris, and was being shown over the Sorbonne, his guide observed, "This is the hall in which the doctors have disputed for three hundred years."—"Ay;" retorted the critic, "and what have they settled?" In view of the present aspect of Theology, and the actual or impending dissolution of all ecclesiastical unity, we are tempted to lay all the swordsmen of the Church under suspicion, and to demand, with Casaubon, what have they settled?

At the present tide of spiritual experience, the position of every Christian thinker is big with interest, excitement, and responsibility. The bands of the ancient faith are unclasping, and the fibres of the new faith are not yet firmly knit. The religious elements—no longer cohering and combining—dissolve in the alembic of speculation, or sink in the eddies of doubt. The spectator sees no more any *systems* of religion, compact and vigorous, authoritative and venerable; but fragmentary theologies, ruinous ecclesiasticism, and relics of mediæval dogmas that have died on the march. The tongue and pen of man—no longer subservient to the authority of tradition—lend their eloquence and vigor to the latest ideas; and the platform and press are already the ascendant powers in our civilization, and the acknowledged creators of public opinion. Our young men can not longer follow in the footsteps of their fathers. However baited by fashion, influenced by habit, coaxed by affection, or threatened by bigotry, they are seeking new paths, and confiding in new guides. The old formula of life does not fit their conscious spiritual condition. Their navigation does not verify the old chart of the universe. The old terrors have ceased to alarm; the old homilies have ceased to edify. To most young men, of vigorous understanding and sound health, the Church is, we apprehend, little better than a superannuated grandmother, whose counsel is heard with impatience, and disregarded with impunity. In spite of all the restraints it can summon, their adventurous reason or vault-

ing passions clear the barrier, and they are launched upon a troubled element, clouded by speculation and bounded by mystery. However dubious their prospects, there is little authority left to reclaim them; for the experience of the leading human societies—uniting with the illimitable expansion of material discovery—has refuted the boasted infallibility alike of the Romish and evangelical Churches; and the baffled interpreters stand aghast before an insurrection of doubt, that threatens to culminate in a general reign of infidelity.

We see, in this tendency, many things unpleasant to contemplate. But why should we ignore a phenomenon that chances not to give us pleasure? We hold that a Christian thinker ought to look at all facts—whether auspicious or otherwise—that appear in the unfolding scenery of his age,—giving such account of them as he may be qualified to furnish, and not affecting, with a base timidity, to banish the threatening omens by shutting his own eyes. If an incompetent teamster, having overturned his coach and fifteen passengers, were to sit down by the way-side, ignore the catastrophe, crack his whip cherily, and assume that all was right, it would hardly change the depressing fact, or improve the reputation of that line of travel. If the old ecclesiastical coach has really capsized—if the spring-torrent of new life, pouring in from the fountains of modern science and philanthropy, has rent such chasms in the orthodox turnpike, as to endanger the safety of passengers and suspend spiritual intercourse—the plain dictate of common sense is, to right the vehicle and repair the road.

This prosperous America of ours, with all its luxurious furniture, has more skepticism than its theology can confute, and more irreligion than its churches can cure. Planted over as it is with temples of worship and spires of faith, it has millions of people who find in all its decorated palaces no spiritual home—in all the range of its natural ministries, not even a stone on which they can pillow their cares, and entertain a heavenly vision. We alluded especially to the tendency to speculation and unbelief among young men; but it is not confined to them. Men of ripe years and wide expeence are unsettled in opinion and adrift in position. These doubts have infected the churches, repressing the springing affluence of their zeal, and corroding their organic structure.

There may be preachers so deeply immersed in the abstractions of theology, so much enamored of the prerogatives of their office, or so far wrapt from the world by the blandishments of a sectarian circle, as not to be aware of these solemn facts. But what preacher can mingle with the community at large, find the clue to the meditations of men of the world, gain the confidence of the enterprising and thoughtful youth, and hear the spontaneous utterance of the popular heart in our noblest literature—without feeling how woefully inadequate the ecclesiastical establishments of the country are to the spiritual guidance and redemption of a great people? Under all the cheerfulness and hilarity of our prosperous living, there seems a spirit of unrest and of questioning that demands, without ceasing, of church and priest, "Who will show us any good?" and a spirit of prayer, that supplicates with painful fervor, "Lord, lift the light of thy countenance upon us!"

Here in America, the drift of the popular heart from the old moorings has assumed every phase, from a modified orthodoxy to a reckless infidelity; from the shadowy Trinitarianism of H. W. Beecher, to the philosophic Theism of Theodore Parker; from the mild misgivings of the New Haven and Andover professors, to the revolutionary climax indicated by organized Universalism. Among thinking men, the tendency involves a kind of speculative anarchy. All the sects are divided and subdivided, in order that each characteristic doctrine may reflect its manifold aspects. Definitions, distinctions, objections and qualifications multiply round every proposition, and complicate every issue. The extreme orthodoxy of America is in the position of a man roused at midnight by an inundation, holding forth a flickering lamp to mark the rise of the waters, too much alarmed to devise means of escape or defence, giving incoherent orders to a tumultuous household, and apprehending every instant that he may be washed from his foundations. Our extreme liberalism might be figured as a man abroad on the bosom of that flood, blinded by the darkness, endangered by drifting wrecks, and doubtful whither the current is bearing him. "Nobody," confesses an eminent Unitarian preacher, "can tell us anything of the perils, the storms, the icebergs of that Atlantic. We have providentially in one generation and day been thrown upon it. The winds of

doctrine that have tossed us hither and thither, the latitudes of polar cold, the dreadful length of the voyage, the immense uncertainty of the harbor, the beclouded heaven, the fog-clothed headlands—oh! how often have these, the necessary experiences of all heterodoxy, taught us the inadequacy of mere individualism to bring us peace and rest."[1]

Among the multitude, the tendency involves suspicion, doubt, and indifference, and ends frequently in the yielding up of all the functions of life to an aggressive worldliness. Common people do not readily discriminate. If a Church has abused their confidence, they make religion responsible. If a sectarian dogma is refuted, they begin to distrust the faith delivered to the saints. If they see an interpretation of the Bible overthrown, they question its essential verity, or try to justify an evasion of its authority. It is one of the temporary evils incident to religious revolutions, that multitudes are emancipated from wholesome restraints, armed with plausible sophistries or convenient doubts, and committed to the dubious direction of their passions. And it has been thoughtfully remarked—in view of this incidental mischief—that "it is a serious perplexity with a well-trained Christian man of our time, whose mind has been filled and expanded by the highest culture, with a full or partial enfranchisement from old prejudices, and with an outlook on the broad, fair, unfenced fields of truth,—it is more than a perplexity, it is a trial of all his sincerity and of all his wisdom,—to decide how much of what he himself believes, or doubts, or knows, he shall communicate to others, even to those who look to him for instruction. There is the risk of destructiveness; the risk of shocking people; the risk of communicating too much or not enough; the risk of not giving something new and true in place of what you take away that is simply doubtful; the risk of opening dismal conflicts in a mind which you can not afterwards compose; the risk of transferring your doubts without your resources."[2] Yet these considerations can not release a man from the obligation to bear witness to the truth, or justify him in suppressing convictions that have become paramount in the light of conscience. Truth will

[1] Re-Statements of Christian Doctrine. First Sermon.
[2] Christian Examiner for November, 1860.

be published, and God will take care of the consequences.

In England, the hopeless alienation of the national life from the ecclesiastical institutions—intimated through a series of years in successive eruptions of heterodoxy, and in a growing audacity of periodical criticism—is now proclaimed in the seven Oxford Essays with a freedom and fearlessness, with a philosophic serenity and dignity, and with a scholarly resonance, that indicate a consciousness of being supported by a triumphant public conviction. Whatever we may think of the soundness of the criticism, in particular instances—as, for example, the endorsement of Bunsen, the estimate of the value of the "evidences," and the examination of the Mosaic cosmogony—the confidence and composure that breathe through those essays declare, unmistakably, that their authors are the vanguard of a rebellion that has the nation at its back.

As a specimen of the testimony borne by the Oxford witnesses, we here cite a page or two from Mr. Wilson's essay on The National Church, where he calls our attention to the "very wide-spread alienation, both of educated and uneducated persons, from the Christianity which is ordinarily presented in our churches and chapels. Whether it be their reasons or their moral sense which is shocked by what they hear there, the ordinances of public worship and religious instruction provided for the people of England, alike in the endowed and unendowed churches, are not used by them to the extent we should expect if they valued them very highly, or if they were really adapted to the wants of their nature as it is. And it has certainly not hitherto received the attention which such a grave circumstance demanded, that a number equal to five millions and a quarter of persons should have neglected to attend means of public worship within their reach on the census Sunday in 1851; these five millions and a quarter being forty-two per cent of the whole number able and with opportunity of then attending. As an indication, on the other hand, of a great extent of dissatisfaction on the part of the clergy to some portion, at least, of the formularies of the Church of England, may be taken the fact of the existence of various associations to procure their revision, or some liberty in their use, especially

that of omitting one unhappy creed. It is generally the custom of those who wish to ignore the necessity for grappling with modern questions concerning biblical interpretation, the construction of the Christian creed, the position and prospects of the Christian Church, to represent the disposition to entertain them as a disease contracted by means of German inoculation. At other times, indeed, the tables are turned, and theological inquirers are to be silenced with the reminder, that, in the native land of the modern scepticism, Evangelical and High-Lutheran reactions have already put it down. . . . . But, in fact, the influence of this foreign literature extends to comparatively few among us, and is altogether insufficient to account for the wide spread of that which has been called the negative theology. This is rather owing to a spontaneous recoil, on the part of large numbers of the more acute of our population, from some of the doctrines which are to be heard at church and chapel; to a distrust of the old arguments for, or proofs of, a miraculous revelation; and to a misgiving as to the authority, or extent of the authority, of the Scriptures. In the presence of real difficulties of this kind, probably of genuine English growth, it is vain to seek to check that open discussion out of which alone any satisfactory settlement of them can issue."[3]

This alienation of so large a part of the community from established schools of Religion, can be traced only to some powerful and widely-operating cause. It is a trite observation, that man is, naturally, a religious being. He is not merely susceptible of having religion ingrafted upon his nature, he is born with religious instincts and aspirations, that impel him to perform devotional rites. How this fact can be reconciled with the notion of his complete natural depravity, we leave for others to explain; but the *fact* itself is so self-evident that naturalists, in discriminating man from the other tribes of creation, have described him as a religious animal.[4]

With this powerful religious proclivity implanted in his nature, if the growth of man sways him toward infidelity or exhausts his spiritual sensibilities, it can only be in con-

[3] Recent Inquiries in Theology, pp. 168-170.
[4] Philosophy of the Plan of Salvation, pp. 36, 37.

sequence of some foreign agency coming in collision with his divine instincts, darkening the soul's vision, and diverting him from the natural course of development. There must be some grave mistake in the apprehension, and in the administration of religion, to account for the distaste (and even disgust) which are exhibited toward it, in our time, by multitudes in the leading Protestant countries. For, to adhere to the good Latin maxim, *Suum cuique tributo*, let it be understood that the irreligious and skeptical men of this age are not universally depraved. The moral characters of large numbers among them, on the contrary, are irreproachable. They have never provoked, except by the blunt statement of their doubts, the inuendoes that have been levelled at them from pious circles, where passive assent is so often mistaken for vital faith. Many of these doubters and aliens have as much personal merit as their self-elected censors and self-righteous judges. They are faithful husbands and revered fathers, genial neighbors and public-spirited citizens. Their irreligion and infidelity were not fostered by any peculiar or virulent depravity. They do not consciously resist the spirit or the evidence of the gospel; but the atmosphere of our churches does not warm their hearts, nor do the arguments of our logicians convince their minds. Neither can we esteem it the fault of a narrow understanding, a neglect of reflection, or a poverty of knowledge. Many of these persons are endowed with a vigorous reason, which they have employed in the cause of learning, and disciplined in the conquest of the sciences. They are not to be suspected as incompetent to apprehend a rational proposition, or to discern a spiritual verity. They are not insensible of the importance of the problem presented by Christianity; they only desire a solution of that problem which shall not stultify common sense nor outrage the generous instincts that adorn humanity.

In our judgment, the original difficulty lies in the fact that the churches have substituted an irrational and offensive theology for the consistent and attractive principles of the Christian religion; and have endeavored to impose upon society fables and speculations, paradoxes and creeds, until the more sagacious and independent minds have become weary of the barren dogmatism, or angry at the domineer-

ing insolence, of those who assume to interpret the providence and kingdom of the Almighty. Between the soul of man and the truth of God, there is always concord, if the will or thought of the Creator expands harmoniously throughout all his manifestations; but the ideas of the past can not be imposed upon the present, nor the convictions of to-day become the creed of to-morrow, if they contradict its clearer insight or riper experience. All attempts to compress the advanced intelligence, and the more vital instincts, of the present century, into the narrow and rigid formulas of the sixteenth, must provoke, sooner or later, wrath, revolt, and revolution. Every form of ecclesiasticism that refuses to expand with the growth of society, and hardens into a despotism, will be exploded by a law as irresistible as that which bursts the acorn in order that a new oak may rise.

It is the persistent habit of the churches to refer to past interpretations of Christianity as authoritative upon present and coming ages. The habit appears to be predicated of the idea that there was, somewhere in the direction of antiquity, a perfect embodiment, or realization, of the Christian faith. People commonly locate this transitory reign of absolute Christianity in the Apostolic age. They usually appeal — all the sects appeal — to the conception of the religion then prevalent — and imagine they have indicated a standard by which subsequent heresies may be accurately measured. We scarcely know any fallacy that rests upon scantier evidence. What student of the Christian annals, tracing the progress of the Church through various periods and over many lands, ever lighted upon the happy spot where faith was perfect, controversy quenched, and the unity of organization hallowed by the unity of a loving spirit?[5] No; the golden age of the Church is a fiction of the reverential fancy, looking fondly back toward the blessed sunrise of the Christian day; it is no historical verity; it has glorified no age of Christendom; and there is no period, therefore, that can be fairly cited as qualified to become the authoritative exponent of our religion.

This position will appear quite incontrovertible, we think, by considering that Christianity has attained its present

[5] Isaac Taylor — "Ancient Christianity."

prominence, not as an arbitrary creation, but as a natural growth.

The Founder of our Faith did not erect it as a system, carefully elaborated, sharply defined, and incapable of modification or expansion. This was not the Divine idea — however frequently it may have been assumed; and it needs no remarkable foresight to perceive that such a religion could never have adapted itself to the diversities of human societies, or to the extremes of culture and experience. Jesus Christ planted his Word as a seed,[6] in which the cardinal truths of the religion lay as germs, to be quickened and cultivated agreeably to the temperature of individuals, the laws and limitations of human nature, and the social *status* of any given epoch. The Apostles were governed by the same idea. From all that we can gather out of the surviving records of the first Christian age, and especially from the book of Acts, it is evident that the early missionaries made no attempt to unfold their religion in all its amplitude, or to trace out its ulterior relations. They did not teach it on any scientific plan, or exhibit it as a complete system of divinity.[7] Like their Master, they planted the new faith as a seed, in which many of its ultimate applications were hidden — as the majestic proportions of the oak are hidden in the acorn. Laboring, as they were, amid all-pervading heathenism, they were content to have the simple principles of the Gospel accepted, even in the crudest form — leaving to their distant successors the task of refining the Christian doctrines, and expanding them into a harmonious system.

Let us notice how little was required, in that age, to transform a man into a nominal Christian: He had only to profess a belief in Jesus Christ, as the Son of God, divinely commissioned and raised from the dead, and to exhibit a certain propriety of moral conduct; and he was joyfully received into the company of the faithful. If he had been a Jew, his mind still retained the stamp of his former training, being only so far modified as to admit his new convictions. He became a Judaizing Christian. If he had been a Greek, hitherto, he retained almost all the Pla-

[6] Neander — "Life of Christ."

[7] Universalist Quarterly, Vol. i., pp. 87–91.

tonic philosophy, and incorporated the speculations of the great Athenian with the teachings of the Galilean Prophet. He became a Gnostic Christian, in that case. Or, finally, if he had tasted the golden wine of Persian thought, previous to his conversion to Christianity, his mind still sparkled with the luminous *penumbra* of Zoroastrianism; and he became an Oriental Christian.

These various, and even opposite, opinions, the converts to Christianity brought over from their respective quarters. All these heterogeneous elements were mingled in the Primitive Church, which really sheltered, under the Christian name, nearly all the speculations, and a large portion of the superstition, then known to the civilized world. Estimating the notions of those early converts, in the aggregate, they were probably more imbued with heathenism than with Christianity, even after their baptism; and so the germs of the heavenly faith, as they sprouted toward the Middle Ages — modified by the soil in which they grew, and bent by the mental habitudes of the nations — impelled the vitality of Christ into a new mythology, and alternately ruled and obeyed the vigorous tendencies of society.

The history of Christianity is the narrative of the gradual development of its seminal principles into broader applications and more abundant results, — as the history of a tree would be the tracing of its growth from the quickened germ to the rising trunk, the spreading branches, and the perfect fruitage. But what if those who affect to administer Christianity, and who are the acknowledged interpreters of its doctrine and spirit, fail to apprehend this primal law, this divine idea, of growth or development? What if they passively receive the interpretations of past ages as the complete conception of the Gospel, and insist on imposing them upon the living age as absolute finalities? What if they regard the researches and ideas of their predecessors, not as contributions to an ever-augmenting treasury of truth, but as exhausting all the springs of that divine wisdom vouchsafed for the culture of mankind. What if they insist on retaining the dire superstitions and crude philosophies, *indigenous to the barbarous periods through which our religion has passed*, — thus confounding the excrescences incidentally engendered in the process of its development with its essential principles and permanent dominion? Such views and

efforts on the part of the churches, must inevitably provoke rebellion, in a rational and humane age; and they go far to explain, in our judgment, the recoil from religion, now experienced and deplored.

Should it be esteemed at all remarkable that such vast multitudes are destitute of piety, when we reflect what a God is exhibited to them in that mediæval theology which still disfigures the Christian religion? How can you love a Being, who deliberately creates you in the exercise of omnipotent power, without having your own welfare in view, but simply his own sovereign glory; who exposes you to eternal torment, on account either of Adam's sin, or of a depraved nature which you inherited and could not avoid; and who sweeps the larger part of the human family into hell, and perverts the existence which he compelled them to receive into the fuel of an immortal curse? How can you trust a Being, who knew so little of coming events as to be surprised by the entrance of sin, although he had left Satan free to bring it with him into Eden, and shed the mortal poison into the fountain head of humanity; who, under the first impulse of his indignation, intended to have destroyed the whole race; who subsequently took vengeance upon them by proxy, and announced a plan for their escape; and who, finally, discriminates, and saves only a remnant, while he rewards the Devil's vigilance with the spoils of a dismembered Universe? Without loving and trusting God, there can be no piety; and here is no basis for either love or trust. The aspect of the Divine Being is such, as he is presented in the dominant theology, that it is next to impossible to have the requisite emotions inspired. Men may stand in awe of such a God; they may fear him; they may serve him with lip-service and dreary sacrifices; but they can not love him, or trust him, except by growing insensible to his dreadful nature. These obstacles to piety are all the more disastrous, because they touch the reason less acutely than the moral sense. "It is not the speculative reason of the few," observes a late writer, "but the natural conscience of the many, that questions the extirpation of the Canaanites, or the eternity of hell-torments. These are points of divinity that are at once fundamental and popular."[8]

[8] Recent Inquiries in Theology, p. 313.

Nor should it occasion surprise that there is so little benevolence — so much selfishness — operating in society, when we reflect that the burden of preaching has been, in all ages, a perpetual exhortation to people to get *their own souls saved — in other words, to look out for their private interests*, in this world and in the world to come, — instead of an exhortation to identify their well-being with that of their community and their race, and generously to share the weal and woe of mankind. There is the God of our traditional theology — an infinite embodiment of selfishness, injustice, and caprice; — what people can worship him, in spirit and in truth — becoming perfect as he is perfect, and being partakers of his nature — without having all their selfish and vindictive propensities fostered, the claims growing out of our social relations undervalued, and a demoralizing blight diffused over their noblest impulses and affections?

The acute author of the "Philosophy of the Plan of Salvation," affirms, as one of the grand propositions framed into his argument, that "*Man becomes assimilated to the moral character of the object which he worships.* This is an invariable principle," he says, "operating with the certainty of cause and effect. The worshipper looks upon the character of the object which he worships as the standard of perfection. He therefore condemns every thing in himself which is unlike, and approves of every thing which is like, that character. The tendency of this is to lead him to abandon every thing in himself, and in his course of life, which is condemned by the character and precepts of his god, and to conform himself to that standard which is approved by the same criterion. The worshipper desires the favor of the object worshipped, and this, reason dictates, can be obtained only by conformity to the will and the character of that object. To become assimilated to the image of the object worshipped, must be the end of desire to the worshipper. His aspirations, therefore, every time he worships, do, from the nature of the case, assimilate his character more and more to the model of the object that receives his homage. To this fact the whole history of the idolatrous world bears testimony. Without an exception, the character of every nation and tribe of the human family has been formed and modified, in a great degree, by the character attributed to their gods."[9]

[9] Pp. 37, 38. See, also, Quarterly, Vol. I. pp. 256–293.

In thus elaborating the broad proposition, this writer has in view the influence of the worship of the heathen deities; but we see no reason why its application should be limited to them. If the worship of

> "Gods partial, changeful, passionate, unjust,
> Whose attributes were rage, revenge and lust,"

has been obviously deleterious, in all ages and among all nations, how can we avoid the conclusion that the motives and feelings popularly ascribed to the Almighty, in our dominant theology — such as anger, jealousy, hatred and revenge — tend to debase the moral character of Christendom?

Thus it should seem that if multitudes of our people are irreligious — wanting in both piety and benevolence — the Orthodox churches are palpably disqualified, as regards their unhappy theology, for supplying the spiritual instruction, and wielding the salutary authority, demanded by the crisis.

We do not deny — as will be seen farther on — that certain beneficial influences emanate from these churches, — the fruit, not of their speculative dogmas, but of the devotional fervor that kindles under hallowed rites, and of the consecrated lives that grow under all sectarian names. We can not fail to notice, in the Gospel, that subtle power characteristic of light and heat, by virtue of which it penetrates even hostile elements — neutralizing, to some extent, the malignity of superstition, mitigating the asperities of bigotry, and toning down the savage features of the speculative landscape till they cease to appall and repel. Moreover, the irrepressible dictates of common sense, in society at large, are always checking the extreme impertinence of unreason, on the part of the framers of theology; and it is the constant tendency of our unsophisticated nature to *qualify* the speculative nonsense of those mole-eyed scholastics, who presumed to interpret in monastic dungeons the resplendent universe of God.

It has long been the subject of remark, among moderately sagacious people, that Orthodox preaching is far in advance of Orthodox creeds; or, in other words, that the conservative clergy teach a higher morality than is authorized by their articles of faith. We have known more than one minister, nursed under the most judicious Orthodoxy now extant, and

commissioned by the inflexible doctors of Andover or Princeton — who has "stolen the thunder" of the liberal pulpit, been surprised into impulsive fellowship with heretical philanthropy, and whose popularity has grown in the ratio of his departure from the old theology and his sympathy with the new. It was not their fault. We absolve them from the sin of wilful defection. We do not see how a man can live in the present age — blessed with a sound mind and good liver, warmed by the glow of domestic love, gladdened by friends, renewed by the spirit of Christ, illumined by the lustre of letters, his mental horizon expanded by science, his spiritual sensibilities deepened by experience — and retain in his blood all the virulence of that monkish theology which he imbibed during his professional training.

But still, in spite of these qualifying reflections, it remains an obvious fact that the influence of the older churches is fatally vitiated by their theology; that they can not furnish the incentives, or quicken the motives, requisite to the renovation of irreligious communities; and that before they can grapple auspiciously with the problem of the age, they must annul their covenant with antiquity, and respect the divine inspirations in this latest hour of time.

Concerning the tendencies toward infidelity, to which we alluded in the opening of our article, we hold that they have been provoked by the mischievous despotism that has restricted religious inquiry.

Consider that, while men have been encouraged to investigate all other subjects, they have been required to accept the established theories of religion as finalities. While reason and learning have been promptly and fearlessly employed to shed light on other questions, from time to time, the questions of religion have been jealously, timidly, petulantly shielded from their scrutiny. What wonder that the low suspicion of the vulgar and the aggravating curiosity of the learned should have been directed to the one peculiar subject, in the circle of reflection, from which all inquiry has been nervously waved away? In the grand apartment of nature, reason has found every door open but one. Religion has dwelt in mystery, bolted and barred from all profane intrusion. Our ecclesiasticism, like Blue Beard, has kept its Secret Chamber; and whether or not it be filled

with the dead credulities that the churches have murdered in the lapse of centuries, it is natural that those who stand without should imagine the worst.

The illiberal and timid policy of the Christian leaders has given a one-sided development to society. The secular side is vital and fresh, growing and fruitful, because it has been allowed to obey its spontaneous tendencies, and has drunk from all the springs of the world without scruple or restraint. The ecclesiastical side is faded and feeble, stunted and barren, because it has been restrained from its legitimate development, and confined to arbitrary limits. Under these unequal conditions, it is impossible that the ecclesiastical function should keep pace with the secular. It is impossible that religion, fettered and debilitated, should march abreast of science, genius, and business, all of them free, ardent and vigorous. Every step in the advancement of society must contract the authority of the churches, extend the "eclipse of faith," and augment the already preponderating power of the secular forces. Will those who have the requisite nerve and vision, inform us where the tide, which has now been swelling for three hundred years, will have landed us by the opening of the next century?

Meanwhile, with every secular interest under full canvas — crowding the ocean with enterprise — wafted by every wind that blows, — the churches lie almost motionless on the bosom of the age, towing a weather-stained mediævalism, anomalous to the time, offensive to refinement and experience, and obviously rejected of God. While reason has banished the unclean harpies from science, the ghastly goblins from philosophy; while education has revealed the capacity of man, and while knowledge has placed every theme of thought in some new and startling relation — this theology remains, — a theory of human life under a divine despotism, so exceptional, so preposterous, so hostile to every analogy of nature, that it could not stand for a day, if the shield of reverential association were withdrawn, and the spirit of our civilization allowed to beat upon its naked deformity. Under all the suggestions, analogies, and demonstrations that leap down to refute it, the dominant theology of the churches declares that infinite wisdom made a mistake, and was obliged to revise his own work; that Almighty power has been circumvented by a being whom he had cre-

ated; that the unchangeable Deity is angry and benignant; that the godhead is a trinity and yet a unity; that man is by nature so depraved that he can not help himself an iota from the rut of hereditary sin, and that yet if he does not help himself he shall slide into hell! Such is the insufferable monstrosity that retards the progress of Christianity, and threatens to sink the stoutest ships in the ecclesiastical fleet.

If the churches have forfeited so much influence, and loaded themselves with so unhappy an incumbrance, they ought to welcome sympathy and counsel from the humblest quarter. If they have brought suspicion upon religion, by secluding it from inquiry and criticism, they should vindicate it by throwing wide the door, and inviting the most thorough examination. If they have hindered its natural development, by imposing artificial restrictions upon its professors, every spiritual fetter should be broken, and the spirit of God bear the assurance of liberty to every soul. If they have wronged it with a verbal reverence, while crucifying it by a secret distrust, let them fearlessly subject it to the ordeal that refines all truth, and confide in its power to face any antagonist that walks the arena.

It will be, of course, impossible to dissociate our conceptions of religion from our views of the inspiration and authority of the Bible. With reference to this fundamental question, it seems to us that we are as yet little beyond the epoch of chaos. With a good deal of surviving reverence for the verbal forms of Scripture, we have no clear and satisfactory clue to its interpretation as a whole. The crude and chimerical notions on the subject prevalent among the uneducated, are not so depressing as the scholastic vagaries propagated by commentators, who have rested their methods on the *petitio principii*, and labored in the service of some contracted sect. It is of the first importance to decide "what part of the accepted faith of our time, associated with the Bible, is drawn from and warranted by the claims and teachings of the Bible itself; and what part is to be referred to claims asserted for the Bible by human theories about its source, authority, and contents." We need hardly say that the discriminating wisdom essential to this decision, is mournfully rare among biblical writers, and can be found only where scholarship is wedded to spiritual insight,

and where both are employed in the interests of truth, in the guidance of the Holy Spirit, without regard to denominational prepossessions.

The rich erudition, fine philosophical perception, and deep spiritual sensibilities apparent in Benjamin Jowett's Essay, indicate that such qualifications as we have named are possible. Seldom do we light upon words, contributed to this confused theme, so clear, pertinent, and auspicious as these: "The office of the interpreter is, not to add another (interpretation to the Bible,) but to recover the original one; the meaning, that is, of the words as they first struck on the ears or flashed before the eyes of those who heard and read them. He has to transfer himself to another age; to imagine that he is a disciple of Christ or Paul; to disengage himself from all that follows. The history of Christendom is nothing to him; but only the scene at Galilee or Jerusalem, the handful of believers who gathered themselves together at Ephesus, or Corinth, or Rome. His eye is fixed on the form of one like the Son of Man, or of the prophet who was girded with a garment of camel's hair, or of the apostle who had a thorn in the flesh. The greatness of the Roman Empire is nothing to him; it is an inner, not an outer, world that he is striving to restore. All the afterthoughts of theology are nothing to him: they are not the true lights which light him in difficult places. His concern is with a book, in which, as in other ancient writings, are some things of which we are ignorant; which defect of our knowledge can not, however, be supplied by the conjectures of fathers or divines. The simple words of that book he tries to preserve absolutely pure from the refinements or distinctions of later times. He acknowledges that they are fragmentary; and would suspect himself, if out of fragments he were able to create a well-rounded system or a continuous history. The greater part of his learning is a knowledge of the text itself; he has no delight in the voluminous literature which has overgrown it. He has no theory of interpretation; a few rules guarding against common errors are enough for him. His object is to read Scripture, like any other book, with a real interest, and not merely a conventional one. He wants to be able to open his eyes, and see or imagine things as they truly are. Nothing would be more likely to restore a natural feeling on this subject than

a history of the interpretation of Scripture. It would take us back to the beginning; it would present in one view the causes which have darkened the meaning of words in the course of ages; it would clear away the remains of dogmas, systems, controversies, which are incrusted upon them. It would show us the 'erring fancy' of interpreters assuming sometimes to have the spirit of God himself, yet unable to pass beyond the limits of their own age, and with a judgment often biased by party." [10]

Having learned to distinguish the actual contents of the Bible from the multifarious contributions of tradition, we shall be enabled to see what portion of the old theology rests upon the authority of Scripture, and what has been imported from other quarters. Much will have been gained, when we shall have reached this stage, but not every thing. The contents of the Bible must then be re-examined from the present stand-point of the more advanced human societies. Such a scheme of inspiration must be applied to the book as shall reconcile it with the hand-writing of God on the manifold leaves of nature, as read by the science accepted among educated men; and with the spiritual experience of eighteen hundred years of Christian growth, as indicated in all the mental phenomena of modern times.

Are there friends of the Bible who dread the results of such a trial? We are not of that class. Are there those who would shelter the book under idolatrous sanctity, and render it an object of suspicion and sarcasm, under plea of preserving its reputation? We have stronger faith in its essential veracity than they, and we cherish it with a wiser regard, for we believe that it will bear to be confronted with criticism, and we are willing to trust it to its own strength. We fear nothing but the injudicious championship of its shallower friends, who appear to have experienced so little of its divine power, and to have gained so little assurance of its moral supremacy, as to regard their petulant special pleading as essential to its preservation. Considering how much of this disastrous advocacy the Bible has survived, we would cheerfully subject it to the salutary criticism which is provided by broad culture and genuine human sensibilities. We have long been ashamed of the querulous temper, and

[10] Recent Inquiries in Theology, pp. 371, 372.

not less ashamed of many of the arguments, with which certain reverend pettifoggers are in the habit of "defending the Bible" against the honest doubts, or inevitable perplexities of thoughtful and respectable men. As though a man who does not cordially believe what he has little or no conception of, ought to be faced with the insolent cant of uplifted eyebrows! As though a man who is perplexed by the discordant din of conflicting interpretations, were an enemy of Divine revelation! As though the bland assent of a mind too torpid to stir the sediment of doubt, authorized a dogmatism that would be offensive (if possible) in a sage!

We have three facts to impress upon our readers, before we draw this section of our paper to a close.

I. That the scepticism which Christians have now to face is not mischievous or malignant, but serious and irrepressible — the effect of new circumstances and enlarged knowledge.

II. That the administrators of religion must cope with the crisis — not ignore or evade it.

III. That both parties in the controversy have an equal interest in the truth, and that no inferior or subordinate interest should be allowed to impede the settlement of the points at issue.

To those ductile conformers to tradition, who persist in in regarding the sceptical movement of our time as a mere revival of the coarse infidelity of the last century, we commend the following observations from Mr. Wilson's contribution to the "Inquiries:" "There may be a certain amount of literature circulating among us in a cheap form, of which the purpose, with reference to Christianity, is simply negative and destructive, and which is characterized by an absence of all reverence, not only for beliefs, but for the best human feelings which have gathered around them. . . But, if those who are old enough to do so would compare the tone generally of the sceptical publications of the present day with that of the papers of Hone and others about forty years ago, they would be reminded that assaults were made then upon the Christian religion in far grosser form than now, and long before opinion could have been inoculated by German philosophy, — long before the more celebrated criticisms upon the details of the evangelical histories had

appeared. But it was attacked then as an institution. . . The anti-Christian agitation of that day in England was a phase of radicalism, and of a radicalism which was a terrific and uprooting force, of which the counterpart can scarcely be said to exist among us now. The sceptical movements in this generation are the result of observation and thought, not of passion. Things come to the knowledge of almost all persons, which were unknown a generation ago, even to the well-informed. Thus the popular knowledge, at that time, of the surface of the earth, and of the populations which cover it, was extremely incomplete. . . . We have recently become acquainted, intimate, with the teeming regions of the Far East; and with empires, pagan or even atheistic, of which the origin runs far back beyond the historic records of Judea or of the West, and which were more populous than all Christendom now is for many ages before the Christian era. Not any book-learning, not any proud exaltation of reason, not any dreamy German metaphysics, not any minute and captious biblical criticism, suggest questions to those who on Sundays hear the reading and exposition of the Scriptures as they were expounded to our forefathers, and on Monday peruse the news of a world of which our forefathers little dreamed,—descriptions of great nations, in some senses barbarous compared with ourselves, but composed of men of flesh and blood like our own; of like passions; marrying and domestic; congregating in great cities; buying and selling, and getting gain; agriculturists, merchants, manufacturers; making wars, establishing dynasties, falling down before objects of worship, constituting priesthoods, binding themselves by oaths, honoring the dead. In what relation does the Gospel stand to these millions? Is there any trace on the face of its records, that it even contemplated their existence? We are told that to know and believe in Jesus Christ, is, in some sense, necessary to salvation. It has not been given to these. Are they, will they be hereafter the worse off for their ignorance? As to abstruse points of doctrine concerning the Divine Nature itself, those subjects may be thought to lie beyond the range of our faculties. . . . But, with respect to the moral treatment of his creatures by Almighty God, all men, in different degrees, are able to be judges of the representations made of it, by reason of the moral sense

which he has given them. As to the necessity of faith in a Saviour to these peoples, when they could never have had it, no one, upon reflection, can believe in any such thing: doubtless they will be equitably dealt with. And, when we hear fine distinctions drawn between covenanted and uncovenanted mercies, it seems either to be a distinction without a difference, or to amount to a denial of the broad and equal justice of the Supreme Being. We can not be content to wrap this question up, and leave it for a mystery, as to what shall become of those myriads upon myriads of non-Christian races. First, if our traditions tell us that they are involved in the curse and perdition of Adam, and may justly be punished hereafter, individually, for his transgression,—not having been extricated from it by saving faith,—we are disposed to think that our traditions can not herein fairly declare to us the words and inferences from Scripture: but if, on examination, it should turn out that they have, we must say that the authors of the scriptural books have in those matters represented to us their own inadequate conceptions, and not the mind of the Spirit of God; for we must conclude with the apostle, 'Yea, let God be true, and every man a liar.'" [11]

The indication here given of the grounds and temper of the existing scepticism, applies to the mass of alienated minds in America as well as to those of England; and we submit that it is scepticism that deserves to be respectfully, candidly, and intelligently met.

The second fact we wish to impress, is, that the accepted administrators of religion can not longer evade the issue, without aggravating the estrangement of the best minds from the churches, and inflicting incalculable injury upon the spiritual interests of men. No possible rashness of criticism, or temporary panic consequent thereupon, can be so disastrous as the tacit confession of weakness implied in dodging the array of difficulties. Mr. Goodwin, whose scruples prevented him from becoming a clergyman, tells us pointedly in his essay, that, while "physical science goes on unconcernedly, pursuing its own paths, theology, the science whose object is the dealing of God with man as a moral being, maintains but a shivering existence, shoul-

[11] Recent Inquiries in Theology, pp. 170-173.

dered and jostled by the sturdy growths of modern thought, and bemoaning itself for the hostility which it encounters."[12] Is it any consolation to a theologian, or any help to a humble Christian believer, to labor or live in a church lying under such an imputation? Or, is it any mitigation of the discreditable dilemma, to be advised by Mr. Mansel[13] to take shelter under metaphysical *finesse*, stolidly exclude reason from any examination of the contents of scripture or of dogmatic beliefs, and so weather the gale by clinging fast to an ecclesiastical *ipse dixit?* For one, we are not enamored of the alternative presented by the Oxford conservative. When repudiation is proposed on the part of man, or state, or system, it impresses us with confidence neither in the plenteousness of the resources, nor the integrity of the debtor.

No; rather would we have reason survey the antagonism of knowledge and faith in all its length and breadth. Rather would we have every difficulty plainly stated on one side, and equitably weighed on the other,—confiding in a prospective solution that shall render essential justice to both the questioning head and confiding heart, and remembering that whatever limited tabernacles, created for transient shelter, may be struck from over us, the expansive temple of truth remains.

What we have already said will derive additional force by considering, under the head of our third specialty, that the advocate of knowledge and the advocate of faith have a common interest in settling the controversy in an equitable manner. It is not for the real interest of a theologian to hold an untenable conservatism, nor is it any advantage to the man of science to propagate an untenable radicalism. Nothing abides that is untrue, and what profit can any society of men derive by making investments in fallacies? And yet, the spectator of learned controversies must deplore, in all ages, a redundant passion for pettifogging, mingled with a fraction of the candor and impurturbable truth-seeking that mark the judicial office. How rarely, and by what a pure fortuity, has any one struck the golden centre of a

[12] Recent Inquiries, page 238.

[13] The Limits of Religious Thought Examined in Eight Lectures delivered before the University of Oxford. By Henry Longueville Mansel, B. D.

truth, while aiming at victory, or wrangling to reach a party point. A man or a church that would contribute real wisdom to the permanent settlement of a great controversy, must be in the pay of no interest less munificent than the interest of truth,—must have no client inferior to the majesty of humanity, and look for no applause less precious than the approbation of God.

As a humble friend and teacher of Christianity—acknowledging its authority, but sympathizing with those who are doubting and being estranged from it; testifying to its renewing power on the heart and to the consecrating glory it spreads over the beauty of the universe, and yet confessing the errors that impede its course and the crudities that confuse its records—we earnestly insist that those who may undertake to adjust it to our larger knowledge, and re-construct its doctrinal formularies on a scale corresponding to the expanded horizon of the age,—shall enter upon the work in the spirit of the judge, not of the advocate; indulging in no special pleading; assuming nothing that can or that ought to be proved; impugning no motives; appealing to no prejudices; trusting to no rhetorical effects; stimulated by no private rewards; swerved by no professional bias; dazzled by no hopes of personal triumph; but balancing the great account in the scales of an even-handed wisdom, not for the satisfaction of a day, but for the assurance, if possible, of all coming time. Is it too much to hope for an adjustment of the points at issue, through the intervention of such a masterly spirit? If so, where is our hope of concord, amid the dissonant war that shakes the kingdoms of knowledge and faith? We wait for God to send us the wisdom of reconciliation, making the crooked things straight, and the rough places plain, so that all flesh may behold his glory.

Meantime, there are other causes that tend to alienate large numbers of good men from the churches, apart from any direct questions touching the authenticity or credibility of our ecclesiasticism. The most potent of these we believe to be the moral infidelity of the churches themselves. In order to indicate clearly our meaning, and at the same time sustain the indictment beyond the power of appeal, we must ask our readers to consider the primary, divine idea of the church.

The establishment of the Christian church introduces a new moral standard among men—superceding the standard of the world. It gives us, as rules of action, divine principles in place of human expediency, and offers us the guidance of the Holy Spirit instead of the blind despotism of public opinion. Those who ally themselves to the church, knowing what they are about, and espousing the kingdom of Christ in the spirit of his righteousness, are those who are persuaded that the heavenly wisdom is best; that the maxims of men are fallacious, and the impulses of self-interest deceitful; that we live well just in proportion as we live right; that we are truly great, to the extent that we are just, magnanimous, and enlightened; that as many elements of heaven as we assimilate to our present life, contribute to render our being just as immutable and glorious as the lives of the angels.

These ideas and convictions, shared by an association of men and women, are what form a church. Without them, there is no such thing. There may be an organization calling itself a church; but, not all the bishops that have held jurisdiction, not all the orthodoxy that can be distilled from the historical creeds, not all the sacraments that were ever tasted, can convert a body of men and women into a church, unless they are imbued with the spirit of Christ, and actuated by the wisdom of Heaven. These things distinguish a real church from other associations. The people who exhibit these traits,—the people in whose organization the spirit of Christ is the breath, and the wisdom of heaven the law,—are the first fruits of the new commonwealth which is destined to supplant, according to the purpose of God, all the crude and partial organizations of this world. If there be a true church any where in Christendom, it is fashioned upon this divine type; to it pertain the promises and the dominion of the future. However limited its company, and however feeble its human aspect, it has the germ of boundless expansion, and "the immortal years of God" to achieve its conquests.

Such is the true idea of the church. Now, there are always tendencies in human nature, and in the shifting circumstances of society, that threaten to demoralize this divine institution. A church is no sooner founded, than the world strives to debase it to its own level; because the world feels,

instinctively, that this is the only way to resist it. An issue rises in the church, and it becomes necessary to take some practical action. It may be a case of discipline, or a case in which choice must be made between two interests that are agitating society. The church must take a position. Now, let us bear in mind that all the members of the church have probably been educated in the world, bred under its favorite maxims, and accustomed to respect its policy. The influence of the old training remains. The new morality proves weak when matched against former habits and ideas. How natural it is, that when these people come to act as a church, they should act according to the maxims of the world, preferring expediency to principle, and accepting public opinion in place of the Holy Spirit. In other words, how natural that they should act just like a purely social organization—like a political party, for instance—looking only to immediate consequences, and ignoring, for the time being, the spiritual claims and resources peculiar to them as a church.

And yet, how plain it is, that, by acting on the maxims of the world, they have ceased to be a church! Their divine charter is gone; the Holy Spirit is withdrawn; Christ strikes them from the roll of the army of regeneration. They may exist still like other social organizations; and they may exert a certain influence common to all corporations; but their assumption of being a church any longer, is sophistical and impudent. They have proclaimed before God and man, that, in their deliberate judgment, they may prosper without the blessing of Heaven, but can not venture to offend the world which they were enlisted to subjugate. As a church, they have committed spiritual suicide—rejecting the element that made them a divine agency, and betraying the moral infidelity that is not merely a misfortune but a crime.

We shrink from contemplating the guilt of modern ecclesiasticism, as it looms forth in the light of such reflections. We avert our vision from the spectacle of the venerable Mother of churches,—so fallen from spiritual dignity, so oblivious to the sanctity of the divine commission she belies, so deaf to the admonitions of heavenly wisdom and justice, —whose idea of subduing the world allows her to fraternize with its political ambition, to pander to its salient passions,

to emulate the craft of its diplomacy, to rival military despotism, and to gloss its most damning depravity. The ancient ecclesiasticism, whose authority penetrates the *strata* of European development, rises above the average level of social morality in no particular, and is heartily espoused to the tyrannies that protect it from the righteous hatred of the foremost minds. Once it had some claim to being known as a church, for it sheltered justice, truth, and love from the ravaging sway of barbarism and anarchy. But now there is nothing to distinguish it from the world, but assumptions that are known to rest upon imposture, and a ceremonial that assumes perpetual childhood in humanity. It is not a church, we repeat, governed by the august principles that dignify the divine economy; but a huge corporation, the ductile worshipper of expediency, skilled in the use of compromises, with the subtlest scent for what men of the world call "the main chance."

How is it possible that live men in Europe,—men who are moulded in the highest type of honor, who love their country's weal and fame, who are fired by the better genius of the age, who aspire to realize a social system that shall render justice to all men,—should love or respect the Romish religion? Those men hear the Bible quoted, not to animate and cheer the heavy-laden, but to ratify the oppression of rulers and badger the people into submission. They everywhere find the priests ready to back the soldiers; and they remember that when, only a few years since, freedom rose amid the sepulchres of Rome, the jealous pontiff locked hands with the nearest civil despot, and suppressed it at the point of the bayonet. They have learned to identify religion with despotism, and they hate the church as the bulwark of the throne; they have learned to associate infidelity with freedom, and they glory in what seem to favor the best aspirations of the time. Thus the moral infidelity of the Romish church necessitates a speculative infidelity in Europe, apart from any doubts that may be suggested concerning its dogmatic theology.

What relation do the American churches bear to the corresponding phenomenon in this country? Has our ecclesiasticism been uniformly actuated by principle, as distinguished from expediency; and ruled by the Holy Spirit, as opposed to public opinion? Has there been a distinction preserved, obvious to all observers, between the motives and

methods and aims of church organizations, and those characterizing secular associations? Has the wisdom from above been manifest in the administration of that which claims to have descended from above; and have the Christian sects, in the lusty vigor of faith and love, made themselves the terror of wrong-doers, the champions of the weak, and the heralds of the glory of the Lord?

Alas! for the confession we must make. Too often has the policy of the world undermined the walls of rectitude and faith that fortify the divinity of the churches, and the abomination of desolation ravaged the holy place. Too often have the agencies consecrated to the regeneration of society, been subservient to the opinions and interests that chanced to be popular and powerful. The history of the ebb and flow of the anti-slavery sentiment in this country, illustrates the general subserviency of the sects. Fifty years ago, when the speedy extension of slavery was contemplated, and when the tone of the national conscience and the judgment of the national mind were equally hostile to its perpetuity, the pulpit, as far south at least as Virginia, was accustomed to speak out in emphatic condemnation of slave-holding. When the rise of the cotton interest and the acquisition of new territory created a re-action in favor of slavery, the churches commenced to apologize for it, and the preachers grew discreet in their allusions to it. As the retrogression of opinion extended, it was found to be a "disturbing" subject to discuss, even on moral grounds; and the preachers, forbidden to condemn it under penalty of losing the support of their parishes, began to examine the Bible anew to learn whether second sight, quickened by self-interest, might not detect some divine sanction for the victorious iniquity! For the last ten years, the tide has been rolling back, and the churches have been gradually recovering their moral equilibrium. While the anti-slavery sentiment has been reviving in society, ecclesiastical bodies have been taking stronger positions, and preachers have been growing bolder—although even now, when the natural spirit of slavery has borne its appropriate fruit in treason and insurrection against the Republic, we suspect there are but few preachers who can bear emphatic testimony against the colossal iniquity, without creating an unpleasant sensation in their congregations. These reminiscences show that

our churches, with respect to the greatest interest involved in our national development, have been passive reflectors of public opinion, rather than vigorous creators thereof.

Occupying so discreditable a position—evincing so little faith in truth and justice, or in God's providence as the bulwark of righteousness—how was it possible for them to secure that respect which is the basis of influence, or to inspire society with due confidence in spiritual realities? Churches can never impart more than they possess; and if they themselves distrust the Christian religion so far as to fear to confide in its principles and promises, in the face of a hostile public sentiment, ought we to marvel that the weeds of scepticism grow rank in the garden of our social life, sheltering the snaky appetites that infest infamous opportunities, and casting an ominous shadow across the path that winds to prayer?

So much of the existing doubt and irreligion as may have been provoked by the moral infidelity of the churches, may be removed by a resurrection of spiritual life—of faith, charity, and courage—in the Christian denominations. This presents itself to our mind as the nearest, most urgent, most practicable work. There may be intellectual problems which we are not yet competent to grapple with. There may be speculative doubts that can not be dislodged by any argument wielded by reason. There may be principles in dogmatic theology that veil their true relations in the shadows of the infinite. But truth incarnated in noble men and women, is crossed by no ambiguities, but has a clear utterance, and carries universal conviction. The Scripture of God, read in a life broadly based in rectitude, furnished with wisdom and love, and mellowing with years into a heavenly tint, needs no commentary; it appeals to the common moral sense of men, as a divine revelation of their possibilities and duties. The Romish church was rescued in the sixteenth century, by a spiritual renovation within—a renovation that was felt and seen, as Macaulay testifies, from the Vatican to the most secluded hermitage of the Apennines. May the Protestant churches be rescued, in this age, from the dark hosts of doubt and irreligion that beleaguer them, by a resurrection of buried principles, by a brave assertion of the claims of liberty, and by aspirations for the Holy Spirit that shall invest them with the power of God unto salvation!

Thankfully do we rest our eyes upon one cheering assurance as we close this review of a clouded theme. Human nature can not dispense with religion, having the hunger and thirst that crave the divine nutrition. Human societies, however alienated from the old types of faith, and however repelled by the conventional administrators of sacred instruction, gravitate to religion by the force of an organic tendency, creating more adequate forms, and installing more genial priesthoods. Whatever else perishes, religion survives. Mankind, in the maturity of their social state, find that they must part with their childish ideas, discredit the tales of the nursery, and exchange the toys that amused them for the implements of a responsible career. But the early lessons of integrity, the early reverence for truth, the germs of youthful friendship, and more than all, the impress of parental authority and goodness, remain, to develop and intensify through all ages,—preserving a bond with the past, giving a clue to the future, and furnishing the elements of a progressive religion, that perpetually throws back the horizon and expands the scene. E. W. R.

Art. XI.

The Resurrection.

The doctrine of the Resurrection is surrounded with many and great difficulties; and very varied and vague opinions are entertained upon the subject. But a doctrine upon which the apostles dwelt with especial emphasis should not be passed by, because obstacles are encountered in the treatment of it. Careful examination of what the Scriptures say, and a comparison of one passage with another, may do something towards settling this, as well as other points.

In investigating this subject, we need to understand precisely what is meant by *the Resurrection;* and we need particularly to determine the time of entering upon the resurrection state; and what Christ has to do with introducing the world into it.

That we may have clear and distinct views of the resurrection, we need to determine first, what is meant by *death;* for our views of the latter point, whatever they may be, will modify our views of the former. Whoever believes that the mental and moral powers of man cease to exist at death, and yet believes in a future existence of blessedness, must also believe that these powers are restored to life again. On the other hand, if one believes the soul immortal, he can not, of course, consistently believe that it will be *restored to life*, for his belief supposes that the soul's life never ceases to exist.

So far as can be determined from observation, death destroys "our earthly house," the physical powers; and more can not be determined in this way. There are many reasons from analogy and science for believing that the mental and moral faculties do not cease to exist at death; but we can not now adduce these, nor need we, as the Scriptures teach us that "all live unto God."[1] The Saviour's declaration that Abraham, Isaac and Jacob had an existence, though dead, proves that their mental and moral powers were not destroyed, though their bodies had returned to dust, and though Christ had not then "abolished death."[2] They were in the enjoyment of some kind of an existence, though they had departed from earth; and from this we conclude that the soul is immortal. And if it is, then it does not depend upon a resurrection for a mere existence after death, but lives on through the influence of those inherent qualities which God gave it, when he ushered it into being.

We may remark here, that all the evidence from analogy and science in proof of a future life goes to establish the doctrine of the soul's immortality, and not a future existence predicated of the Christian resurrection. Arguments from these sources fail when an attempt is made to press them into proving that all will live after leaving earth *because* Christ "hath abolished death;" they lack the link that is necessary to connect them with this truth.

We are thus prepared to determine, in a measure, what *is not* meant by the resurrection, and so far, prepared to understand what *is* meant by it.

The Greek word for resurrection is ἀνάστασις; and this is

[1] Luke xx. 38. [2] Tim. i. 10.

derived from ἀνίστημι, which is compounded of ἀνά, *up*, and ἵστημι, *to place, to stand;* and means *to stand, to rise, to rise up again; to exalt; to restore.* It is evident from this that the word *anastasis* contains the idea of *advancement, promotion*, or *exaltation;* and from the way in which the Saviour used the word in his reply to the Sadducees, and from other passages, we are led to the conclusion that the resurrection, in its widest import, *means a life of peace and joy beyond the grave;* and that it includes the great moral work that is to take place with every person, by which the soul *rises*, through human and divine agency united, from its state of moral imperfection at death to a "perfect man," and becomes conformed to Christ's spiritual likeness.

The Saviour said, that "*in* the resurrection they are as the angels of God in heaven;"[3] or, as Luke records it, "they are equal unto the angels; and are the children of God, *being* the children of the resurrection."[4] If by resurrection Christ meant simply the way, or means, or both, by which man is prepared for a future existence, or ushered into heaven, why did he not say, "*After* the resurrection they are as the angels?" And why did he say, "They are the children of God, *being* the children of the resurrection?" These forms of expression show that the resurrection means something different from a restoration to life: that it is something different from a Jacob's ladder, by which the inhabitants of earth climb up *to* heaven.

As this passage is often explained, the word resurrection is made an adjective, qualifying *state* understood, and would read thus: "In the resurrection *state*, they are as the angels of God in heaven." As the word is *not* an adjective, any explanation that requires it to be so used is clearly erroneous.

If "*in* the resurrection they are as the angels of God," it is obvious that the condition is an exalted one, when compared with the life on earth; and hence corroborates the definition we gave of the word resurrection, to which we were led by an examination of its derivation and component parts. That the word resurrection is always used in its *widest* import in the Scriptures, as we have defined it, will not be expected. It is sufficient for our present purpose to

[3] Matt. xxii. 30. [4] Luke xx. 36.

show, as we have endeavored to, that it *has* that meaning in the most important and particular explanation of the future state that Christ ever gave the world; and, when not used in its widest import, it is not employed in a sense that would militate against the definition given.

We come now to the second point in our inquiry, *the time* of entering upon the Resurrection.

Paul says that all shall be made alive in their own order; "Christ the first-fruits, afterward they that are Christ's *at his coming;*" from which we conclude that those who had died before his coming, would then be "made alive in (by or through the instrumentality of) Christ." And the *time* of the Saviour's "coming" can be determined by reference to a few passages, where that point was definitely presented. Christ said unto his apostles, "Ye shall not have gone over the cities of Israel till the Son of man be come."[5] On another occasion, after giving them a very particular account of the signs that would precede and attend their "coming," he said, "This generation shall not pass till all things be fulfilled."[6]

By comparing the language of Paul with what Christ said of the time of his coming, we arrive at the conclusion that all who died before the Saviour's resurrection, *through* him were made alive *at his coming;* and were *then* introduced into that happy state termed the resurrection. But it may be objected, that, according to the words of Christ, "even Moses showed at the bush, that the dead are raised, when he called the Lord the God of Abraham, and the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob."[7] And it may also be objected, that Christ was not, in fact, *the first*, in order of time, that rose from the dead.

In reply to the first objection, it is sufficient to observe that any just rule of interpretation requires the words of the Saviour to be so explained as to harmonize with the declaration of Paul, that Christ "hath abolished death."[8] And this limitation would preclude the idea that these patriarchs had previously entered upon that happy existence, into which neither they nor others could enter except *through* Christ. They might have been in *a* state of exist-

[5] Matt. x. 23. [6] Matt. xxiv. 34. [7] Luke xx. 37. [8] 2 Tim. i. 10.

ence even more desirable than earth, but it could not have been that exalted condition called the resurrection. In respect to the second objection, we should keep in mind the obvious but sometimes forgotten fact that a restoration to life, to dwell longer here on earth, is not the resurrection the apostles every where preached; it is not the Christian resurrection, which Paul believed in, and which he hoped the just and unjust would enjoy. The failure to notice this evident distinction has led expositors to assert that Christ was not the first that rose from the dead. Christ was the first who rose from the dead, and over whom death had "no more dominion." Those who before him had been restored to life lived here, and, of course, died again, did not, like the Saviour, enter upon the resurrection immediately after being raised.

If these facts are kept in mind, we shall be more ready to allow that the expressions, "Christ the first-fruits,"[9] "the first-born from the dead,"[10] "the first that should rise from the dead,"[11] are to be understood in their most obvious import; and, if they are, then Christ was the *first*, in order of time, that rose from the dead to enter immediately into that state, where all shall be equal unto the angels. Paul said, "I have hope toward God, that there *shall be* a resurrection of the dead,"[12] which plainly shows that he did not suppose that any had "the pre-eminence" of the Saviour by having entered upon the resurrection before him. The error that some fell into in supposing that the resurrection was past,[13] seems also to indicate that the apostles had not taught, that the patriarchs and others who had died were *then* in the enjoyment of the resurrection. And the declaration of Peter, that "David is not ascended into the heavens,"[14] is directly opposed to such a view, and, it would seem, should settle this point beyond further controversy.

If we inquire what Christ has to do with introducing the world into the resurrection, it will aid in determining whether he was the *first*, in the order of time, that rose from the dead.

The apostle says, "For since by man came death, by man came also the resurrection of the dead." Now if, *by* or

[9] 1 Cor. xv. 23. [10] Col. i. 18. [11] Acts xxvi. 23. [12] Acts xxiv. 15. [13] 2 Tim. ii. 18. [14] Acts ii. 34.

through the instrumentality of the Man Christ Jesus, the dead are raised, it would seem that none had entered that exalted state till he "abolished death." And, if "*in* Christ all shall be made alive," we infer that no one was "made alive" in the sense the phrase is here employed, till the Saviour arose from the dead. The apostles "preached *through* Jesus the resurrection from the dead." [15] Paul said, "He which raised up the Lord Jesus, shall raise up us also *by* Jesus." [16] If the resurrection of the dead is *through* Jesus—if God raises up men *by* him—does it not follow that none entered the resurrection before Christ was raised? Either his death and resurrection were not indispensable to the enjoyment of future happiness, or those who died before his coming, did not, at death, enter that state called resurrection, but remained expectants, detained in hades, the state of the dead, till his coming.

The declaration of Christ, that "God is not the God of the dead, but of the living, for all live unto him," clearly establishes the fact that those who had gone from earth were in the enjoyment of some kind of an existence. And when we compare this with the assertion that "Christ hath abolished death," and with the fact that the apostles preached "*through* Jesus the resurrection from the dead," and taught that he was the "first-fruits," that "he should be the first that should rise from the dead," and that David had not then "ascended into the heavens," we are led to the conclusion that those who died before Christ, did not at death "enter into the full fruition of celestial joys," but awaited his coming at the setting up of his kingdom.

The question may now arise, if the condition of those who lived and died before the days of Christ was as we have been led to conclude, what is the state of those who have died since the "coming" of the Saviour?

The answer to this question is to be found in the correct interpretation of the following passage: "Behold, I shew you a mystery; we shall not all sleep, (remain in a state of death), but we shall all be changed in a moment, in the twinkling of an eye, at the last trump; for the trumpet shall sound, and the dead shall be raised incorruptible, and we shall be changed." [17] Our first inquiry is, when were

[15] Acts iv. 2. [16] 2 Cor. iv. 14. [17] 1 Cor. xv. 51, 52.

these things to take place? In verse 23, the apostle tells us that every man shall be made alive in his own order; *Christ first*, "afterward they that are Christ's *at his coming*." In the subsequent part of the chapter, he is treating of the same event, and its attendant circumstances. There is nothing in the connection that leads us to conclude that a different time is referred to from the one mentioned in verse 23, the coming of Christ. Further evidence that a time close at hand is referred to, is found in the use of the pronoun we. He says, "*We* shall not all sleep," evidently expecting that many of them, himself probably among that number, would live to see the fulfilment of what he there uttered.

Additional evidence that this passage refers to something that would take place at Christ's "coming," will be found by comparing the apostle's language with the Saviour's description of the signs that would immediately precede and attend that event. "And they shall see the Son of man coming in the clouds of heaven with power and great glory. And he shall send his angels with a great sound of a *trumpet*, and they shall gather together his elect from the four winds."[18] What Paul describes was to take place "at the last trump." And these references in both to the sounding of the trumpet seem to point to one and the same time. If so, the apostle described what was to happen in that generation; for the Saviour declared that that "generation should not pass" till the things he had spoken of were fulfilled.[19]

Our conclusion will be strengthened by a further comparison with Rev. xi. 15: "And the seventh angel sounded, and there were great voices in heaven, saying, The kingdoms of this world are become the kingdoms of our Lord, and of his Christ." "This is the establishment of Christianity upon the fall of Judaism." (Whittemore in loc.) And, if this view is correct, we have a clew to the time of the "last trump;" for the *seventh* and *last* trumpet sounded at the "establishment of Christianity upon the fall of Judaism." If we have determined correctly the time when the event Paul described was to take place, it is evident he did not mean that those who were on earth at the last trump were to be translated without seeing death, for no such thing happened at that time.

[18] Matt. xxiv. 30, 31. [19] Matt. xxiv. 34.

The following explanation, we think, will harmonize the view, that Christ was the first that rose from the dead, with the assertion of the Saviour, that God is not the God of the dead, but of the living.

Previous to Christ's coming at the establishment of Christianity, those who died did not enter immediately into the full enjoyment of heavenly bliss. This could not be, till they become children of the resurrection; and they could not become children of the resurrection, till Christ "abolished death." *At his "coming,"* the dead were raised, that is, introduced into that higher and more exalted state,—the resurrection. Since that, each one at death has been transferred from earth to that heavenly abode "in a moment, in the twinkling of an eye."

We will paraphrase the passage, giving this view of it: "Behold, I explain to you what has been a secret; we shall not *all* remain in a state of death, when we die, as all have who have died before us, and as those of us will who shall die before Christ's coming; but those of us who live till that time, when we die, instead of remaining in a state of death, will, in a moment, be introduced into that happier state, where none entered, till Christ 'abolished death.'" If this exposition is correct, it throws light on that difficult passage in 1 Thess. iv. 14–17, as that also, from its very words, refers to something that was to take place at the "coming of the Lord."

It seems that erroneous views of the condition of those who had died, caused sorrow among the believers in Thessalonica; and Paul endeavored to dispel this by informing them, that those who had already died, and those who should die before "the coming of the Lord," would then be raised, and the living would have no advantage over them. Then he goes on, as in Corinthians, to tell them what would happen to those who should live until that "coming." When these died, they would not *remain in a state of death*, but would be "caught up," or, as expressed in Corinthians, "changed in a moment, in the twinkling of an eye;" that is, transferred suddenly from earth to heaven. And such thereafter, he told them, would be the case with all at death; the king of terrors was to hold none in bondage any longer. And they were also assured that they should be reunited with those friends who had previously died, and evermore be with them and the Lord.

Before proceeding farther, we will notice the following objection, which may be urged against the interpretation we give of 1 Cor. xv. 23. If those who died before Christ's "coming" were "made alive" at that time, how are we to understand the language of the next verse?—"Then cometh the *end* when he shall have delivered up the kingdom to God, even the Father: when he shall have put down all rule, and all authority and power." Did the *end* come at the establishment of Christianity,—the coming of Christ? Were all rule and all authority and power put down then? The Greek word τέλος translated *end*, means *fulfilment*, *accomplishment*, or *consummation*, as well as *termination*. The word is employed in a great variety of significations. In the New Testament, it is translated *custom*, *end*, *ending*, *finally*, and *uttermost*; and the verb τελέω from which it is derived, is also employed in a great variety of significations. In the New Testament, the verb is translated *fulfil*, *finish*, *accomplish*, etc. In the classics, we find τέλος ἔχειν used in respect to a person, meaning *to be grown up*. By the word *end*, then, is not necessarily meant the termination of what is spoken of. It is equally as proper, —so far as that word is concerned,—to understand it as referring to *perfection*, *fulfilment*, or *consummation*, *as to termination*.

The gospel dispensation had been looked forward to by prophets and patriarchs as a golden era. This is clearly shown by the words of the just and devout Simeon, who, when he took the child Jesus in his arms, "blessed God, and said, Lord, now lettest thou thy servant depart in peace, according to thy word; for mine eyes have seen thy salvation, which thou hast prepared before the face of all people."[20] He had evidently looked forward to Christ's day with a strong desire to see it. He was rejoiced to see the commencement of that period in which the things foretold of the Messiah's reign would come to pass. The coming of Christ, the setting up of his kingdom here on earth, was the great event so often portrayed by the prophets, and which the Scriptures so fully describe. It was a *fulfilment* or *consummation* of numerous predictions. All that was to be done for the world, however, was not *then* accomplished;

[20] Luke ii. 28-31.

but the work was fully inaugurated; the means for its entire completion were then put into operation; Christianity was then fully established; and this is what the apostle referred to by the word *end.* Here, as in other places, what was to be done through the instrumentality of Christ is spoken of prospectively, as if already completed. The declaration of the apostle, "he hath put all things under his feet," is an example of this mode of speaking in relation to what is *destined to be done* through the instrumentality of the Saviour. In the epistle to the Hebrews, the apostle has himself shown us, that he spoke of what is yet to be done, as already completed. "Thou hast put all things under his feet. For in that he put all in subjection under him, he left nothing that is not put under him. But now we see not yet all things put under him."[21] This last sentence explains the apostle's mode of speaking. His own limitation of his language clearly shows how he meant to be understood by the Hebrew brethren; and if we interpret his language to the Corinthians in the same manner, there will be no conflict between what he there said and the views we have presented.

The contest shows that Christ's "coming" and the end (perfection, or consummation,) were closely connected. The Greek word ειτα translated *then*, is uniformly used in the New Testament to denote what immediately or very soon follows. If, then, the end immediately followed the coming of Christ, the apostle's language must be interpreted as we have explained it; for neither at that time, nor at any subsequent period, have "all enemies" been actually put under the Saviour's feet. And this shows clearly, even when taken alone, that the language used was not designed to express what had already been done, but rather what would actually be accomplished under the Messiah's reign.

The revelator,—in language we have before had occasion to quote,—described the setting up of Christ's kingdom in a similar way to the apostle, speaking of what was to be done as already completed. "And the seventh angel sounded; and there were great voices in heaven, saying, The kingdoms of this world are become the kingdoms of our Lord and of his Christ; and he shall reign forever and ever."

[21] Heb ii. 8.

"This is the establishment of Christianity upon the fall of Judaism. It is the setting up of the reign of God and of his Christ. . . . It is not meant that the kingdoms of this world had then already been, in full effect, won over to Christ. That, of course, was not true; but it was true that a train of measures was put into operation which would in time render that event certain. The work was commenced; the kingdom of heaven was established among men; and it was certain that in the operation of the principles of Christ, the whole world should at last be subdued. The language of the revelator regards the future as being present. As if a general should say, on taking some favorable position that ensured him the victory, 'I have gained the day,' i. e., I have taken those measures that render success certain."—(Whittemore in loc.)

The prophet Daniel, in describing what the Saviour would accomplish, spoke in the same manner as the apostle and revelator. He represented what would be accomplished under the Messiah's reign, as completed at the establishment of Christianity. "Seventy weeks are determined upon thy people and upon thy holy city, to finish the transgression, and to make an end of sin, and to make reconciliation for iniquity, and to bring in everlasting righteousness, and to seal up the vision and prophecy, and to anoint the Most Holy."[22] This language must be explained in the same way that we interpreted the apostle's and the revelator's. What was to be done under the gospel dispensation is spoken of as completed, at the setting up of his kingdom here on earth.

If the views presented are correct, they will aid in understanding 1 Peter iii. 18–20. They make plain the object of his preaching "unto the spirits in prison." They had not *then* been exalted into that heavenly abode—the resurrection. They were in sheol, or hades, the state of the dead; yet, according to the Saviour's words, in the enjoyment of some sort of an existence. At the setting up of his kingdom, they were to be introduced into that higher and more desirable state.

That Christ descended at his death into ἅδης, that state into which all who had previously died had gone, is evident from

[22] Daniel ix, 24.

the words of Peter, "Thou wilt not leave my (Christ's) soul in hell (ἅδης;) neither wilt thou suffer thine Holy One to see corruption."[23] If we compare this with the Saviour's words to Mary, "Touch me not; for I *am* (*have*) *not yet ascended* to my Father; but go to my brethren, and say unto them, I ascend unto my Father, and your Father; and to my God and your God"[24], the plain inference seems to be this: while his body lay in the tomb, he was in Hades, the state of the dead. How he was there employed, the passage in Peter tells us: he preached unto the spirits in prison.

The difficulties that commentators have met with in explaining the words of Christ to Mary, have evidently arisen from an effort to put a construction upon them that certainly would not be regarded as the most obvious. Allowing that the expression, "I am not yet ascended to my Father," means, "I am not now ascending, that is, going to ascend;" does not the saying, Tell my brethren, "I ascend unto my Father, imply that he had not been with him, while his body was in the tomb? And when we observe that the verb, translated "am ascended," is in the *perfect* tense in the Greek, and that the ordinary translation would be, "I *have* not yet ascended unto my Father;" the common exposition appears more questionable than our English translation renders it; and the view we have suggested is strengthened.

We are aware that ἀναβέβηκα is sometimes used as in the present; but, when so employed, it denotes "habitual and repeated action." Now, if we admit that the verb "am ascended" is rightly construed in the present tense, is the "habitual and repeated action," which it denotes, consistent with the idea that Christ had been with his Father during the three preceding days that his body was in the tomb? Would not the language rather imply, that, as he was not with his Father before his crucifixion, so he had not been with him since his crucifixion? Whether, therefore, the verb be regarded as in the perfect tense, or employed as a *present*, the fact that it is not *the usual present tense* favors the view taken.

Another question may arise, How can Christ's promise to the thief, "To-day shalt thou be with me in paradise," be harmonized with the views advanced? The difficulty

[23] Acts ii. 27. [24] John xx. 17.

arises, undoubtedly, from regarding paradise and heaven as synonymous; a point certainly not obvious. According to Parkhurst, paradise (παράδεισος) was borrowed by the Greeks "from the Persians, among whom it signified *a garden, park*, or *enclosure* full of all the valuable products of the earth." In the Septuagint, the "LXX almost constantly render the Hebrew word, (gan) when it relates to the Garden of Eden, by Παράδεισος. He also states, that the Jews use the "*Garden of Eden* (figuratively) *for the intermediate state* of holy departed souls." Bloomfield says, "Among the later Jews, the term denoted that pleasant abode in hades appointed for the reception of the pious dead, until they should, after the day of judgment, be again united to their bodies in a future state." The origin of the word and its use in the Old Testament show, that it is not synonymous with heaven; but might with propriety be applied to *any* pleasant or happy place.

In the New Testament, the word is found only three times. In 2 Cor. xii. 4, it means heaven. In Rev. ii. 7, "to eat of the tree of life, which is in the midst of the paradise of God," is a metaphorical description of the rich blessings of the Gospel,—the reward of overcoming in the Christian warfare. That Christ did not mean heaven by paradise will be seen by comparing his words with those of Peter, "thou wilt not leave my (Christ's) soul in hell (ἅδης.) The apostle here evidently conveys the idea, that Christ, at his death, went to hades, the state of the dead; and, if he did, he and the thief were not in heaven together on the day of his crucifixion, but in hades.

From Christ's use of the word paradise, in his reply to the thief, and from its origin and its use in the Old Testament, we infer that the place of the departed patriarchs was a state of real though imperfect happiness. And, if so, the language of the Saviour affords no objection to the doctrine of the resurrection as here presented, but rather corroborates the views we have advanced.

If the conclusions to which we have arrived in relation to the resurrection, and the part the Saviour has in this great work, are correct, the way is prepared for determining in what sense Christ is the Saviour of *all* men. There is no difficulty in understanding in what sense he is the special

Saviour of those who believe, but in what sense he is the Saviour of those who have lived and died since his day, without even hearing his name, and of those who have heard of the gospel, and yet have turned a deaf ear,—is quite another question. And to understand it, the true idea of the resurrection must be kept in mind, which means, as we define it, "a life of peace and joy beyond the grave, and also includes the great moral work which is to take place with every person, by which every soul *rises*, through human and divine agency united, from its state of moral imperfection at death to a 'perfect man,' and becomes conformed to Christ's spiritual likeness." Since it is *through* Christ that all become children of the resurrection, and enjoy all the holy and happy influences of that heavenly state, the sense in which he is their Saviour becomes apparent. But it may, perhaps, be made plainer by answering the question, Where would people be after death, if Christ had not died and rose again?

Two points which we have endeavored to establish, must be kept in view, in order to settle this question understandingly. First, Christ taught that Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, and others who had died, were in the enjoyment of some sort of an existence. Second, the apostles taught that *by* or *through* Jesus "came the resurrection of the dead." From these two important truths, we infer that if Christ had not died for the world, and rose again, "abolished death," all at death would have entered upon the same kind of existence with these patriarchs; and this would have been their final and everlasting condition. In whatever respect, therefore, people are better off in the resurrection than the patriarchs were in the state in which they were before death was abolished, in that very respect they will be indebted to Christ.

If the doctrine of the resurrection, as we have presented it, be conceded, it is evident that Christ is *something more* than a perfect man, though inferior to, and dependent on, the Father. He is something more than a great Moral Teacher, who illustrated his principles by his life. The tenor of the New Testament places the Saviour entirely above a mere man; and, in this respect, strengthens the views advanced. The idea that he was simply a perfect man, that he had little more to do in the salvation of the world than

Peter or Paul, merely proclaiming the Father's unbounded love, and illustrating his teachings by his life, seems not to come up to the prophecies concerning him, what he claimed to be himself, nor what the apostles said of him.

It is scarcely necessary here to add, that the Resurrection holds no unimportant place among the truths of the gospel; for, aside from its own intrinsic merit, a correct view of the subject is indispensable to a clear understanding of other doctrinal points—especially important to us as a denomination. L. L. R.

Art. XII.

Hale's Ninety Days' Worth of Europe.

Ninety Days' Worth of Europe. By Edward E. Hale. Boston: Walker, Wise & Co., 1861.

Journals of parsonic travel run the risk of being professional, and are apt to be priggish. We have endured much in reading some of them, where sectarian prejudice supplies the animus of the work and meagreness of culture does the filling up. The clerkly authors had plainly changed their climate, not their temper, when they crossed the sea. Their only transport was the carrying over their wonted social sourness and theologic bitterness, as fit criterion of judgment upon stranger men and manners. Of such ungenial disrespect, and consequent utter failure to enter into foreign ways of thinking and living, this book has not a trace. It is simple, generous, full of humor, and so is appreciative. Its humor is notable. That quality we hold to be a prime condition, as well of just estimate of what the traveller sees, as of agreeableness in what he writes. By it, the Howadji's "Syria" and Kinglake's "Eothen" were not only attractive for freshness and brilliancy, but authoritative, as penetrating to the heart of that remote Eastern life. Very different are those unhumorous, and so unsympathetic, works upon the East,—like the Rev. Cream-cheese's "Sou-

venir and Sentiment of the Orient," and the Rev. Gradgrind's "Facts of the Holy Land."

Being humorous, "Ninety Days' Worth of Europe" is free from that pestilent habit into which so many travellers' reports fall, of scolding or fuming about annoyances and vexations. We are not here treated to the usual laments over their extortion of candles and shillings, or that wretched bill of fare, or the other uncomfortable bed. The humor continually crops out in some quaint thought or criticism, some naive way of looking at things and people, some queer association, some amusing description. It enlivens the book, and, throughout, makes it so fresh and brisk, that writer nor reader ever nods. It makes the chapter on Ireland, in particular, very funny and very vivid. It puts the droll experience with Killishandra folks, as well in the most real and truthful way as in a most laughable light.

The short time, putting the traveller to his speed in order to make the most of it, may have, Rarey-fashion, made him show his good points. At any rate, we are informed, all along, with his deft, handy way of using the time, his shiftiness, if there be such a word, the opposite of shiftlessness. He seems never taken unawares and at disadvantage, but always bearing in mind the injunction—"If you set out to take Vienna, take Vienna." Here is the reason why his ninety days of Europe were so well worth while. A less shifty and slower-moulded man would not, in that brief space, have brought so much to pass. A tithe of it would be more than hundreds bring back, who go abroad and spend ten times as many good days and good dollars, too. We remember one of these travelled gentry who went to Dresden, but could not, for the life of him, tell if he had seen the Sistine Madonna. Mr. Hale is up all the time, takes care of the minutes, the hours then caring for themselves, seizes every chance, takes every hint of an opportunity, and snubs circumstance in the most cavalier and charming fashion. It pours hard and is pitch dark, but, with a jaunting car and a tipsy guide's aid, he finds John Foster's cabin; the Calais steamer glides off and leaves him fumbling distractedly after the necessary permit to depart, but he leaps on board from the end of a shaky plank and goes on to Dover; in London, only twenty minutes to accomplish three miles, two furlongs, seven rods to the railroad station; but

he and the cabman triumph over fate and time, and the thing is done. His journey may be sometimes disagreeably obvious, but his quickness of mind and ready decision, what Carlyle calls the double, are also and most agreeably apparent.

As the humor of the book makes it cheerful and entertaining, the common-sense and clear-sightedness of it make it full of valuable information and instruction. No detail of the proportions of St. Peter's ever gave us so clear a notion of its size, as the statament here, that if Aladdin's genie could bring the great thing from Rome to Boston Common, it would just fit the space between Park street mall and the Frog Pond. The glimpse of English university life is a mere aggravation. It is good, but discontents one because there is no more than a glimpse. The way is admirably described, which the British Museum has for the convenience of the readers and students of its eighty thousand books of reference and its other treasures. It makes one look forward longingly to the time when public and society libraries this side the water will be stocked and managed with like magnificence. Mr. Hale rejoices, again and again, in the administrative faculty of the French, and gives a fine instance of it in his explanation of how the Protestant churches in Paris order ecclesiastical matters. We hope to see the rules for "*les fidèles*," which he quotes in this connection, taken from his pages and posted in the church porches of all the faithful in New England. So much ritual decorum our Puritanism ought to bear, and can. The book is stocked with, emphatically, pieces of information, bits of knowledge, which every one going abroad would be glad to own, but which travellers are the last to give.

Without some notice of galleries and works of art in Europe, a book of travel there would be like the play with Hamlet's part left out. In this, the art-talk is independent, sensible and unobtrusive,—therefore, of the good sort. But how sorry we are to be taken down in our expectation of the civic sculpture, and street statues abroad. It is averred that they are, on the whole, quite like ours. It is to be hoped, then, that the horses wear blinders. We are glad of the information about the painted Venus. It certainly puts a different complexion on Gibbon's theory, though not on his statue, to know that the color is not for the sake

of life-likeness, but simply to warm up the cold white of the marble. But we have seen that done here effectively by letting the light through a carnation-tinted screen. And then the blue iris of the eye? "Why, it is affectations." Seeing, doubtless, might be believing in this thing. But all are not lucky like pastor Paris to whom Venus came, or pastor Hale who went to her. Mr. Story's Cleopatra is here much more satisfactorily set before us than in Hawthorne's romance. We hope, in all sincerity but with some fear, that the opinion expressed of it, as being nearer the glory of antique sculpture than most modern statues, will prove well-grounded in its eminent merit. But the book of sculpture seems closed, if not sealed for all time, with those elder masters, true lords of the art, whose names are forgot, but their works forever memorable. Advice is given to go through the galleries, marking those paintings which seem choice, and then by the catalogue finding out the artists. The reward follows, Mr. Hale says, of discovering that you have hit just the great pictures and the highest names. He believes, then, with Göethe, who, in his autobiography, says that when he started on his Italian journey, he cleared his mind of all traditions and conventions, and brought it to the great works untrammelled. Such "maiden meditation, fancy free" may answer for those who look with an aptitude of eyesight and insight, and with preparation of careful culture. But the "silly multitude" must be guided in the right way. How many a traveller, left to his own devices, has slipped into folly,—and then put the misadventure into print,—by scouting the judgment of centuries, and setting up the canon of his own passing impression of art or of some of its works. To the tourist, still let Murray be safe guide, wise philosopher and valued friend; but the right of private judgment be reserved to those who own it by antecedent right of thought and study.

But, in fine and in one word, simplicity is the capital merit of the book. As we read, we have the genial talk of a friend. The dedication of it, then, is fitly to a "circle of friends." Only we are sure that, for its genuine, simple spirit and way, it will make friends, and the circle of readers be larger and better pleased, than the preface, with the very audacity of modesty, pretends to hope or believe in.

L. G. W.

Art. XIII.

The Existence of Moral Evil not Incompatible with Divine Goodness.

Few problems have more deeply engaged the serious consideration of thinking Christians, and the solution of none, perhaps, has been attended with greater difficulty, than that of the existence of Sin, or Moral Evil, under the perfect government of an infinitely wise, powerful and beneficent Being. That God has instituted a moral government in the earth is no less a deduction of reason than a fact of revelation. That this government and all the laws pertaining to it are perfect, is inferred, not only from the absolute perfection of Him by whom it was instituted, but from the perfection of the government and laws pertaining to the material universe. Here all is absolute perfection. Through revolving ages and cycles this government and these laws have controlled all worlds, and every particle of matter of which the immense whole is composed. Not one of its laws has been, or ever can be, successfully resisted or thwarted in its operation. Its proposed results, as far as we know, or can know, have all been attained; and while time shall continue to roll its unwearying rounds, such must be the operations and results of this government and its laws. And can it be supposed that the *moral* government of the Most High is less perfect? Has the Almighty instituted such a perfect government over mere inanimate matter, and left the vast empire of intellect, the universe of mind, without a government and laws equally perfect and efficient? The thought is preposterous.

How, then, it is demanded, could sin enter the world? How could moral evil obtain a foothold in the earth? And why, under the perfect administration of the divine government, does it continue its ravages in the world, bringing "death and all our woe," alienating man from his beneficent Creator, filling the earth with violence, and extending its baleful influence to all the habitations of the children of men? Could not the Almighty have prevented its introduction? And has He not sufficient power to expel it from

the earth? or wholly to stay its ravages among mankind? How, then, can its introduction, continued existence, and direful consequences in the world, be reconciled with the perfection of the Divine government, and the infinite goodness of God?

Of the various theories with regard to the origin and present existence of moral evil, prevalent in the world, it will be necessary to notice but two, viz:—that which attributes its introduction and perpetuation directly to God, as the efficient cause of all things; and that which maintains that it came into the world, and continues to exist, not in accordance with, but in opposition to the will of God, though permitted by him. The first may be termed, for the sake of perspicuity, the doctrine of Divine Sovereignty, and the second that of Human Agency. These two theories, *apparently* contradictory, are undoubtedly both true, to a very great extent; and were our powers of comprehension sufficiently expanded, or were the advocates of each to employ only such language, in their arguments and illustrations of their favorite view, as should be understood in precisely the same sense by each, apparent contradictions would unquestionably disappear; and we should be able at once to discover a perfect agreement and beautiful harmony between them. But such, as yet, are not the facts; and we must continue to regard them, in some manner, and to some extent, as differing theories.

According to the first-named of the foregoing theories, God ordained, from all eternity, the existence of sin, and consequently all the guilt, condemnation and suffering resulting from it. For long ages past it has been contended, and extensively believed in the Christian world, that evil is an ultimate end in the purpose of God; that it will be endless in duration; that its existence and endless perpetuation are necessary to secure the highest glory of God, which, it has been believed, is his object in all his works, and all his dealings with subordinate beings, and constitutes the highest possible good of the universe. That this theory of the existence and final result of evil is reconcilable with the infinite goodness of God, which extends to all worlds and all beings whom he has created, is a principle too preposterous to claim any serious consideration; and one which, at this day, can find but very few advocates in the Christian church.

A portion of the Christian community, feeling that the doctrine of Divine sovereignty, connected with predestination, as taught by Calvin and his coadjutors, was wholly irreconcilable with divine goodness, that it carried an imputation of infinite cruelty and injustice directly up to the throne of the Almighty, have rejected it, and substituted in its stead the doctrine of human agency, or the free will of man. These contend that moral evil was not foreordained of God, or introduced into the world by his agency, or in accordance with his will; but that it was introduced and perpetuated in opposition to that will, but by his permission; i. e., that he did not exert his sovereign power to prevent its introduction; nor does he exert that power to banish it from the world. These also have contended that the existence of evil and its consequences will be endless in duration; thus admitting that it will be an ultimate end under the divine government. How this theory, any more than the other, can be made to harmonize with the goodness of God, has never yet been shown, and is equally impossible to conceive. It admits that God infallibly knew all the consequences that would result, both in time and eternity, from the bestowment of this agency on his off-spring man; and yet, with this perfect knowledge, he voluntarily bestowed it; and though he sincerely desires, contrary to his absolute fore-knowledge, that all sin should cease, and all unrighteousness come to an end, yet he cannot so exert his power as to violate or restrain the perfect freedom of the human will. On neither of the foregoing theories, therefore, is it possible to reconcile the existence of moral evil with the divine goodness.

That God exercises a controlling power over the universe of mind, as well as of matter, is a proposition clearly expressed in the language of revelation, and one which very few are disposed to deny. How far this control extends, in what manner and degree it determines the actions or volitions of men, are questions which, so far as our present inquiry is concerned, are immaterial. The following are a few of the declarations of the Bible on this point: "I am God, and there is none like me, declaring the end from the beginning, and from ancient times the things that are not yet done, saying, my council shall stand, and I will do all

my pleasure."[1] "All the inhabitants of the earth are reputed as nothing; and he doeth according to his will in the army of heaven, and among the inhabitants of the earth; and none can stay his hand, or say unto him, what doest thou?"[2] "A man's heart deviseth his way; but the Lord directeth his steps."[3] "So then, it is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that showeth mercy. Therefore hath he mercy on whom he will have mercy, and whom he will he hardeneth."[4]

In perfect accordance with the foregoing, we read that God not only declared that he would harden the heart of Pharaoh, but repeatedly, that he had hardened it in such a manner that he refused to obey the divine command communicated to him through Moses; and in relation to this hardening of his heart, God expressly declared to him, "And in very deed for this cause have I raised thee up, for to show in thee my power; and that my name may be declared throughout all the earth."[5] Of our Saviour, Peter says,—"Him being delivered by the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God, ye have taken, and by wicked hands have crucified and slain."[6] And again, "For of a truth against thy holy child Jesus, whom thou hast anointed, both Herod, and Pontius Pilate, with the Gentiles, and the people of Israel, were gathered together, for to do whatsoever thy hand and thy counsel determined before to be done."[7] From the language thus cited, it is obvious that the purposes of God, in the administration of his moral government, extend not only to the outward actions, but to the motives by which such actions are induced. But no advocate of the doctrine of the Divine Sovereignty contends that, in consequence of this control, man is not accountable to God for his conduct in life; or that he is not guilty in the sight of God when he intentionally violates the divine law.

Nor can it be denied that, in a certain sense, and to a certain extent, the actions and volitions of men are free; of this fact we are perfectly conscious. Were it otherwise we should cease to be accountable beings. But who is able clearly to define the nature of this freedom? or the exact

[1] Isa. xlvi. 9, 10. [2] Dan. iv. 35. [3] Prov. xiv. 9. [4] Rom. ix. 16–18 [5] Ex. ix. 16. [6] Acts, ii. 23. [7] Acts, iv. 27, 28.

degree in which it exists in man? Edwards defines this freedom to be "the power, opportunity, or advantage, one has to do as he pleases," or, in other words, "as he wills." This definition, it will be perceived, has respect merely to outward action, and does not even touch upon the freedom of the will. Another writer says, "To act freely, is to do an act with the consciousness of being able not to do it." This, like the definition of Edwards, has reference to the mere act, without regard to the volition by which it is induced, and is, consequently, imperfect and unsatisfactory. After all that has been written on this intricate subject, it will, perhaps, be safe, if not perfectly satisfactory, to adopt the conclusion of Locke, that this freedom, or liberty, whatever it may be, "belongs not to the will, but to the agent, or man." We may, however, rest in this conclusion, that we are free to will, or to act, according to the influence of motives brought to bear upon our minds; and that our volitions and actions will be good or evil, according to the good or evil character of the motives to which we yield. Should it be said that we have power to resist an improper or evil motive, it may be replied that this very power of resistence is found in the stronger influence of some other and counteracting motive.

But, after all, the true question before us is not, how did evil originate? but, is its existence compatible with the infinite goodness of God? If we can arrive at a satisfactory solution of this question—if we can be brought to see that its introduction and prevalence in the earth are not incompatible with that goodness, it is of little consequence to us whether it was introduced directly by the Divine agency or permitted to exist by him "who worketh all things after the counsel of his own will." In fact, it is difficult to conceive how it can be consistent with the Divine perfections voluntarily to permit the existence of that which it would not be right in him to ordain.

We are now prepared to consider some facts connected with the origin of sin, and its first introduction into our world. Moses, after giving a history of the creation of "the heaven and the earth," and of man in the image of God, proceeds to inform us that "the Lord God planted a garden eastward in Eden; and there he put the man whom he had formed. And out of the ground made the Lord God

to grow every tree that is pleasant to the sight, and good for food; the tree of life also in the midst of the garden, and the tree of knowledge of good and evil."[8]

Aside from the creation of man, when he was made but "little lower than the angels, and crowned with glory and honor," we are here presented with the first manifestation of the parental care and kindness of God towards his newly-created offspring. He not only caused the earth to bring forth all that was necessary for his daily sustenance, and for supplying the natural waste and decay of his physical constitution, but, in the spontaneous productions of Eden, he gave him that which was "pleasant to the sight;" thus promoting and increasing his enjoyment in life. And we cannot, for a moment, admit the belief that "the tree of knowledge of good and evil" was planted "in the midst of the garden" for any other purpose than the promotion of man's good; but, like every other production of the earth, it was designed for his use. Surely, an all-beneficent Father would not have placed it there for the purpose of destroying the happiness of his children.

The sacred historian proceeds: "And the Lord God took the man, and put him into the garden of Eden, to dress it, and to keep it. And the Lord God commanded the man, saying, of every tree of the garden thou mayest freely eat; but of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, thou shalt not eat of it; for in the day that thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die."[9]

Here several particulars will claim our attention. And,—

1. God created man in his own image, with such mental functions, moral perceptions, and spiritual powers as he saw fit to bestow; also, with such appetites, passions, propensities and desires, as he voluntarily chose to implant in his nature; knowing infallibly, not only the strength and operation of all these desires and passions, but in what manner they would operate, and all the consequences that would result to mankind from their improper use. Here we find *cause* of sin; for "every man is tempted when he is drawn away of his own lust, and enticed; then when lust hath conceived, it bringeth forth sin; and sin, when it is finished, bringeth forth death."[10]

[8] Gen. ii. 8, 9. [9] Id. 15-17. [10] James i. 13, 14.

2. He planted a garden in which he caused to grow the various kinds of trees, which spontaneously brought forth such fruits as were necessary for the sustenance of man. Also, the "tree of the knowledge of good and evil," in the midst of the garden, which was "pleasant to the eyes, and a tree to be desired to make one wise," with the certain knowledge that our first parents, impelled by their desires, would partake of its fruit; and in this garden he placed his newly-created offspring. And here, in the objects of desire, as well as of necessity, we find the *occasion* of sin; for without these objects in view, the desires would not have been aroused to action.

3. Had there been no command or prohibition, there would have been no sin in the act of partaking of that fruit by Adam and Eve; for "sin is the transgression of the law," and "where no law is, there is no transgression." But God, in infinite wisdom, and we doubt not, in infinite goodness, saw fit to introduce a positive prohibition, and to introduce a positive prohibition, and to inform our first parents of the inevitable consequences of disregarding that prohibition; thus rendering a foreseen act sinful, which would have been otherwise innocent.

4. At this period Adam and Eve had formed no moral character; their intellectual faculties were wholly undeveloped; their powers of moral perception had, as yet, lain dormant; their spiritual powers had never been called into exercise; they had no knowledge of either good or evil; and without such knowledge, and a development of their intellectual, moral and spiritual capacities, the formation of moral character was an absolute impossibility. They were simply innocent; but without any positive holiness, or those shining virtues which adorn humanity.

With the foregoing facts in view, we are prepared to follow the sacred historian in his account of subsequent events. "Now the serpent was more subtle than any beast of the field which the Lord God had made; and he said unto the woman, yea, hath God said, ye shall not eat of every tree of the garden? And the woman said unto the serpent, we may eat of the fruit of the trees of the garden; but of the fruit of the tree which is in the midst of the garden, God hath said, ye shall not eat of it, neither shall ye touch it, lest ye die. And the serpent said unto the woman, ye shall

not surely die; for God doth know, that in the day ye eat thereof, then your eyes shall be opened; and ye shall be as gods, knowing good and evil. And when the woman saw that the tree was good for food, and that it was pleasant to the eyes, and a tree to be desired to make one wise, she took of the fruit thereof, and did eat, and gave also to her husband with her, and he did eat."[11]

It is wholly immaterial, so far as the object of this article is concerned, whether we consider the foregoing account of the first transgression a literal history of facts, or a figurative representation. Certain it is that there was an act of transgression, and consequently of sin; and equally certain that the act brought upon the transgressors its inevitable consequences; for "the eyes of them both were opened, and they knew that they were naked."[12]

But were those consequences to our first parents altogether and ultimately evil? Did no good result to them by reason of their transgression? They were guilty in the sight of God and in their own consciences; but was the Divine favor wholly withdrawn from them? Did their disobedience subject them to the "wrath and curse of God," for time and eternity? And further, did their sin involve their whole posterity in "all the miseries of this life, death itself, and the pains of hell forever?" Their trial followed immediately after their transgression; and we must suppose that God, in arraigning, convicting and sentencing them, charged them with the full measure of their iniquity, and informed them of all the consequences of their guilt, or, in other words, pronounced the full penalty of his violated law. And it appears, from the history of this transaction, that the consequences of their disobedience followed immediately the act of transgression; for, not only were their eyes opened to discover their nakedness, but fear, the invariable concomitant of guilt, took possession of their souls. "And they heard the voice of the Lord God walking in the garden in the cool of the day; and Adam and his wife hid themselves from the presence of the Lord God amongst the trees of the garden."[13] They were immediately arraigned at the bar of God, and instantly convicted on their own confession. After their conviction, but before sentence was

[11] Gen. iii. 1–6. [12] Id. 7. [13] Id. 8.

pronounced against them, God proceeded to curse the serpent, and to announce his final destruction: thus demonstrating that evil, whether introduced into the world by the direct agency of Deity, or existing by his permission, is not an ultimate end in the divine purpose; and if not an end, we must believe it subordinate, and the means ordained by unerring wisdom for the attainment of some other end; and this, in the purpose of infinite goodness, can be only good.

After the arraignment and conviction of the guilty pair, and the denunciation of God to the serpent, the sentence immediately follows. "Unto the woman he said, I will greatly multiply thy sorrow and thy conception; in sorrow shalt thou bring forth children; and thy desire shall be to thy husband, and he shall rule over thee. And unto Adam he said, because thou hast hearkened unto the voice of thy wife, and hast eaten of the tree of which I commanded thee, saying, thou shalt not eat of it; cursed is the ground for thy sake; in sorrow shalt thou eat of it all the days of thy life; thorns also and thistles shall it bring forth to thee; and thou shalt eat the herb of the field; in the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread, till thou return unto the ground; for out of it wast thou taken; for dust thou art, and unto dust shalt thou return." [14]

In relation to the foregoing sentence, the following particulars may be noticed:

1. There is not the least intimation that any of the consequences of the transgression would extend to the future world. On the contrary, they are all of such a character that they must necessarily pertain wholly to the present state of being. Nor is it intimated that the guilt of our first parents would so descend to their posterity as to render them totally depraved in "all the faculties of their bodies, souls and spirits," or constitute them heirs of eternal torments beyond the grave. Neither is it reported or even taught by implication, that the nature of Adam and Eve was changed by this one act of sin; or that they lost that image of God in which they were created, and which they retained till they transgressed the law of the Lord. And so far from teaching that every subsequent act of their lives

[14] Gen. iii. 16-19.

was sinful, as the consequence of their fall, their history does not even intimate that they committed another sin during their whole earthly existence.

2. In pronouncing sentence upon the woman, God informed her that he would multiply her sorrow and her conception; that in sorrow, or with pain, she should bring forth children; and that her desire should be to her husband; or, adopting the marginal reading, her desire should be "subject to her husband." Here is no intimation that any change had been wrought in her physical constitution by the act of transgression; and if no such change was effected, we have no reason to suppose that she was originally, or in a state of innocence, exempt from the operation of the universal law of nature in relation to the bringing forth of offspring; or that she was an exception to the whole animal creation. But, admitting it were otherwise, and that all those pains and sorrows came upon her as the punishment, or consequence, of her sin, does no good result from such sufferings? We have every reason to believe that those sufferings create, or at least arouse to action that ardent and enduring maternal love so indispensable to the preservation and welfare of every new-born creature, and the source of such unspeakable joy and happiness in the breast of every mother. It is an undeniable, if not a universally admitted fact, that the joys of maternity far outweigh its sorrows; and if so, such sufferings cannot be incompatible with divine goodness.

3. We may next consider the denunciation against Adam; and here we find what have been considered the two great evils, or curses, which have come into the world and passed upon all mankind, in consequence of sin, viz., labor and death, or the dissolution of the body. But is labor an evil? If so, was it something which did not enter into the purpose of God when he created man in his own image? We learn that our first parents, immediately after their creation, received the Divine benediction. "And God blessed them; and God said unto them, be fruitful and multiply, and replenish the earth, and subdue it; and have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over every living thing that moveth upon the earth."[15] From this it

[15] Gen. i. 28.

is evident that God originally ordained labor, as the means by which men should rise to that exalted rank in the scale of being for which he was designed in the purpose of his Creator. And how could man, without labor, and that development of his faculties induced by it, subdue the earth, or exercise dominion over all other creatures? But labor, even if we admit that it was imposed on man as part of the penalty of God's violated law, is not a curse, but a real and substantial blessing. In proof of this, we have only to look into those regions where the earth spontaneously brings forth all that is necessary for human sustenance. There, man, intellectually and morally, is but very little elevated above the wild beasts by whom he is surrounded. Compared with the untutored aborigines of our own country, who, for the purpose of procuring their food, are compelled to engage in the simple labor of the chase, the inhabitants of those tropical regions are but very little exalted above mere animals. Without labor, neither the physical, intellectual, nor moral powers of human nature could be fully developed. With it, man becomes an exalted being. Without labor, only comparatively small portions of the earth could be inhabited by man. With it, the most sterile and inhospitable regions teem with intelligent human beings, and become the theatres of human enjoyment. Labor, then, even admitting that it was imposed on man as a punishment, or as a consequence of sin, is the direct means of procuring for him great good, which he could obtain in no other manner; and is, consequently, not an evil, but a true blessing; and its institution an evidence of the infinite goodness of our heavenly Father.

Natural death, or the dissolution of the body, which is the common lot of humanity, has long and generally been considered one of the most direful consequences of the first transgression; a calamity which all mankind would have escaped had it not been for the sin of our first parents. But this view of the subject is certainly not warranted by the language of God to Adam; nor is it sanctioned by any thing we find in the inspired volume. Death was, in the beginning, and still is, the penalty of the Divine law. To our first parents God said, "in the day that thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die;" and the voice of the Almighty now proclaims to all men, everywhere, "the soul

that sinneth it shall die." Through all ages of the world, and wherever the righteous government of God extends, "the wages of sin is death;" and from the consequences of unrighteousness no human soul can escape. Though natural death is frequently the consequence of sinful acts and indulgences, it is abundantly evident that it was not introduced into the world and made the portion of all the living, by the transgression of Adam and Eve in the garden; for during long ages before the creation of man, successive generations and numerous species of animals had existed and died on the earth. In further proof of our position, we may notice the fact that our progenitors did not suffer natural death at the time when God declared that they should "surely die," i. e., in the day of transgression. If the declaration of God that they should die in consequence of transgression was true, it was equally true that the death denounced against them was inflicted in that very day; consequently, that death could not have been the dissolution of their bodies, for they lived in the earth many years after the day of transgression. Another fact bearing strictly on this point is, that in their primeval state they needed food to repair the natural waste and decay of their physical constitutions, which would not have been necessary had they been created with bodies exempt from dissolution, or natural death. Finally, God assigned to Adam the true reason why he should return to the ground, viz., for, or because, out of it he was taken: "for dust thou art, and unto dust shalt thou return." If, then, the dissolution of human bodies, or natural death, is the consequence, not of sin, but of their earthly organization, their dissolution and return to their native elements can be no more incompatible with divine goodness than the death of the rest of the animal creation.

But, aside from all these considerations, every Christian believes that man was created for a higher, purer and better state of being than he can ever attain in the flesh; a state in which he will be free, not only from all mortal infirmities, but from the influence of all those passions which so often mar his felicity, destroy his happiness in life, and retard his progress towards that state of high perfection to which he is destined in the purpose of his God. This more perfect and glorious condition can be reached only through

the portals of death; for "flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God: neither doth corruption inherit incorruption." We must, therefore, look upon natural death as a wise, and even beneficent ordination of our heavenly Father, through which alone man can reach immortal joy.

We have now considered the evils announced to Adam and Eve in their sentence from God; and have seen that none of them militates against the goodness of the Almighty, but that good results from them all. And it may not be improper here to remark, that all the penalties of God's law are adapted to the moral nature and condition of all the subjects of his government; and designed, in their infliction on the children of disobedience, to promote the good, and only the good, of their recipients. We may now notice some other results of that first transgression.

We have already seen that our first parents, in their primival state, were totally destitute of all knowledge of either good or evil; their intellectual, moral and spiritual powers were all undeveloped; they had formed no moral character, and were entirely destitute of the means of forming such character, without which it is difficult to conceive how they could become the proper subjects of a moral government, or the rightful recipients of rewards and punishments. By their act of disobedience, they obtained that indispensable knowledge; for, says the historian, "the eyes of them both were opened;" and further, "and the Lord God said, behold the man is become as one of us, to know good and evil." If we admit that the knowledge obtained by our first parents, in partaking of the forbidden fruit, was thus important, yea, indispensable to them, it follows undeniably that, however great the evils in which they involved themselves by their sin against God, they obtained, by that very act, a good far outweighing all those evils; and which, so far as we can know, they could have obtained in no other way. Should it be contended that, had they remained innocent, they might have obtained the knowledge, and even the enjoyment of good, without any experience of evil, it is sufficient to reply that this is a mere assumption, unsupported by a single fact or legitimate argument. As we can have no actual knowledge of good but by its enjoyment, so we can have no real knowledge of evil but by enduring its pains and penalties. And as good and evil are relative

terms, we cannot be in the enjoyment of good without the knowledge of evil. Must we not, then, conclude that the foreseen transgression of the divine law by Adam and Eve, by which means they obtained that knowledge, was God's chosen method of imparting it to them? And if so, it must have been the best which unerring wisdom could devise. In a word, it is difficult to conceive how they could have obtained it in any other manner.

There is another stand-point from which we will consider our subject, and from which we may hope to obtain additional light. Evil has generally been considered of three kinds, namely, the evil of imperfection, natural, and moral evil; and from the first of these it is obvious that both of the other kinds measurably proceed. Were man a perfect being, it is difficult, if not impossible, to conceive in what manner he could be subject to either natural or moral evil. The progress of decay, corruption and decomposition of our bodies is the cause of those pains and sufferings which are denominated natural evils. We may not say that God could not have created man with an incorruptible body. But had he so made him, he would not have been the creature he now is; and with his present physical organization, these evils are inevitable, being subject to the operation of those unvarying laws by which all material organism is affected. Were man perfect in all his mental, moral and spiritual powers, as God is perfect, he would not be liable to sin; for, were his knowledge infallible, he could never be deceived; were his wisdom unerring, and had he sufficient power, he would never fail in his pursuit of the means of happiness; he would have no unsatisfied desires, the patent causes of sin; and had he perfect perception and strength of purpose, he would be in no danger of yielding to the power of temptation. But such is not his condition. Perfection does not, and can not pertain to created beings; it is the attribute of God alone; and is incommunicable. To absolute perfection, self-existence is indispensable. Hence a perfect creature is an utter impossibility; and even Omnipotence cannot create such a being. But, because evil is the inevitable result of imperfection, shall we charge the Great First Cause of all things with a want of infinite benevolence in calling into existence, from nonentity, such a creature as man? The purpose of God, in creation, could have

been no other than the communication of happiness; for a being infinitely wise, good and happy, can act from no other motive. And when we consider the fact that there is a far greater amount of good than of evil, a vast preponderance of enjoyment over suffering, in the world; and especially, when we reflect that all evil is limited, and destined to pass away, we are constrained to acknowledge the goodness of God in the creation of man, notwithstanding the amount of evil in the earth.

Natural evil results from the constitution of the material universe, and the operation of natural laws; and consists of the pains and sufferings endured by all creatures in consequence of the change, decay and tendency to dissolution in all material bodies. It has been contended that man, whilst in a state of innocence, was exempt from these pains, and would never have endured them had he remained free from sin. But it is difficult to conceive how this could have been the case if we admit, as has already been shown, that he was created with a mortal body. Formed of the dust of the earth, his body must have been subject to the laws of matter; and there must have been, inherent in his physical constitution, an irresistible tendency to decomposition and death. But, however this may be, no one will contend that his existence, under these circumstances, is not consistent with divine goodness.

Moral evil has been defined as "natural evil, with volition superadded." It is the result of wrong volitions, induced by the undue indulgence of our natural passions and propensities; and, in a great degree, the consequence of human imperfection. How far we can control, or successfully resist this evil, and what amount of culpability attaches to us in consequence of our wrong volitions and actions, it is not our present purpose to inquire. If it can be shown that the design of God, in introducing, or permitting moral evil to exist in the earth, is good; that it is designed for, and is in fact overruled by him to, the production of an overbalancing amount of good, it follows that its existence is not incompatible with infinite goodness.

We have before shown that Adam and Eve, in their primeval state, although innocent, were destitute of positive virtue; they had no moral character, and could not, under their circumstances, form such character; and we now con-

tend that, without the prevalence of moral evil in the world, the formation of the most exalted moral character, and the existence of the brightest virtues that adorn human nature, and render it truly Godlike, would have been impossible. We cannot know the intrinsic value of virtue without a knowledge of vice; and the cases are innumerable in which individuals, by suffering the consequences of sin, have been led to a life of righteousness and consequent happiness. Did we never endure contumely from our fellow men, we could never exercise the virtue of forbearance. Were no acts of wrong committed, there could be no such virtue as forgiveness. Were we beset by no temptation to evil, we could never know the joy of a triumph over them. Were there no suffering of evil in the world, man could never feel ecstatic bliss flowing into the soul from the exercise of heaven-born charity. The existence of moral evil and the pains resulting from it have aroused to action the purest impulses of our natures and noblest energies of the human soul. Many of the most exalted characters which have shed a lustre on humanity have been formed and perfected in struggling to overcome the evils by which they were surrounded. Without the existence of evil, the world had never seen a Wilberforce, a Howard, or a Florence Nightingale. In short, evil, not as a final end in the Divine economy, but as the efficient means to other and higher ends, seems to have been indispensable in carrying out the all-wise purposes of our adorable Creator; and, as such, is a wise and beneficent instrumentality.

Looking through the pages of sacred history, we find ample proof that, under the superintendency and overruling power of God, evils of the most malignant character, sins of the darkest dye, have been made subservient to beneficent ends, and the means of great good, even to the most guilty. One single instance of this kind establishes the correctness of our position, as no proof of a contrary final result can be produced.

In the familiar history of Joseph and his brethren, we are presented with a series of facts, forming a well-connected chain of secondary causes and results, which fully demonstrate the great truth that evil, under the control of infinite wisdom and goodness, becomes the efficient means of great good, which could in no other manner have been attained.

The partiality of Jacob for Joseph was wrong, inasmuch as it was the means of creating envy in the breasts of his ten older sons. That envy was sinful in the outset, and by indulgence became enmity and deadly hatred, resulting in the deliberate determination to imbrue their hands in the blood of their unoffending brother. They were finally induced by the interposition of one of their number to abandon their murderous purpose; and they only sold him as a slave into the hands of mercenary strangers. Arrived in Egypt, he was sold to Potiphar, the captain of Pharaoh's guard; and here another act of wickedness was perpetrated, which seems to have been necessary to the final result. The wife of Potiphar, frustrated in her lustful purpose, prefered a false charge against him, in consequence of which he was cast into prison, where he was brought to the knowledge of the king, without which he could not have been the instrument of the great good which was finally accomplished through him. The history is familiar to all readers; we need not follow it in its particulars, and will come at once to the results of those various sinful acts.

The famine predicted by Joseph, at the specified time prevailed through the land of Egypt, and spread through all surrounding countries; but by his foresight the Egyptians were preserved from starvation; and at length his parents and brothers, with their families, shared his beneficence, and were saved from death by his care. Joseph clearly recognized the hand of God in all these events. To his guilty, but humbled and forgiven brother, he says: "Now therefore be not grieved, nor angry with yourselves, that ye sold me hither; for God did send me before you to preserve life." And again, "so it was not you that sent me hither, but God." Although it is here positively declared that this great deliverance was wrought by God, it is evident that he effected his purpose by the direct agency of that wickedness which placed Joseph in the position he occupied; and it is equally obvious that the great good finally enjoyed by all concerned, even the guilty ones by whose sins he had been driven from his home and kindred, would have been accomplished by no other means; for such was God's wise ordination, and it could not be changed.

We might notice many other facts narrated in the Scriptures, such as the hardening of Pharaoh's heart, the cruelties

he inflicted on the children of Israel, the betrayal and crucifixion of our Saviour, by the wickedness of the Jews and Romans, all finally resulting in good, and all tending to establish the all-important truth that evil, under the control of an omniscient God, is made subservient to beneficent ends; thus establishing the position that all which we call evil will be thus finally overruled. But space will not permit us to pursue this point further.

We cannot, however, dismiss our subject without briefly noticing one other particular. Had sin never entered into the world, and had mankind never experienced its direful consequences, it would have been impossible to know the "joy unspeakable and full of glory" flowing into the soul from that great salvation wrought out for man by our blessed Redeemer. That the bliss of salvation will be enhanced by a remembrance of the sufferings previously endured by sinners, is evident from the language of our Saviour. In the account of the woman "who was a sinner," and in the parable of the two debtors, who "had nothing to pay," this principle is clearly taught. Christ also declared that "joy shall be in heaven over one sinner that repenteth, more than over ninety and nine just persons, which need no repentance." It was the obvious purpose of God, in the admission of sin or moral evil into the universe, to increase the happiness of mankind, and thus promote his own declarative glory by the final triumph of his grace over all evil: for "the law entered that the offence might abound; but where sin abounded, grace did much more abound." The joy and glory of deliverance from sin will be the cause of endless rejoicing among the heavenly hosts. They will raise higher notes of praise to God than could have been chanted had sin never existed. It was on this ground that the great Apostle thanked God, in behalf of his Roman brethren, that they had been the "servants of sin." And when the purposes of him "who worketh all things after the counsel of his own will," shall be accomplished, and the creation, "delivered from the bondage of corruption into the glorious liberty of the children of God," shall surround his throne in light and glory; when all God's ransomed offspring shall see "eye to eye," and the universe become reconciled "through the blood of the cross," then will all acknowledge the infinite goodness of the Great First Cause in all things, even

in the existence of sin and evil of every kind; and we shall realize the small importance of the question which now engages the attention and commands the talents of those who are contending with regard to the doctrines of Divine Sovereignty and Human Agency. W. S.

Art. XIV.

The Jews and the Gentiles.

The distinctions of character between the Hebrew race and the Gentile world have many points worthy of more than a passing thought, if we would rightly understand why Jesus came from among the former, and how his truths not only spread among them, but among the latter also. We desire to set forth a few of these points of difference, and then to show by what steps both Jews and Gentiles were brought to a mutual preparation for the coming of Jesus.

The Jews were early distinguished, called, chosen, from the nations of the world as a peculiar people beloved of God. This was so deeply impressed upon them, that even when the Gospel was established "the called," "the chosen," and "the elect," were assumed as titles particularly applicable to Christians. The titles hitherto used to distinguish Jews from the Gentile nations were thus transferred to distinguish Christ's people from all others. But the Jews were set apart from the nations of the world by inherent differences of disposition and training which fitted them for the great work God had in store for them—a work no less than that of giving to the world the true religion. To say that our Saviour was a Jew, is therefore only to say, that he was distinguished from the Gentile by all the elements of character which from earliest time had made the Jews a marked people in the midst of mankind.

1. From a single glance at their history we find that the Jews, from the beginning, were a *religiously* educated people. They dwelt with God; they listened to his words;

they were taught always to obey him. He was their King; their laws came direct from him; he rewarded and he punished them. Their religion and their life was one. The rules of religion penetrated into every custom, public or private. They went to it to learn the most minute directions for daily conduct. It taught them when to wash; when and what to eat; how to dress; as well as all the regulations of intercourse with their own nation and with strangers. It was all in all to them. Every school was a school of God. Prophets were the great men, and priests were the great educators; and religion was always the theme of both prophets and priests.

The entire world outside were differently educated. Look where we will, we find them deep in the study of "philosophy." Religion was all fable to them. Philosophy with them was grappling with the great problems of their existence. Matter, with its changes and transformations, and Mind, with its immediate relations to the world, were the themes on which they lived. Their schools were schools of philosophy; their labor was artistic development; their genius took the guise of the intellect, self-impelled and self-sustained. They were ruled and governed by men of mind, who, if not atheistic absolutely, had at best the very slightest possible respect for gods, temples and priests. Their great men never by any chance stood before them as prophets or priests; but as models of contempt for religion and her rites. This broad distinction is observable in the outset.

2. Such being the stand-point of education we can naturally trace the result in each case. The Jews reached, with little or no hindrance, the great central idea of *one God*, which lies at the basis of every religion destined to any permanency. This became interwoven with their nature, and they were never so shocked as when exhorted to tolerate religions which overlooked this fundamental truth. Their very existence seemed in their eyes dependent upon their faithfulness to this idea. In consequence they lived the will of God. Their *record* was a revelation from the one God. Thus they arrived at a direct revelation, such as we accept in the Old Testament Scriptures. To them it was the final appeal—the end of all argument, and the umpire in all disputes.

All other nations were naturally at fault in these respects. They allowed their religious ideas, uneducated, to be dissipated, and so were confused by a rank growth of gods. Every priest gave the revelation from his particular god whenever he was asked, and modeled it according to the station of him who sought the knowledge or according to the bounty bestowed by him on the temple. There were no reliable dicta whatever—no permanent words which spake and it was done. Thus schools of philosophy might continue their disputations forever. No standard of appeal was to be found, and man's frail apprehensions were alone to decide the matter in each discussion. Thus, we may say, the Jews were anchored fast and sure by the throne of God; and the Gentiles were afloat at the mercy of winds and waves, without an anchor and without a haven.

3. Religion was a matter of moral life to the Jews. The entire rule of morality to them was comprised in it. They saw no separation between faith and practice; they sought none. To do what religion condemned was always wrong; to fail to do what it commanded was equally wrong. True, they often forgot the spirit in seeking to perform the letter; but that was merely an error of interpretation, and does not disprove the great fact. Their religion was indeed the whole ground of their morality. It was a soul wedded to their souls—so wound into their being that all acts were colored by it. Even at this day we find in its moral commands some of the loftiest principles of moral right.

To all other nations religion was a matter of external forms and observance. It mattered nothing to them how much or how little they performed in the moral man, provided only they occasionally countenaced the sacrifices to the gods or contributed towards the pagantry the state had set up. The moral life was wholly independent of the religion. They recognized no connection between the two. Morality was taught on a different basis. It depended on human relations and personal expediency. Religion was external worship, and the gods themselves were far from being guides in the light of morality. Some of the later schools of philosophy joined with their ideas of the highest good of man, his unknown relations to the gods; but all under the shadow of a fog impenetrable to their utmost searchings.

4. We find throughout their entire literature the traces of a similar difference. The Jewish literature consisted of a religious mind and heart, trained with every element of devoutness, and poured out in praise and prayer to the one God, Maker of heaven and earth. Every sketch of biography, even the most common-place genealogies, had a religious idea, like a golden thread, running through them from beginning to end. Every aphorism, every allegory, every parable, every exclamation almost, had a religious reference. The whole literature of the Jews was thus permeated with their connection with God, and their obedience or disobedience to his commands.

Other nations had a literature in which every subject stood alone. There was no central chain to which they were all attached. There was no undercurrent of devoutness which linked each thought to the great power that made and upheld the universe. Their law, their philosophy, their poetry, their religion,—each had its separate style, its technical phrases, its variable manifestations of thought. Even in their religious literature itself, (so called) there was but little of a religious nature. It consisted in the bald apotheosis of great men—heroes in battle, and generals in the art of deceit. It was a matter in which no heart was found. It consisted of words without the responsive soul looking out. There was no lifting us by great thoughts into blessed communion with a higher nature. There was a continual smell of earth on its garments; the atmosphere around it lacked the clearness and purity caught by the Jews from the mountain of the Lord's holiness.

5. So the history of the Jewish experiences is eminently a religious history. From the first record of the creation, in the Book of Genesis, up to the very coming of Jesus, no feature except this is constantly present as we read. All through the thousands of years of organized existence, under whatever form of government they lived, this shines out. Over one seventh of their time and one tenth of their material substance were devoted to religion. All was centred in the directions, the paramount government, the overruling providence of God. Everything came from, everything was attributed at once to, God. Peace, war, slavery, bondage, freedom, victory and defeat were alike, God-given,—given not in the sense of fated, but given as punishment and

reward for the disobedience or faithfulness of the entire people.

The history of nations outside was one of kings, emperors, great generals, living and ruling of themselves. Successes came from their sagacity, defeats from their lack of foresight and proper skill in management. Accordingly, we find that defeat was the sign of the incompetency of men who were considered worthy of death, or, at the very least, worthy of banishment from the state; while a victory gave a great triumph to the general. God had nothing to do with the outside nations in their own eyes. It was all man's work and to be punished or rewarded accordingly by man.

6. This difference, too, may be instanced in one peculiarity which, perhaps, more than any other slight thing we could mention, shows the spirit of the whole. All nations have a "golden age" to which they appeal, and where they see all the happiest imaginations of human life realized. Now the Jews always looked forward for this golden age, *forward*, to the coming of the promised one of God. Every other nation looked always back, far back, and sang the glories of the past and lamented the age of gold as forever gone.

Here, then, were the actual differences existing between the Jews and the Gentiles. They were intrinsic, practical. They elevated the Jews, in a religious point, above all contact with other nations. The highest aspirations of the loftiest Gentile soul never dared to tread the eminence to which they had attained, and where they habitually dwelt, as at home. Here, then, is seen why this race was "called," "chosen," "set apart," for the great purpose of receiving the Son of God, and setting up his permanent religion in the earth.

Here the theme changes. Would not these differences, so marked, prevent the spread of the religion of Christ? How can we reconcile this state of things with the rapid extension over the Gentile world of the reign of Jesus? The Jewish state was necessary to insure the development of the religion itself; but must we not also see an antagonism between the Jewish and Gentile soul which could not be overcome by the Teacher even with the whole power of truth on his side?

Let us turn to the actual history of the events, and there see how these differences were overcome.

1. First in order here, is the dispersion of the Jews. They, scattered amid all nations, carried with them a portion at least of the Jewish spirit, and gave, in some slight degree, a knowledge of their moral and religious status to all people. We find members of the Jewish nation in good repute with kings and emperors, in various nations, still holding to their great religious idea of one God, and still obedient to the religious life in which they were educated. Of the humble members of this people there were doubtless very many diffusing their faith and principles of conduct among the common classes in the Gentile world. This may by many be esteemed one of the providential means of breaking down the barrier which was existing.

2. Besides, the Jews were not of the same pusillanimous character as their neighbors, as heretofore shown, in their religion. This very feature was a powerful instrument for overcoming the resistance of these differences of nurture. They were everywhere a proselyting people. Their religion was not only practiced by themselves; it was thrust perseveringly and ostentatiously upon every one. They made the Gentiles acquainted with it whether they chose or not. They carried their sacred literature in salient passages with them; and were constantly referring in conversation, in trade, even in oaths, to their peculiar faith, and to the worthies who were representatives of it. Perhaps no people in the world were so well fitted by extraordinary energy and zeal to impress upon others the superlative value of their religious opinions. Thus other nations became somewhat accustomed to their peculiarities, and the sharp edges of difference were in a measure worn off.

3. By the time Christ came, the Jews had become first subject to the Greeks and afterward to the Romans. And although this subjection may have created a hatred in the Jewish heart, the influence towards assimilation of mutual truths must have been great. Overrun by the world's conquerors and made subject, they became a provincial people. Thus their affairs became known passably well to a great portion of the Gentile world—first to the Greek, then to the Roman. The armies successively stationed in the provinces were well informed in all the customs and all the

phases of Jewish religion; and as they were changed occasionally, the information was spread very rapidly and surely amid numerous families, and throughout whole Gentile provinces. Then we might hint here, also, the permanent relations which always occur under such circumstances, more or less, in which the Gentile becomes the Jew or the Jew the Gentile, and marriages follow.

4. The Jews, too, latterly did not object so violently to the coming of the Gentiles to their homes. The language of Greece and Rome became a familiar thing to the Jews; and among the mass of people it was used much oftener than the Hebrew, which soon was considered a sacred tongue, and given up mostly to the priests. The patois of the common Jew—a jargon between Hebrew and Arabic—gave way to the more polished language of their conquerors. The Jewish literature was generally translated into Greek. The beautiful symbolism of their religion was clothed in the classic terms of the Greek literature. Intercourse became free in every respect, and the barriers to communication of thought and feeling rapidly dissolved. Palestine soon became a resort of some leading minds among the Gentiles, and few were considered fully educated who had not at least traversed the country.

5. It was in the interchange of thought which this mixture of Jew and Gentile produced, that the idiosyncrasies of each were so far blended that the differences inherent from long education and distinct purposes of existence were somewhat overlooked. Both classes were thus more lenient towards the young teacher, Jesus, who arose a Jew, with his more elevated spiritual religion. His own nation, long waiting and anxiously looking forward, were eager to grasp at any reality that promised the Messianic reign. The Gentile nations, tired of looking back and weary of the present, did not weigh very intently the origin of the man, when the promise was of unheard happiness and perpetual joys. They were alike prepared to accept such doctrines as were lying at the basis of the words and acts out of which Christianity grew.

We have thus traced, as briefly as possible, (for under each head there is room for a vast amount of particularizing and comment,) the peculiarities of the race from which Jesus has sprung. We have seen the elements of character which

distinguished it from all other races, and rendered it the proper medium of divine communication. We have also, with equal brevity, traced the events which tended, when the full time for the communication had arrived, to demolish these differences practically, that they might not prove an insuperable barrier to the spread of the truth. The intercourse of the Jews with the whole world, and the actual presence of Gentiles in every sphere of Jewish life, rather expedited the work Jesus had in hand. And although in the beginning it brought persecution and death upon its advocates, yet its principles, destined to free the world from sin, found a response in human nature, and the glad tidings were soon triumphant. H. A. W.

Art. XV.

Spiritualism Nothing New.

It was said of old, by one famed for his wisdom—"Is there any thing whereof it may be said, See, this is new? It hath been already of old time which was before us." This is not as true now, probably, as in the days of Solomon. Since his time the world has made some forward movement, and there are many things of which Solomon himself, if he were to come among us, would say, "See, this is new." Our cotton factories and printing presses, gun-powder and electric telegraphs, Daguerreotypes and telescopes, locomotives and steamships, would probably surprise the wise man and his contemporaries, if they could look in upon our world for a day or two; and would possibly lead to an essential modification of the saying of Solomon. So far as history goes, it can not surely be said of any one of these, "It hath been already of old time which was before us." They are the products of modern thought and necessity, and no wise man of the East can claim them as inventions of older times.

It would be a humiliating thought, that the saying is as

applicable to the condition of the world now, as when it was uttered, twenty-eight hundred years ago. It would reflect somewhat seriously on the race of man, that it had found out no new thing, made no progress in truth, science, or civilization in all that time. But the facts show clearly enough that, however it might have been in Solomon's day, there are certainly some new things under the sun in our day—and that the ancient prophecy is hastening to its fulfilment, "Many shall run to and fro, and knowledge shall be increased."

And yet it is an interesting study, the comparison of the past with the present, and the bringing out the striking likenesses which exist in many things, and the nearness of contact between much knowledge and many facts of to-day and thousands of years ago.

The mysteries of the Egyptian priests reveal a knowledge of chemistry, and the pyramids and temples an acquaintance with mechanical laws and forces, which may well challenge the admiration of modern professors and builders. And the singular accuracy of the astronomical calculations of the ancient Bramins, the exactness of their tables in regard to the places of the sun and moon, and other heavenly bodies, more than four thousand years ago, make us feel that at least one science was carried in India to a high degree of perfection at a period when nearly all Europe was in a state of complete barbarism.

The Cape of Good Hope was sailed round ages before the Portuguese ships doubled it; and America was discovered long before the time of Columbus. So in painting, sculpture and architecture, the ancients lead us; and though we would not fully accept the words of the German, who exclaimed—"Out upon those ancients; they have said all our fine things before us"—yet if we turn to poetry, philosophy, geometry, mechanics, politics, we shall find Plato and Aristotle, Homer and Virgil, Euclid and Archimedes, and a host of others, standing between us and the sun, and throwing us in part at least into their shadow.

The same remarks are applicable, to some extent, in the domain of theology, for many of the errors and false dogmas of the creed and the church, are certainly not new under the sun. The doctrine of the trinity is as old as the Zend Avesta of the Hindoos, and may be found in Plato and the

early Greek philosophers. It is no new speculation, but a mysticism of the most ancient philosophies. The doctrine of the devil, of an evil spirit in antagonism with the Supreme Deity, dates back as far as the Magian doctrine of Persia, and perhaps finds its parentage in India. The ideas of endless punishment, of a future general judgment are equally old, and of the same authority, having their roots far back in the black night of paganism.

In all these particulars and others, we suppose, if some old priest of the Hindoos could rise from the dead, or some mummy from the tombs of Egypt could be galvanized into life, they would pass examination safely, and their orthodoxy be pronounced satisfactory. So slight the change which has taken place on these points since the times of the heathen ascendancy.

Closely allied to the doctrine of the devil and of evil spirits, or demons, are many of the phenomena deemed miraculous in the early Christian times; and the student of history cannot but be struck with their resemblance to some of the wonders of so-called spiritualism in our own time. The comparison of these, and the singular likeness drawn out by it, will give us our present theme.

We shall state here a few of the facts, beginning with certain statements made by IRENÆUS, who flourished about one thousand six hundred and fifty years ago, an hundred years or more after the death of St. John. He makes mention of some who "cast out devils, so that those from whom they were ejected often turned believers. Others had knowledge of future events, visions, and prophetical sayings. Others healed the sick, by imposition of hands."

Here we have "visions," prophesies of events yet future, healing the sick by imposition of hands, or by the manipulations of the operator; all which correspond well with the modern wonders of animal magnetism, clairvoyance and spiritualism. The same powers, mental and physical, the same influence of mind over matter, are seen in these cases, that appear in the phenomena of mesmerism, or biology, and in the action of the so-named "healing mediums."

Again, he says, "we have many in the church endued with prophetic gifts, speaking with all kinds of tongues, laying open the secret thoughts of men for the public good." Here we have a new item of wonder—"speaking with all

kinds of tongues." This is in perfect keeping with the claims of some in our day, who profess to speak all the dead and all the living languages. If they do, if under any influence brought to bear on the mind, they write or speak a language of which, in their natural or normal condition, they know nothing—still there are those who set up a prior claim to the wonder. It is no new revelation from the spirit world. It cannot be said that Christianity has grown old and threadbare, that the world needs to be quickened into life by some new manifestations of spiritual power—and therefore the marvels of our time. It is no new thing—in the first ages of the church we have the same pretensions, or the same realities, as the case may be. And so far from the wonders in review being proof of growth and new revelations in spiritual things, we are only going back into the old way, to what has been "already of old time which was before us."

TERTULLIAN, who lived a few years later, challenges the heathen magistrates to call before their tribunals any person possessed with a devil; "and if the evil spirit, when exorcised by a Christian, did not confess himself a devil, not daring to tell a lie, then they might hang the Christian exorciser on the next tree." Tertullian seems quite confident that the devils, or evil spirits, of his time would not dare to lie to a Christian. We can only say, that since his time the spirits have grown worse instead of better, or else they are not particularly afraid of a Christian, for some of them now both lie and are profane!

CYPRIAN, the scholar of Tertullian, who wrote about the middle of the third century, say sixteen hundred years ago, says—"Beside the visions of the night, even boys among us are filled with the Holy Ghost, and in fits of ecstacy, see, hear and speak things by which the Lord sees fit to instruct us." Again Tertullian says, "There is a sister among us, endued with the gifts of revelations, during the time of divine service, which come upon her by an ecstacy of the spirit. In her trance she converses with angels, and sometimes, also, with the Lord; sees and hears mysteries; and knows the hearts of some, and prescribes medicines to those who want them." One day when preaching on the soul, this woman fell into a trance, and when she was recovered told him she "had seen a soul, in the form of the body, yet so

as to be a spirit, not of a void and empty quality, but what might be handled, tender and transparent, or like light, of an airy color, and in all points of human shape."

The particulars here given by Tertullian, recall the words of Solomon, "there is nothing new under the sun." Here are all the wonders of spiritualism—boys in ecstacy, women in trances, seeing spirits and conversing with them, repeating the thoughts of others, making known secret and hidden things, and prescribing medicines for the sick. The mediums of our time have not advanced a step beyond the marvels of their brothers and sisters of the early ages.

In that length of time, from the 1st to the 19th century, the world has not grown at all; and no discoveries have been made in the spiritual realms. We have no new developments of the mental, spiritual or physical powers of man, not known fifteen centuries back. So we have all the twitchings of the limbs, contortions, convulsions and groanings, which are witnessed in these days, and are regarded as proofs of the entrance of the spirits into the bodies of the mediums, or the possessed. Cyprian says, the demons, or evil spirits, "insinuate themselves into the bodies of men, raise terrors in the mind, distortions in the limbs, break the constitution, and bring on diseases." This exactly corresponds with the experience of our times, and shows that the same cause was in operation then as now, and that those who gave themselves up to these beings suffered the penalty of unnatural excitement, ruined health of body, and often the prostration of reason.

And it is further worthy of notice, that those cured of their diseases often fell back again into the same condition of body and mind, or even worse; like the spirit who, returning, took to himself seven spirits worse than he. This was the case with many of the demoniacs, or people who had become insane.

As if to complete the picture and perfect the resemblance, we have even the tipping of tables and chairs, as an aid in the art of prophecy, or revelation. Tertullian admits the fact that the heathen could do these things, and call up "spirits from the vasty deep," as well as Christians. "Do not your magicians," says he, "perform very amazing feats: call ghosts and departed spirits from the shades below; and by their infernal charms represent an infinite number of

delusions? And how do they perform all this, but by the assistance of evil angels and demons by which they are able even to make tables and chairs to prophesy?" He then offers to make these spirits confess that they are "damned to everlasting misery, and only wait for the general judgment to have their tortures complete."

It is plain that, with regard to table-rapping and tipping, we cannot say, "see, this is new!" It is sixteen hundred years old at the least—how much older we cannot say. If Tertullian had favored us with a minute description of the *modus operandi* of the chair and table wonders, we doubt not we should have had an original treatise on spirit communications agreeing in all points with the modern phenomena—for it may be safely said of the whole performance—"It has been already of old time."

In conclusion, let us say that the facts adduced establish two points: 1st. That the physical and mental phenomena which have attracted so much attention at the present day, are of the same class common in the second and third centuries of our era, both among Christians and Pagans. 2nd. That the same philosophy of explanation was current then, which is adopted now, viz., that they are the work of spirits. Of course there is some confusion and contradiction in the accounts given by the ancients; but perhaps not more than is found in modern statements.

One point of difference is worth a notice. The early Christians believed that the contortions of body, the groanings and writhings, the diseases and insanity, were caused by evil spirits or devils; while the cure was wrought through mediums possessed not by human spirits, but by the spirit of God, the Holy Spirit.

The theory now is that the diseases of body and mind are the result of natural causes, and the cure is wrought by the spirits of the dead coming into the body of the living medium and using it as a means of contact with the afflicted. So with regard to the prophesying, and the revelation of secret things—the explanation now is that the spirits of the departed act through the medium; but the Fathers of the Church explained it by the subject of the trance being filled with the spirit of God.

Doubtless, both in the ancient and modern marvels, it has been abundantly shown that there is a large infusion of im-

posture on the one hand and of credulity on the other. Yet, with this allowance, if the testimony of honest and sensible persons may be trusted, there are many curious, astonishing and inexplicable facts, which no reasonable man can, or wishes to ignore. There is in some cases a manifestation of intelligence, not general intelligence merely, but particular knowledge of persons and events, truly surprising; and this is equally the fact in ancient examples and in the modern.

This, we think, may be readily admitted; and yet this is very far from proof that departed human spirits have any thing to do with it. Certainly there is no more evidence of this, than there is of the position of the Church Fathers, that demons, devils and evil angels were the cause of the wonders of their times, or that God entered into and spoke through the entranced boys, or the "illuminated sisters," as Tertullian calls them. The actual phenomena may be allowed—the explanation may be rejected. One by no means follows as the logical sequence of the other.

T. B. T.

Art. XVI.

Temptation.

In a recent number of the Quarterly we briefly examined the Scripture Record and called up facts of history, in order to determine, if possible, whether the common belief of christendom in a personal devil had any foundation in primitive Christianity. We arrived at the conclusion that heathen fables had been accepted as Gospel facts, and that the religion of Christ gives us no Satan as a scape-goat for our sins. But temptation and sin are ugly facts in the world, even though they have no concrete spiritual or corporeal representation; and, that we may not be mere iconoclasts, we now propose to consider what is the true Scripture doctrine on these subjects.

James, in his general epistle, gives us the whole matter in a nutshell: "Every man is tempted when he is drawn away of his own lust and enticed." The word *lust*, (for which we prefer to substitute the word *desires*, as more adequately representing to us the comprehensiveness of the original term,) is in this place but a synonyme for the love of selfish gratifications of every kind. The word *desire*, however, like its Greek equivalent, represents attractions to good as well as to evil; or, rather, natural and normal desire ends in good, abnormal desire in evil. The so-called science of phrenology, with all its vagaries, has rendered good service in the promulgation of this truth—that we are not endowed by nature with certain propensities which are good and others which are bad, but that each and every one of our powers and faculties, when exercised within the limits of reason, tends to good and to the building up of a perfect manhood, while the abuse of these powers alone constitutes moral evil. Avarice is extravagant acquisitiveness, the latter being the handmaid of prudence; rage is but excessive and irrational indignation, fighting in the dark against a man of straw, instead of wielding the sword of the spirit with sober earnestness against wrong and oppression.

There is no use which has not its corresponding abuse. This is as true of our moral faculties as of our intellectual and physical powers. Disease, whether of mind or body, is but an allotropic form of health; or, if this seems paradoxical, we may say that health and disease are products of the same energies, results of the same forces, the only difference being, that, in the one case, the forces act in their originally intended channel, while, in the other, some conflicting or disturbing agency, or some excessive or deficient use of the force itself produces results not in harmony with the archetypal plan. Oxygen is the great life-supporter of all animal existence; yet, under its allotropic form of ozone, it loses its life-giving quality, or, more accurately, has an intensity which tends to the destruction of life; and, if it were organic, we should call it diseased; if it were spirit, we should call it sinful.

Medical men are fast becoming convinced that the healing art can never be elevated to the rank of a science, until it is acknowledged that there is nature in disease as well as

in health. The pioneers of the profession now boldly declare that "all morbid action is but the modification or perversion of some natural or normal action or function," and that "all the physical results constituting morbid structural alterations are mere perversions or modifications of natural or normal textures, or, at most, analogous textures fabricated from the same materials by like processes." Particularizing, they say that "nervous affections are but variations in the natural actions of the affected organs; the redness, pain, heat, and swelling of the inflammation, are only the exaltation of the normal processes of circulation and nervous influence; the phenomena of fever are mere modifications of the regular vital actions, though the causes of these modifications may be a poison from without; hemorrhages and dropsies consist simply in a perversion of the common functions of secretion, excretion and absorption; morbid deposits and extraneous growths are varieties of healthy or examples of perverted nutrition; and so with the rest."

That the Greeks and the Hebrews had but a shallow psychology, is clear from the manner in which they spoke of mental diseases. The loss of reason, the former attributed to the haunting presence of the fairies, the latter to demoniacal possession. The Latin language, on the other hand, has contributed to the English, "delirium," and "insanity:" "delirium," *de* and *lira*, "the going out of the furrow," originally the farmer's expression for his crooked ploughing, but soon applied to the wandering of men's wits; "insanity," from *in* and *sanus*, "unsound," "unhealthy," first in body, then in mind. These terms, although they do not exclude foreign influence, yet imply only the leading astray and the perversion, but not the exclusion or destruction of nature.

When we come to the department of morals, etymology shows us that in the Latin, English, French, German, and Italian languages, not to mention others, the most common ethical terms testify to the truth of the law which we are illustrating. From the Latin we have borrowed "right" and "rectitude," "error" and "transgression," from which it appears that righteousness is but "straight-forwardness" in the way of nature, while "error" and "transgression" indicate a wandering from the right way and a passing over and beyond the limits which bound this way. "Wrong,"

the etymologists tell us, is simply that which is "wrung" or distorted from the right. The French, the Germans, and the Italians, have their corresponding words of a similar and mostly identical origin, but these we will not particularize.

Thus we see that language, in its modern formations, has been breaking away from the old fables, and unconsciously embalming in its new uses and combinations the advanced thought and intuition of the world. When we retain the old fables in our theologies, we have a husk without a kernel, a house without an occupant. Despite occasional radicalisms, nothing is so conservative as theology; and pagan doctrines and superstitions, transplanted from their primitive ages and their native lands, often preserve a sort of fungus-life beyond the term of their natural existence, by sucking the sap of new and thrifty growths. What philosophy, then, is in the old myths, we often lose. Whether the authors of the fable were conscious of it or not, they who first represented the prince of darkness as a fallen angel of light, expressed in this poetical garb a truth of deep significance. It was fitting that the foulest fiend should have once been an archangel; but we have retained the form of the fable, forgetting its significance, and its apt illustration of the scripture: "If the light which is in thee be darkness, how great is that darkness."

Our illustrations have tended to show that "evil is only good perverted," that physical, intellectual and moral disease—or sickness, insanity and sin—are but disturbances in the normal working of powers and forces whose healthy action tends to the building up of the highest life. Because the river which bears on its broad bosom fertility and plenty through the land, when swollen by the floods of the spring-time overflows its banks and carries devastation in its course, shall we say, "Cursed be the river?" Shall we not rather place our possessions high above the reach of the destroying flood, and build strong dykes to keep it out? When the locomotive bears the rushing train from its appointed track, carrying orphanage and sorrow to a hundred homes, shall we say "Cursed be steam," or shall care and skill strive to guard against such calamities?

But because evil is only the perversion of good, it is not thence to be argued that evil *is* good; neither, because in

the divine plan, evil may ultimate in good, is evil to be done that good may come, as both reason and scripture tell us. No one who has not submitted the intuitions of consciousness to the plausibilities of reasoning, can help believing that man possesses what is called "free agency." Certain it is, that without this power there can be no such thing as virtue and vice in the world. These words imply a voluntary choice between good and evil. This free choice, however, does not exclude the influence of inducements and temptations, but, on the contrary, implies their presence, for the idea of choice without inducement is an absurdity. Virtue consists simply in choosing that course of action which reason and revelation show to be conducive to the best interests of our being, and, in order that virtue should be what it is, it is necessary that inducements to wrong as well as to right should be set before us, and that we should make deliberate and rational choice of the latter.

"Virtue" and "goodness" are not exact synonymes. Goodness may be simply amiability of character, and the gift of nature; virtue is the moral strength gained by the discipline of conflict. "Goodness" in the *abstract*, however, Whately tells us, expresses a higher degree of excellence than "virtue," since we speak of the "goodness" but not of the "virtue" of God, virtue being but a human quality. We may say that there is a passive goodness which is of nature, and an active goodness which is born of virtue, the attainment of the latter being the perfection of human character. Beautiful as are those natures which are saintly as if by inspiration, yet unless they have strength as well as beauty—that strength which can be gained only by action—we feel that a chief element of the highest virtue is wanting. Such are those of whom Wordsworth speaks in his "Ode to Duty"—

> "Glad hearts, without reproach or blot,
> Who do thy will and know it not."

The amenities and the gentle genuine courtesies of life are not the highest virtue, albeit the highest virtues are barren without these.

We cannot refrain from quoting a few words upon this point from the beautifully gifted Channing, whose natural purity of soul was equalled only by the vigor and strength

of his moral and intellectual nature. He says: "In all these [the kindly] emotions of our nature, I see the kind design of God; I see a beauty; I see the germ and capacity of an ever-growing charity. But they are not virtues, they are not proper objects of moral approbation, nor do they give any sure pledge of improvement. This moral amiableness I too often see in company with sloth, with uselessness, with the contemptible vanity and dissipation of fashionable life. It is no ground of trust, no promise of fidelity in any of the great exigencies of life. The love, the benevolence, which I honor as virtue, is not the gift of nature or condition, but the growth and manifestation of the soul's moral power. It is a spirit chosen as excellent, cherished as divine, protected with a jealous care, and especially fortified by the resistance and subjection of opposite propensities. It is the soul, determining itself to break every chain of selfishness, to enlarge and to invigorate the kind affections, to identify itself with other beings, to sympathize, not with a few, but with all the living and rational children of God, to honor others' worth, to increase and enjoy their happiness, to partake in the universal goodness of the Creator, and to put down within itself every motion of pride, anger, or sensual desire, inconsistent with this pure charity. In other words, it is strength of holy purpose, infused into the kind affections, which raises them into virtues, or gives them a moral worth, not found in constitutional amiableness."

This, then, being virtue, sin is its opposite, and consists in yielding to temptations to wrong doing, and in the heedless or deliberate choice of that course of conduct which is at variance with the instructions of reason and revelation. Before us are inducements to rectitude, on either hand temptations to transgression; — rectitude being as we have seen the going straight forward in the path of duty,—transgression, the crossing over its limits.

But all we have thus far said might, perhaps, be accepted without any adequate appreciation of the fact that we are our own tempters. While we reject as baseless the theory of a powerful tempting spirit—a *professional* tempter, as it were—we still cling to the coward's plank, and charge our temptations, if not our guilt, upon our fellow-men, or upon that most convenient non-entity, "the force of circumstances." Man can never become sufficiently conscious of

the extent of his own individual moral responsibility, until he throws aside this cowardly plea, and takes upon himself the burden of those errors which are justly chargeable upon him and upon no one else.

The natural history of temptation is simple. Given, on the one hand, as the endowment of man, certain faculties, appetites and propensities, tending, in their natural and legitimate exercise, to promote his well-being and happiness, and, on the other hand, given, as the complement of these faculties, certain objects for which they have natural appetences, the result would be, if man were perfect in knowledge and wisdom, a complete and beautiful harmony, without sin, without sorrow, without death. But since God alone is omniscient, and omnipotent, and all-wise, and perfect, while created man has but finite powers and finite wisdom, perfect harmony cannot, in the nature of things, be the result. Thus, at first, through our ignorance, we do much that is for our harm; but the pain or other punishment, which follows the error, is the kind admonition which the Father gives us that we are straying from the right course. The path of duty in any respect once known to us, whether through reason, or revelation, or suffering, thenceforth we are to choose in that respect whether or not we will guide our feet by the lamp of knowledge. And here it is that temptation comes in. God's law says, "This is the way;" selfishness says, "This by-road is pleasanter and perhaps will lead to the same goal; let us go in it." And then the determining will, in its strength or its weakness, in its devotion to God or to self, casts the white or the black ball into the urn of fate, and thereby a soul is saved or lost.

When the Sabines gained possession of the Roman citadel, it was through the treachery of Tarpeia, the virgin daughter of the Roman commander, whom they had corrupted by promises of gold. When sin takes possession of the citadel of the soul, it is not by a furious assault from without, but a traitor within faithlessly draws the bolts and turns the key. Temptation to sin is not the attack of an enemy,—it is treason in our own camp. God had given us strength, if we will but use it, both to ward off the fiery darts of the wicked and to subdue the traitor.

We constantly speak of temptation as though it were

something active, operating upon us from without, whereas the outer world only furnishes us opportunities for self-indulgence, and those often of our own seeking. Nothing can be an inducement to wrong-doing, unless the wrong disposition already exists within us, ready to embrace any opportunity for action. This is clear from the fact that what is an inducement to one person is no inducement to another, but may, on the contrary, produce feelings of aversion and disgust.

When our desires extend to that which is for our harm or for the harm of others, then we tempt ourselves. When we entertain, though it be but for an instant, the most fleeting thought of disobedience to what we know to be the highest law, we tempt ourselves. But when we have become so schooled to the perfect law of obedience that the right *acts itself*, as it were, without any conscious effort of the will, then there can be no such thing as temptation for us. Then a marble statue in a garden of forbidden fruit could not be less tempted than we.

If, then, a man is tempted when he is drawn away and enticed by his own selfish desires, temptation is but a synonyme for self-love, and sin is just self-indulgence, and the foil of temptation and the death of sin is self-denial.

> "Two principles in human nature reign,
> Self-love to urge, and reason to restrain,"

and we are to choose, every day of our lives, which we will serve—self or reason. Neither is the service of reason a hard service, nor that of self a pleasant one, except for the moment. The service of reason is in the end the best service of self, for it gives us that lasting pleasure which alone is worthy of the name of happiness. We may think we are driving a sharp bargain when we purchase illegal or excessive present gratification on a credit of perhaps many years; but nature's claims never outlaw, and she demands interest upon interest to the uttermost farthing. Self

> "—— sees immediate good by present sense,—
> Reason, the future and the consequence;"

and,

> "—— greedy, *that* its object would devour,
> *This* taste the honey and not wound the flower."

It would seem that ordinary prudence, to say nothing of any higher motive, ought to be sufficient to induce in us moderation and temperance in the gratification of our desires. Just as surely as fire consumes wood, leaving but cold and cheerless ashes,—just as sure as it is that we cannot burn our dwelling to the ground and yet enjoy its protection, so certainly will the indulgences of youth waste the energies of manhood, leaving but sorrow and desolation as the companions of age. Wisdom dwelleth with prudence; he that sinneth against her wrongeth his own soul; all that hate her love death.

The saying of Epicurus, that "it is more desirable to be miserable by acting according to reason, than to be happy by going against it," may seem harsh, but, viewed by the light of prudence, there can be no truer saying. We need not fear, however, that misery will result from following reason, even in the present; for it is the truest of truisms, that "virtue carries with it its own reward," in securing that peace of mind which passeth all understanding.

It has already been remarked that temptations are relative, an object which excites undue desire in one man frequently offering no temptation to another. To this it may be added, that we do not oftenest yield to great temptations, but to comparatively insignificant ones,—that is, insignificant in themselves considered individually, and apparently insignificant in their results. Great temptations come to few men, and no man was ever greatly tempted unless he had been accustomed to yield to smaller temptations. The path of duty is a direct mathematical line, and every line diverging from this, whether more or less, has its origin in a single point in contact with, and but a single remove from, the position of some point in the original line; and, however small the angle of departure, the result may be infinite separation. The river does not burst forth in full flood from the mountain-top, but a single drop, perhaps the light burden of the tiniest flower-cup, is its source. Many trickling drops form the gushing spring; many springs the leaping and foaming brook; the confluent brooks, from their distant sources uniting their scanty waters, soon give us the deep-flowing tide of the Ohio, and the Mississippi, and the Amazon.

Not only is the physical world composed of atoms infi-

nitely minute and beyond the perception of our senses, but the characters of men are as truly formed on the atomic plan. Satan has no such prolific creative power as Jove-like to give birth from his own brain to mature Neros and Caligulas, instant and homogeneous creations. Character is the last term of an ascending geometric series, of which all the acts of one's previous life constitute the preceding terms.

Thus the temptations, and the yieldings or the resistances, of childhood and youth, enter into the character of manhood and age. For every disobedience, however slight, to higher law, man has forever after less of manhood, unless, by timely repentance and tears, he may have drawn a discipline from sorrow which shall contribute to the restoration of virtue. G. L. C.

Art. XVII.

Literary Notices.

1. **Lectures on Universalism; To Inquirers after Christian Truth. Delivered in the Second Universalist Church, in Providence, R. I. 1860–61. By Rev. John G. Adams. Providence: Cooke & Danielson. 1861. pp. 54.**

Seven Lectures in exposition and defence of Universalism, in pamphlet form, making distinctively a missionary document. The author presents the doctrine in the religious and theological aspects of the times, exhibiting the concessions to, and implications of, Universalism, in the current theological literature—particularly in the *position* of the new-school orthodox, and the *complaints* of the old school;—states what Universalism is, not merely in its dogmatic but its moral, spiritual and practical phases;—considers the question, "Who would have Universalism true?" and shows that God, Christ, angels, and all good as well as disobedient men, desire its truth; and from these points proceeds with a clear logical argument in favor of the doctrine;—makes a fresh and reasonable statement of the Bible defence of the faith;—presents the historical view, showing the recognition Universal-

ism has had in all ages of the church;—traces the spirit and the issues of the doctrine in literature—a most interesting and scholarly production;—and concludes with a statement of the every-day life of Universalism,—the adaptation of the doctrine to the wants, trials, sorrows and bereavements of human souls. The excellent argument and Christian spirit of the lectures lose nothing of point and effect in that they come in a literary dress which will hold the attention of readers of cultivated taste. The "rough and ready" style of argument doubtless meets a want in the community; but we confess a special satisfaction when we find a charming rhetoric brought to the aid of truth.

2. Hebrew Men and Times, from the Patriarchs to the Messiah. By Joseph Henry Allen. Boston: Walker, Wise, & Company. 1861. pp. 429.

An attempt to judge of this work by a cursory examination soon convinced us that it would not yield its secret on so easy terms. It is a book to be studied rather than read. Invited by the preface to give particular attention to the chapters on "The Law" and "The Messiah," we have endeavored to examine them with care. They have at least the merit of novelty; and though we are not prepared to admit, as yet, that the antecedents of Bible doctrine on these points are in the mythologies and practices of other than Hebrew sources, yet no reader can fail to be convinced that this doctrine does not claim to be entirely new as it appears in the Scriptures—to be wholly dissevered from the prior religious experiences of mankind. The originality of the Bible is frequently less in the materials of its teaching, than in the new relations and combinations, and spiritual vitality of the materials. The author has met a want in Biblical literature, and has fully, as far as we can at present determine, redeemed his promise to give the results rather than the processes of scholarship—the sequences and connections of Hebrew history, without embarrassing his reader with the literary discussions the subject involves. The students of the Bible will feel a strong indebtedness to him for his labors. We are glad to add that the book is handsomely printed on substantial paper.

3. An Appeal to the People in behalf of their Rights as Authorised Interpreters of the Bible. By Catharine E. Beecher. New York: Harper & Brothers. 1860. pp. 380.

It is claimed by this book that all the mischief attendant upon conflicting schemes of theology, arises from the Augustinian theory of the origin of evil—a theory sometimes called the doctrine of "total depravity," or of "original sin"—a theory forced

upon the church in the fifth century, and which has been a fruitful source of dissension, persecution, and schism down to the present time. The theory is denounced as the basis of a scheme of theology repugnant to the moral sense of mankind; and the appeal is made to the people, as possessing common sense, and *therefore* as authorized to decide upon the matter. The authoress is confident that the people are fast outgrowing this theology, and she deems the time not far distant when the dominant creeds will not shock all that is pure and good in the human heart. Without coming distinctly to Universalist conclusions, she repeats Universalist arguments. Her impulses are too strong for her logic, and not unfrequently her generalizations evince impatience rather than caution. Nevertheless her instincts are human; and Universalists will not fail to look upon her as an efficient though not intentional auxiliary in a common theological reform. The book evinces much reading; is systematically put together; and not a line will be complained of as obscure.

4. The History of England, from the Accession of James II. By Lord Macaulay. Volume V. Edited by his Sister, Lady Trevelyan. With Notes to Vols. I., II., III. and IV. A Sketch of Lord Macaulay's Life and Writings, by S. Austin Allibone, and a Complete Index to the Entire Work. Boston: Crosby, Nichols, Lee & Co. 1861.

Memory goes back to the Spring of '49, when, opening the first volume of the work which in the above finds a melancholy close, we read the first sentence—"I purpose to write the history of England from the accession of King James the Second down to a time which is within the memory of men still living." What a feast for the intellect was promised here! The story of the great English revolution which, in the person of the Prince of Orange, issued in the establishment of protestantism and constitutional liberty; of the subsequent internal struggles which raised England from ignominious vassalage to a foreign throne to "the place of umpire among European powers;" more particularly of that great conflict in which American independence had its birth, to be followed by the growth of empire which, up to within a few short months, has exhibited to the world a spectacle of material prosperity and power unrivalled in the history of nations. It soon appeared that the promise held out in the opening sentence quoted, could never be made good. The materials at the command of that marvellous brain could not be compressed within the limits which the original purpose contemplated. The five volumes which he lived to complete, embrace but a period of sixteen years. James the Second ascended the throne in 1685; the work abruptly closes with the death of William in

1701. The foretaste of what the history of succeeding periods would have been, had their author been spared for its completion, make it painful to realize that such a repast can never be in store for us. Certainly the death of no other author ever sent such sorrow to the reading community. Sincere was the grief of thousands when the mournful tidings reached them, that the marvellous pen which had given to the facts of history a witchery beyond the pages of romance, was forever motionless. The fifth volume is but a fragment; yet it completes the career of Macaulay's favorite, William the Third. It is a source of satisfaction that the task of finishing the sketch of that monarch has not been left to other hands. The edition of the volume named above contains a most admirable sketch of the life and writings of Macaulay by S. Austin Allibone, and an index to the entire work. Of the volumes first published, one hundred and fifty thousand were sold in four weeks. The sale of the fifth and last will not be less rapid or extensive.

5. The Life and Career of Major John Andre, Adjutant-General of the British Army in America. By Winthrop Sargent. Boston: Ticknor & Fields. 1861. pp. 471.

Americans have been most generous in their sympathies for the fate of "poor Andre." He was a spy, sought the ruin of the colonial cause, risked the danger which fixed his fate, in an attempt to give the cause of American independence a vital wound. Perhaps the success of the revolution hinged upon the capture of Andre. Yet he seems to have won the love of the American people. They never speak of him except with a sigh for his melancholy doom. Washington deeply regretted the necessity which compelled him to order his execution. We view his designs against our liberty without heat, because he was a Briton; while his daring, which was heroic, kindles our admiration. The book before us, giving the details which do not appear in the general history, will be welcomed by all American readers, alike for the interest they feel in the fortunes of its hero, and the new light it sheds upon a dark place in our early history. It comes to us too late to speak distinctively of its merits. We can only say that it has the appearance of a laborious and thorough presentation of the youth, manhood, and fate of the *real* hero of West Point.

6. Reminiscences of Scottish Life and Character. By E. B. Ramsay, M. A., LL. D., Dean of Edinburgh. From the Seventh Edinburgh Edition. Boston: Ticknor & Fields. 1861. pp. 297.

The author is moved to collect and publish these Reminiscences

from a fear that, as Scottish manners become obsolete, the "Scottish traditions may be lost entirely." At first he prepared a lecture on the subject, but the materials increasing beyond his expectation, he finds the proportions of a book none too large to contain them. The manner in which the book has grown, may be regarded as an evidence that labor has been expended upon it. It more frequently happens, we fear, that the book wants matter than that matter wants a book. The religious feelings and observances of the Scotch; their conviviality—*one* feature of which Dean Ramsay is happy to say, is becoming obsolete; the old Scottish servant—that great character in the novels of Scott; Scottish humor and proverbs, with an alphabetical list of the latter—these are the special topics of the quaintly-printed book. The author warmly defends his countrymen on most of their peculiarities. He has certainly made a spicy, entertaining book.

7. Struggle for Life. By the Author of "Seven Stormy Sundays." Boston: Walker, Wise & Co. 1861. pp. 311.

The simplest experiences of poverty-life—in themselves too dramatic to need any other than the simplest portrayal—are here woven into a story touching, yet encouraging, and serious, yet of cheering influence upon a reader's heart. We would gladly say the word of commendation that would help circulate a book so full of the true missionary spirit—so sure to humanize the heart while it interests the fancy.

8. The Heroes of Europe: a Biographical Outline of European History from A. D. 700 to A. D. 1700. By Henry G. Hewlett. Boston: Ticknor & Fields. 1861.

An aphorism from Emerson is the text upon which this book discourses and gives illustrations: "All history resolves itself very easily into the biography of a few stout and earnest persons." Twenty-eight personages—among them Charlemagne, Hildebrand, William Tell, Christopher Columbus, Martin Luther, Ignasius Lyola, and Cardinal Richelieu—are the centres of as many epochs in a thousand years of European history. The chapters are well written, clear, and often graphic. Of value to any one who will read, it has a special value for those who cannot read the voluminous histories.

9. The Avenger, a Narrative; and Other Papers. By Thomas De Quincey. Boston: Ticknor & Fields. 1859.

Were it not for a note from the author, the reader depending for information upon the book itself would have no suspicion that for this collection of papers, as also for those which make up the

preceding twenty volumes, he is indebted to the taste and industry of an American editor. The author, however, confesses his indebtedness in this particular—acknowledges that another has done for his writings what he could not have done himself. In view of the beautiful series of De Quincey's works, now accessible for a moderate sum, the name of James T. Fields will always command honorable mention in connection with that of Thomas De Quincey. "The Avenger" portrays, as only its strange author can do, the passion of revenge. The book also contains "Additions to the Confessions of An Opium Eater," a "Supplementary Note on the Essenes," a paper on "China," and another paper on "Traditions of the Rabbins,"—to our taste hardly second to his best. The print is of course uniform with the preceding volumes.

10. The China Mission: Embracing a History of the Various Missions of all Denominations among the Chinese. With Biographical Sketches of Deceased Missionaries. By William Dean, D. D. New York: Sheldon & Co. 1859.

We shall feel more at liberty to criticise the sectarian aspects of Foreign Missions, when, by our own example in a better method of philanthropic labor, we have earned a right to find fault with the method chosen by others. The so-called evangelical form of Christianizing the heathen may be wrong as judged from the sectarian point of view; but the fact that it exists in any form is an expression of philanthropic purpose which rebukes the inaction of sects claiming to be "liberal." But of the book before us, let us say, that with the exception of its theological peculiarities,—which are, as a matter of course, widely different from those we receive,—we find in it nothing to censure, and much to commend. It makes a valuable contribution to the ethnology, history, and geography of a portion of the globe embracing more than a third of its population; while its biographical sketches are redolent of heroic character. Twenty years of experience as a missionary gave the author ample qualifications for his task.

11. Lectures on the English Language. By George P. Marsh. New York: Charles Scribner. 1860. 8vo. pp. 697.

An extended review article in a late number of the Quarterly did ample justice to this excellent book. We cannot, however, refrain from expressing our word of commendation, so great has been the satisfaction with which we have read it. We recently heard the complaint that many of our best teachers of Greek and Latin in the act of teaching habitually

outraged their "mother tongue." Mr. Marsh tells that, "A distinguished British scholar of the last century said that he had known but three of his countrymen who spoke their native language with uniform grammatical accuracy;" and he quotes Couvier as saying of the French, "There are five or six persons in Europe who know Greek; those who know French are much fewer." As respects our native language, it is undoubtedly but too true that "familiarity breeds contempt;" and so it happens that American scholars need to study few things more than the English language. A work similar to the lectures named above has heretofore been a desideratum. Latham, Fowler and Brown, have done much to elucidate the principles of English grammar; but we have had few works which treat of the incipient and initial steps of the language before grammar can apply to it. Mr. Marsh begins at the very source of the language, even its elementary sources; and he traces their historical combinations, elucidating the etymology of words by apt though not too numerous citations from the old authors. The occasions of new combinations, or of the more popular introduction of words heretofore of but seldom use, are stated, and form a most unique feature of his work. The author explains in what sense, and to what extent, foreign learning will help towards a right knowledge of English; he does not attach so much importance to this kind of aid as scholars are wont to do. The chief method is to study the English itself, in its original masters, rather than through the scattered specimens which are given in grammars and dictionaries. So numerous, however, are the points presented by Mr. Marsh that we cannot here allude to a tithe of them. We sincerely hope that the reader will, without delay, make his acquaintance with all the points in the book itself. He will find it full of curious matter. Let us state, as a single specimen of interesting information, that according to Mr. Marsh our English Bible has 97 per cent. of Anglo-Saxon words; Cowley and Swift each 89 per cent.; Thomson and Shakspeare 85 per cent.; Pope 76 per cent.; and Gibbon only 58 per cent. These facts show what books we must read to get nearer the "well of English undefiled;" and that in this particular, even, the Bible is "the book of books." We are glad to learn that the Lectures are meeting with a rapid sale. Such publications richly deserve pecuniary encouragement.

12. Nature and Art in the Cure of Disease. By Sir John Forbes, M. D., D. C. L. New York: Samuel S. & William Wood. 1858.

The unscientific can appreciate the distinction between the principle of cure in disease and the removal of obstructions in

the way of this principle; and hence it is intelligible to say that however much medicine may effect in removing impediments to health, *nature* alone can *heal*. As applied to the soul diseased with guilt, we fully appreciate the same general doctrine; and it confirms our theological conviction to find so strong an analogical proof as the treatise before us presents. The author is eminent among medical men; is an authority in medical matters; and may be trusted for all his statements of *fact*. The "profession" will be slow to acknowledge the soundness of his conclusion; for every "profession" is conservative, and dislikes innovation. Yet, to Sir John Forbes is attributed a great reformation in the drugging system—a sufficient proof that his opinions even are entitled to respect.

13. Personal History of Lord Bacon. From Unpublished Papers. By William Hepworth Dixon. Boston: Ticknor & Fields. 1861. pp. 424.

This is an attempt, in part successful, to relieve Lord Bacon of the odium which for two centuries has tarnished his reputation. The great merit of the philosoper, and, in part, the statesman, has compelled the world to respect a name which ordinarily must have sunk under the load of obloquy traditionally and historically resting upon it. Mr. Dixon acts the part of a zealous pleader. He explains, apologises, palliates, and excuses with a shrewdness which evidently convinces himself, however it may prove with his less heated readers. He has certainly labored to master his subject, and has brought forth much new and interesting matter pertaining alike to Bacon and his contemporaries. We may regret that he shows less skill in arranging his book than in shaping his argument. He is often a compiler where he should be author. Much of his matter could be compressed to the convenience of the reader. But comparatively, these are slight faults. A really fresh work on so great a theme as the personal history of Bacon, with any degree of success in effacing the blots upon his great fame, will secure for Mr. Dixon the gratitude of all appreciative readers.

14. Twelve Sermons: Delivered at Antioch College. By Horace Mann. Boston: Ticknor & Fields. 1861.

The example of Dr. Arnold, of sainted memory, was potent on the not less good Horace Mann. No one can read the humblest discourse of the Rugby teacher, without feeling the glow of his affection for his pupils; no one can read a discourse in the volume before us, without sympathising with the devotedness to his youthful charge, which warmed the heart of the late lamented

head of Antioch College. Though never formally ordained, Mr. Mann was by nature and by grace a preacher. If in some particulars he lacked the geniality so conspicuous in the pioneer of Rugby, he exhibited a mastery of moral themes, and has given a logical, vigorous treatment of them, such as his English prototype never evinced. The Twelve Sermons, on such topics as the Being, the Character and the Law of God; Sin; Temptation; Retribution; and Immortality, will do hardly less towards redeeming the sermon from the odium of dulness than the masterly and fascinating discourses of Robertson.

15. History of the United Netherlands: from the Death of William the Silent to the Synod of Dort. With a Full View of the English-Dutch Struggle against Spain, and the Origin and Destruction of the Spanish Armada. By John Lothrop Motley, LL.D., D. C. L. Vols. I. II. New York: Harper & Brothers. 1861. pp. 532, 563.

These two volumes (the whole work will comprise four) embrace a period of but six years, namely, from 1584 to 1590. A short period if counted by years; a long period if counted by its results as affecting the liberties of mankind. Says Mr. Motley in his Preface: "History has few so fruitful examples of the dangers which come from superstition and despotism, and the blessings which flow from the maintenance of religious and political freedom, as those afforded by the struggle between England and Holland on the one side, and Spain and Rome on the other, during the epoch which I have attempted to describe. It is for this reason that I have thought it necessary to reveal, as minutely as possible, the secret details of this conspiracy of king and priest against the people, and to show how it was baffled at last by the strong self-helping energy of two free nations combined." The destruction of the Spanish Armada belongs to that class of events which includes the struggles of Marathon, Yorktown, Waterloo and all the crises on which the destiny of the world for the time depended. The story has been often told; but never so well, never with such dramatic effect, never with such an appreciation of the spiritual issues involved, never with so exhaustive a portrayal of the antecedent and collateral events, as by Mr. Motley. It is saying much to say that our author, in point of rhetoric, has improved upon his former volumes on the Dutch Republic. It slightly marred the pages of that work, that the art of the rhetorician was sometimes too obvious. In the two volumes named above, this fault almost entirely disappears. The simplicity of the style is hardly second to its beauty. The mantle of Prescott has worthily fallen upon the shoulders of Motley.

16. Currents and Counter-Currents in Medical Science. With Other Addresses and Essays. By Oliver Wendell Holmes. Boston: Ticknor & Fields. 1861. pp. 406.

The public were not surprised, nineteen years ago, when Dr. Holmes made a determined assault upon Homœopathy; for he was professionally an antagonist of that form of practice. They were surprised a year ago, when he at least *seemed* to be almost as unqualified in opposition to the old practice, with which, as an instructor, he has been long associated. As we read the address, "Currents and Counter-Currents," in the book before us, we are convinced that his invectives against the old practice are much less unqualified than we had supposed. His position is simply this: There is a *presumption* against the use of poison as a remedy for disease. It is not to be taken for granted that a mineral will heal *because* it is a poison. Reasons may exist strong enough to overcome the presumption; in very many cases such reasons do exist; but in every case calling for practice, the reasons must be *obvious*—they must never be *assumed*. The notion that poison is a remedy for the *sick*, because to the healthy it *is* a poison, he regards as the root-fallacy of homœopathy. To the old-school theory Dr. Holmes is still loyal. As respects the merits of the question involved, we shall venture no opinion, for we have none to venture. We know it is common for persons quite as incompetent to form a judgment on the subject as ourselves, to dogmatise learnedly on the respective claims of the various theories of medical practice. We know cases in which persons who can scarce read their own names in print, assume to solve medical problems with a conclusiveness that would excite the wonder of the "profession," if it did not more potently move its derision. We are content, however, to leave these problems with those whose education and experience best qualify them to judge. Certainly, if education and experience fail to decide wisely, ignorance can hardly claim to act as an umpire. We shall carefully re-read what Dr. Holmes brings before us in the handsomely printed volume, the title of which is given above.

Art. XVIII.

The Religion of Zoroaster.

[Continued.]

Herodotus remarked that of all people the Persians were the most ready to adopt the customs of other nations; and a modern Parsee has borne frequent and willing testimony to the facility with which his brethren in India fell in with the practices of the Hindoos, and now copy the habits and institutions of the English. A people of mild temper, and on the whole remarkably free from bigotry, they have been ready to learn from every source; and their opportunities have been ample. They occupied a position almost in the geographical centre of the old world, in intimate connection with the three leading races of men by whom it was peopled. The great highways of ancient commerce ran along the foot of the mountains which bordered Iran on the south-east and the north-west, and marked it out as the first common ground of traffic; while the gold of the desert of Cobi and the products of the Indian mines furnished a ready medium of exchange.[1]

The people of Iran belonged, as we have seen, to the great Indo-European family of nations, with the Hindoo branch of which they were most intimately connected. Along their northern border roamed the many tribes of Turan—fleet riders and irresistible invaders—who formed from the earliest times a considerable part of the population of Media and Sogdiana, and who exercised a constant and sometimes a preponderating influence. On their west, and equally mingled among them, were the so-called children of Shem, the populations of Syria, Babylonia and Palestine; to say nothing of the Greek deposit left by the conquest of Alexander. So many ways were there for the infiltration of foreign customs and modes of thought, among a people proverbially ready to borrow.

Of these various sources, the original family one was unquestionably the chief. When it is remembered that the

[1] Heeren's Researches, i. 257.

language of the Veda, of the older parts of the Avesta, and of the cuneiform inscriptions presents only such diversity as is to be found among the dialects spoken in the several shires of Great Britain, or in the various provinces of Germany, we should expect to find very many coincidences between the religious traditions and observances of India and those of Iran. Yet we would again caution the reader against concluding that the one is lineally derived from the other, or that the Zend religion has any immediate connection with the very gross idolatry of the modern Hindoos. The evidence only shows a common and remote origin for both, the point of departure being that primitive nature-worship presented in the hymns of the Rig Veda, while yet Hindooism had not grown and spread like the banian, embracing all manner of beasts and birds and creeping things within its shadowy labyrinths. We will here note a very few of the objects which are the common inheritance of both Indian and Iranian. The original three-fold division into the castes of priests, warriors, and husbandmen, the initiatory rite of girding the young neophyte with a sacred cord or emblematic girdle, and the use of the homa, or soma plant, which is at once a vegetable product, a hero and a celestial genius, are points common and fundamental to both peoples. Many characters of their mythology are in like manner a common inheritance. Thus the vedic Yama, the king of the dead, is the Yima of the Vendidad, the chief of the golden age, or of Paradise, the Jemshid of later fable; the Zend Mithra is, as we have already observed, the vedic Mitra, the sun; Haug has shown that Armaiti, the name of the Amshaspand who is guardian of the earth, is in the Rig Veda a name for the earth itself,[2] and according to Roth, the vedic Adityas are identical with the Amshaspands.[3] The same is true of a number of other personages. The dog with four eyes and yellow ears, led by the Parsees along the road which a corpse has been carried over, is but a slight variation of the two dogs of Yama.[4] In the copious quotations from the Veda, with which Prof. Max Müller has illustrated his dissertation on the Funeral Rites of the Hindoos, those dogs of the under world are described in precisely the same terms as the animal prescribed in the Vendidad. It

[2] Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft viii. 770.
[3] Ibid. vi. [4] Spiegel's Avesta, ii. 143.

may be added that they are designated by a term believed to be identical in its etymology with the Greek Cerberos.

It is worth remarking, however, that the personages common to both religions have generally different, or even opposite characters in each. The gods of the one people are very generally the devils of the other. So Ahura, the supreme god of the Zoroastrians, is the fiend, Asura of the Hindoos; and on the other hand Indra, the chief god of the Veda, becomes in the hands of the Iranians, Andra, or Ander, one of the principal devils. Even the common designation of the one people for a celestial divinity is to the other the name for an infernal spirit. The Sanscrit *diva*, a god, a name spread through all the Indo-European languages, and recurring as the Greek *Zeus* (gen with Aeolic degamma *Divos*) and Lithuanian *daevas* is the Zend *daeva*, a spirit of darkness. This seems to be evidently the result of mutual and sectarian hate, and is closely paralleled in the history of Christianity. Not only did Milton people his Pandemonium with the gods of the ancient nations, but the Apostle Paul indignantly declares, "The things that the Gentiles sacrifice, they sacrifice to *devils*, and not to God." [5]

In addition to this primitive ground-work lying deeper than the distinction between Indian and Iranian, the religion of Zoroaster was probably affected in some degree by a later influence emanating from India itself. That disturbing power was Buddhism. Sakya-Muni, the founder of that most wonderful system, lived, according to oriental chronology, in the last quarter of the seventh century before Christ, and was therefore contemporary with Hezekiah in Palestine, and the Seven Sages of Greece. This barren gospel,—the first nevertheless ever offered to all mankind—was preached by zealous missionaries through all India and the high countries of Central Asia, promulgated in Siam, China and Tartary, carried to the borders of the arctic circle in Siberia, and ultimately confronted Christianity and European civilization in Russia and Sweden.[6] Buddhist missionaries had reached China as early as 217 before Christ, and about the year 120 B. C., a Chinese general, after defeating the barbarous tribes to the north of the desert of Cobi, brought home, as a trophy of his victories, a golden

[5] 1 Cor. x. 20. So also Lev. xvii. 7. Deut. xxxii. 17. 2 Chron. xi 15. Psa. cvi. 37. [6] Max Müller's Buddhism and Buddhist Pilgrims.

statue of Buddha. Buddhist monasteries were not uncommon in Bactria, and the Chinese pilgrim, Hiouen Thsang, in the seventh century of our era, found in Balkh itself a temple of distinguished sanctity. A mutual interpenetration to some extent of the systems of Zoroaster and Buddha took place. In the third œcumenical council of the Buddhists, held B. C. 241, resolutions were adopted for purging the sect of *fire-worshippers* and other intruders.[7] So on the other hand Dr. Spiegel thinks he has discovered in the later Zoroastrian legends a quite perceptible, although not very important, infusion of Buddhist ideas.[8] We find, too, even in the Yasna, mention of a final annihilation—an idea at variance with the fundamental tenets of Zoroaster—expressed by almost the same word as the Buddhist Nirvana.

The Turanian, or Scythian tribes, bounded the Persian empire on the north, and were intimately mingled with its inhabitants. In Media and the adjacent provinces they formed a large, if not the principal element of the population. The inscriptions of the Achemenian kings are copied in a Scythic dialect for the use of these people, and this dialect, from its prevalence in Media, the reputed birth-place of Zoroaster and his religion, was long taken for the real language of the Medes. The Parthians, who held the empire for 494 years, were a Scythian people;[9] to say nothing of the less important conquests and migration from the north. So long and intimate contact could not be without effect on a people so impressible and imitative as the ancient Persians. Accordingly Col. Rawlinson maintains that the institution of the Magi, and the Magian element-worship as known to Herodotus, having originally nothing in common with the spiritual dualism of the Iranian race,[10] are the native institutions of the Scyths. It is certain that the religion described by the Greek historian is widely different from that of the inscriptions of Darius, and of the older parts of the Avesta. In the Behistun inscription Ormazd is appealed to at the commencement of every section, and no other deity is named, nor is there any allusion to fire-worship; and all this agrees with the first fargard of the Vendidad. The monarch moreover records that he has re-

[7] Westminster Review for Oct., 1856. [8] Avesta II. Einleitung 12. [9] Justin, xli. 1. [10] Rawlinson's Herodotus, i. 339, and Notes on the Early History of Babylon, 34.

stored the *temples* and the sacred hymns (probably the gâthâs of the Yasna) which Gomates the Magian had suppressed, thus representing himself as an antagonist of the Magi. Herodotus, on the other hand, says that the Persians have *no temples* or altars, and adds: "Their wont is to ascend the summits of the loftiest mountains, and there to offer sacrifice to Jupiter, which is the name they give to the whole circuit of the firmament. They likewise offer to the sun and moon, to the earth, to fire, to water, and to the winds."[11] He appears to know nothing of Ormazd and Ahriman, or of Zoroaster. It is well known that the religion of the Iranians, starting from a comparatively small and simple beginning, gathered up doctrines and practices on every hand as it progressed, until it became a very complex and burdensome system; and it may well be that a large part of these foreign elements were copied from the Scythian nations, who, either as aborigines or immigrants, formed such an important part of the population of the empire.

The intercourse of the Medes and Persians with the Shemitish races living west of the Tigris,—the Assyrians, Babylonians, Hebrews, and Arabians, either as sovereigns or subjects, as teachers or learners, was also long and intimate, and productive of many important results. It has already been stated that the Persians derived the doctrine of the fravashis from Assyria, and their ideas of Zervana and of astral influences from Babylon. The cuneiform writing of the Persian inscriptions is but a modification of the older Assyrian; and every form of alphabetic writing used by the Medo-Persian race bears testimony to its Shemitish origin. So too the Huzvaresh language, which, under the Sassanian kings, superceded the ancient Zend, was chiefly distinguished by its large intermixture of Shemitish words and by dropping a great part of the native inflexions, in consequence of its use by a foreign and mixed population. These influences followed the conquest of the old and opulent cities of Mesopotamia and the adoption of Babylon as one of the royal residences. Yet the idolatry of the Shemites was too gross and sensual to unite readily with the spiritual, and scarcely tangible, faith of Zoroaster; and the Persians adopted from their Babylonish subjects only some of their more sublimated

[11] Lib. i. 131.

doctrines and a few of their sacred symbols, such as those already mentioned, and the winged bulls and lions of Persepolis.

The fertile intellect of Greece asserted its supremacy in the conquered East as well as in the conquering West. From the time of Alexander, Greek arts, literature and philosophy were diligently cultivated by the savans and scholars of Asia. Even Hebrew exclusiveness could not resist the fascination of Grecian ingenuity, and the pressure of Grecian power. Grecisms found their way into the text of the Book of Daniel; the later Jewish writings are mostly in the Greek tongue; and Hellenic science is travestied in the tracts of the Talmud. Alexandrea became the nursing mother of an eclectic philosophy and theology, and of a mystic compound of both, whose beginning found expression in the pages of Philo—its culmination, in the sects of the Gnostics. The people of Iran did not escape this wide-spread influence. According to the testimony of Aelian, the kings of Persia and the people of India had alike obtained native translations of Homer's verses.[12] In Edessa, side by side with the Syrian high school, was a Persian academy, at the head of which stood Hibas, Probus, and Cumas, men distinguished in their time as interpreters of Aristotle. There were others at Nisibis and Gandisapor, founded in part by Syrian Christians, where Medicine was studied from the text of Hippocrates.[13] Chosroes the Great, otherwise called Nushirvan, was an admirer of Greek philosophy, and caused the works of Plato and Aristotle to be translated into Persian. When the edict of Justinian closed forever the schools of Athens, which had nourished and sent forth so many sages and orators, seven of the last representatives of the Lyceum and the Academy sought an asylum in the East, and were hospitably received at the court of Nushirvan.[14]

It remains now to examine the connection of the Magian religion with the Jewish and Christian. The first contact of the Hebrew people with the Medo Persian is recorded in the seventeenth chapter of the second book of Kings: "In the ninth year of Hoshea, the king of Assyria took Samaria, and carried Israel away into Assyria, and placed them in

[12] Aelian Var. Hist. xii. 48. [13] Assemani Bibl. Orient, Tom. iii. P. ii. quoted in Spiegel's Avesta, Einleit i. 25. [14] Gibbon's Decline and Fall, chap. 40.

Halah and in Habor by the river of Gozan, and in the cities of the Medes." This great deportation occurred B. C. 721. It would be easy to attribute to this event greater importance than probably belongs to it. When it is remembered that the Magi were a tribe or caste of the Medes, and that Media was the reputed birth-place of Zoroaster; that this compulsory emigration took place 230 years before the composition of any Persian document whose date is certain, and nearly 400 years before the Avesta is supposed to have been reduced to writing; and that the Hebrews had already enjoyed the benefit of a succession of prophets and teachers, and possessed a pretty well developed religious literature; the inference is natural that here was an opportunity for the introduction of all the more elevated ideas of the mazdayasnish religion. Without denying such a possibility, it is sufficient to say that there is no evidence, or even necessity for assigning such an origin to the peculiar tenets of Zoroaster. Whatever possible effect, however, this emigration might have had on the faith of the Medes, it could have none on that of the Hebrews as it has reached us in their sacred books; for the transplanted Israelites never returned to publish new ideas in Judah and Jerusalem. But it does not appear that any very important consequences followed from the captivity of Israel.[15]

The next event in this connection was the Babylonish captivity, which commenced B. C. 598. Sixty years later, the capture of Babylon by Cyrus brought the Jehovistic Jews for the first time into close contact with the Persians.

[15] The question, so often asked, as to what has become of the ten tribes, rests on the unfounded assumption that they retained their integrity and always refused to mingle with the surrounding population. Now there is no reason for presuming this. A people can be kept distinct only by maintaining peculiar customs and institutions, supported by marriages exclusively domestic. But the peculiar religion of Jehovah, with its exclusive sanctions, never prevailed in the kingdom of Israel. All the sovereigns of that state, from first to last, followed some form of idolatry common to the surrounding heathen. Besides, the laws relating to matrimony were not much regarded even in Judah by the mass of the people, and seem scarcely to have been known in the earlier ages of the monarchy. Even those zealous Jehovists who returned from the Babylonish captivity, brought with them a multitude of "strange wives," (Ezra ix. and x.; Neh. xiii. 23.) There was nothing, therefore, to preserve the ten tribes as a pecular people; and a few generations would suffice to make them undistinguishable from the mixed population of the empire.

From that date, for a period of 1175 years, till the overthrow of the Sassanian dynasty by the Caliphs, a continual intimacy was maintained close enough to admit of the freest interchange of opinions, and the fullest exercise of mutual influences. For the greater part of this time the relations of the two races and their diverse religions were friendly, but the friendship finally ended in the persecution of the Jews by the Persian kings, and a hostility that imbued with mutual bitterness the later books both of the Magi and the Rabbins. After the first century of our era the Christian churches of the East doubtless contributed somewhat to the formation of the later Magian doctrines, and may possibly have derived some doctrines and usages from their heathen neighbors; but as the doctrines of the Church were so largely taken from the Hebrew Scriptures and traditions, we shall not for the present consider them apart from the Jews. A clear and reliable history of Jewish opinion for the long period just named would be a work of uncommon interest, and would set at rest many vexatious questions, but the scantiness and unreliable character of our information are much to be regretted. Still we are not without some glimmerings of light amid the general darkness.

The Achemenian kings appear to have treated the Jews from the very first with marked friendship. According to Ezra, the decree for the restoration of Jerusalem was published in the first year of Cyrus. This, however, cannot possibly mean more than the first year after his conquest of Babylon. Yet with all the encouragement offered, but a comparatively small part of the whole people returned to Palestine. Ezra states the number at 47,697, which would be but the population of one small city. In fact Babylon continued for centuries to be considered, almost equally with Palestine, as the Jews' fatherland. A rabbinical authority declares that Ezra purified the land of Babylon by taking the rabble away with him, while the better class remained.[16] An early tradition told how the captive king, Jeconiah, and a body of Jews, having a part of the sacred furniture of the temple, had settled at Nehardea on the banks of the Euphrates,—afterwards noted as the seat of one of the great rabbinical schools; and even in the second century

[16] Kiddushim, 69 b.

after Christ the Shechina was believed to be still preserved in the synagogue of that city.[17] The Jews in Babylonia maintained for over a thousand years the semblance of a political organization under their Exilarchs, or Chiefs of the Captivity, who claimed to be descended from the royal house of David, and the celebrated Jewish traveller, Rabbi Benjamin of Tudela, found populous Hebrew communities there as late as the twelfth century. The learning there cultivated was so highly prized that for many ages the most eminent teachers of the Law in Palestine were Babylonish Jews. Thirty-two years before Christ, the Rabbi Hillel, one of the three most distinguished of all the Jewish doctors, was invited from Babylon and elected president of the great Sanhedrim. The institution of the Synagogue is believed to have originated in Babylonia. There too were the rabbinical high-schools of Nehardea, Sora and Pumbadita,[18] where thousands of Jewish youth were instructed in the religion and jurisprudence of their nation, and where was collected and elaborated that vast body of tradition, speculation and exegesis composing the Babylonish Talmud. And all the while the daily affairs of life would bring together the Jew and the Zoroastrian on every highway, in every caravan, bazaar, and place where men congregate, so that an interchange of opinion was unavoidable. We also know that several of the leading Jews and Rabbins found favor and exercised influence at the Persian court. Nehemiah was an officer in the household of Artaxerxes. Mar Samuel, rector of the college of Nehardea in the middle of the third century, was on terms of intimacy with Ardeshir Babegan, and conciliated his favor for the Jewish people; and by tempering his graver sense with a sprinkling of humor, made himself so agreeable and influential in the palace of Sapor his son, that the Jews gave their Rabbi the nick-name of King Sapor. The king himself confessed this influence by declaring his gratification that he had never unnecessarily taken the life of a Jew. Ifra, the mother of Sapor II., was

[17] Fürsts Cultur—und Literatur—Geschichte der Juden in Asien, i. 8.

[18] As many as 1200 students attended the lectures of Abba Areka, commonly called Rab, at the high school of Sora in the first quarter of the third century; and 100 years later the discourses of Rabba are said to have drawn together a concourse of 12,000 persons during the two last months of the academic year. Id. 68.

a great patroness of the Jews, made the chief rabbins her almoners for the poor of both races, and often interceded with her fierce, though illustrious, son, saying: "Do not meddle with the Jews, for their God grants them whatever they ask." Other Jewish doctors, too, like Rab Ashe in the latter part of the fourth century, had privileges at the palace; and King Yesdijird I. had so little of orthodox intolerance as to favor both Jews and Christians.[19]

But an end came at last to these centuries of harmony. The palmy days of Jewish scholasticism passed away. The continual wars with the Romans wasted all the provinces from the Tigris to the Mediterranean. A succession of kings from Yesdijird II. (A. D. 442) harassed the Jews by a series of persecutions, till the synagogues and schools were closed in 473 by royal edict. The productive labors of the Rabbins declined, and finally ceased, and about A. D. 498 the Talmud was terminated.

A passage in the New Testament,[20] and an early tradition preserved by Eusebius, seem to indicate that the Apostle Peter preached the gospel within the boundaries of the Parthian empire. However that may be, Christianity was early propagated in the East, and Bardesanes of Edessa, who wrote in the reign of Marcus Aurelius, mentions its spread in Parthia, Media, Persia and Bactria. In these countries the Christians enjoyed a considerable degree of quiet, if not complete toleration, and by the reign of Sapor II. they had many flourishing societies and included many officers of the royal service. The bishop of Selucia, Ctesiphon, was the head of the Persian church, and maintained a constant communication with Rome. The presence of so many Christians with their churches, schools, teachers and books could scarcely have been without some effect on the surrounding population; yet their influence was always subordinate to that of the Jews: partly because the books and doctrines of both were to a great extent the same, and partly because the Jews had occupied the ground centuries before the Christians, and maintained it about a hundred years later. There were several circumstances greatly to the disadvantage of the Christians. The Magi, of course, opposed them with the usual bigotry of a priesthood; and the Jews

[19] Furst i. 236. [20] 1 Peter v. 13.

hated them with all the enmity of those who agree in the main, but differ in details, and they easily found means to fill the royal ear with tales of treasons nursed in the Christian churches. But what gave point and opportunity to every accusation was the fellowship of the eastern Christians with their brethren of Rome, while the cross had become the standard of the Empire, and hereditary warfare was waged between the two nations. Thus there was easily formed what we should call, in modern nomenclature, a Native Persian party; and it was intimated to Sapor that the bishop of Ctesiphon, with the concurrence of his church, carried on a treasonable correspondence with Constantius. The king sent for the heads of the church, and required of them a prescribed pledge of loyalty. This was in the year 343. Simeon, bishop of Ctesiphon, believing a compliance with the terms of the order inconsistent with his obligations as a Christian, made a spirited refusal. The king replied: "Whereas Simeon scorns my authority, and obeys the Roman emperor, whose God alone he worships, but utterly despises my God, he must present himself before me and be executed." Thus began, if not the first, at least the first considerable persecution of Christians in Persia.[21] From that time any influence they might have had on the established religion of the country ceased. A series of persecutions, relieved indeed by intervals of rest, yet sometimes extremely violent, aggravated at times by their own imprudence and fanaticism, harassed and weakened the Persian Christians, while the Magi became ever more bigoted and impervious to foreign teaching. On the other hand we are not sure of a single doctrine ever generally received by the Christian Church which can be traced to direct intercourse with the followers of Zoroaster.

In the course of the many centuries, however, during which the disciples of Moses and of Zoroaster lived together in harmony, some mutual infiltration of ideas was scarcely to be avoided. The point of most interest, as well as difficulty, is to determine which party were the learners, and what were the lessons. We shall have no difficulty in believing that each adopted something from the other; and we hope to satisfy our readers, as we are fully convinced

[21] Neander's History of the Christian Religion and Church, ii. 105.

ourselves, that the Parsees were the principal gainers in the amount, if not also in the quality of the exchanges.

It has already been shown that the Persians were remarkably imitative, and susceptible to foreign influences; while it is well known that of all people the Jews clung with most tenacity to the customs and ideas of their fathers—"Accursed shall be he who keepeth a pig or teacheth his son the wisdom of the Greeks."[22] This consideration alone would go far to determine which people would be most likely to learn from the other. Again, which people had most to teach? At the time of their first contact (B. C. 538) the Persians were a nation of herdsmen and soldiers, among whom academic education aspired to little beyond horsemanship, archery and veracity. It is doubtful if they even possessed the art of writing, and certain that they had no documents which left any distinct mark on succeeding times; while the Hebrews were a people already past the best days of their literature, as well as of their power. The greater part of their history had been written. The most illustrious of their prophets and poets had slept with their fathers, leaving their compositions a legacy for the admiration of all ages. It will not be denied that the law of the Pentateuch, with its peculiar and stringent provisions, existed nearly in its present form at the close of the captivity, we might rather say before the captivity. We think that after admitting all that the freest modern criticism demands, it will be conceded that at that time the Jews had their religious system and literature, and the priestly and levitical orders very fully developed and organized, and were in general much attached to them. How then is it conceivable that these men should consent to sit at the feet of illiterate Gentiles in hopes to learn the lessons of a diviner wisdom? It matters not that the Hebrews were a fallen and dependent people, and the Persians powerful and victorious. Athens, stripped of her violent crown, still continued till the age of Justinian to teach literature, science and philosophy, to all-conquering Rome. When we spread before us on the same table Isaiah or Jeremiah on the right hand and and the best hymns of the Yasna on the left, and read them side by side, it seems to us utterly incredible that the com-

[22] Gfrorer's Philo und die Alexandrinische Theosophie, ii. 350.

panions of Ezra would forsake their own fountains of living waters, and turn away to the sterile rock, to broken cisterns that hold no water. The only Persian compositions which have any chance of being as old as the time of Ezra, are the Gâthâs, of which the following is as favorable a specimen as we can select:

"Through the holiest spirit and through the best purpose,
Which proceedeth from purity in words and works,
Hath Mazda-Ahura given unto us
Riches and understanding, fulness and immortality.
He doeth the best deeds of this most holy spirit—
The best through the vocal prayer from the mouth of man,
He performeth pure works by the hands of Armaiti;
By his own wisdom alone is Mazda the father of purity.
Thou art also the Holy One in Heaven,
Who hast created the cow for us as a benificent gift,
Who hast given her fodder and sufficiency according to thy wisdom,
Since thou hast held communication with men." [23]

This wierd and mystic hymn wakes no responsive chord in the breast of the captive Jew sitting beneath the willows of Babylon longing and languishing for his native land; while the promises of his own Isaiah are more acceptable to him than bread and wine to one who is ready to perish. It is from the returned Jews that we have received the Scriptures; and they were likely to have their minds too fully occupied by the exciting scenes through which they were passing, by their own anxieties and hopes, and by the teachings of Moses and the prophets to think much of adulterating their sacred books with the unwritten legends of their new friends. We have read the Yasna and the Vendidad several times with some degree of care, and have not found an idea or expression so like any thing in the Old or New Testament as to afford a presumption of a common origin. And no other of the Magian books was extant until very long after the closing of the Old Testament canon. Nor does it appear probable that either any possible esoteric doctrines of the Magi, nor yet the diffused superstition of the populace has had any perceptible effect on Judaism as it stands in the Bible. The ideas, when not puerile and unworthy,

[23] Yasna, xlvi.

were altogether too thin and nebulous for the rough grasp of the Jew. Hence the result of our inquiry is, that it is not proved that our Old Testament contains any thing adopted from the creed of Zoroaster.

Yet those Jews who remained in Babylon did not invariably set their faces against all Gentile culture and foreign belief. They united with their neighbors to celebrate the religious festivals of the Persians; they studied their jurisprudence, and, to some extent at least, adopted their superstitions. Among the recent Babylonian discoveries might be named four cuneiform monuments, known to be Jewish, from the names of persons and things, and proving the adoption of gentile customs.[24] But the most curious relic of this kind which has come to our knowledge is a saucer, or platter, described in Mr. Layard's second work, and bearing a long Chaldee inscription. It is, however, unquestionably a Jewish relic. The inscription is an exorcism for the banishment of evil spirits, and is as follows, according to the decyphering of Dr. M. A. Levy of Breslau:

"This is a bill of divorce to the Devil, (Shed) to the spirits, to Satan, to Nirich, to Sariah, to Abatur Tura, to Dan . . . and may the Lilith disappear from the place of Behran, the place of Beth-najun, from Bahr of the wilderness at Espandarmid, and from my whole house. Good Lord God (Jah Elohim tob) destroy the king of the devils (shedin); of the deevs; the dominion of the Lilith. I adjure thee . . . Lilith, grand-child of the beautiful Lilith, whether male or female. I adjure thee . . . May your heart fail before the mighty man who has dominion over the *shedin*. Go forth Lilith! See, remain in the darkness. See, beware! I drive you hence, and from my house in the place of Behran, the place of Beth-najun, and from the region around. As the shedin write bills of divorce and give to their wives, and then visit them no more, so take your bill of divorce, and receive your writing, and go hence, flee, haste, and go from the house in the place of Behran, the place of Beth-najun; in the name of N N go into darkness before the mighty man, and sealed with his seal, that it may be known that you return there no more. In the name of the Good Light, Amen, amen, amen, selah."

It is impossible to make a very close approximation to the date of this relic; but from several peculiarities in the forms

[24] Zeitschrift D. M. G., viii. 229, and Lassen's Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes.

of the names, we are fully satisfied that it is several centuries later than the Christian era. Some of the names here occurring require a word of explanation. *Shedin* is Chaldee for *Shedim*, the most frequent and proper word for devils or demons both in the Old Testament and the Talmud;—of which more hereafter. *Nirich* and *Sariah* are Parsee names for two of the chief deevs, as they are enumerated in the Ulema-i-Islam. *Abatur* is the good genius of the Mendaeans, but is probably a fiend here, according to the general principle that the gods of one people become the devils of another. *Tura* is a satyr, or goat-formed demon of the Mendaeans. Abatur and Tura seem here to be confounded together and taken for one. *Lilith* is a Hebrew word, occurring only once in the Old Testament, (Isa. xxxiv. 14,) and there translated *screech-owl* in our version. It is impossible to say with certainty what kind of creature, actual or fabulous, was intended by the writer. The marginal reading in our Bible is "*a night monster;*" and the Rabbins who have much to say respecting the Lilith, understand by the word a female demon of great beauty, with a profusion of flowing hair and rich apparel, and whose peculiar vocation was to entice men to unchastity. This is precisely the character of the *pairiki*, or *pari*, already known to the Vendidad. The question here, as elsewhere is, which people first had the idea? If Isaiah used the word in nearly the same sense as the later Jews did, which is certainly to be presumed in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, then the Hebrew lilith is, so far as we can know, the original of which the Persian pari may be a copy, but can not possibly be the prototype.

We have in this amulet a Hebrew groundwork filled up to considerable extent with details of Eastern superstition. The mention of the deevs, of Nirich and Sariah, and of the Good Light, are instances of Magian ideas, as is also the command to the evil spirits to depart into *darkness*.

The demonology of the Jews has strong general resemblances to that of the Persians; but it would be very hasty and uncritical to assume that in all cases of coincidence the former had borrowed from the latter. Doubtless each people contributed to modify the ideas of the other; but we shall be able generally to trace the common doctrines to a higher antiquity among the Hebrews than among the people of Ormazd.

There is one particular in which both peoples were common pupils of the same teachers. The subject of study was Astronomy, which with them meant Astrology, if it meant anything. The Chaldee priests were early distinguished for their diligence and success in the study of celestial phenomena. Callisthenes, who accompanied Alexander, is said to have found at Babylon astronomical observations for a period of 1903 years. It is more certain, however, that Ptolemy had access to a series of Chaldean observations, sufficiently accurate to have a scientific value, extending back 721 years before the birth of Christ. It is from this source that the Magi derived the astronomical and astrological notions that abound in their later books. The Jewish doctors were equally fascinated with the science of the Chaldees, and turned it to a very similar account. The Talmuds abound with this recondite learning, which has for us little scientific value. The rabbins taught that were it not for the heat of Orion, the world would be congealed by the cold of Scorpio, and *vice versa;* and were it not that the tail of Scorpio is in the milky way, no one stung by a scorpion could live. This is a not unfair sample of their Astronomy, and many things might be taken indifferently from a Jewish or a Parsee book, bearing no internal marks to distinguish their source.[25] S. R.

[To be continued.]

Art. XIX.

Sin and its Sequences, Immediate and Remote.

Sin is comprehensively defined by an apostle, as "the transgression of the law."[1] Law is "a rule of action."[2] Any acknowledged standard of right becomes a law to those who recognize it, and are rightfully it subjects. The foun-

[25] Fürst, Culturgeschichte i. 40–100–122.

[1] 1 John, iii. 4. [2] Blackstone, v. 1, ¶ 2.

tain of right, and the original source of law, is the divine equity.

The principle in man's nature to which the law of rectitude appeals, is the moral sense, or conscience. This principle is co-extensive with human sanity, a moral light "which lighteth every man that cometh into the world."[3] It is this inward, moral function which occasions disquitude on the violation of what we regard as right, and complacency of feeling on compliance with known duty.

The conscience does not, of itself, decide between right and wrong. This is the office of the judgment. Neither does the conscience choose between right and wrong. This is the function of the will. But the judgment having prescribed the path of duty, and the will decided to follow in, or deviate from, that path, the conscience gives the music for the march, either the harmony of approval, or the discord of condemnation. Conscience is the moral sensorium which responds with pain or pleasure to every act of obedience or transgression.

Human reason being finite, the judgment, however enlightened by human wisdom, is an insufficient guide. Hence the necessity of revelation. Revelation elevates the standard of human duty, and this elevation brings an increase of human responsibility. Given a revelation, it becomes a moral chart for the guidance of the judgment in all moral discrimination, and to this standard the will and the conscience must also be amenable.

Among the Hebrews, sin was the violation of the Mosaic code. The rules of duty recognized in that moral system were, to reverence and worship the living God; to avoid idolatry and polytheism; to observe the seventh day as sacred to physical repose and religious meditation; to honor parents; and to abstain from coveteousness and lust, from theft and perjury and murder. These principles of right, embodied in the decalogue, are eternal and universal, retained in Christianity, obligatory through all time, and most of them interwoven with the civil codes of all enlightened communities.

The Gentiles had no revealed standard of moral duty. They had, in the more enlightened portions of the world,

[3] John, i. 9.

statute laws of human origin, for the regulation of their secular relations. They had also treatises on morals, written by meditative and observing, but uninspired and erring minds, of their own respective nations. With these, they had the aids of common sense, experience, observation and conscience. And so far as these lights, in connection with individual capacities, defined the path of duty, they were morally responsible to the great Heart-seër and Heart-searcher whom they but dimly recognize as the "unknown God."[4] Though unrevealed by oracle, or prophet, or by written word, he still impressed a shadowing of his being, by the light of outward nature and the inner capacities of man, even upon the pagan mind. Thus, the great missionary of Christianity to the Gentile world: "For when the Gentiles which have not the law, do by nature the things contained in the law, these, having not the law, are a law unto themselves; which show the work of the law written in their hearts, their conscience also bearing witness, and their thoughts the meanwhile accusing, or else excusing one another."[5]

Though the element of conscienciousness seems to inhere in all men, its manifestations differ in different individuals and communities, according to their different modes of moral training, and the differing laws and usages of society. In this respect, the moral sense is analogous to the natural senses. Thus, the sense of flavor is innate and universal, and is at birth, perhaps, nearly uniform in all men. Yet, by the different cultivation of this sense, one comes to disrelish milk, the first and natural food of all men, and to enjoy tobacco which all men naturally loathe. So conscience is universal; and if men could grow up in a state of society perfectly natural and primitive, such as society would have been in Eden if our first parents had not sinned, its manifestations would probably be uniform. But by different modes of culture, the conscience of the savage sees a virtue in revenge, while the Christian conscience owns the duty of forgiveness.

Conscience being thus subject to artificial circumstances as to the manner of its action, — the things it condemns or approbates depending on the manner in which the reason

[4] Acts, xviii. 23. [5] Rom. ii. 14, 15.

has been educated, — some have hence inferred, that conscience is, itself, but the creature of education, and that, by nature, man has no moral sense. It might be as legitimately argued, that man has, by nature, no gustatory sense, because of the great variety that exists in human palates. [6] The principal difference is, that the natural senses are manifested at birth, while the moral sense is not developed till the mind is sufficiently unfolded to discriminate between right and wrong.

Sin is the exercise of the physical or intellectual powers in any way that offends or pains the conscience. There is a sinfulness of thought, as well as of action, even among people unenlightened by revelation. Paul, in speaking of the Gentiles, represents their "*thoughts*" as "accusing or else excusing one another;" that is, their good thoughts as accusing their evil thoughts; and "their conscience also bearing witness;" that is, bearing record, or taking note of all their cogitations and volitions. We sin when we indulge the eye in seeing objects, the ear in hearing sentiments or language, the palate in tasting food or drink, which tend to debase our nature; when we exercise the muscular power to the injury of others; and when we exert the intellect in plotting schemes, or bringing forth productions which are hostile to our moral sensibilities.

In a general and philosophical sense, sin is the violation of any law, physical or moral. In this sense, to violate the laws of our physical nature, is a physical sin. * For such transgression of the material laws of our being, we reap a

[6] This word is here used in the popular, and not in the strictly scientific sense.

* We are confident that we give the opinion of the writer as well as our own, when we say that the term *sin*, in its strict meaning, applies only to *moral* transgression. There is indeed, a clear analogy between the effects of physical and of moral transgression, but it is only in a metaphorical sense, that the physical transgression can be called a sin. It is our conviction, that any application of the word to other than transgressions of the moral law—which are necessarily *voluntary* transgressions—is to be avoided. We cannot too carefully guard against such a use of terms as may tend to confound guilt with simple misfortune or accident. Again, the circumstance that in some particulars the moral and the physical transgression are conjoined as in the case of intemperance, must not blind us to the fact, that the two elements are distinguishable. Physical transgression may also be an *occasion* of sin —never its cause. *Ed. Quarterly.*

physical punishment, in the loss of health; and this penalty we reap, whether we violate these physical laws knowingly or ignorantly. But sin, in the scriptural sense, is the intentional violation of the laws of our moral nature, in disregarding the dictates of conscience and the revealed will of God. The penalty for this kind of sin is received in the moral nature, and, unlike the penalty of physical transgression, depends upon the degree of light and knowledge against which we may have sinned. It consists in a pain in the moral nature, — anguish and remorse of conscience, in proportion to the extent to which it has been opposed and violated.

Sometimes this penalty is immediate, and sometimes remote. The former uniformly occurs when the conscience is healthy and active; but when otherwise, the compunction may be long deferred. And when thus delayed, it is often finally awakened through the medium of the physical suffering arising from the sin. One may transgress the acknowledged rule of right, in the wrong indulgence of his physical nature, as, for instance, in intemperance, or lust, and feel few stings of conscience till they are awakened by the pain of body and loss of health which such transgression ultimately brings. And in other cases, the pain of spirit seems to precede the actual perpetration of the wrong. It sometimes arises from the contemplation of, and preparations for, the evil deed. Paul seems to have allusion to these moral phenomena when he says, "Some men's sins are open beforehand, going before to judgment; and some men they follow after."[7]

Some men act with forethought and calculation in all their doings, whether good or evil. There are those who plan their evil courses, drawing up a mental programme of every important movement before proceeding to its execution. Such a man sins with deliberation, arranges his dark designs, and is practical and systematic in his iniquity. If he embarks under the black flag of piracy, he disciplines his demoniac crew in the tactics of assault, sees that the rigging of his hellish craft is in order for an emergency, and arms it with all the implements of effectual murder. If he engages in counterfeiting, he studies the perfection of his plates or

[7] 1 Tim. v. 24.

dies, that he may make a successful imitation of the note or coin, and plans concealment for his apparatus, and for the prosecution of his work. Such a man's sins, if his conscience has not, by long abuse, been rendered torpid, "are open beforehand," going in advance to judgment, and to punishment. He *begins* to receive the penalty before he actually commits the deed. From the moment he contemplates the course of crime, his soul becomes possessed of the dark idea; his heart is pregnant with the throbbing evil, his aching conscience is defiled, and his peace departs. Guilt consists not principally in the overt act. It lies in the consent of the will; and as soon as the crime is determined, guilt ripens to its full blackness, and the sin goes to judgment in anticipation.

On the other hand, there are many, perhaps a majority of the sinful, who are uncalculating and impulsive, and who sin only from excitement, temptation, and the absence of self-control. There are many weak men whose lives fall far below the mark of virtue, who never deliberate a crime, or premeditate an injury. Such are often deeply penitent as soon as reflection brings a reaction of the moral feelings, and, like Peter, weep at the remembrance of the sin.

All sin is serious and lamentable and deeply deleterious. It is inward blight, and spiritual mildew. Persistence in known moral wrong is to the moral life what the physical vices are to the bodily health. Habitual indulgence in the violation of the moral sense, however secret may be the nature of the sin, however disconnected with physical comfort, and however invisible its effects to others, still works a moral blight, as sure and as fatal to the health of soul, as is the violation of physical law to the elasticity of the animal spirits and the vigor of the constitution.

Those imperceptible sins, like anger, hatred, fraud and inhumanity, irreverence of Deity, misanthropy and pride, work within the soul a disquiet and prostration, a kind of spiritual *tremens*, analogous to the effects of intemperance upon the nervous system.

The consequences of sin are not only disastrous, but inevitable. There is no possible evasion of those immutable laws of which sin is the transgression. Any denial or perversion of this truth, any dogma which allows the sinner to compromise with divine justice, any law of moral insol-

vency, invented as a mitigation of exaggerated views of punishment, diminishes the wholesome restraints on human passion, and operates injuriously to morals.

In regard to the nature and penalty of sin, there are extremes of sentiment, equally erroneous and unsalutary. Sin is sometimes held forth as infinite in all its bearings. The infinity of sin involves an infinite responsibility, with an infinitude of guilt and punishment. If this dogma has its root in truth, we step at once, with the first sin, from the innocency and irresponsibility of childhood, to the depravity and guiltiness of demons! Man's finite capacity is thus exaggerated for the sake of magnifying his enormity. An angel falls far below infinity, and man's highest promise for the future, is to be "as the angels." [8]

The idea of man's infinite demerit, instead of creating greater seriousness in view of sin, as it is perhaps designed, often tends, it may be presumed, in the opposite direction. This doctrine makes one sin as deeply culpable as ten thousand. A celebrated pirate was once asked, while in prison awaiting his execution, why he had *murdered* so many whom he had robbed upon the seas. His answer was, that the penalty for piracy alone was death; that it could be no more than death for piracy and murder; and that dead men could not be subpœnaed as witnesses. It would seem, upon reflection, that the theory of infinite sin might be similar in its practical operation.

There is an opposite extreme of belittling the nature of sin to a mere weakness and misfortune. There are not wanting those who hold low views of moral justice, thinking that the Deity regards all men with equal complacency, without reference to moral character. In the minds of such, there is little real distinction between the reverent and the profane; the human, and the selfish; the honest, and the fraudulent; the intemperate, and the abstinent; the loose and dissipated, and the pure and self-denying. They hew down the dark, high mountain of human guilt, to a mere molehill, and vainly imagine that their own bluntness of moral vision gives them a clear view of moral evil. Those who have not cultivated a moral discrimination which refines the conscience and renders it keen-sighted, often

[8] Matt. xxii. 30.

imagine that others magnify the distinction between right and wrong, and blend, in their own dim vision, all shades of moral character into one neutral color, without light or shadow, divesting human actions of all credit or demerit.

There is not only an underrating of sin, but also a disparaging of virtue. Those who have the most lax and tolerant ideas of vice, and who are always speaking apologetically of sin, generally entertain a proportionately low estimate of human merit. They who have never successfully struggled against inclination in themselves, cannot appreciate the self-denial, the moral agonizing, and persevering warfare with impulse and temptation by which self-conquest is achieved. "Fools make a mock at sin," [9] and often at virtue and morality; and especially at the idea of holiness of heart, and innocence of thought, and purity of life, as mere sentimentality and delusion. If some theologians of the older, "evangelical" schools have done evil by magnifying sin, some teachers of the newer and more liberal sects, have wrought equal injury by making it microscopic. All efforts to inculcate stringent notions of duty, to paint sin darkly and to enjoin a high and pure ideal for human aspiration, have only provoked satire and levity in some quarters, and been denounced as cant and dissimulation. This tone of ministration has, by a distinguished liberal minister of New England, been characteristically denominated, "*goodyism.*"

Allow, if you please, that few, or if you will have it so, that none come up to the full mark of character that Jesus inculcated and exemplified. This would form no valid ground for lowering the ideal. No artist can equal nature; yet the painter or the sculptor, informed by the genuine spirit of art, keeps nature's models in his eye. So should the Christian "press towards the mark" [10] of that high purity enjoined by Jesus. To keep men from grubbing in the earth and "wallowing in the mire," [11] we must point them to the skies.

Not only have there been efforts to make sin diminutive, but there is a theory which even makes it good. There have been moral teachers who have labored less to show the enormity of sin, and to guard mankind against it, than to

[9] John, ii. 4. [10] Philip, iii. 14. [11] 2 Pet. ii. 22.

prove that it is a creature of God; that it "originated in goodness;" and that it is desirable and indispensable. This is most literally calling "evil good," and putting "darkness for light."[12] When God looked out upon the finished universe, and approved the work, sin had not entered. True, there was a moral law, and man had been constituted capable of disobedience. But that the disobedience was, therefore, designed, necessitated and approved, is a *non sequitur*. As fitly might it be argued that Fulton, in the application of steam-power to the propelling of vessels and machinery, designed and desired all the accident and death that have resulted from his invention. He doubtless foresaw that such calamities might occur from human ignorance and negligence. The *possibility* of such results is inseparable from the confinement of the force that resides in steam. Yet he knew that such accidents could be avoided by care and skill on the part of those who might manage the machinery; and that a balance of good would result from steam navigation. Indeed, the very word *accident* precludes the idea of design and essentiality. Neither can the careless engineer plead, in justification, that Fulton was the primary cause of his own dereliction.

So man's moral freedom and accountability, without which he were not man, are inseparable from the possibility of disobedience. Sin is an accident, and not a law, but "the transgression of the law;" and the sinner can not plead in palliation, that God has made him *capable* of sinning. Neither may we argue, because God overrules man's wrath and disobedience so that it shall work no final evil, that, therefore, sin is good. Good needs no overruling, but is beneficient in its own natural and immediate tendency. We may not imagine that God needs evil in the world, and that, by transgression, we are in the way of duty, and thus "do evil that good may come."[13] He has so arranged his moral laws, and so directs his providential forces, that there shall be no ultimate loss from the aggregate of happiness. The currents of evil are turned from their original and natural courses, and applied to good. It is a fixed and present law, that he who sins shall suffer; nor will the suffering be mitigated by the false inference, that our sins

[12] Isa. v. 20 [13] Rom. iii. 8.

help God in achieving final good. He has secured this consummation beyond all contingency, and requires us, for our welfare, and in reverence to his authority, to obey.

It is an extreme to teach, as has been often taught in former time, that sin brings no punishment in the present life. We are always more forcibly impressed with what is near and sure, than with what is distant and uncertain; and however hot and glowing may be the fires of retribution kindled in the future world, they are dimmed by distance, and cooled by the uncertainty. Those who have been educated in such views seem to recognize no law of present compensation, and are thus led to misinterpret the natural results of transgression, as mere casualties. There is thus an habitual blindness to the immediate consequences of disobedience; and occasionally, a "fearful looking for of judgment and fiery indignation,"[14] in the future; but this distant evil is impressed only by some extraordinary fervid representation.

The natural tendency of this method is to produce a state of mingled recklessness and excitability. Indeed, the greatest profligates have been regarded by this school as the most hopeful subjects for conversion and salvation and often the most promising candidates for the ministry. The more the conscience is abused the more sensitive it is to the power of terror, and the more susceptible to that sudden and violent reaction which revivalists denominate *conviction*. It is difficult to alarm the innocent and placid mind; while the guilty conscience, with the moral nerves all stimulated and inflamed by sin, is rendered doubly excitable. "The wicked flee when no man pursueth; but the righteous are bold as a lion."[15] Hence the vile and reckless are often highly susceptible to all terrific influences.

A few years since, two distinguished statesmen died, the one as eminent for the purity of his private moral, as for his intellectual power; and the other, unfortunately, the reverse. The latter, it was said, sought and welcomed the offices of religion, in his last hours; while the former repelled the obtrusion of an over-officious clergyman who seemed to covet the honor of preparing him for death, while he was occupied in taking leave of his friends. These facts, if facts they were, have been employed in the pulpit, in

[14] Heb. x. 27. [15] Prov. xxviii. 1.

eulogy of the Northern and disparagement of the Southern statesman. By a broader view of moral philosophy, and a full appreciation of the principle above illustrated, this conclusion might possibly be reversed.

No less unwarranted and practically unsafe is the idea, that sin leaves no consequences to be realized beyond the grave. This extreme is a modern reaction from the ancient dogma of no present retribution. One view limits to the present life all mercy and forgiveness; while the other circumscribes within the same small compass all justice and punishment. In either case, the bed is too short and the covering too narrow for the repose of a broad, far-reaching, and untrammelled mind.[16] There is no authority in Scripture, or the deductions of sound reason, for limiting the exercise of any of the divine attributes, either to this life or the future. While a large portion of the Christian world are repudiating the dogma of endless punishment, but a small part are adopting the opposite ultraism of no future retribution. The latter is principally limited to a fraction of a single sect; while the former is discarded by one whole denomination, by a majority of one or two others, and by a considerable number in nearly all orders in Christendom. The theory of no future discipline has been before the reading religious world for nearly half a century, and is losing ground, even in the denomination within which it originated.

Although, as heretofore promised, the response of the moral sense directly follows sin, when the conscience is in a healthy state, yet there are circumstances under which this immediate reaction would seem to be precluded. By frequent repetition, and long continuance of any particular sin, the conscience ceases to revolt from familiarity with the evil, as, by habitual use, some poisons cease to nauseate, and even become palatable. The falsehoods of trade, the cruelties of war, the affected earnestness and pathos of the lawyer in a wrong cause, and the duplicities of the politician, are illustrations in point. In cases of this kind, the judgment, as well as the conscience, sometimes becomes perverted. The individual has ceased to recognize correct moral principle as his rule of action.

[16] Isa. xxviii. 20.

Let us now suppose this conscience to be re-quickened, and the judgment re-enlightened by some influence in the present life. The memory runs back over these misdeeds, and the resuscitated conscience goes back with the memory. As the memory pauses at the commencement or the contemplation of each sinful act, the conscience pauses, and forbids the deed. And as we repeat, in memory, the perpetration of the wrong, the conscience is pained with the remembered violation.

But this re-awakening of the conscience does not always come in the present life. The conscious approach of death usually produces it; but this effect is often obviated by the suddenness of the event. The hardened pirate may be seized, by mutiny, in his sleep, and laid to slumber in the coral chambers of the ocean, or pierced by a ball from the pursuing man-of-war, with blood and plunder in his heart. Reason, analogy, and Scripture, would seem to teach that, in such a case, the compunction would follow death, if memory survives, and conscience resumes its vitality. "He that doeth wrong shall suffer for the wrong which he hath done;" [17] and if not in this life, in the future.

Perhaps it may be argued that, in the case supposed, death is the punishment. But this is only a physical evil, and the moral consequences of the sin are still unrealized. And beside, good men often suffer death in acts of duty, as in the extinguishment of a fire, in the saving a child from the flames, or a man from drowning. The legitimate penalty of sin, and that of which the Scriptures more generally treat, is moral suffering.

One argument urged against any future retribution is this: All sin, on the whole, is for the best. Though man means evil in the act, and though present, seeming evil may result, yet God will overrule it for future and private good, as in the case of Joseph's brethren selling him into Egypt. The sinner, seeing this in the future world, will feel no pain, but even rejoice in remembrance of his former sins. Now if a *knowledge* that our sins are overruled for good will prevent remorse for past sins, certainly a firm *belief* in such overruling will produce a similar result. Many of us believe, in the present life, in such a consummation. Does

[17] Col. iii. 25.

such belief prevent compunction for transgression? If so, then this belief prevents all present punishment, save the mere physical results of sin. In this case, the doctrine must be immoral. And if such belief does not present such compunction, neither will a knowledge of the thing believed, and therefore this argument is groundless. It proves, or rather disproves, too much. If it disproves future, it also disproves present suffering for sin, by those who thus believe.

But a belief that God averts the tendency of evil, and transforms its results, does not relieve the violated conscience. Joseph's brethren saw, undoubtedly, that their transgression resulted, indirectly, in their preservation. Joseph said to them, "Be not grieved nor angry with yourselves that ye sold me hither, for God did send me before you to preserve life." Yet this did not prevent the workings of conscience. After the death of their father, they asked pardon of Joseph anew. And though he re-assured them, saying, "Fear not; . . . . ye thought evil against me; but God meant it unto good,"[18] there can be little doubt that, to the day of their death, they felt, at times, the gnawings of remorse. It might be very plausibly argued that these dealers in human flesh suffered enough from famine, before they went to Egypt, to punish them for their sin. But the famine had no visible connection with their crime, and their righteous father and the innocent Benjamin suffered from this evil as deeply as themselves. The legitimate penalty for their sin was inward "tribulation and anguish,"[19] humiliation and remorse. Had they died of starvation on the way to Egypt, this would not have been a punishment for their guilt, nor any sequence of their unnatural conduct. Doubtless their souls would have been harrowed by the evil memory in the day of their famishment. But if not then, why not at a subsequent period? The pain of a violated conscience is a natural and philosophical effect, and must follow, immediately or remotely, as inevitably as the physical effects, a transgression of the material laws. He who indulges his appetites intemperately can not escape the bodily injury arising from this cause by a knowledge that he shall gain future wisdom from the expe-

[18] Gen. xlv. 5; l. 19, 20. [19] Rom. ii. 9.

rience. And just as impossible to evade the pain of conscience arising from a transgression of the moral law, by a knowledge that such violation shall be overruled, even for our own future good.

Another argument in support of the hypothesis that limits all the sequences of sin to mortal life is drawn from that class of passages in Scripture which speak of present punishment, as, for instance, "The righteous shall be recompensed in the work; much more the wicked and the sinner."[20] It is loosely inferred from this, that if sin is punished here, sin can not be punished hereafter, else the sinner would receive double for his sins.[21] This argument seems based upon the old idea of punishment—as a kind of *revenge* specially inflicted by the Deity in retrospect of sin, instead of a *consequence* naturally following from man's moral nature. Adopting the newer and more rational theory of punishment, as a reaction of the abused conscience, the argument fails in application. It would be in amount like this: Sin produces remorse in the present life. Therefore sin committed here can not produce remorse hereafter, otherwise there would be a double remorse for sin. This is no more logical than to say that a sin committed to-day produces remorse to-day; therefore there can be no remorse for the same sin to-morrow. None will dispute that a sin committed this week may occasion compunction next week, or in future years. And if the sinner should die in the day of the transgression, it is not easy to discover how death should preclude remorse, if memory and conscience survive the body.

The promise of the final restitution is sufficient for all the purposes of consolation. It is enough to be assured that the forces of evil will be intercepted before they reach the cord on which is suspended man's final destiny, without contending for the unrevealed and questionable doctrine that all unhappiness is confined to earth. Why, then, the tenacity sometimes manifested in denying all future penitence for sin? Perhaps it may be answered, that the Scriptures do not positively reveal any future retribution, and our proof-texts may be demanded. In regard to the testimony of the Scriptures on this point, there is a difference of opinion

[20] Prov. xi. 31. [21] Isa. xl. 2.

which it is not the present purpose to discuss. Certainly the Scripture does not deny this doctrine, nor affirm the opposite. And waiving the inferential argument already adduced, that the Scriptures declare the punishment of all sin, and that all sin is not suffered for in this life; and even allowing that the Bible does not positively declare the doctrine of future punishment, we should still be unauthorized in a dogmatical denial of all future discipline. In this case, it should be regarded as an open question, like future identity, and the recognition of friends.

The only passage of Scripture usually alleged, or much relied on, as disproof of future retribution, is this: "He that is dead is freed from sin."[22] Allowing, what is by no means indisputable, that this text refers to literal death, the utmost it affirms is, that the departed do not continue in transgression; that the dead are freed from *sinning*. Having previously showed that the moral consequences do not always immediately follow sin, it were superfluous to argue that a cessation from sinning does not necessitate an immediate discontinuance of the penalty. It is not so in this life, either in regard to the moral or the physical effects of sin. He that is in the penitentiary, is freed from stealing; not only from the temptation, but from the possibility; and yet he is suffering the penalty of crime, it may be in regret and humiliation, as well as in the loss of liberty. So it may be in the future, for a season, with those who die impenitent. For aught this passage shows to the contrary, there may be "spirits in prison"[23] suffering the penalty of former sins, though delivered and precluded from their repetition.

It may be argued that if the evil reminiscences of the present life awaken regret in the future, the regret may be endless; and that, hence, the theory of future disciplinary suffering involves the doctrine of endless punishment. But the natural tendency of remorse, in this life, is either to produce penitence and reformation, and consequently pardon and relief, or to exhaust and paralyze the sensibility of conscience, and bring moral atony. The latter occurs when the transgressor continues under evil influences; but the former, when he is aided upward by the power of grace. In the future life, there will be none but elevating influences,

[22] Rom. vi. 7. [23] 1 Pet. iii. 9.

and the sorrow will bring penitence and pardon and salvation.

The strength and duration of penitential sorrow are in proportion to the magnitude of transgression and the depth of guilt. The remorse of Adam for the transgression in the garden may have recurred occasionally during the whole of the nine hundred years that he sojourned on earth. It was doubtless keenest at the first, growing fainter with the lapse of time. There is a recuperative power in the moral as in the physical nature, which, with time and treatment, will heal the wounds that have been made by sin. There is a limit to the power of grief, even in this life. And as time bears no proportion to eternity, the deepest sorrow a finite being can suffer must have an end. L. C. B.

Art. XX.

Our Civil War.

At last, the crisis has come. Our chronic sectional strife has ripened into blood. Bullets have taken the place of ballots. Rebellion has attacked our flag. Traitors menace our Capital. Anarchy threatens our government. War has begun. Already its first martyrs have fallen, and the next message that clicks from the telegraph may bring tidings of severer conflicts and of still more serious slaughter. As the consequence, the whole North is resounding with the cry, "To arms!" Our cities have become camps; and the land, just now so peaceful, is echoing with the roll of the drum and the tramp of hosts marshalling for battle.

What is the meaning of all this? Who are the aggressors? Is our position necessary? Is it expedient? Is it right? These are questions fitting these pages, and we propose an attempt to answer them. As we commence to write, the country is yet in suspense and expectation. Washington is thought to be safe. Cairo is entrenched. Norfolk is in

blockade. Baltimore has just been occupied. But Fort Pickens and Harper's Ferry are in debate, and the rebels are said to be concentrating in Virginia. We know not what a day or an hour may bring forth, nor what changes of situation in affairs, or what developments in events may transpire before what we pen in May shall appear in July. Our purpose, however, is not with the stratagies of the campaign, but with the nature of the contest and the questions of duty; and these we hope so to discuss that what we say will still be appropriate, whatever movements or changes may have occurred.

Superficially considered, this war seems to be a mere strife of personal or sectional ambition; or a controversy about the negro; or an insurrection of local prejudices because Mr. Lincoln rather than Mr. Breckenridge, or Mr. Douglas, or Mr. Bell, was elected President; or, as some would affirm, a quarrel engendered by the officious and persistent intermeddling of the North with the "domestic institutions" of the South. But however these personal and sectional seemings may show themselves on the surface, the war is, at bottom, no such thing; and whoever takes only this view of it, altogether fails to comprehend the contest and the real questions and interests at stake. It is a conflict, not of persons or of sections as such, but of principles. The negro is but the representative of the essential equality and absolute rights of man. The election of Mr. Lincoln has but served as the desired *occasion*, and is not at all the *cause* of the disturbance.[1] And this discussion of slavery, of which so much complaint has latterly been made, so far from being an "intermeddling" on our part, is a discussion

[1] "I asked a gentleman who has done more to inaugurate the Secession movement than any other man outside of South Carolina, 'Why have you raised all this tempest about Mr. Lincoln's election?' He replied: 'Do not deceive yourself; Mr. Lincoln's election had nothing to do with it, beyond enabling us to rouse our people. If Mr. Douglas had been elected, we should have broken up the Union just as soon. If Mr. Bell had been elected, it would have delayed us but very little. Even if Mr. Breckenridge had been elected, we would have seceded before the close of his term. We believe that there is an essential incompatibility between the North and the South.'"—*"Ten weeks in the South"—a Letter from A. D. Richardson, Esq., in the New York Tribune, May* 10, 1861.

inherited from the fathers of the republic, the continuance of which has been forced upon us by the persistent purpose of the slave-bazars to take possession of the government, and make it, under republican forms, substantially a vast slave empire. The war dates far back of all these modern controversies and irritations, and is simply our Constitutional incongruities come to a head. It is no strife between the North and the South merely; it is a conflict between two hostile and irreconcilable theories of government and of human rights. It is two distinct types of civilization—or rather, it is civilization and barbarism grappling at length in a hand-to-hand fight for the possession of this continent.

It is the misfortune of nations that they are slow to apprehend the problems given them to solve. We have erroneously thought of the doctrines of democratic liberty as established here. We have seen other nations still struggling in the throes of their enfranchisement, with battles still to fight, with sacrifices still to make, often with blood still to shed in the great controversy of the people against theories, and of equality against privilege; but we have complacently flattered ourselves that, on *our* soil, this work had all been done, and that, with no struggle to wage and no sacrifices to make and no heroism to exhibit, we had only to enjoy what our fathers purchased, and to vote and to trade undisturbed under the vine and fig-tree which they planted. This conflict comes to undeceive us. It comes to remind us that there are numerous stages in the grand process of developing ideas into institutions, and of inaugurating principles into the mastery of nations, and that there is work also for us to do in this direction. We, too, it comes to admonish us, have contributions of blood and terror and self-denial to make on the altar of humanity, for the overthrow of oppression and the ultimate enfranchisement of the race. We also, it tells us, are summoned to be heroes, and thus in our turn to make history fragrant with the aroma of sacrifice and valor, and to add still other names to the roll of those who have made themselves illustrious as the soldiers of freedom and progress.

What are the facts? The South, if it be proper so to designate those engaged in this rebellion, stands to-day upon the same essential platform on which absolutism has always stood, enunciating the same philosophy and putting forth

the same arrogant claims. Not only does it show us treason arraying itself against patriotism,—anarchy against order, and the Mexican *pronunciamento* against our American deference to the will of the people constitutionally expressed through the ballot box; it sets up a banner, inscribed with the old lie of tyrants, that might makes right. It scoffs at the idea of human equality. It renounces the sentiment of absolute justice. It despises the masses as fit only to be ruled. It affirms that capital sustains its true relation to labor only when it owns the laborer, and builds its sham confederacy on the doctrine that one class of men are born to be trampled upon and chattelized by another. In a word, sneering at the fathers of the republic as dreamy and fanciful enthusiasts, denouncing the Declaration of Independence, rejecting every principle of the Revolution and despising the doctrines of a genuine democracy, it substantially plants itself upon the assumption of the divine right of kings, and represents ideas as thoroughly and cruelly despotic as ever sat on a throne, or ground the people into the dust.

It is one of the inevitable penalties of the service of vicious principles or practices that "evil men and seducers shall wax worse and worse, deceiving and being deceived." Never has the world seen a more striking or melancholy instance of this than is furnished in the decadence and demoralization of the South in respect to this subject. At the organization of our government, slavery was almost universally regarded as an evil and as doomed soon to pass away. We are not to forget, indeed, that the war of Independence had not enlisted the sympathies of the entire people. There was a large—in some of the colonies, as in the case of South Carolina, an almost predominating Tory influence. To this extent, of course, sympathy with the principles of the Revolution was limited, and there were those who turned a loving eye back to the leeks and onions of Egypt. But so far as the war was approved on principle, the people, South as well as North, were all enamored of liberty. Fresh from the discussions and struggles of freedom, the whole moral sentiment of the patriots of the country revolted at the idea of slavery any where, and especially under a government originating in the Declaration of Independence, and boasting itself the champion of the inalienable rights of man.

Mr. Madison declared, in substance, that where slavery exists, Republicanism is a fallacy and an absurdity. Even the most bigoted adherents of Toryism and the staunchest defenders of slavery did not think of maintaining slavery as a thing right in itself.

Many persons suppose that "Abolitionism" is a heresy of modern origin, the child of Lloyd Garrison's fanaticism. But Mr. Garrison himself never said severer things of slavery, or more emphatically urged the necessity of its abolition than the men of the Revolution. Washington and Jefferson were abolitionists, and the latter especially denounced slavery in the strongest terms alike on the ground of equity, of political economy and of moral influence. Madison was an abolitionist, charging that the mere distinction of color was made "a ground of the most oppressive dominion ever exercised by man over man." The youthful and afterwards eminent William Pinkney, of Maryland, was an abolitionist, declaring that slavery is "as shameful in its continuance as in its origin," and that by "the eternal principles of natural justice, no master has a right to hold his slave in bondage a single hour." Abolition societies existed, South as well as North, and as the president of the Pennsylvania society, in "An Address to the Public," November, 1789, Franklin branded slavery as "an atrocious debasement of human nature." The people of Virginia, in Convention, in 1774, declared that the abolition of domestic slavery is the greatest object of desire." The people of Georgia, in Convention at Darien, in 1775, denounced "the unnatural practice of slavery in America" as "a practice founded on injustice and cruelty," "debasing part of our fellow creatures below men, and corrupting the morals of the rest."[2] But why multiply quotations? Has not Mr. Alexander H. Stephens, the so-called Vice-President of the rebellion, sufficiently summed up the evidence for us? Speaking in behalf of the conspiracy, in an authoritative exposition of its "new Constitution," he says, "the prevailing ideas entertained by

[2] The most of these declarations have become so familiar that it is not deemed necessary to authenticate them by formal references. These citations have been mainly made from a "Manual of Southern Sentiment on the Subject of Slavery," prepared by D. R. Goodloe, of North Carolina, and published in consecutive numbers of Dr. Bailey's "Facts for the People," 1853.

Jefferson and most of the leading statesmen at the time of the formation of the old Constitution, were that the enslavement of the African was in violation of the laws of nature; that it was wrong in principle, socially, morally and politically. It was an evil they knew not well how to deal with; but the general opinion of the men of the day was that, somehow or other in the order of Providence, the institution would be evanescent and pass away. The idea, though not incorporated into the Constitution, was the prevailing idea at the time."[3] And he might have added that this almost universal hostility to slavery, alike in Church and State, found fitting expression in the ordinance of 1787, adopted by the unanimous vote of the States, forever consecrating the whole empire of the South-West Territory to freedom.

But in an evil day, as a temporary expedient, as it was thought, for disposing of the difficulties arising from its existence, at the demand of *South Carolina*, seconded by Georgia and North Carolina, slavery was treated as a party with whom terms were to be made, and thus became a power in our national affairs. From that hour, it has proved an occasion of discord, and has been insatiable in its ambition, crying like the daughters of the horse-leach, "*Give, give.*" At first, indeed, with rare exceptions, it did not so far debauch its defenders as to induce them to advocate it on moral grounds. It was conceded to be wrong, but was defended as a property interest, or as a means of sectional power. But the poison was diffused among the people, and it could not fail to do its work. Jefferson, writing of his hopes of emancipation, said that it was to "the young men grown or growing up," who had "sucked in the principles of liberty with their mothers' milk," that he looked "with anxiety to turn the fate of this question." Alas! he did not consider that while, in exceptional cases, there might be those who would rise above its influence, the mass of the people born and bred in the midst of slavery, breathing its atmosphere, would catch its spirit and be corrupted by its principles. Becoming profitable through the invention of the cotton-gin, and the opening of new fields for slave-labor, it has educated its adherents to regard it as the

[3] Speech at Savannah, March 22, 1861.

paramount concern; and gradually wearing away their sensitiveness to its wrong as it has supported them in idleness, and fed their self-importance, and given them political power, it has wrought their moral depravation, until politicians and theologians vie with each other in defending it as the corner-stone of society, intrinsically right; as a divine institution, with which all the interests of civilization and religion are identified!

History affords no parallel to this demoralization. The result has been the theory of society and of government which the South is now avowing. Toryism has ripened into absolutism. Slavery has killed out all republican ideas and sympathies, and carried its adherents back to the principles of feudalism. "The central idea of Northern society," says *De Bow's Review*, the highest Southern literary authority, "is the absolute equality of all the races of men. . . . . Southern society rests on entirely opposite grounds." And "the destiny of the States of the South," it affirms, is "to assert the principle of inequality." As if this "principle of inequality" had not been the "principle" asserted in all the oppressions under which the masses have been groaning since history began, and were, instead, some benign truth now first announced for the regeneration of the world! This, indeed, is what Mr. Stephens, in the speech just referred to, in effect declares. Denouncing "the assumption of the equality of the races" by the men of the revolution as "a sandy foundation," he says, "our new government is founded upon exactly the opposite ideas. Its foundations are laid, its corner-stone rests, upon the great truth that the negro is not equal to the white man; that slavery, subordination to the superior race, is his natural and normal condition. This, our new government is *the first in the history of the world* based upon this great physical, philosophical and moral truth!" Who would suspect, reading this, that all the perished aristocracies and despotisms of the world have been "based upon" the very assumption thus strangely dignified as a "great truth" now first practically recognized, or that the struggle of the race through revolution and blood, has been against this old doctine of inequality as thus organized in governments, and towards a government in which the unity and brotherhood of man should be fairly confessed?

Mr. Stephens, it is true, would blunt the edge of this criticism by confining the application of his "great truth" to the negro; but by what authority does he thus limit the application of his "principle?" Color is nothing in itself —only the indication of the inferiority which is alleged as the justification of slavery. But if the hypothesis of his inferiority justifies the "subordination" of the colored man, the "principle" applies with equal force to all of whom inferiority is affirmed, and there is no bar to the conclusion that "slavery, subordination to the superior" class, is "the natural and normal condition" of every less favored and dependent class. The negro, as was just intimated, only represents the toiling masses of whatever color. Hence, the frank and logical defenders of slavery pronounce the consideration of color of no consequence, affirming that serfdom or vassalage is the only legitimate condition of the laborer, and that society can be stable only as it rests on this basis. This is the actual theory of the South to-day. A recent examination of De Bow's *Review* for the year 1860, and for the first few months of the current year, amazed us at its bald and bold avowals to this effect. It intimates the necessity of "a government based upon the principle of military subordination." It says, "to make one aristocrat in the future, we must sacrifice a thousand paupers; yet we would by all means make them—make them permanent, too, by laws of entail and primogeniture." It frankly declares, "we of the South must so modify our State institutions as to remove the people further from power" and "to lengthen the term of office," and that the new Southern constitution must make provision for securing permanent representation of the landed interest," and "an herditary senate and executive."[4] Similar testimony might be quoted from other sources.

Is there any mistaking the principles or the logical results of the political philosophy with which we are thus furnished? Grant but for a moment the premises upon which the South has thus planted itself, and not only must the Declaration

[4] We have not the numbers at hand as we write, and regret to find that our notes do not give the references as they should. These extracts are but specimens of what might be quoted at almost any length; and we commend the *Review* to all who are interested in acquainting themselves with the present forms and tendencies of Secession thought.

of Independence which our fathers made, and the Republican Constitution which our fathers framed, be thrown away —as the conspirators have thrown them away, but, to repeat what we said in these pages ten years ago, writing of the Fugitive Slave Law, all that the friends of freedom have, through the ages, been contending for must be given up; Austria and Naples must be accepted as the only just interpreters of political science; every popular movement that has ever made a despot tremble, or shaken tyranny from its seat, is proved wrong; and our vaunted Bills of Rights are only so much lying paper that should as soon as possible be committed to the flames.

Only in the light of this position of the South is the *animus*, or the significance, of this rebellion to be understood. Some would have us speak of it without regard to its antecedents, or its radical causes, as a rebellion against the integrity of the government, or as a conspiracy for the overthrow of the Union. But this would be simple tautology. As well might a physician say as his diagnosis of a fever that it is an inflammation. Inflammation is an effect, not a cause. So with the disunionism that is expressing itself in this rebellion. The conspirators have no hostility to the Union in and of itself. They would be content with the *forms* of the government if they could determine its *spirit*. They want to feudalize the republic. They want to turn back the hands upon the dial plate of our civilization from the 19th to the 10th century, and to be duly recognized as the barons of the reorganized epoch. But the North has no sympathy with any such design, and will not assent to it. We still believe in the Declaration of Independence. As the so-called Vice-President Stephens has said of us, we "still cling to the errors" —the democratic errors of the fathers of the republic. We honor those men of the revolution as wise and Christian statesmen. We stand by the Constitution they ordained, not because we think it perfect, but because of the ends it seeks to further and the interests it conserves. We believe in the reality and the universality of the rights of man, and deny that one man or one class of men has a patent from God, or a warrant any where, to enslave or oppress another. We have protested, therefore, against the baronical assumptions and despotic principles of the slaveocracy. We have declined to permit them to make the government any longer

the expression of their ideas, or the instrument of their purposes. We have said that henceforth it shall express the ideas of the fathers, and be the instrument of the purposes for which they founded it, viz: "to establish justice, . . promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty."

Hence this civil war. It is but the natural result of the attempt to harmonize freedom and despotism in one working system—philosophically inevitable, and therefore prophesied, from the first. You cannot undertake to mix acid and alkali without producing an effervescence. Thunder and lightning must ensue if two clouds of opposite electric conditions meet. So liberty and slavery are in "irrepressible conflict." Free principles, in proportion as they are vitally held, will assert themselves; and no matter whether it exist under republican or monarchical forms, despotism is always aggressive. The North, with its ideas and traditions, could not but discuss and oppose slavery; and ever since the South yielded itself to the drift of despotic principles in its adoption of slavery as a thing to be approved and fostered, it has been its instinct and necessity to rule—or ruin. It has been arrogant and intensely sectional. It has taught the doctrine of state allegiance instead of loyalty to the country as a whole, and has substituted clanishness for nationality, and a local jealousy for a comprehensive patriotism. In this spirit, it has ruled the country—as Ex-Governor Hammand, of South Carolina, declared in his celebrated "mud-sill" speech—for more than sixty years, growing constantly more arrogant, more unscrupulous, more exacting. Unless, therefore, the sentiment of freedom were to be crowded out of our affairs, and the South were to be permitted to have every thing permanently its own way, transforming our republic from a Union of Free States into a grand oligarchy of slave-barons, just such an agitation as has been perturbing our national life for years past, ending in just such a struggle for mastery, was unavoidable. Fifty years ago, almost, Mr. Calhoun, the father of the political heresies which have given special inspiration to this rebellion, foresaw this struggle on account of the irreconcilable hostility between freedom and slavery, and confessing the South to be "essentially aristocratic," said, "when any material obstacle . . . shall tend to throw us out of the rule and control of the country, we shall then

resort to the dissolution of the Union."[5] And still earlier than this, nearly seventy years ago, Wm. Pinckney, of Maryland, himself a slaveholder, foretold that unless democracy destroyed slavery, slavery would destroy democracy: and *this is what it is now trying to do.*

This conflict, then, we repeat, is one of *principles*, and not of persons, or of sections. No doubt, looking carefully among the considerations which have propitiated the people towards the rebellion, we should find the idea of an antagonism of interests between the South as a purely agricultural, and the North as a commercial and manufacturing section, associated with the dream of a direct Southern trade with Europe; and the theory of some of the conspirators has perhaps contemplated a more unrestricted policy of free trade than the North is as yet ready to adopt. But that this is not the cause of the war is evident not only from the fact that, in organizing the rebellion, the seceded States have straightway adopted our tariff policy, adding to it provisions still more repugnant to the principles of free trade, but also from the fact that slavery is so distinctly made the issue by all the rebel authorities in expounding the reason of their movement. Whatever their speculations as to free trade, or however ambitious of direct intercourse with Europe, the South would not have been mad enough to undertake the overthrow of the government on any such account. Only in the fatuity of their pro-slavery insanity was such a piece of mingled folly and wickedness possible. Giving these commercial dreams all the importance that can be assigned them, then, we still find the cause of this difficulty in the radical hostility between the two systems, and thus perceive that the conflict is purely one of principles. So far as we are concerned, "we wrestle not against flesh and blood, but against principalities, against powers, against the rulers of the darkness of this world." We have no quarrel with the men of the South, as such. They are our brethren, our friends. We have sat with them at their tables, and they have sat with us at ours. Not only by the memories of a common history, but by the ties of business and by the sanctities of domestic and social affections, we are

[5] Com. Charles Stewart's Letter to George W. Childs, dated Bordentown, May 4, 1861.

linked together, and should be linked together, as one people. It is a fratricidal strife, and we would fain be relieved from the necessity of drawing the sword against them. It is not that we love Cæsar less, but Rome more.

The war is none of our making or seeking. We have done nothing to invite or justify it. We have interfered with no prerogative of State sovereignty,—have invaded the domain of no individual rights. We have claimed no authority to meddle with slavery in the States in which it exists, and have proposed no movement towards any such end. The North has yielded and compromised—far more than many of us have thought consistent with duty or self-respect, sacrificing cherished convictions and something even of conscience for the sake of peace. We have simply exercised our American right of free discussion and of carrying our principles to the ballot-box. Believing slavery to be wrong, economically, politically, morally, we have said so, declaring that, by our consent, it shall spread no further, and, in accordance with the letter and spirit of the Constitution, putting those into power who represent this purpose. This is all. But, defeated in the election, the conspirators have rebelled. They protest against the doctrine that the majority shall rule, and unable longer to control the government, they have resolved to disorganize and destroy it. The war is theirs, and not ours—and is but the final outcropping of plots that have been long maturing. For more than thirty years, high authority in South Carolina told us, the people have been in the process of education to this end. And after this madness appeared, we waited long and endured much, hoping that better counsels would prevail. Forts, mints, ships, custom-houses, money, arms were stolen from us wherever they could be seized. Armies were levied against us, and our troops were beseiged in our own strong holds and beneath our national flag. Loyal citizens were driven from their homes, property was confiscated, and violence and outrage reigned. Still our authorities dallied and temporized, risking the confidence of many who had helped to elect them, in the desire to avoid an acceptance of the gauntlet thus insolently thrown down. It was not until the country was startled by the attack on Sumpter and by the evidence thus furnished that the South *would* have war, or the utter humiliation of our Republic in the

surrender of all that had given it meaning, or entitled it to respect as one of the actual powers of the world, that the Proclamation of the President was issued, and the civil war was thus accepted as a fact.

There was nothing else that the President could do. He was sworn to support the Constitution and to execute the laws. How could he innocently fail to act when he saw the Constitution trampled and the laws defied? Or how could patriotic citizens fail to support him in acting? Should he or we see conspirators breaking up the government, and do nothing to save it? Next to the utter folly of the theory of "secession" is the folly of talking about "coercion," and of saying that the President has made this war. He had no option. The South defied the government, and commenced the war—and on it must rest the responsibility. Any thing that we *could* have innocently surrendered, we would. But the doctrines of liberty,—the principles of justice and of human equality,—this government, reared by our fathers' toils and cemented by their blood, standing amidst the thrones and oppressions of the world the grand assertion alike of the people's right and of the people's ability to govern themselves,—the one beacon toward which so many eyes and hearts have turned for encouragement—these, and the beautiful flag that has symbolized them, commanding homage wherever foot has trod or ship has sailed—*these* we cannot give up. *These* are more to us than friends or brethren; more to us than any and all earthly ties or connections; and since the South will compel us to choose between war and a surrender of these, we say, let the war come, and may God defend the right!

It is, indeed, a terrible alternative that is thus pressed upon us. War is not an arbiter to be lightly invoked, and can be justified only as a last resort. Even the most righteous war is a fearful tragedy, full of unspeakable horrors, and carrying a host of mischiefs in its train. Already the shadow of this has fallen upon hearts and homes, as husbands, fathers, sons and brothers, have taken their lives in their hands and gone forth to its exposures—yielded heroically as offerings on the altar of our country, but still yielded with many regrets and with tears. And deeper shadows, alas! are yet to fall as the war goes on. Then, there is the moral waste of war—character perverted, and vicious habits

acquired—sadder far than any mere loss of life. There is the vast amount of productive industry diverted into destructive channels. There are the derangements and interruptions of business. There is the necessity that transforms men into the destroyers of each other, and almost inevitably fosters a spirit of vindictiveness and retaliation even in the most Christian minds. These are only a few of the evils inseparable from war; but they are enough to set God's seal of condemnation upon every war waged for personal ends, or for any thing but the succor or maintenance of the most sacred interests, and especially to show the almost unparalleled guilt of the men who, in their unhallowed ambition, have precipitated this war upon us. They are evils in view of which every good man should feel himself imperatively called to discountenance the war spirit, and to plead for peace till peace becomes treason or cowardice. *Then* war is less an evil than peace. Great and terrible as are its mischiefs, war is not the worst calamity that can befall a people. Anarchy is worse. The decay of patriotism and of public spirit is worse. An indifference to vital principles, either of moral law or of civil rights, is worse. The peace of mammonism, that only asks for the chance to buy and sell, and is willing to purchase this at any sacrifice of loyalty to God or of fidelity to man, is worse.

We shall suffer much on account of this war. Business will suffer. Homes and families will suffer. Churches will suffer. And our country, in all departments of its concerns, will have occasion, like Rachael, to mourn for her children—for the flower of so many of her youth cut off, and for the strong arms that will be palsied and the stout hearts of her mature and vigorous men that will cease to beat. But we as a people, and the world, would suffer far more if, for the sake of peace, we should yield to the demands of traitors, and permit our principles to be trampled, our flag to be dishonored, and this temple of our government to be overthrown.

Let us not be misunderstood. We are no idolaters of the Union. Amidst the different circumstances of to-day, we hold the same opinions on this subject that we expressed in this periodical ten years ago.[6] We prize the Union, but

[6] Vol. viii. Apr. 1851.

only on account of the *principles* it professes to represent. And while we regard the doctrines of secession as nonsense and self-evident fallacies, that would leave us no government and no claims to respect as a nation; while we should regret to see even one star plucked from our flag, and have no faith that this territory of the United States can be permanently occupied by more than one nation, we do not believe that, as has sometimes been represented, the cause of free government, or of popular rights, is dependent upon the continuance of the Union in its present form; and we could see it dissolved, if so a majority of the people should deliberately and constitutionally ordain, and lose no heart or hope concerning the essential interests involved. But we *do* believe in the necessity of order. We *do* reverence the principles of democratic liberty. Whatever may be done about the Union, we *do* count it of vital importance that, until the people have decided to dissolve it in the observance of constitutional methods, anarchy shall be prevented, rebellion be put down, and the government show itself able to vindicate its authority and to sustain itself against all attacks; and we *do* see, or think we see, that a failure of our government in these respects would demonstrate, or be understood as demonstrating an essential weakness in the system, and thus necessarily prove disastrous to the progress of democratic ideas and the cause of popular institutions in all time to come.

On this account, and not in any idolatrous worship of the Union, we deem it imperative on us to meet the issue which the South has forced upon us, though it must be at the price of blood. On this account, standing upon the platform of the Bible, and with all the peaceful teachings of Jesus before us, we feel that we should be false to God and recreant to every demand of our religion, if we did not say that the honor of our republic must be maintained; that terrible as are the evils of war, it must be waged rather than that the government be thus disorganized, or a single principle we have affirmed be yielded to despotic or traitorous demands. Better a thousand times that war shall ravage our land from end to end, blighting our fields and darkening our homes — better that commerce be crippled, and credit stagger, and that every other man of us should be slain than that, when *such* interests are at stake, we should waver,

or suffer this star in the heavens of the nations to go out in chaos or the darkness of a military despotism. Our blighted fields would bloom again. Our shadowed homes would at some time grow bright. Commerce would at length revive. Credit could be restored. Even the places of the dead might be filled. But though in the providence of God all things are possible, when again could there arise such a republic as this if our attempt at self-government should now prove a failure? Or when or where could freedom hope for support, or democratic liberty and law expect to be permanently maintained, if, with our schools and our Bibles and our Churches, and all that gives life to our Christian civilization, they should be abandoned, or prove unable to maintain themselves here?

We might point abroad to the most favored nation upon whose industry rests the incubus of an aristocracy, and whose people are taxed to support a throne and to purchase the gewgaws of royalty, to illustrate what are the interests thus at stake. It is enough now that we can look at the South in contrast with the North, for this purpose. "The South can show no such scene as this," said a friend, of strong Southern sympathies hitherto, sitting by our side the other day, as we were looking upon the hundreds of intelligent and enthusiastic boys at a review of one of the New York public schools. The remark, unfortunately, is too true. The South can furnish no such spectacle as our northern free schools present; and this indicates the difference in the two sections, and their ruling ideas and tendencies throughout. The South has clear heads and generous hearts; but in respect to education and the intelligence of the people,—in respect to moral ideas and religious culture,—in respect to science, literature and art,—in respect to an organized industry and a regard for labor,—in respect to the rights of free speech and a reverence for law,—in respect to every element of a genuine Christian civilization, there is much the same difference between it and the North as there is between twilight and noonday. *Here* we have something that can be called civilization; *there*, however it may be gilded with culture and wealth and refinement of manners, they have, underneath the thin coating of polish or pretension, an essential barbarism. Great names have, indeed, illumined the history of the South. Wash-

ington was of the South, and was the centre there of a galaxy of statesmen and patriots, the fit companions and peers of Franklin and Sherman and Otis and the Adamses of the North. But this was in the days when South as well as North breathed the inspirations of freedom, and when "the mother of Presidents" had not yet fallen to be the breeder of slaves. And even now, no doubt, there are noble men and women scattered through the South, nurturing themselves in sympathy with the best ideas of the age, and ready to be the leaders in the regeneration that is to come. But for years past, the South has been steadily deteriorating, intellectually and morally, as well as politically. In proof, we might point to its records of violence and ruffianism so often appearing, but so seldom rebuked,—to its brutal attack on Sumner, committed by one man, but so generally approved,—to its barbarities in Kanzas,—or to the bullies and duellists whom it has sent as its specimens of gentlemen to make a "bear garden" of our House of Representatives. It is enough to point to the inhumanities and atrocities that have marked "the reign of terror" inaugurated in all the "seceded States" since this conspiracy began to develope itself, and to the estimates of honor and of obligation exhibited in connection with its progress, as indicating the tone of morals and the type of life at the South. Never before saw the world such a spectacle as has been thus presented. In such a comparison, Cataline could plead excuse, and Arnold claim manly recognition. Never before was rebellion so unjustifiable in its origin or its methods. Never before were imposition and deceit so reduced to a system, or did conspirators dare so to misrepresent facts and to falsify history. Never before was there such wide-spread private disloyalty, or such unblushing falsity to public trusts; never such meanness of treachery, or such baseness of dishonesty; never such a ruthless laying of hands on interests so priceless, or such unscrupulous trifling with obligations so sacred. All terms are perverted. Perjury is baptized as patriotism. The grossest malefeasance in officials is pronounced a wise foresight, worthy of all praise. Plunder and fraud and perfidy are glorified as fidelity. A general repudiation of honest debts is proclaimed as a solemn duty of citizenship. And a wicked conspiracy for the extension of slavery is declared a holy war for liberty! That many engaged in all

this are sincere and consciencious in what they are doing and saying, only darkens the picture the more, and proclaims with a sadder and more terrible emphasis the essential depravity of the principles and social organization that have power so to pervert conscience and language, and to educate noble, generous and intelligent men and women into such a misinterpretation of the law of God and such a contempt for the moral judgment of the world.

Not only on account of the Union, then, but by all that makes our Northern civilization, based on the rights of the people and a respect for honest labor, and blossoming in schools and churches, in factories and workshops, in benificent laws and Christian ideas and high-toned estimates of character, better and more desirable than this Southern semi-civilization, as well as by all the traditions of our history and by every principle of free government, we are summoned to accept the issue this conspiracy forces upon us, and to wage this war to a successful termination. Not only are we thus doing battle on the side of order against anarchy—on the side of well-regulated and constitutional government against lawlessness and rebellion, and in vindication of the right of the majority to rule and of the duty of the minority to submit, but we carry the ark of the Lord and the blessings of the new covenant. The cause of Christianity and of progress is symbolized by our banner. The South is fighting on the side of power—for exploded dogmas of inequality and aristocratic rights,—for the throne, the whip and the chain,—for the privilege of consuming without causing, and of wringing wealth out of unpaid toil; and its movement is but one of those reactionary eddies in the great current of progress which history has so often shown, attesting that heathenism still lingers, and that despotism is hard to die. *We* are fighting on the side of the people—not simply for the slave, but for ourselves and our children; for the down-trodden and oppressed every where; for *man*, and thus for the South itself in its highest destiny and interests. We are fighting for the vindication of labor and its right to its reward; for the vindication of the laborer and his right to rise; for the free school; for free speech and a free press; for all that has been gained for civilization and freedom by the toils and sacrifices of patriots and martyrs in the past, and for all that is precious in the

hope of a growing enfranchisement of the nations in the future.

In such a contest, who can doubt that it is our duty to go forward, waging it to the end? Not without meaning was it, we may be sure, that its first martyrs were the sons of Massachusetts, and that they fell on the anniversary of the blood that opened the Revolution at Concord and Lexington. The coincidence is the providential intimation of the identity of the conflict; we will accept it also as a prophecy of the result. The conflict, indeed, is as old as the race. It dates from the first protest of right against might, and of man against tyranny and aristocracy. It is the same conflict that Moses waged in Egypt,—that the Gracchi waged in Rome,—that Cromwell and Sidney and Hampden waged in England, and that has been waged wherever a word has been spoken, or a blow has been struck for the overthrow of irresponsible power. Our fathers entered on other men's labors, and took up this conflict where the heroes and martyrs of the English Revolution had left it. As one chapter in its history, they appealed to the sword and vindicated the claim of a people to be represented in any government by which they are taxed. Ours it is to take the same sword and write another chapter, finishing what they began by vindicating human equality, the authority of law, and the ability of a democratic government to maintain itself alike against enemies without and traitors within. Our fathers promulgated principles; we are to establish them.

We have already, perhaps, sufficiently intimated our opinion as to the relations of this subject to the question of Christian duty. The spirit of Christianity is peaceful, but it is not craven, nor does it ask us to be traitors to humanity, or, by inaction, accomplices to the destruction of liberty and the overthrow of government, as the price of obedience to its requirements. It condemns the spirit that makes war; but it has only approval for those who stand for the assailed right, and defend, though it must be by the sword and at the cost of life, the majesty of law and the sacred interests of freedom and justice. "If it be possible, as much as lieth in you, live peaceably with all men," is the Apostle's exhortation; and planting ourselves on this as the common-sense as well as the Apostolic interpretation of the Sermon on the

Mount, and the succeeding lessons of the New Testament, we claim that our position in this conflict is one that Christ approves and that God will bless. Christianity, as well as every sentiment of a genuine manhood, would rebuke us for poltroonery and an inexcusable disloyalty to the most solemn trusts, if we should suffer any theories of non-resistance, or any scruples about the lawfulness of war, or any rose-colored sentimentalisms about the beauty and desirableness of peace, to weaken our arms, or lessen our zeal in this resistance to traitors and this rally for liberty and law. No wonder that Quakers and peace-men lay aside their scruples, and pour out their money, or gird themselves for this warfare. No wonder that the Peace Society, at its recent meeting, not only did not condemn, but at least indirectly approved it. And well does the *Advocate of Peace*, in its late issue, say:

"The cause of Peace was never meant to meet such a crisis as is now upon us. It belongs not to Peace, but to Government alone; and all that can be required of us, is that we prove ourselves loyal citizens. . . . It is not strictly war, but a legitimate effort by government for the enforcement of its laws, and the maintenance of its proper and indispensable authority. The principle is the same with that which quells a riot in one of our cities, or seizes an assassin or incendiary, and brings him to condign punishment. . . . It becomes every peace-man to throw his entire influence against the gigantic crime of attempting to overthrow the freest and best government on earth, in order to establish upon its ruins an oligarchy of slaveholders for the extension of slavery over a continent. If a million of men were mustered to put down by force this climax of all offences, it would still be in form, as it ought ever to be in spirit, only a simple, rightful enforcement of the laws—the very laws which the rebels themselves helped enact—against a combined, wholesale violation of them."

We endorse these sentiments; nor, in doing so, can we refrain from adding that, though never an opponent of strictly defensive war, we have found occasion, amidst the lessons of events, to reconsider some of our theories in connection with this general subject. We have not heretofore believed in the maxim, "In peace, prepare for war." We have groaned at the expenditures for our army and navy. We have opposed military companies and "trainings." We have thought all these things a needless waste of time and

money; have had no faith in the efficiency of such "holiday soldiers," and have turned from them with a kind of disgust, especially when we have seen ministers, as we have thought, dishonoring their office by countenancing them as chaplains. All this is changed now. We have lost none of our faith in the importance or desirableness of peace, or in the principles upon which what is called "the cause of Peace" is founded. Our horror of war and our sense of its wrong and evils are no whit abated. But we have seen to what risks our Capital and our country have been exposed because our ships and our arms and our soldiers had been so traitorously scattered; we have been made to realize that rebellion would, in all probability, be flaunting its flag over Washington to-day, in possession of the archives, and possibly of the prestige, of the government, had it not been for "the N. Y. 7th" and "the Mass. 8th;" and we have made up our mind that, so long as there are violent and evil men in the world, government must be ready to check and restrain them, and that it can do so only by strengthening its arm of military defence. In one view, it may seem a poor use that men make of themselves when they train themselves in the art of destruction, and we may find reason to ask whether we are fulfilling the highest ends of life when we go forth to meet our brothers in mortal conflict; but there is another view in which we see that whoever puts himself on the side of right against wrong, and counts life not dear to himself for the sake of great principles and precious interests imperilled, is doing a great and noble thing, whatever he may do. Action is noble or base according to the spirit that fills it; and if we can sing the hymn—

> "Nothing so small can be,
> But draws, when acted for Thy sake,
> Greatness and worth from Thee;
> When done beneath Thy laws,
> Even servile labors shine—
> Hallowed is toil, if this the cause,
> The meanest work divine,"—

not less can we see dignity even in the poorest military "training," and feel that we are answering the highest ends of life when we draw the sword against the lawless and the violent, if but a spirit of loyalty to God and duty nerve our arms and inspire our hearts.

We have said that we shall suffer much on account of this war; but it will also do us good. We needed its discipline and its awakening power. We needed its revival of patriotism, and its occasions for heroism and self-sacrifice. Partyism needed to be broken up. We needed to be lifted out of our mammonism and selfishness; to be taught the unity of our sympathies and interests; and to be recalled to the recognition and service of the grand first principles of our republic. This war has done and is doing all this. It is, in important respects, a moral regeneration;—an emancipation of our politics from the thraldom of the slave-power;—a fresh baptism of the whole North into sympathy with liberty. Already, we are breathing deeper, and have been kindled into a worthier sense of our American responsibility. The heart of the people has been quickened to a healthier beat. Never before, during the quarter of a century that we have taken note of our affairs, have we seen so much to assure us of the moral and political vitality of the nation. The government has been tested, and was never before so strong as it is to-day, because it never before so well knew its strength, or its resources in the love and loyalty of the people, deeper than all love of party,—higher than all love of ease, or gain, or home. There are tories and traitors among us, indeed, as there will be among every people struggling for the right, but by no approach so many in proportion as in the Revolution. There will be peculation and jobbing; men who will cheat in contracts, and scruple not to coin money out of the sufferings of soldiers and the sale of their own souls. But the masses are true, and will learn new lessons of hope and confidence as they are taught their unity in a common love of country, and will gather heroism out of the sacrifices they will make, or from their sympathy with noble deeds. A grand sight it has been to see the spirit that has thus been evoked,—the enthusiasm and unselfishness of patriotism that have thus been inspired,—the old fires of revolutionary ardor and chivalry that have thus been re-kindled,—the sublime loyalty to our traditions that in the hour of peril, in spite of all our differences, binds us together as one man. A grand sight it has been to see with what alacrity the call of the country has been responded to—how the farmer has left his plough, and the mechanic his shop, and the merchant his counter, and the professional

man his office, and the petted sons of wealth their ease and their luxuries, to go forth—many of them, no doubt, in a mere love of adventure, but the most of them to fight the battles of our endangered institutions; and how mothers, wives and daughters have freely given up their loved—sometimes their all, saying, Go, stand bravely in your place, and come back to us, if you come, with honor unstained;—to see men fresh from the strife of a hotly contested election, forgetting party names and jealousies and prejudices, and rallying shoulder to shoulder and heart to heart, to hold up the flag that traitors would pull down, and to support the government that rebellion would overthrow;—to see men who have been accustomed to count trade the great interest, and to make their gains their first thought, coming forward and pouring out their money like water—from mercenary motives, some of them, without doubt, but the great mass of them in a generous zeal for the service of their country and for the maintenance of its credit and its power.

Many persons had come to doubt whether there were any of the spirit of the olden time surviving among us, and to think that love of country had been lost in love for party, and the willingness to sacrifice for principles swallowed up in a devotion to trade. The old stuff of our patriotism, it was fashionable to say, had been consumed, and our manhood had become "choked with cotton, or cankered with gold." Thank God all this has been effectually disproved. We shall have no more talk about modern degeneracy. The children are showing themselves no whit behind their fathers. The first gun fired into the starving garrison of Sumpter was the roll-call of the nation, in response to which the people are showing that there are to-day patriots as true,—heroes and heroines as noble,—citizens as self-sacrificing as have ever illumined our history with their deeds, or sanctified our soil with their blood. And though there is much for us to suffer in consequence of the strife, we shall come out of it nobler, more vigorous, more vital, more united, because more conscious of our own loyalty; with less allegiance to party and more allegiance to ideas; with a clearer conception of principles, and a profounder sense of the worth of our republic and of our obligations to it. The shock is severe, but the result will be not only to settle our government more firmly on its foundations and to give us and

the world a greater confidence in its strength and permanence, but to shed the electric current of awakened chivalry and patriotism through every vein and artery of our nation.

And now that the conflict has come, let us hope that it will be waged until this great question between freedom and slavery is here settled forever. Jefferson pronounced our Constitution "a capitulation between conflicting opinions and interests." Now that the truce is broken, though no act or fault of ours, let there be no more capitulation till one party or the other has triumphed. We have faith to believe that this war is to prove "the beginning of the end" of slavery. God knows how to make the wrath of man to praise him. Every step the slave-power has taken to strengthen itself, for years past, has only weakened it and hastened the final crisis. The Fugitive Slave Law—the repeal of the Missouri Compromise—the wickednesses in Kansas—the Dred Scott dicta—the insolent demand that slavery shall be considered the pet of the Constitution, and be carried and protected wherever our flag floats, all designed to give the South power, have successively proved the providential means of alienating the sympathies of the North—goads to quicken the people to opposition, and to educate them to the purpose of saying to slavery, thus far, but no farther. With the infatuation of those doomed to destruction, the conspirators have now sought to overthrow the government for the purposes of their ambition. But designing to perpetuate slavery, they have only sealed its more speedy destruction. They have made it impossible that any party at the North shall dare to co-operate with them hereafter. They have taught those dependent upon them for cotton to emancipate themselves from their dependence by opening new fields for its cultivation. They have given the Unionist and non-slaveholders of their States the needed occasion to rid themselves of their domination. By their piratical "letters of marque," they have compelled the merchants of the North to demand their overthrow. By their barbarities, treachery and repudiations, they have separated themselves from the moral fellowship of mankind. Like the dog in the fable, possessed of power, they have thrown it away in their greediness for more. Boasting that cotton is king, they have themselves broken its sceptre, and seeking to inaugurate a more complete despotism, they have

solved the problem of our politics,and opened the door of emancipation. Let us hope that our authorities will do nothing to hinder or delay the work thus begun.

The conflict, indeed, is to be no boy's play. Desperate men have staked their all on this last throw, and they will fight as desperate men must. Moreover, though the leaders of the rebellion are unpardonably criminal, the masses of the people are honest. Deceived as to the purposes of the North, they think the contest one for "their homes and their firesides." They see in it, according to their ideas, the charms of romance, the appeals of patriotism, the sanctions of religion. All this will intensify the struggle. No matter. "The time for compromise has past," said the late compromiser, General Butler, in a recent speech at Washington, and "the time for compromise has passed" echo men of all parties throughout the entire North; while from the slave States themselves comes up the answering cry, "Let the blow, as it must be terrible, be quick, hard, decisive. Let there be no halting at the Capital; no halting at Richmond; no halting at Charleston; no halting at Montgomery longer than to hang the traitors who have plotted treason there; and no halting even at the extremest southern coast of the Union, until freedom's troops shall have planted freedom's starry flag upon every battlement and every fort in the rebel domain. They have invited war, and war let it be."[7] Let there be no more hesitation or irresolution. Offensive war now becomes defensive. Let there be no negotiation,—no more patching up of truces or bargains. The blood of the slain cries from the ground—not for vengeance, but for justice. Compromise, mediation, adjustment become now complicity with treason. Let the South still hug to their breasts the curse of slavery, if they can and will; but let them understand that this talk of its extension, that these arrogant airs, that these insolent claims for power are done with forever. The country is in earnest —without respect to former policy or opinions, *in earnest.* "Let us," says one of the extremest of the Northern sympathizers with the South hitherto, "let us settle this thing speedily and surely. It may ruin this generation; but we owe it to the next that they shall have no such troubles as

[7] Delaware *State Journal and Gazette.*

we have had. Let us strike now in our might, and, if necessary, wipe the rebels from the face of the earth. Let us finish things while we are about it." [8] This is the voice of the people, and in this case the voice of the people is the voice of God. Woe to the man—woe to the administration or party, that dares to disregard this bidding.

We have spoken confidently as to the result. If those who guide our affairs are faithful, and thus morally as well as intellectually equal to the occasion—as we believe they are—success is certain. To doubt this is atheism. Not only have we legal right and the whole spirit of the Constitution and all the material resources of a great government on one side, every principle that God approves is with us. Christianity is with us. The sympathies of all good men are with us. The pleadings of the slave and the prayers of the oppressed every where are with us. All the forces of civilization are with us. Events, too, are all on our side. Italy, in her restored unity, shakes herself from the dust and kindles a beacon for our encouragement. The growing liberalism of France tells of the tendency of history. The softening despotism of Austria and the crumbling dominion of the Pope proclaim the power of ideas. And autocratic Russia, hitherto so cold and stern in her absolutism, breaking the chains of her serfs and bidding twenty millions of slaves to stand up as men, sends across Europe and from her distant Asiatic shores the words of Christian cheer. If our rulers are men, we cannot fail. Let us believe that they *are* men, and that they will do their duty, and give them our confidence. While demanding that the war shall be short, let us guard against impatience. While exacting justice, let us watch against the spirit of retaliation and of vengeance. While sympathizing with those who go forth to fight the battles of liberty and of law, let us be careful of those they leave behind. And amidst all the rest, let us learn the lessons of principle, and nurture ourselves in sympathy with the ideas our flag is henceforth to represent. Thank God that that flag has been so flung out over mast and home, and that its colors are so worn above the hearts of our people and even of our children—the witness of the universal loyalty, and the proclamation of the purpose to stand by the government come what may.

[8] Hon. D. S. Dickinson, of New York, in a recent speech.

Thank God for what that flag is and for what it has done. Hitherto, it has represented our nationality; to-day, it floats the type of law and of the sovereignty of constitutional forms; henceforth, let us be assured, when the clouds that now obscure our heavens and the dust of this conflict have passed, it shall wave the symbol not only of these, but of human equality and the inalienable rights of man.

It was an affecting sight, the other day, at the grand gathering of thousands in New York, to attest their devotion to the Union,—fitly appointed in *Union* Square—to see the smoked and tattered flag ot Sumpter, pierced by traitors' balls, but not a star gone, waving above Washington's statue and held in his hand. Bearing that banner thus aloft with one hand, and pointing to God with the other, might we not well feel that, serene and massive, he symbolized the genius of our institutions? We will accept the omen. Out from this conflict, our republic shall emerge unharmed. However its flag may be assailed, or torn, or enveloped in the smoke of battle, it shall not be trampled or humbled, but still be borne aloft, not one star missing from its constellation, waving over a reunited and henceforth undivided people, while our government shall stand to cheer the nations, and our country go forward, pervaded by a common life and fulfilling its appointed destiny. E. G. B.

Art. XXI.

Poetry in Prose.

Poetry is more in feeling than in thought. It is a plant that has its roots in our sensational rather than in our intellectual being. A thought that starts the blood and makes it tingle, that makes one leap out of his chair, as though startled by the touch of divine power, that drowns momentarily all distinctness of thought and sends a flood of passion pouring upon the brain, and makes a pigmy feel the forces

of a giant pulsation through his veins, that thought is poetry; that is the thought that creates a soul under the ribs of death, and gives to airy nothings a local habitation and a name. Nothing but the vision and the faculty divine can generate such a thought. It is not always found in the sounding brass and tinkling symbols of rhyme, but sometimes burns and leaps along the lines of sober prose. It is a something which we call genius that creates it, and genius is a singular combination of heart and brain, of thought and feeling, which will prolate this power, whether it speaks in prose or poetry. The world has long since, in her high court of literature, assigned definite places to her Milton, Dante, Shakespere, as among the greatest poets of the race. But we must put some others there beside them, as men possessed of the divine afflatus that can create something of nothing, that can startle thought and feeling into wonderfully strange and powerful movement. Hence, we refer to the poets who have written in prose, and who have possessed all the power of intellect that the great poets of the world have indicated.

The mountains are few that stand so high as to become the property of great regions, so the minds are few that loom up so as to become the property of mankind. Such minds appear to fall back into the glowing symbolisms of antiquity, and we invest them with mysteries and meanings that do not dwell in them. Great men fade into common mortals when we come near to them. It is seldom that their power looks out of their eyes or sits throned upon their brows. Their greater powers are never obtrusive; they are rather coy, and retreat into the distance from common observation; there they only glimmer upon the edge of the world, like the lightning upon the edge of the summer cloud. Still some men have a little of the material type of greatness in their faces—thunder is always marshalling its forces upon the brow of Napoleon, and the serenity of a great sea-calm forever sleeps upon the brow of Washington, and the weightiest gravity of greatness is throned upon Webster's features. But the mysterious burning power of the poet, that which, by the heat processes of intellect, crystallizes the *spirituelle* of a landscape, or the deductions from the conflicts of an age of action, never sits upon the countenance. This power is only intermittent, and when it leaves we see its

footprints dimly traced in language. It can not throw a shadow nor a trace upon the lineaments of flesh. That is too coarse a canvas upon which to limn lines from the regions of light.

The common topics upon which these men write have a nearness to our experience, and we understand them. But in their moments of inspiration they bound an infinite distance from us, and are beyond our comprehension. They cease to instruct us, and commence to please and astonish us. It is then that we cry wonderful, and admire what we can not understand. Humboldt, generalizing upon the relations between nature and its effect upon the mind, surprises us with a knowledge, a statement of facts and conclusions which can never be attained by the slow processes of induction. They must be leapt to across an impassable chasm from our position; and we see him standing there noble and serene, but can not divine the power by which he attained his position. When he touches nature he clothes and exalts her with all the royalty of his genius. However familiar her scenes may have become to us, when he speaks of her, the "charm and magic of her power" all come to her again—the field of corn is something more than bare stalks and yellow ears, it leaps into the mysteries of sylvan temple and gentle gloom, and comes into a close sympathy with the human breast: make the field, mountain, plain, by the creative touch of genius, a living personality, and they will move into human feeling and thought, will live with the sympathies of men, will warm and ennoble him, by the majesty of their outline, and the mellowness of their flowing surface.

Says Humboldt, "we find even in the most savage nations, (as my own travels enable me to attest,) a certain vague terror-stricken sense of the all powerful unity of natural forces, and of the existence of an invisible, spiritual essence manifested in these forces, whether in unfolding the flower and maturing the fruit of the nutrient tree, in upheaving the soil in the forest, or in rending the clouds in the night of the storm." In all these prose poets, as well as in Milton, or in Shakespere, or even in the delicate Keats, or that "wonderful boy" Shelley, we see this terrible power given to nature, which we can not understand in our common moods. They put eyes, wings, feet, hands, thought,

into her huge frame, and she becomes an animated nature, with feelings and purposes. We live, talk, dream with her, and with her thousands of high born souls find companionship that the misapprehending world denies them. In all these prose poets, we discover the same intelligent unity and companionship, that the savage discovers in the forces of nature. No matter of what tongue, or of what nationality, they have the same eye of genius to see with, the same tongue of genius with which to give their utterances. The surprising power of Channing and of Goethe, of Ruskin and of Humboldt, is a something beyond our reach, a something that has a brotherhood under all circumstances of manifestation.

Poetic power shows itself in two departments of thought, in the descriptions of nature and in the higher abstractions of moral philosophy. No man has lived who has possessed pre-eminent power in both departments. Humboldt and Hugh Miller have great apprehension and force in descriptions of nature. Burke and Ruskin are surpassingly powerful in the more solitary and sublime abstractions of philosophy. Humboldt and Miller are essentially different in their studies and the fruits of their genius, from those of Burke and Ruskin. Kingsley has some power of that kind distinguishing Humboldt and Miller, but it is weakened by his too great specification of facts, so that the feeling is lost in the actuality. Dickens has much of this power in his labored, yet easy, minute descriptions of social scenes; and all the time he shows the passiveness of the self-assured magician, who knows his work, and proceeds easily to the task. But Dickens never lifts the eyes to the horizon circle, much less to the zenith. He shows you the kindness of this gentleman, and the gentleness of that defenceless woman, as the sweet effect of a sunbeam that struggles into that court or into that humble window. He deals in particulars, in the pleasing, amiable weakness or virtues of the human heart, and not in the concrete or universal.

In weighing the calibre of our prose poets, we shall take no absolute standard of measurement. We shall call him a poet who has the power of moving us, of lifting us from passiveness into turbulence of feeling, from a feeling of imbecility to conscious dignity and strength. The use of the poet is to give dignity and refinement to life; when he does that, the purposes of his genius are fulfilled.

Rising from over their speculations, we will introduce the reader to the genius of those who illustrate over them. We have Humboldt, not with all the power of his original life upon him, but disfigured and transformed under the clothing of a foreign hand—still he is Humboldt.

In his introduction to Cosmos, he rises into something superior to didactic description, into the expression of poetry in the regions of abstraction. He says:

"In the uniform plain, bounded only by a different horizon, where the lowly heather, the cistus, or waiving grasses, deck the soil; on the ocean shore, where the waves, softly rippling over the beach, leave a track green with the weeds of the sea; everywhere the mind is penetrated with the same sense of the grandeur and vast expanse of nature, revealing to the soul, by a mysterious inspiration, the existence of laws that regulate the forces of the universe. Mere communion with nature, mere contact with the free air, exercises a soothing yet strengthening influence on the wearied spirit, calms the storm of passion, and softens the heart when shaken by sorrow to its inmost depths. Everywhere, in every region of the globe, in every stage of intellectual culture, the same sources of enjoyment are alike vouchsafed to man. The earnest and solemn thoughts awakened by a communion with nature intuitively arise from a presentment of the order and harmony pervading the whole universe, and the contrast we draw between the narrow limits of our own existence and the image of infinity revealed on every side, whether we look upward to the starry vault of heaven, scan the far stretching plain before us, or seek to trace the dim horizon across the vast expanse of the ocean."

This passage rises above the special into the universal. We leave the "long heather, the cistus," as the bird leaves the twig and plunges into the infinity above, and as we move we feel the silent yet potent influence of laws that move in harmony for some great end. He brings the solemnity of nature individually before us, as she lives in all zones. The luxurience of the tropics, the silence of the polar night, the storm of the sea, and the mountain daisy, all seen and felt, quiets, softens, enlarges, and lifts any soul that so feels them. We feel them to be the most sacred messengers of God to man. The poetry of the passage is in the loftiness of the sentiment—is not in the particular objects brought to the at-

tention, but in the elevating flow of the feeling. The old poets sought activity; sought too much to give active life to the objects brought to the mind. But this age dwells more in the regions of sentiment, verges towards oriental quietism. The old poetry excited the baser feelings, the new informs the understanding and enobles the feelings.

Here is a passage from Humboldt, suggestive of the Homeric school:

"If I might be allowed to abandon myself to the recollections of my own distant travels, I would instance among the most striking scenes of nature, the calm sublimity of a tropical night, when the stars, not sparkling as in our northern skies, shed their soft and planetary light over the gently heaving ocean; or I would recall the deep vallies of the Cordilleras, where the tall and slender palms pierce the leafy veil around them, and waving on high their feathery and arrow-like branches, form, as it were, 'a forest above a forest;' or I would describe the summit of the peak of Teneriffe, when a horizontal layer of clouds, dazzling in whiteness, has separated the cone of cinders from the plain below, and suddenly the ascending current pierces the cloudy veil, so that the eye of the traveller may range from the brink of the crater, along the vine clad slopes of Ovotara, to the orange gardens and banana groves that skirt the shore."

The poetry of the passage lies in the quick movement of a panorama of great objects, so that, for the moment, you are transported to a pleasing dream, wherein the hollow dome of the "tropical night," the soft "planetary stars," the ocean, the Cordilleras, the feathery hands of the palm, and the over-topping peak of Teneriffe move magical and serene, endowed with life and human sympathy.

Again:

"A knowledge of the laws of nature, whether we can trace them in the alternate ebb and flow of the ocean, in the measured path of comets, or in the mutual attractions of multiple stars, alike increases our sense of the calm of nature."

The poetry of this is not in the expression, not in dignified and sounding words. It lies deeper; it lies in the thought, in its truthfulness and sublimity. Yet the words are quiet and commanding; they have none of the imbecility

of affectation. The ceaseless and eccentric movement of the comet, the most untamed of celestial bodies, the stars held in their maze of movement by the leash of gravitation, all call the thought to rise from the contemplation of individual objects towards the inextricable confusion of a first comprehensive glance upon them ;—then, suddenly, as by a flash, a sun-beam, suspending no motion, all are reduced to the calm of perfect obedience to law, not the passionless uninviting calm of inert matter, but a calm with life beating strong and full, where each particle moves in confused maze, yet endless harmony. The finger of the Creator suddenly appears and writes harmony upon the clouded front of nature. First we have confusion, then the domestication of rest; one sits by the law-bound comet, and ocean, as quietly as by his fireside—the great law makes them powerless for harm. To agitate, and then to give rest, is the greatest power of the imagination. That poet is not true to his genius who makes all things tend to peace ; he must arouse the emotions, plunge us into confusion, send us, momentarily, wondering and distracted, as unable to find the rock of rest, and then speak peace from all this confusion; this is poetic power.

Again, says Humboldt of Grecian scenery :

> "It presents the peculiar charm of an intimate association of land and sea, of shores adorned with vegetation, or picturesquely girt round by rocks glancing in the light of ærial tints, and of an ocean beautiful in the play of the ever-changing brightness of its deep-toned moving waves."

The delicacy of the thought, and the multitude of the figures here, tend to obscure the poetic power of the observer. Still, the passage evidences poetic power, and that delicate in apprehension and strong in conception. Greece may be called, most eminently, the mellow land, ripe and rounded with a sensuous, various and suggestive reality. Nature always gives its tone to its inhabitants. And we can see that she has imparted her delicate powers to the character of the Grecian. Under favoring political institutions his nature developes ; and the same nobility, boldness, and multiformed beauty are in the character, that you see in the scenery. Over the hills and vales of Greece, is found the

ripe, mellow autumnal atmosphere, and the whole has the richness of heavy wine—and it is this same potation that the heroes of ancient Greece drank, which made them noble in character. We can see that Humboldt saw Grecian scenery with the fine phrenzy of the poet's eye, the comprehensive outline and the delicate tints of the picture are thrown in at a touch, and we do not see the poet's power until we are calm and conjure up the actuality of the picture to the imagination.

Schiller says of the Greek poet that "nature seems to interest his understanding more than his moral perceptions; he does not cling to her chasms with the fervor and the plaintive passion of the poet of modern times." The activity of the Greek intellect could not be thwarted, turned aside from its legitimate objects; still, in such a country as that which they possessed we would naturally look for a great predominance of feeling over thought. It is so with Humboldt; nature appeals to his understanding rather more than to his heart and moral powers; still he possesses much of the delicate sensibility of the child. His intellect, like a dry light, glimmers through his words, more than you can see the warm stream of feeling flowing through them. Under his pen nature is alive and active; he peoples her with animated and beautiful beings who show more symmetry of lineament than warmth of feeling in the countenances. The best imaginations have a moisture in their flumes; they are less dazzling and more inviting, more akin to the pleasing shapes that come and go over the embers of the hearth-stone. The modern poets have not the simple grandeur of the ancients in their descriptions of nature, the education of civilization habitually fills the mind with more objects that call for activity of thought, so that we now see it tortured into fanciful shapes and not left in all the forcible simplicity of nature. The modern heir is somewhat ailing with the St. Vitus' dance of the spasmodic school, and this imperfection is carried into its off-spring. In Cosmos, as much as in any great work of modern times, we find nature described as she is, with much of her grace and beauty left upon her, with the pure glow of her far-diffusing life and vitality left upon her, flushing every feature. Bassil the Great calls the stars "those everlasting blossoms of heaven," and speaks of the ocean as "gently moved by the breath of heaven, and in

roseate hues caressing the shores peaceful spent." Gregory of Nyssa writes.

"When I see every ledge of rock, every valley and plain, covered with new-born verdure, the varied beauty of the trees, and the lilies at my feet decked by nature with the double charms of perfume and of color; when in the distance I see the ocean, towards which the clouds are onward bound, my spirit is overpowered by a sadness not wholly devoid of enjoyment. When in Autumn the fruits have passed away, the leaves have fallen, and the branches of the trees, dried and shrivelled, are robbed of their leafy adornments, we are instinctively led, amid the everlasting and regular change in nature, to feel the harmony of the wondrous power pervading all things."

Plato tells us of the dark shade of the thickly leaved plane tree; the luxurience of plants and herbs in all the fragrance of their bloom; and the sweet summer breezes which fan the chirping swarms of grasshoppers. And Chrysostom thus:

"As the aspect of the colonnades of sumptuous buildings would lead thy spirit astray, look upward to the vault of heaven, and around them on the open fields, in which herds graze by the water's side; who does not despise all the creations of art, when, in the stillness of his spirit, he watches with admiration the rising of the sun as it pours its golden light over the face of the earth; when, resting on the thick grass beside the murmuring spring, or beneath the sombre shades of a thick and leafy tree, the eye rests on the far-receding and hazy distance."

Such is the grand simplicity of poetic feeling, as drained through a translation, which we see in the old masters. As Humboldt tells us, "feelings ennoble thought," and without a full rounded flow of feeling, that which comes in the quiet of an active mind, we can not use noble language. This is the age of steam, of haste, of intense intellectual excitement and activity, and we have little time or disposition for the indulgence of the genial calms of nature. A sensation must be dallied with, indulged and nourished and kept in a state of perceptible existence until all its phases and depths can be measured and comprehended. But this age makes men who drown sensation, and ignore it, call

that man weak who yields to the imbecilities of its influence; so that one thing seems to be forgotten, that the great men of all ages have been men of feeling, eminent for sensuous and impressible natures. It was not weakness for Cicero to give himself up to the emotions inspired by nature within the solitude of his Italian villa; nor for Burke to seek the still country and pleasant waters of Beaconsfield for relief from the dust and din of the House of Commons; nor for Bacon, from the earliest period of his history to the latest, to dream continually for the pleasures of retirement and contentment. These men felt that the richness of their natures could best find nourishment and bloom and fruitage, in all their proud luxurience, in contemplative retirement. They, like the other great characters from whom we have quoted, were not charmed and caught up in every little whirl of excitement. They saw nothing ignoble in leisurely watching the calm placidity of nature, her multifarious unfoldings and her majestic beauties as they slept in forest solitude or moved in stormy grandeur. Now we leave these things to the poets and to women, to the heroes of the Pantasocracy, and to the sages of Concord. It is seldom now that the practical great men of this age, in England or America, turn aside from the chaotic sphere of their activities, into the green pastures and by the side of the still waters. Humboldt came to us, in his later days, as a lingering representative of the grand old masters—he stood original and alone, and like a great column from a mountain summit, faded into the warm precints above him.

Of modern writers in prose, Hugh Miller was one of the most commanding and powerful—he possessed that wonderful charm that seized the heart and the brain of the reader and bore them irresistibly onward. His descriptions of nature in all her phases, in her progressive geological changes, in the simple element of sweeping force, are superior to those of any modern delineator, Humboldt not excepted. Miller had a great sympathy with mankind, and this gave him an interest in ethics as well as in physics. In this endowment of strong sympathies with human nature, he was the superior of Humboldt. His activity of thought led him to labors in politics and religion; but he was not so calm, not so comprehensive, had not so much of the organizing mind, nor the wide and various experiences of his Prussian

contemporary, so that he will not occupy so large a place in the attention of mankind. In the theological tendencies of his thoughts, and in his deductions from nature, he proceeds with a firm confidence and a high hand, almost with a contemptuous facility, to sweep away the arguments of his adversaries. You discover the true fervor of the poet in his soul at every new step and developement, and that certain oneness of purpose, headlong impetuosity which the poet always possesses, and which neither sees nor regards the consequences. No matter whether an error is sustained by the University sanction, by Parliamentary law, by temporal law, by spiritual Bishop, or by the thinly spun speculations of antiquity, he controlled it with all the confidence and abandon of purpose that you see in the child; and yet you feel that his assertions are not dogmatism, but rather the confidence of one who knows that he is in the right.

As an illustration of his poetic power, we make a quotation from his Footprints of the Creator:

"Viewed simply in its picturesque aspects, this olive leaf of the Old Red seems not at all devoid of poetry. We sail upwards into the high geologic zones, passing from ancient to still more ancient scenes of being; and, as we voyage along, find ever in the surrounding prospect, as in the existing scene from which we have set out, a peaceful intermixture of land and water, continent, river, and sea. We first coast along the land of the Tertiary, inhabited by the strange quadrupeds of Cuvier, and waving with the reeds and palms of the Paris Basin, the land of the Wealden, with its gigantic iguendon rustling among its tree forms and its cycadæ, comes next; then comes the green land of the Oolite, with its little pouched insectivorous quadrupeds, its flying reptiles, its vast jungles of the brova equisetum, and its forests of the helmsdale pisee; and then, dimly as though a haze, we mark, as we speed on, the thinly-scattered islands of the new Red Sand Stone, and pick up in our course a large floating leaf, veined like that of the cabbage, which not a little puzzles the botanist of the expedition. And now we near the vast carboniferous continent, and see along the undulating outline, between us and the sky, the strange forms of a vegetation, compared with which that of every previously seen land seems stunted and poor. We speed day after day along endless forests, in which gigantic club mosses wave in air a hundred feet overhead, and skirt interminable marshes, in which thickets of weeds overtop the mast-head, and where mighty rivers come rolling to the sea.

We mark, through the long retiring vistas which they open to the interior, the higher grounds of the country covered with coniferous trees, and see doddered trunks of vast size, like those of Cranton and Crigleith, reclining under the banks of deep muddy reaches, with their decaying tops turned adown the current. At length the furthermost promontory of this long range of coast comes full in view; we near; we have come up abreast of it; we see the shells of the mountain limestone glittering white along its farther shore, and the green depths under our keel lightened by the flash of innumerable corals; and then, bidding farewell to the land forever, we launch into the immeasured ocean of the Old Red, with its three consecutive zones of animal life. Not a single patch of land more do those geologic charts exhibit which we still regard as new. The zones of the Silurian and Cambian succeed the zones of the Old Red; and, darkly fringed by an obscure bank of cloud ranged along the last zone at the sides, a night that never dissipates settles down upon the deep. Our voyage, like that of old fabulists of five centuries ago, terminates on the sea in thick darkness, beyond which there lies no shore and there dawns no light; and it is in the middle of this vast ocean, just where the last zone of the Old Red leans against the first zone of the Silurian, that we have succeeded in discovering a solitary island unseen before, a shrub-bearing land, much enveloped in fog, but with hills that at least look green in the distance."

The poetry of this passage lies in its weighty melody, in the full resonance and smooth flow of the language, and in the gloom and grandeur of the objects conjured up to the imagination. Again he says: "There spreads all around a wild and desolate landscape of broken and shattered hills, separated by deep and gloomy ravines, that seem the rents and fissures of a planet in ruins, and that speak distinctly of a period of convulsions, when upheaving fires from the abyss, and ocean currents above, had contended in sublime antagonism, the one slowly elevating the entire tract, the other grinding it down and sweeping it away." He scatters through his books expressions like the following: "a broken and tumultuous sea of primary hills;" "a lofty promontory like a large spear thrust horizontally into the sea;" "the same billow that sends its long roll from the German Ocean to sweep the base of the Sater, and to leap up against its precipices to the height of eighty and a hundred feet, breaks in foam, only a minute after, over this stony tract;" "the

solitude is busy with the occupations and enjoyments of instinct."

We must, however, forbear; for our subject—unlike most themes—has no natural and necessary close; it admits of indefinite expansion and also of arbitrary conclusion. Possibly we may, in a future number of the *Quarterly*, resume the topic. If so, let this paper be regarded not as our article complete, but as a first instalment. Meantime we shall be happy if, amid the din and anxieties of war, we have turned the attention of our readers to a less exciting and a more genial theme. I. D.

Art. XXII.

Washington.

We are told, somewhere in the fragment of Quintus Curtius' Life of Alexander, that the province of Bactria, at certain seasons of the year, was exposed to whirlwinds of dust, that covered the roads, and blotted out the familiar landmarks. Travellers, who were overtaken by one of those tempests, bewildered and imperilled, had no resource but to wait the rising of the stars to guide them on their course. The American nation is now overclouded by the whirlwind of rebellion; and over one third of our empire, the baleful progress of treason has blottod out the landmarks of patriotism. The emergency of the hour brings to mind the resource of the Bactrians; and an intelligent glance at the luminous firmanent of our history, may serve to indicate the path of duty, to guide bewildered and timid minds, and to extricate the sacred ark of freedom.

The century that produced Washington, while it gave us many conspicuous and brilliant men, was deficient in what we call morally great characters. It gave the world ambitious and able rulers, acute and masterly diplomatists, facile and graceful scholars—bold philosophers and dazzling sophists, and gentlemen, whose courtly accomplishments did

not always disguise the vices they had inherited with their titles. In Russia, the eighteenth century produced Catherine II., a women, whose artful and sagacious mind gave her vast influence in European politics, and whose coarse impiety was equalled only only by her scandalous vices. In Prussia, it produced Frederick the Great, a person without faith in God or sympathy with man—cold and cunning, subtle and sinuous as a serpent—a man great in the small qualities; small in the great qualities. In France, it produced two monarchs—one of whom passed under the bloody guillotine, and left in his tragical fate a claim on human charity; while the other, a cancer of revolting brutishness, afflicted his kingdom for half a century.

In that age arose the celebrated atheistic philosophers, who thought that a few wicked priests proved the perniciousness of religion, and who expected to abolish God by overturning a depraved Church,—a band of irritated lunatics, whose "madness" had some "method," and some provocation, but whose writings a man of ordinary cleanliness would only handle with tongs at arms length. On the throne of England, in that age, sat the Georges—the heaviest and stupidist of kings, with dulness enough to choose the wrong, and wilfulness enough to make them adhere to it. Around their throne, gyrated a nobility whose rank was oftener borrowed from heraldry than supported by personal merit. The morals of the age were reflected in its manners. The finest gentlemen of Europe ruined each other at the gambling table; and their wives and sisters exchanged everything but affectionate epithets, in the excitement of the cards. High-bred lords, whose honor was so tender that they were ready to run their swords through any man who should venture to impeach it, were not above the baseness of leading inexperienced young men into the dreadful vortex of gaming, or of blotching the fame of unprotected women with scandal. From the court of the sovereign down to the hall of the country squire, the habits of good society were often outrages upon decorum, and its language such as decency has now banished from every drawing room.

Such was the remarkable moral destitution of the eighteenth century. It is that great company of tyrants, atheists, and libertines, with their murky purposes and drivelling

passions, that stand in the background of the scene, as a foil to a jewel, setting off the sterling moral splendor of Washington. Indeed, before the eighteenth century came in, the salient moral power of Christendom retreated to America, and built its altars anew on the virgin purity of the continent espoused to a regenerated future. Here, religious faith, fidelity to social rights, the love of liberty, of chastity, and of honor, came for refuge and support; and here they grew, sturdy as the oak and glorious as the magnolia. Not Christian integrity alone, but genuine manliness, found its fairest representative in the Puritan exile and the Huguenot refugee.

Those sterling virtues, forming the basis of future States, and the germs of a growing nationality, were embodied in Washington. He became the representative of those great qualities, which the lavish hand of providence had sown upon these shores, to grow into the harvest of freedom, and to fruit in the glory of mankind. Nature—grown parsimonious in her gifts to other climes, where they were so often perverted or ignored—brought a prodigal treasury to the new world, and shed her highest inspiration upon our youthful empire. For a new race of Christian and heroic men started into being, filling every sun-lit glade that was cleft from the wilderness with homely energy and resolute daring; and arming, under the eye of God, for the stirring muster-roll of the revolution. In advance of this hardy band, in stature and in character above them all, Washington stood, in the completeness of his ample nature, largely endowed with the better genius of his native land, and inheriting from his English ancestry the fiery valor and high-toned honor, that flamed along the ranks of the cavaliers, and adorned the sunset of European chivalry. The choice crystalization of his age, he became its greatest benefactor, and most enduring and illustrious monument.

There is some danger of mistaking the qualities that constitute Washington's greatness. He was not a brilliant man —not one of those electric personages who dazzle an epoch by extemporaneous actions. His attributes were rather solid and majestic, than brilliant or fascinating. There was more granite in his nature, than painted glass. Yet he was minutely accomplished in all that graces social intercourse, and pleases the fastidious eyes of high-bred women. He was

not a genius, acting from sudden impulses or instinctive foresight; but a man of elaborate reflectiveness, who held his passions bound by an iron will, which he took deliberate counsel with conscience and common sense. It appears to us that the grandeur of Washington's character may be described by a single great word—*fidelity*. He was faithful to his own powers—faithful to the principle of freedom, and faithful to God, whose providence he acknowledged and revered.

It is a rare experience to find a man absolutely faithful to his own powers, so many things occur to mislead his judgment or force him from his legitimate position. By fidelity to one's own powers, we mean that practical use of them, in any given circumstances, that redounds most to his own honor, and to the service of mankind. Washington carefully trained himself for the greatest practical efficiency in the sphere in which destiny cast him. America, a hundred years ago, was no place for elaborate theories to cobweb an earnest man's life. It was no place for arcadian dreaming. There was hardly room in the eager march of events and in the sudden transitions of the national drama, for a ruffle-shirt to bloom at an evening festival. The ladies and gentlemen of Europe were monopolizing the frolic and speculations of life; but here, the dusky Indian darkened the frontiers, and pale famine crept to the cottage door. There was no chance for literary distinction as yet; and literature, in any general sense, had no business on the scene. Not but that learning, as well as religion, had priest and shrine from the beginning; but what the country needed, in the existing emergency, was men of action, rather than men of erudition,—men of practical sagacity and personal power, fitted to cope with rising dangers, rather than speculative scholastics or epic bards.

The mental culture of Washington seems to have been every way respectable for the scene in which he was placed and the career he was to run; and the acquisitions of his youth were enhanced in after years. His mind showed a decided leaning toward those studies that could be made immediately available—as, for instance, mathematics and surveying. His filial rectitude, his high sense of honor, his unaffected piety, are attested by many familiar anecdotes. He was elaborately accomplished in that high-bred courtesy

which distinguished gentlemen of "the old school,"—a type of manners which has been pulverized by the friction of democracy, and swept away with the buckles and lace that decorated our stately ancestors. He was also disciplined in the peculiar hardships and perils incident to his country and career. He excelled in all athletic exercises; rode the fiercest horse with consummate skill and grace; and bore a spirit as intrepid as that of the lion-hearted Richard. His tall, commanding frame, which we see in the painting of Stewart and the marble of Canova, was banded over with tenacious muscles, vital with the pulsations of perfect health, and fitted in its iron solidity of endurance, to defy the inclement elements and to face the thunders of war. At the age of twenty-one, through the pathless wilderness beyond the frontier, where every thicket is liable to shield the lurking assassin, Washington travels on his first great errand of patriotic duty. It thrills the heart to reflect *whose* life it is that explores those forest wilds, charged with a paltry letter, and at the mercy of a single ambushed rifle! But God mysteriously protects those who are elected for great deeds. No harm befalls the valiant youth, even in that ghastly tragedy where Braddock dies, though the whistling bullets slaughter every horse he can mount, and embroider his military dress with mementoes of a dreadful day.

In this school, characterized by more than Spartan vigor, he learns a vigilance beyond the martial tactics of Europe, and a fortitude beyond the endurance of any court-bred general. He learns to cope with the subtle savage in the sinuous windings of the war-path—to weigh his own home-bred militia in the balance with English armies,—to endure the stupidity of military conceit, and to repair the blunders of legislative incompetency. Under the pressure of emergencies, suddenly developed, and charged to the muzzle with responsibility, he trains his mind to rapid generalization, to acute decision, and prompt action. In this practical school, too, he acquires that inflexible self-control,—that subjection of every passion to the voice of reason and the grasp of will—which forms one of the most prominent features in his traditional fame, and must have furnished a large element in his subsequent influence.

A simple statement of the public confidence inspired by Washington, at the age of twenty-three, and of the grave

trust reposed in him at that time, will show at what an early period his great reputation took root among his countrymen.[1]

We must receive into our minds an image of the scene, in which he becomes the leading actor. It is 1755. We are spectators of the great wrestling match between France and England for the exclusive possession of this continent—or, rather, of the eastern portion of it, for the immense region beyond the Mississippi is yet unexplored and unknown. The English crown has acquired, through her colonies, a strong footing on the Atlantic shore, and is thrusting out the ligaments of advancing empire along the banks of the Monongahela. The French crown, by her colonial dependencies, commands the mouth of the St. Lawrence and of the Mississippi. Such are the respective positions of the two great powers in North America. It has been the aim of France to unite her northern and southern bulwarks by a chain of forts, stretching through the interior of the country from the Lakes to the Gulf, by which she may not only resist the further progress of the English settlements westward, but, by moving her military chain gradually eastward, force our colonies entirely off the continent. Between the two extreme points, where the power of France is entrenched, had run a line of trading posts and missionary stations, which has facilitated the establishment of garrisons, and enabled the French emissaries to launch all the terrors of Indian hostility upon the English frontiers. Thus, while the English settlements are being pushed westward—especially from Virginia and Maryland—throughout the wilderness before them, the chain of a hostile nationality is being welded from fort to fort, and behind it lie the civilized Jesuit and the hawk-eyed savage.

An attempt has already been made, under Braddock, to strike the fort at Pittsburg from the French cordon; but the sanguine army that entered the wilderness in the flush of hope, has come pouring back, trimmed by defeat and dissolved by panic. In the wake of the dire disaster are lighted cabins, scattered families, and a triumphant foe. The exposed frontier calls for prompt and energetic action. The

[1] In the ensuing pages, free use has been made of the well-known biographies of Washington, and especially of Mr. Everett's admirably condensed sketch.

Assembly of Virginia votes a provincial force of two thousand men, to march instantly to the rescue of the border; but where is the man qualified to become its leader? Washington has seen twenty-three years; he has done good service, with small resources, on the unsettled frontier. In Braddock's army, he held no higher rank than that of volunteer aid to its rash chief; but he has come from a tragedy that fills the colony with dismay, himself covered with honor. The day that saw four hundred and fifty brave men slaughtered by an invisible foe, has fixed the military reputation of the young Virginian for all time. So clearly does his merit shine in the eyes of the province, that Governor Dinwiddie, a man commonly ruled by stubborn conceit, overcomes his private preference for another person, and makes Washington commander of the newly-raised militia.

Four weeks after his return from the disastrous fight on the Monongahela, he received his commission and immediately moved forward to Winchester—then one of the remotest settlements—where he fixed his headquarters, and made himself the buckler of the border, until the war closed in the subversion of the French power on the Ohio.

The services he rendered, in the position assigned him by the colony, were all the more trying and meritorious, because they were mainly of an obscure and defensive character. There was no chance to achieve a brilliant action. If he avoided defeat, it was more than the juncture of events promised. With no adequate means at his command, he is made responsible for the security of the wide frontier. With an undisciplined militia, having no pay, hardly any clothes, miserably armed, and radically discontented, he must retain them in the service by personal influence. With a governor, who knew nothing of military affairs, whose orders were impracticable when they were not contradictory, the young commander must be thwarted at every turn, and embarrassed in every measure, and yet preserve a clear reputation under public criticism. The commander-in-chief of the English forces on the Continent, was Governor Shirley of Boston; and thither Colonel Washington was compelled to travel, in mid-winter, to settle a paltry difficulty with a subaltern officer commanding Fort Cumberland, who thought that a royal commission justified an insufferable arrogance. To complicate his difficulties yet more, frequent

desertions occurred on the approach of danger; villanous contractors abused his confidence, and rivals traduced his character in hopes of getting his place. The high-spirited young officer,—enamored of the pursuit of arms, yet forbidden to prove his intrepidity,—feeling the impulse of the blood of the cavaliers, yet bound to check his impetuous soul,—wore the galling fetter of circumstance with dignified patience, and waited the tardy evolution of events.

All these difficulties and provocations, experienced and magnanimously endured by a young man of twenty-three or four years, were providential preparations for the rigor of his revolutionary position; and they were pledges to the nation, that the man, to whom it confided the helm of its fortunes, was qualified for the trying emergency, as a champion is trained for the ring.

The military education of Washington may be said to have commenced at the age of sixteen, when he entered the wilderness as a land surveyor, and to have terminated at twenty-seven, when the scourge of war retired from the western border. But the civil, administrative, and economical parts of his education were yet to be formed; and, to the perfecting of these qualities—so essential to the symmetry of his powers, and to his efficiency as the Revolutionary leader—Providence devoted the ensuing fifteen years. While absent with the army, two years before the close of the war, he was chosen a member of the Virginia House of Burgesses; and he continued to be a member of that body until the opening of the struggle for national independence. In this school of legislation, he became acquainted with the routine of government, and familiar with the science of politics. Like his illustrious peers in the coming drama—Franklin and Jefferson—he never trained himself to the art of debate, and seldom achieved the Yankee triumph of "making a speech." This circumstance, while it lessened his notoriety, no doubt augmented his influence. A brilliant debater becomes, almost of necessity, a conspicuous party leader; and, while all men pay him the tribute of admiration, the interests of partisanship (not to say the envy of rivals) array against him an inveterate opposition. Washington was denied the eloquence that might have rallied faction, in order that he might command the confidence of a nation. By never shining as a speaker, he obtained an ascendancy over

all parties; and by aiming to make himself master of every question, his personal influence, in all deliberative assemblies, was immense. When Patrick Henry was asked who was the greatest man among the delegates to the First Continental Congress at Philadelphia, he replied: "If you speak of eloquence, Mr. Rutledge, of South Carolina, is by far the greatest orator; but if you speak of solid information and sound judgment, Colonel Washington is undoubtedly the greatest man on the floor."

During these preparatory years—as the owner of a large estate—Washington became familiar, also, with the minutest details of business and of domestic economy. Thoroughly experienced in every branch of practical affairs—thoroughly informed in every department of knowledge then available for the advancement of American interests—no man presented such complete qualifications as he to guide the helm of empire, when the nation was ready to launch on the stormy sea of Revolution.

While God was preparing him for that great trust, he found it necessary to balk the dearest wishes of the man he was guiding to a beneficent greatness. In boyhood, Washington had been on the point of joining the British navy; and his mother had been the instrument of saving him for his country. At the close of the French war, he made repeated efforts to obtain a commission in the royal army. But, though his military reputation stood high, and he had the favor of Governor Dinwiddie and other dignitaries, to back his suit, all his applications failed. His merit was acknowledged; but England grew a weedy luxuriance of younger sons, who choked every spot where the sun of patronage shone; and the commissions were monopolized by those who waited nearer the seat of power. By what slender threads do the destinies of nations seem to hang! Three years before Washington's marriage with Mrs. Martha Custis, during his trip to Boston, he had stopped at New York, the guest of Colonel Beverly Robinson of that city. There he had met Mary Phillips, a sister-in-law of his host, and had become a suitor for her hand. Why the lady declined the honor of his alliance—considering that he was in the flower of manhood, superb in his bearing, and blameless in honor; a high-bred gentleman, brave and irreproachable as Bayard or Sidney—it would be hard to explain. But Wash-

ington returned to his arduous duties on the frontier a rejected suitor; and his companion in arms and in travel, Colonel Morris, remained in New York and won the woman. She had stood, unconscious, at the gate of immortal fame, and might have entered by saying, yes; but fate tripped her tongue and made her say, no; and that negative was, perhaps, the salvation of American liberty. She was the heiress of a large landed property in New York, and, when the appeal was made to arms, her family espoused the cause of the king, and took refuge in the mother country. What might have been the relations of Washington to American independence had he married that lady, at the age of twenty-four, before the difficulties with Great Britain had commenced, and had thus become allied to a wealthy and influential family in New York, whom the trump of war was to rally to the royal colors and banish from the American soil? It may be observed in passing, as a matter of curiosity, that Washington's headquarters were held, during part of the campaign of 1776, in the vacant mansion of the Morrises, on Harlem River; and that the lady, who might have cursed his country by blessing his suit, lived in England to the age of ninety-four, having survived the illustrious patriot some twenty-five years.

In estimating Washington's military services during the Revolutionary War, constant reference must be made to the paucity of his resources, and to the disorganized state of the country. Foreign writers have instituted imaginary parallels between his military genius and that of some of the great conquerors who have shot their meteoric glories through distant ages. A late French writer, for instance, while paying the highest tribute to Washington's moral greatness, decides that his martial ability was below that of Julius Cæsar. All such comparisons are futile, because they fail to discriminate the different surroundings of the two characters, and ignore the peculiar difficulties that beset the American chieftain.

Washington had an army to create, as well as lead to victory; and that army had to be formed out of an untrained militia, drawn from a scattered population, a miscellaneous body of men, badly officered, imperfectly equipped, serving without pay, and sometimes without food. It devolved on the Commander-in-Chief to raise supplies, "with-

out credit or the power of taxation," from a people "subject to separate state governments, and not yet organized under one efficient central authority." As Congress could act only by recommendations addressed to the several States, he was supported by no strong civil power at any time during the war, and his personal character and influence really stood for the nation in place of a central government. Without a military chest, without money, "the sinews of war," and without constitutional authority, Washington maintained the conflict against the disciplined armies and world-renowned valor of the first power among modern nations. With troops as ragged and pitiful to behold as those of Falstaff, he presented to the royal foe a front of unbroken courage, sublime as the unconquerable spirit of Leonidas, when he turned back the wave of battle from Thermopylæ. He was never at the head of what military men would esteem an efficient force, until the junction of the allied armies at Yorktown preluded the speedy triumph of the new Republic, and struck the flag of St. George from the Colonial States.

But the gravest difficulties surmounted by Washington were not so much the inevitable outgrowth of the circumstances of the country as the suggestions of vanity, ambition and duplicity, springing from the frailty of human nature. In the most gloomy days of the revolution, already burdened as he was by care and danger, there were in the American army intriguers who desired to supplant him, liars who aspersed his honor, and traitors who tried to sacrifice the dear country to which he had pledged his life and fortune. The crime of Arnold has been blazoned to the world, but the despicable vanity of General Gates nourished a brood of vipers that more vitally endangered American liberty; and it is now known that, in the person of General Lee, Washington endured, for three years, out of a mistaken regard for the public interest, the insolence of a traitor meaner than Arnold, far more mischievous, and worthy to rest in yet blacker infamy. Situated as the country was, during that momentous period of our history, it is morally certain that no man inferior to Washington could have brought the war to a successful issue. The solid majesty of his character, the personal influence he wielded, the general confidence reposed in his integrity and wisdom, were absolutely essential to the auspicious result of the struggle. No

other man could have restored the public confidence, after the disastrous campaign of 1776; no other man could have afforded to despise, as he did, the calumnies spread abroad by unprincipled competitors; and no other man could have subdued, by the magnetism of personal authority, the military sedition at Newburgh.

As the gods know their own strength, so a wise and good man is conscious of a certain weight of character and of a trust in the final verdict of mankind, that keep him steadfast and serene, while base men are brawling, and while society rocks on an ocean swell. How truly this sublime serenity may be ascribed to Washington, will appear by relating two circumstances, developed by his public life.

Soon after the commencement of the revolution, a volume of spurious letters, attributed to Washington, was published in London, intended to show that he was secretly unfriendly to the American cause, and thereby vitiate his influence among his countrymen. His rivals, in the army and in Congress, in the furtherance of their plot to displace him, procured the re-issue of this base fabrication in New York, and its circulation through the country. Most men would have promptly exposed such an impudent forgery, and indignantly protested against its damaging imputations. Washington did neither. For twenty years, he never honored the miserable imposture enough to notice it. For twenty years, it lay at the mercy of his silent disdain; and it was not until he was in the act of taking final leave of public life, at the close of his second Presidential term, that he alluded to the calumny, by filing a refutation of it in the department of State.

The other circumstance, to which we have alluded, occurred in connection with Mr. Jay's celebrated treaty. It was during Washington's second administration. A strong opposition party had, by this time, grown into being; and the country, besides being agitated by the collision of politics, was in danger of becoming embroiled in war with both France and England. The affronts received from the two great powers were about equally aggravating; but the popular mind was far more willing to endure insolence from France than from Great Britain. France had been the friend of America, in the late conflict, and was herself striving to achieve a republican form of government; and it

required, consequently, peculiar provocations to elicit a hostile feeling towards that country. But, the wrongs received from England were fresh in the nation s memory; and a new war with that power, however impolitic, would have been congenial to the public feeling. It was under these circumstances, that Washington—rising, as he always did, above the dissonance of passion, and having in view the ultimate welfare of the country—resolved on sending a special minister to England, with instructions to negotiate a treaty. He selected John Jay, the Chief Justice of the United States,—a man qualified, in every point of view, for the important mission. The nomination, besides being furiously assailed by the opposition, with difficulty passed the Senate.

The treaty which Mr. Jay succeeded in negotiating,—viewed at the present day, apart from the heat and prejudice engendered by party friction, seems as favorable to the United States as any reasonable man could have required. Nevertheless, it barely secured the endorsement of the Senate, and was assailed, on its official promulgation, with all the malignity of partizan hatred. Even in Boston, which had been esteemed the strongest bulwark of the administration—the Treaty was condemned in a public meeting, and a remonstrance despatched to the Executive. The demonstration of popular feeling, as it spread over the land, rose so far as to asperse, in the grossest terms, the private character of the President. Washington was never greater than in that evil day, when, convinced that the public interest required the confirmation of the Treaty, he exposed his gray hairs to the storm, and pressed his inflexible purpose, while the chair of state rocked under him. It is such executive vigor—the attribute of consummate manhood, that guides a nation safely through a great convulsion; while God only can tell what wolfish treason may leap to our throat, while a paralytic "*grannihood*" sits at the helm of power!

The conscious rectitude, that gave such dignity and strength to Washington's public life, is finely illustrated in his treatment of one of the measures of the opposition, at this time. The House of Representatives made a demand for the instructions, under which Mr. Jay had negotiated the treaty. A call of this kind, at the present day, from either House of Congress, is uniformly complied with,—unless, in

some special case, (in the judgment of the President,) the communication would be detrimental to the public service. But, in that early day of the government, usage had established no precedent; and the demand for Jay's instructions, besides being couched in offensive language, was properly regarded as a hostile movement against the administration. Washington declined to communicate the instructions, taking the position that the power to make treaties was confided, by the Constitution, to the President and Senate; and that it was not the province of the House of Representatives to examine the instructions that might have formed the basis of such treaties. Provoked by his refusal to yield the paper, the opposition naturally supposed and asserted, what was extensively believed by the public, that the instructions contained matter which would damage the government, if it were divulged. It was charged that the President was actuated by some other motive, stronger than his regard for a constitutional principle, on which he had ostensibly withheld the paper. He disdained to vindicate himself, as he might have done, at any moment, but calmly confided to time the solution of the question. For thirty years, those celebrated instructions lay buried in the archives of the nation. Meantime, the political antipathies, which had made them the mark of critical curiosity, died away; the hand, that had written them, was mouldering in the tomb; and the fame they had qualified for a day, was enshrined in the immortal veneration of mankind. At length, twenty-six years after the close of Washington's mortal career, the paper he had declined to yield on a peremptory order of the House, was accidently brought to light, and found to contain nothing which his most violent political enemy could have turned against him.

There is no act in Washington's career, more important to be acquainted with or more interesting to contemplate, especially in the pending crisis of our country, than his agency in the formation of the Federal Union. Nor is it paying too high a tribute to his influence to say, that, without the beneficent ascendency of his personal character, this noble fabric of constitutional liberty could not have been reared.

It will be borne in mind, that, during the revolution, the several States sustained the relation of independent sover-

eignties; bound only by a league for mutual defence; with no common government armed with authority, and united by the sinews of no organic system. The stress of the war, the plea of common interests, and the presence of common danger, had forced the States into temporary unity of feeling and action; but when the pressure of foreign aggression came to be withdrawn, the bonds of concord relaxed, and the shade of anarchy shot across the land. The boon of independence had been achieved, but there was no government to wisely preserve what had been gallantly won. The old Congress, invested with no authority over the States, presented only the phantom of power; making futile recommendations, disregarded by the local governments. In this condition, the country could neither enjoy tranquillity at home, nor secure respect abroad. It wanted the first condition of an auspicious social developement.

The leading men of the day were painfully sensible of the miserable collapse, in which the embryo republic threatened to founder. But it does not appear that many of them looked forward to the grand remedy, finally realized in the establishment of the Federal Government. The idea of a Central government, invested with authority over the States, was at first regarded with almost universal jealousy and distrust, as an expedient tending directly to despotism. After the idea had been conceived, it was strenuously opposed in all the States, and won its way to popular favor by slow processes. And, long after the Federal Government had become enthroned over the Union, its operation was vigilantly watched by a powerful opposition, and its alleged tendency to subvert state rights was vehemently denounced.

The movement, which ultimately led to the adoption of our present government, began in the necessity of adjusting certain commercial difficulties between Maryland and Virginia. In March, 1785, commissioners on the part of those States met at Alexandria, to devise means for regulating the navigation of the Potomac and Pocomake rivers, and of the Chesapeake Bay. Washington was "one of the commissioners on the part of Virginia; and, his associates being on a visit to him at Mount Vernon, it was there agreed by them to recommend to their respective States the appointment of a new commission, with enlarged powers, to devise a plan for the establishment, under the sanction of Con-

gress, of a naval force on the Chesapeake Bay, and a uniform tariff of duties on imports, to which the laws of the two States should conform." This suggestion, made in a private conference at Mount Vernon, was adopted by the Virginia Legislature; and that body proceeded to pass a resolution, "directing that so much of the report of the commissioners as referred to a uniform tariff of duties, should be communicated to the other States, with an invitation to attend the proposed meeting." This encouraging action was followed up, on the 21st of January, 1786, by another resolution of the Legislature of Virginia, "appointing commissioners to meet with those which might be appointed by the other States, 'to take into consideration the trade of the United States;' and 'to consider how far a uniform system in their commercial regulations, may be necessary to their common interest and to their permanent harmony.'"

The meeting thus initiated, was to be held at Annapolis, in September, 1786; but, so slowly did the idea of a Federal Union develope itself, that delegates from only five States attended. The only fruit of this conference was the production of a report, setting forth the existing evils in a strong light, and recommending the several States to send delegates to Philadelphia, the following May, to deliberate in a new convention. A copy of this report being sent to the old Congress, which still retained a fruitless existence, and receiving the endorsement of that decayed body, it acquired, in the opinion of scrupulous persons, "that necessary constitutional sanction, in which the meeting at Annapolis was deficient." Thus, by gradual stages, and through the unwearied exertions of Washington and other influential men, the celebrated "Federal Convention" was called into being, perhaps the noblest assemblage of patriotic wisdom that ever fashioned a throne for freedom.

The convention assembled on the 2d of May, 1787, and Washington, appearing at the head of the Virginia delegation, was unanimously chosen its president. In anticipation of the responsible work which was to devolve upon the body, "he read the history," says Mr. Sparks, "and examined the principles, of the ancient and modern confederacies. There is a paper in his hand-writing, which contains an abstract of each, in which are noted, in a methodical order, their chief characteristics, the kinds of authority they pos-

sessed, their modes of operation, and their defects." During the four months occupied by the sitting of the Convention, Washington watched the development of its work with great solicitude; and his influence was steadily exerted to secure the organization of a strong central government. When the present Constitution of the United States was at length completed, it was unanimously regarded, though not in all respects what its framers could have desired, as being the best instrument of which the state of the country admitted, and as presenting the only possible bulwark against "anarchy and civil war." Mr. Curtis, in his elaborate history of the Constitution, mentions the tradition, "that when Washington was about to sign the instrument, he rose from his seat, and holding the pen in his hand, after a short pause, pronounced these words: 'Should the States reject this excellent constitution, the probability is that an opportunity will never again be offered to cancel another in peace; the next will be drawn in blood.'"

It is a fact worthy of notice, that this Constitution, under which the United States have achieved such unparalled prosperity, which it has been proposed to amend in order to furnish new guaranties to slavery, was originally framed mainly by slave-holders, when slavery existed in all the States but one; and that it contains, as it now stands, every guarantee in favor of slavery that could be extorted from those who are justly venerated as the architects of our national greatness.

On the 17th of September, 1787, the Constitution was communicated to the old Congress, with a letter from Washington, signed in his capacity of President of the Convention. It still devolved upon the States to accept or reject the Constitution, through the action of their local assemblies; but "it was provided in the instrument itself, that it should become the supreme law of the land, when adopted by nine States." During the eight or ten months occupied by the holding of the State conventions, which were to decide upon the adoption of the Constitution, Washington never ceased to press the measure, by means of private conferences and an extended correspondence, with all the power of his unrivalled personal influence. By the Summer of 1788, the ratification of the nine States was secured; and the American Government, under the beneficent hands of Federal

Union and National Law, dates from that period. It is worthy of notice, that neither Virginia, in which the idea of the government had originated, nor New York, now amongst its most loyal supporters, ratified the action of the Convention, until the Constitution, by the support of nine other States, had already become the supreme law of the land. Virginia was the tenth, and New York the eleventh of the ratifying States.

The Government, whose gradual unfolding we have thus traced, began the career of empire with about four millions of people, with no branch of national industry beyond its infancy, and some of them entirely unknown; with not one state jurisdiction west of the Alleghanies, and with not a single vessel to uphold our flag upon the seas. Within less than three-quarters of a century, the American Union has received thirty-four States under its law—developed a population of thirty-five millions—animated the great valley of the Mississippi with all the elements of civilization—planted two tributary republics on the shores of the Pacific ocean—matured the old branches of industry and discovered new—created a commerce inferior only to that of England—and made liberal contributions to the social, educational, and scientific improvement of mankind.

What is it that now threatens to dismember the great Confederacy, and arrest our political development? The question trenches upon ground lately occupied by passionate partizans, but ground, nevertheless, where any patriot may lawfully stand. Without presuming to enter, at the end of this paper, upon a discussion of the great issue that absorbs the national interest, we make the general statement, in which we believe all intelligent men will concur, that the shock which has fractured the Union, came from a resolution of a minority of the States to have *slavery perpetuated* by force of Federal power and by authority of Federal law. The desire to break up the Confederacy, or to withdraw from its jurisdiction, springs from the belief that the principles and tendency of our government, as it is at present organized, are unfriendly to slavery, and must eventuate in its gradual extinction. The States, therefore, in which slavery has become the paramount interest, requiring new guarantees for the protection of that system, but meeting a stern denial at the presidential election, have rebelled against

the authority which they could not make subservient to their purposes. While they have grossly misapprehended the temper and designs of those who elevated Mr. Lincoln to the presidency, they are correct in our judgment, in regarding the government founded by our fathers as essentially hostile to slavery. The sentiments of those who framed the Constitution, and their reluctance to give slavery any decisive sanction under it, are too well known to require more than a passing allusion. The convictions of Washington may be said to represent those of his illustrious peers in the Constitutional Convention; and Washington had resolved, as early as 1786, "not to possess another slave by purchase;" and had declared, the same year, in a letter addressed to Mr. Morris, "There is not a man living who wishes more sincerely than I do, to see a plan adopted for the abolition of slavery." The subsequent liberation of his own slaves by will, shows that the convictions here expressed on the subject, were thorough and final. Under a government framed by men holding, for the most part, similar convictions—a government administered consistently with the intentions of its founders, slavery can not permanently endure; and hence, those who would perpetuate the system forever, at any or every sacrifice, must obviously step out of the Union, and take the chance of forming a new polity more congenial to their designs.

Upon his contemporaries, the character of Washington made a profound impression. Lord Erskine said that he was "the only human being for whom he ever felt an awful reverence." Rufus King, the American minister at London, writing home in 1797, testified that it was a common observation in England, that Washington was not only the most illustrious, but the most meritorious character that had yet appeared. Since his death, the grandeur of his fame has risen, rather than declined, in the esteem of those qualified to appreciate him. It is the judgment of Charles James Fox, that "a character made up of virtues, so happily tempered by one another and so wholly unalloyed by any vices, as that of Washington, is hardly to be found on the pages of history." Lord Brougham pays him a similar tribute, when he styles him "the greatest man of our own or of any age—the only one upon whom an epithet, so thoughtfully

lavished by men, may be innocently and justly bestowed." And Guizot, the philosophical historian, declares that "of all great men, he was the most virtuous and the most fortunate."

Thus elevated, by the voice of mankind, to the highest seat in the pantheon of history, let him remain in his glory. Thus enthroned among the immortal benefactors, who have leaped the chasm of oblivion, with no leaf torn from the chaplet of their fame, let him rest from his cares. In that august Senate, serenely sitting above the brawls of parties, the contagion of baseness, the roar of war, securely shrined in grateful love and reverential memory,—shine on, O Chief of Freedom's sons, through the years of unrecorded time. And let the splendor of your *name*, brightening as it ascends, fire the successive generations with patriotic virtue, till the wide horizon that rings the world, shall flame with festal glory. E. W. R.

Art. XXIII.

The Late Rev. Hosea Ballou 2d, D.D.

At the outset of our labor in selecting topics and providing materials for the present number of the *Quarterly*, it did not enter our thought that we could have occasion to write such a caption as the above. We were indeed aware that for the past year, and especially for the past six months, the health of Dr. Ballou was somewhat waning. We attributed the fact to his excessive labors as President of Tufts' College, and naturally concluded that the relaxation of the vacation weeks would bring back his accustomed strength. A few weeks before his death, incidentally meeting him in a railroad car, he stated to us a fact from which it was obvious that his illness had a more serious cause, than the simple exhaustion of excessive labor. Still, his case did not seem to us an occasion for alarm—he himself evidently did not fully realize its serious nature. When, however, a member

of the College Faculty informed us that the President had been compelled to suspend his College labors, the danger began to be palpable. We were in the way of learning from him every day, and every day's report gave occasion for increased anxiety. At first Dr. Ballou was unable to perform College duty; then, his disease was threatening; then it became critical; then there was no possibility of recovery—no person so situated, said the medical authority, ever recovered! Shortly the sad intelligence came that the earthly career of that great and good man had come to a close! The inscription on his casket-lid was the following: "Hosea Ballou 2d.—Died May 27th, 1861.—Aged 64 years, 7 months."

We shall not attempt to describe our sense of the loss so suddenly brought upon us a Christian denomination. We cannot find the words that will enable us to perform such a task. We shall not attempt to estimate the loss to the youthful Institution of Learning to which its only President gave the full maturity of his wisdom, his learning and his moral influence; for here also any words at our command would fail. We shall not attempt to portray the personal bereavement which has come upon us in common with all who knew Dr. Ballou intimately; for here, too, we at once realize that our emotions can have little fellowship with language. Sitting at our present task in the quiet of our study, the imagination will bring before our vision the presence of that venerable head; we see that genial, kindly, cheerful countenance, that was always to us a benediction; we hear that voice more grateful to our ear than any strain of music; we catch that glow of humor, that always dispelled unworthy sadness; we drink the wisdom that always came unconsciously—for never was modesty more unfeigned—from the lips of a rich and sanctified experience; and as the charm dissolves, and the painful realization comes over us, that the presence is not real—nor ever again shall be on those earthly shores, the eye will dim, the articulation choke, and the pen almost refuse its office.

We cannot resist the conviction, that the moral and intellectual character of Dr. Ballou was extraordinary—extraordinary we mean even when compared with the moral and intellectual qualities of other men of acknowledged preeminence. There was an indefinable quality in both his na-

ture and attainments, that compelled other men to reverence him as a superior. An entire stranger could not enter his presence and not intuitively recognize his peculiar worth. For the twelve years that we have intimately known him, and for the twenty years that we have known of him, he has been the pride of the denomination of Christians with which he was conscientiously and most devotedly identified. Not alone his rich scholarship, not alone his capacious intellect, not alone his conspicuous integrity, perhaps not all of these traits gave him in the denomination the place he never sought, but which he could not help but fill; there was another excellence for which we have no technical name, but which every person intimate with him could but perceive—a quality that permeated his whole nature and gave a nobility to his character and influence—which made him, in many particulars of vital importance, the leading man of a large Christian body. We readily call to mind other men in our denomination of unusual worth—men in whom learning, intellect, and moral excellence were and are blended in large degree—men with whom it was and is great fortune to be on terms of intimacy; but it stirs no envy in the breasts of the living, nor is regarded as an invidious reflection upon the dead, to say that Dr. Ballou was an example of goodness quite peculiar and commandingly superior. We should hardly dare to write these words if they expressed only our own belief. But we write them in the full assurance, that every person who reads them and had an acquaintance with the subject of them, will at once say that we have written nothing but what is already familiar truth.

And such is the man that in the earthly sense—but, blessed be the Father, not in the Christian sense—is forever lost to us. At our conventions, our associations, our dedications and ordinations, at our social gatherings and our fire-sides, we are no more to meet him with eyes of flesh. We cannot realize, we may say that we do not wish to realize, the magnitude of our loss. We cannot realize that no more shall we sit at those feet and learn wisdom. As we cast about us to see whereupon *that* mantle shall fall, we recognize a void. We have noble men among us—men that we can respect, trust, and follow; but we shall never see another Hosea Ballou 2d.

It is no part of our purpose to attempt a biographical sketch of the great man who but yesterday was with us, and whom we now mourn. Our denominational papers have anticipated us in this labor, and many of the secular journals have been prompt to spread among their readers the leading particulars of his career. Simply as matter of record in the pages of the *Quarterly*, with which he was for many years connected as editor, we condense the outlines of his biography in a brief paragraph.

Hosea Ballou 2d was born October 18, 1796, in Guilford, Vermont. Some persons have supposed him to be a son, and very many have regarded him as a nephew,[1] of Hosea Ballou, senior. The senior Ballou was in fact a brother of the grandfather of Hosea 2d. We have heard the subject of this sketch speak with considerable enthusiasm of the satisfaction he felt when in his boyhood he had an opportunity to study Latin. His love of classical learning was developed in his youth, and the foundation was then laid for the elaborate scholarship that distinguished him later in life. Circumstances, among which family influence must have been a leading particular, early inclined him to Universalism. About the year 1815, he was settled as pastor of the Universalist Church in Stafford, Ct. In 1821, he was settled as pastor of the Universalist Society in Roxbury, Mass., where he resided seventeen years. During this period his literary attainments became conspicuous, and his "Ancient History of Universalism," an acknowledged classic in American literature, made its appearance. The "Universalist Expositor," projected by him, and chiefly indebted to him for its high reputation, was commenced during his residence in Roxbury. He became pastor of the Universalist Church in Medford in 1838, where he remained till his appointment as President of Tufts' College in 1853. After a brief tour in Europe—a tour which, as it had been the dream of his life, was an immense satisfaction to him—he entered upon the duties of his office as the head of the infant institution on Walnut Hill. Here his resident and formal labors commenced in 1855. The period of his presidency was com-

[1] We are indebted to a very carefully-written sketch of Dr. Ballou in the Boston *Daily Advertiser* for correction on this point. We have so often heard Hosea 2d speak of Hosea senior as his "uncle," that we were led to suppose the relationship to be immediate.

paratively brief—comprising actually about eight, though formally, perhaps, but six years. He was, however, spared to give elevation, character, and reputation to the college; and all this through an example of toil, of watchfulness, of disinterestedness, and of practical wisdom that, in the result, may truly be said to entitle him to the honors of martyrdom; for it can hardly be doubted, that the arduous labors of his responsible position as the head of the new institution shortened his earthly career. As already stated, he died May 27, 1861.

Though the most unobtrusive of men, it was impossible that the sterling qualities of Dr. Ballou's character should fail to arrest the attention of appreciative minds outside of denominational limits. Himself a Universalist in belief, sympathy and position, men of different, we might almost say hostile sects, have been among his warmest admirers. We once heard the remark from a person who felt anything but sympathy for Universalist opinions, "Dr. Ballou has the soundest judgment I ever saw in any man." A distinguished Unitarian divine said of him—in an exaggerated tone which, nevertheless, showed his high appreciation of the man—"Dr. Ballou knows everything." Whatever public honors he received, sought him—he never sought them. It was a tribute to merit, and in no sense an expression of favoritism, when, in 1845, Harvard College conferred upon him the degree of Doctor of Divinity. We have heard the remark that in this the institution honored itself rather than the man. Since his death, we have seen the highest tributes to his worth in the secular journals conducted by persons known not to be in sympathy with Universalist sentiments.[2]

[2] We cannot deny ourselves the pleasure of quoting here, in full, a notice of Dr. Ballou which appeared in the Boston Daily *Transcript* on occasion of his death. The notice has peculiar worth as coming from an appreciative source outside of our denomination. The writer, we may add, is avowedly Unitarian, alike in belief and ecclesiastical position:

"Dr. Ballou was one of the most learned theologians, and one of the most vigorous and idiomatic writers that any body of Christians in our country could produce. His published volumes belong to the standard literature of the Church. His articles were broadly conceived and so thoroughly reasoned, that his masterly hand could at once be detected. His concise criticisms were noted for their strong sense, genial humor

Dr. Ballou once said to a person in the employ of the Universalist Home Missionary Society: "We hear a great deal said about persons having their mission; but generally there is a great deal of nonsense in that kind of talk. In your case, however, the fact is clear—you *have* a mission." Remembering the incident, we hesitate to say of Dr. Ballou himself that he had a mission. And yet his work was so distinctive, had in certain respects so much the character of pioneering, that we can call to mind few men of whom it can with greater propriety be said that they had a mission. This affirmation is properly made of persons who open new spheres of industry, introduce new phases of thought, or in any way originate movements which benefit their fellow-men. We, of course, speak of Dr. Ballou as a Universalist, and this, too, in the strictest denominational sense. Let us look briefly at the nature of his work in this relation.

and admirable wit. Few Americans have ever gone abroad so well furnished by historical knowledge and taste for natural scenery, for a profitable tour in the Old World. It was said that his knowledge of the Alps was so accurate that he could probably have told precisely where he was if he had been dropped from a balloon into some one of the passes or valleys of Switzerland. Those of our readers who remember the White Mountain letters of the Rev. T. S. King which have appeared in our columns, will recall his frequent and pleasant allusions to Dr. Ballou, whom he delighted to meet among the New Hampshire hills, as he was an enthusiastic admirer of nature, and was passionately fond of mountain scenery. When Dr. Ballou was selected as the first President of Tufts' College, the wisdom of the choice was universally acknowledged. His name and personal character have been a tower of strength to the institution. His ample learning, simple tastes, sterling sense, and ingenuous character, combined to make him a good executive officer, and enabled him to exert the best influence upon the students. He was President of the Faculty and Professor of History and Intellectual Philosophy. During his ministry, he directed the studies of several young men whose means did not allow them to enter college, or avail themselves of the divinity schools. Some of these scholars have become famous men, and now occupy prominent positions in the liberal churches. They cherished the warmest feelings of veneration and love for their guide and friend, and the news of his death will be received by them with the deepest sorrow. Dr. Ballou was probably the most learned theologian in the ranks of self-educated men in our country. The oldest American university sixteen years ago suitably acknowledged the literary attainments of this graduate of the common school, and he was acknowledged the peer of those of our learned men who had enjoyed, in early life, educational privileges and advantages which were denied to him."

Universalism as a sentiment and belief has been in the world since the days of the apostles. Of this fact no reader of the "Ancient History of Universalism" will have a doubt. But Universalism as a consecutive movement tending to organization and ecclesiastical forms, as the germ of a denomination, must be regarded as comparatively of recent origin. Winchester and Murray were, in some respects, efficient pioneers in this work; but the leading spirit—the one whose energy, eloquence, force of character, and sterling intellect, made him distinctively the "father of modern Universalism," was Hosea Ballou, senior. Providence always adapts true men to their work. Scholars and critics follow pioneers, but are themselves seldom pioneers. They nurture and trim the tree that different men plant. The elder Hosea Ballou was not a scholar; and though possessing, in large degree, the intellectual qualities which fit one to become a critic, he was not, in any eminent degree, a critic. His mind was not retrospective—his gaze was towards the present and future, not the past. Reverently holding fast to the Scriptures, and testing all opinions by them, he broke from the trammels of other men's interpretations, and endeavored, by the simple efforts of his own understanding, to elicit the meaning of the oracles. To him the testimony of the Bible to the doctrine of the final holiness and happiness of all men, was clear, explicit, and irrefragible. Filled with this discovery—for to him it was substantially a discovery, and especially in the form in which he received it, though the same essential thought is clearly traceable to the very days of the apostles—he gave to its promulgation the full strength of his vigorous intellect and the unfaltering zeal of his earnest soul. Others caught his spirit, adopted his views, labored in his vein; and gradually the seeds of denominational life—in some measure planted before his day—took more vigorous root, sprang into visible forms; and long before the venerable patriarch closed his eyes upon earthly scenes, conventions, associations, sunday-school organizations, churches, periodicals and kindred instrumentalities, gave outward evidence of the active existence of a Christian organization, to the progress of which he had contributed more than any other single individual. In all this he probably worked without any very definite plan. He was "led by the spirit" of his great truth—acted at its bid-

ding. He did not guide the truth so much as the truth guided him.

We must add that in this we see the universal law in the initiatory steps of every religious movement. Religious organizations are never put together as houses are—by rule, plan, and specific purpose. Humanly speaking they *happen;* and the human instrumentalities leading to such results act impulsively under the guidance of strong sentiment, and with but little anticipation of the ecclesiastical forms in which their labors are destined to be enshrined. In this early stage of a denomination's history, zeal is strong; every preacher is a missionary; and without waiting to be sent for, he goes forth to proclaim his thought, it may be without money and without price.

But scholarship and criticism, though never the pioneers of a religious movement, are certain to follow,—that is, if the movement has in it vitality and substance enough to merit the attention of scholars and critics. A denomination that cannot produce a literature will necessarily be of short life. Universalism had, as in new regions it now has, its itinerants, its missionaries, its devoted preachers in whom the simple love of the doctrine gave direction to their labors, and prepared the way for ecclesiastical results which, on their part, can hardly have been premeditated. But the time came for a somewhat different class of laborers,—men who, though not less devoted nor less in earnest, should somewhat reverse the original order of procedure—who, instead of being under the control of the sentiment, should put the sentiment itself somewhat under control; who should act less from impulse and more from premeditation; who should have in their labors more of method and fixed purpose; men who, realizing that even the best of emotions are, in themselves alone, evanescent, should see the need of fortifying their results by resort to criticism, to philosophical disquisition, to the kind of argumentation that will have force after the original tide of deep enthusiasm shall have measurably spent its force.

We do not say that the change from what we will call the *impulsive* phase of Universalism to what we will call its more *reflective* phase—from the phase in which feeling controlled the men, to the phase in which men controlled the feeling—was an abrupt change, and hence clearly and defi-

nitely distinguished in our denominational history. The poverty of language requires us to speak of the night as succeeded by the day, without specially and verbally making account of the gradual and intermediate changes of dawn and twilight. With the Universalist denomination, as yet brief in its history, the daylight of criticism and scholarship has by no means appeared. But we trust that the dawn of such a day is upon us. And while it would be unjust alike to the dead and the living to attribute the new light to a single star, yet may we assert that among our luminaries one was so pre-eminent, the light it gave was so refulgent, the quickening effects of its rays so conspicuous, the harvest its light and warmth have already ripened so ample and promising, that we need not hesitate to assign it the central and commanding place in our denominational galaxy.

Dr. Ballou has from the first been acknowledged as distinctively the scholar and the critic of our denomination. It was, as we have before hinted, his "mission" to give a more reflective turn to the style of Universalist thought and argument. And never was a man better qualified for such a task. By inclination, by habit, by moral and religious proclivity, by temperament, firmness of purpose, and comprehensiveness of understanding, he was the providential man that came at the time appointed. No other man has done so much to make Universalist theology respected alike by those who do, and by those who do not, believe in it. He did nothing for transient effect—sought for his convictions no precarious advancement—had confidence in no accessions to the cause other than such as were drawn to it by its intrinsic force.

No matter how varied or numerous the forces in any particular person's character, some one force is always pre-eminent, and gives direction to all the remaining forces. Ambition, avarice, intellectual and moral proclivities, all may be strong, but it will hardly happen that all the tendencies shall have equal strength; one will be somewhat in the ascendent, and so give tone and direction to the complex character. Dr. Ballou had beyond most men a capacious and comprehensive understanding—he saw not only individual truths, but the relations of truths; he had great

mental acquirements—his reading, especially in the departments of theology, history, and mental philosophy, was extensive and very precise; his industry was very extraordinary—plodding, particular, discriminating and unyielding; but in no one of these features do we find the leading trait in his character. The root of his character was in *the moral nature.* His sterling integrity, his inflexible conscientiousness, the deep sense of responsibility with which he entered upon any labor, this was in him more than intellect, more than learning, more than industry; it was the quickening element in his entire career—inspiring and sustaining all his faculties—holding him with unflagging perseverance to whatever work he had in hand. In every sense in which he was a laborer, whether as student, thinker, writer, teacher or preacher, the force which stirred his energies was his moral nature. Whoever came into social relations with him distinctively felt his integrity; and this, no matter how remote from moral considerations may have been the occasion which called for intimacy with him. It has been said of Washington that there was a majesty in the most trivial of his acts—even in the most casual direction to a servant. Dr. Ballou could not indulge in a humorous anecdote, describe a mountain, or expose a sophism, but he made his hearer feel his conscience.

As an example of his integrity, showing itself directly, we need but refer to the candor with which he always presented his convictions. No man ever loved Universalism more ardently than he—no man was ever more rejoiced at every proof of the substantial advancement of the cause. But never did he resort to any artifice—never did he employ an argument in which he himself did not have entire confidence—never avail himself of the advantage of a sophism, for sectarian ends. This virtue is rare, *very* rare. Men of tolerable excellence have too often felt that a lie might at least be winked at, provided it was designed for the glory of God. There have been men too conscientious to tolerate a wrong where it might seem that they or theirs would derive advantage from it, but who seem insensible to such scruples, when the church, the sect, the creed is likely to thrive by an artifice! Strange as the fact may seem, the conscience that will not equivocate for a doated theology, shows the rarest of all forms of integrity! Dr. Ballou, be-

yond any man we have ever known, exemplified this fidelity to truth. Whoever heard him speak on religious themes, whoever read his writings, felt that the spirit that communed with them *could not* deceive.

His dominant conscientiousness was, in one important particular, an incentive to the industry which was so remarkable in his case. If it was his purpose to ascertain the opinions of other men on a particular subject, particularly to ascertain the grounds on which they rested those opinions, and still more particularly, if he purposed to make a statement of those opinions and grounds, he felt that he was under a solemn obligation to make thorough work—that he did his fellow-men wrong if he judged of their reasoning hastily, without full examination of the alleged claims of this reasoning—that he was deceiving others if he gave to them as certain men's opinions what he had not, by a most faithful scrutiny, made himself sure *were* other men's opinions. Hence he worked with patience and perseverance simply that he might do no man injustice.

In another particular his industry found its great incentive in his moral nature. Some persons have an impression that he toiled from the simple love of toil. Such was by no means the case. He once said to us, in substance, and in lamentation over his innate love of ease, as he regarded it, "I have *heard* of men that have a monomania for hard work, but I never knew any such men; I don't believe there are any such; I believe that man is naturally lazy—at least I know that I am!" It gave us much consolation to hear such a man say this; but coming from him, the declaration gave us no encouragement or excuse for idleness. He felt that it was his *duty* to work and this with diligence; that he was responsible for the use he made of his gifts; that God demanded his toil and that it would be culpable in him to hold back; and his integrity, his master in all things else, was his master also in this. With him as with all men, hard work was a hard struggle, but it was a divine struggle—obedience to a divine call. It was not so much that he was industrious *and* conscientious, as that he was industrious *because* he was conscientious. Even the toil which makes so conspicuous a trait in his career, found its incentive in his conscience.

To the readers of the *Quarterly*, it can hardly be necessary to say much respecting the intellectual gifts and attain-

ments of Hosea Ballou 2d. No other class of persons, equally large, knew him so well in these particulars. In all the solid qualities of the essay and review his productions have for years had neither rival nor second. In that limited sense in which such a term is sometimes applied to the writings of uninspired men, Dr. Ballou has for years been our authoritative writer; and before any one among us felt it prudent to dissent from his conclusions, it has been deemed somewhat obligatory carefully to examine the processes by which he reached his conclusions. But well understood as were his powers in these pages, we cannot refuse ourselves the satisfaction of attempting a trifle more than simple allusion to them.

The distinguishing trait of Dr. Ballou's understanding was in its breadth and comprehensiveness. He saw through and round his subject. He never mistook a segment for a complete view. Hence, in his leading disquisitions he realized the necessity of ascertaining, as far as possible, all the data; and he never ventured upon a process of reasoning until this preliminary work was faithfully performed. It is easy enough to perceive that every person who assumes to write on subtle themes, should do as much—easy to see, that neglecting such precautions, his theorising must be unsatisfactory. Yet every day's observation and experience assure us, that it is a rare gift that *can* adhere to such a course. The ordinary intellect is in too much haste, has too little of persistent force, is too willing to succumb to the excitement and passion of the hour, is too easily diverted from a steady course by objects which touch the emotions and fix prejudices. Encountered by the flaws and the rough billows of the lake, the lighter craft, dependent wholly upon the breeze, have no resource but to scud before the wind; it is only the heavy and well ballasted vessels, having a propelling power of their own, that can hold a direct course in spite of the eccentricities of the wind and the deep. With most men, the popular current is irresistable,—we mean in the sense that it carries with it the reason as well as the conduct. It is hard to believe against the fashion—hard to reason against the impulse of the hour. Why, as we write, how have we *quasi* non-resistents, under the strong emotions occasioned by a national crisis, become clamorous for war! How do thousands who but yesterday scorned the military, passing

a procession of uniforms with averted gaze, now flock to the "parade!" Very likely, the new impulse is nearer the right and expedient—the necessities of the time may have *demonstrated* the wisdom of the axiom, "In time of peace prepare for war." But had our intellects been able to take larger views, and to form profounder judgments, we might have seen in time of peace even, what it is but little merit to see now, in time of war. We repeat, the understanding is very rare that can hold its way against the prevailing impulse of the hour; or that can find the right and the expedient without the aid of such impulse. This is the understanding that grasps principles, has confidence in their unchangability, and never loses sight of them even amid the dust created by popular paroxism.

We can name few men that were more largely gifted in the particular that we have described, than Dr. Ballou. His feelings were easily and strongly moved by objects which commended themselves to his judgment; but the *fashion* of sentiment never imposed upon him. Some years since, when the dramatic power of a female reader had created a Shaksperean panic, and every body, for the time, admired Shakspeare, Dr. Ballou remarked to us, in reply to a question which called for the remark, "People can now see things in Shakspeare, that would astound Shakspeare himself if they could be pointed out to him!" He saw much more clearly than we, that the popular appreciation of the great poet was only a spasm and a fashion—that half a dozen public and professional "readings" could not do the work of years of private and personal study. His faculty to apprehend, not only great principles, but the *relations* of great principles, made it impossible that he should be a bigot. No man held more tenaciously to conclusions he had laboriously evolved, but we never heard it said of him, no one could say, that he had any hobbies. While some of us have been clear as the sun on the problem of sovereignty, and others of us equally positive as respects the problem of free-will, did he not see, more clearly than most of us, the *relations* of the two? Has he not done much to moderate the intensity and qualify the judgments of both parties? Did not the elaborate essay, published in the *Quarterly* years ago on "Divine and Human Agency," have a palpable effect throughout the denomina-

tion? We speak interrogatively; for we are unwilling to mingle anything of a controversial spirit in the tribute we desire to pay to the gifts of that great man.

It was a happy mingling of the moral and the intellectual, that led Dr. Ballou to distrust all expedients and all reasoning that under any circumstances compromised or deferred a principle. We remember a marked example in illustration of what we mean. In reply to a somewhat warm tribute to the merit of Mr. Grote's History of Greece, he remarked, sanctioning everything we could say with exception of a single particular, "But he justifies the Athenians in the resort to *ostracism*." "Still he justifies the practice only on the ground that the safety of the State demanded it, while the necessity required only a temporary enforcement of the custom." "True, but when, even for a moment, a State breaks from a clear dictate of moral right, though it may avoid a present danger, it is only getting into other and more threatening dangers." On a certain occasion, a religious society, with a view to the payment of a troublesome debt, resorted to an expedient that seemed to him a departure from the example which should come from such a body. "I hope it will fail to get any money," said he; the remark seemed to us rather uncharitable, till he completed his thought, by adding, "they had better fail in that, than fail *altogether*." Nothing could persuade him but that every invention that made a compromise of principle was sure to return and plague the inventor.

Of the effects of Dr. Ballou's labors, we must be indulged a word. We can describe them no better than by characterizing them as of the *permanent* kind. As a controvertialist, he knew principles not men. So clearly did he discriminate between principles and expedients—between the durable and the transient—that productions which came from him a quarter of a century ago are pertinent to the wants even of to-day. Most of us must confess that in the more impulsive phase of our theological experience, we honestly made use of arguments in which we have learned no longer to confide. Much of our early literature is poorly adapted to existing needs. Dr. Ballou thought and wrote for the future as well as for the present. It was an extraordinary gift that could do this.

It is but a further amplification of the same essential point to add, that nothing of a personal nature ever appeared in his literary productions. He carried on no guerilla warfare against men—he fought only against error itself. No one could provoke or coax him into a discussion in which the parties would necessarily have as much prominence as the themes. He loved Universalism and the denomination as its instrument of progress; and he labored to build the cause upon a permanent foundation—the rock of principle. In this single aim, he exhibited a forgetfulness of self—a disinterestedness of spirit and aim truly heroic. If regard is had to the pecuniary results of his toil, seldom has any man done so much and received so little. In all this we write words of very great praise—but we write them without mental reservation and without qualification.

But we must close. At the date of the sad event which has given occasion to our humble tribute to a great and good man's memory, we had but little space in these pages at our command. But we could not defer a purpose to say at least a brief word of the man who, it has always seemed to us, came nearer, in moral and religious excellence, the Master than any other man whose acquaintance we have enjoyed. We realize, however, that had our space been unlimited, we could not have done complete justice to the theme—our readers would still have found fewer things said than unsaid. At whatever point we approach the character of Dr. Ballou, it at once dilates to large proportions. His devotion to the cause of denominational education,—the monument whereof is the brief history, yet marked prosperity, of our infant college on Walnut Hill—an institution which has received its impress and guarantee of continued usefulness from his powerful mind and pure character;—his fidelity to all the working interests of the denomination, calling him to its associations, conventions, and kindred assemblies;—his profound sympathy with all the reforms of the age, so far as based on the acknowledged authority of the Christian records (and he turned at once from every movement, however rich in promise, that even questioned this authority);—his Christian influence, all the more real because unconscious, operating as a ministry for good in quarters little known to himself;—and, to name but one more particular, his abound-

ing yet quiet humor, which made sunshine under every roof that covered him, and every circle he entered, relieving the hard features of his solid acquirements, and making him the most genial as well as most instructive of companions;—in every one of these several traits, we should, did we give way to the feeling that the special topic warms within us, expand our words into so many essays rather than paragraphs.

But he has gone from our earthly midst. In the family, the church and congregation, the circle of brethren, the institution to which he gave the maturity of his wisdom, in these pages, where for years he gave the elaborate productions of his industrious brain, he will no more be seen;—except, indeed, in that high and more spiritual sense, in which, though dead, he is yet with us. Rich is the legacy he has left us. And while we can but mourn for his sudden departure, we will strive to be grateful that he was so long spared to us. May we evince our gratitude by greater efforts to emulate his extraordinary worth. G. H. E.

Art. XXIV.

Literary Notices.

1. The Relations of Slavery to the War: and the Position of the Clergy at the Present Time. Three Discourses. Preached at Watertown, N. Y. By Rev. E. W. Reynolds. 1861.

The great crisis which the madness and the crimes of wicked men have brought upon the nation, very naturally and properly suggest a large proportion of the topics alike for the pulpit and the religious as well as secular press. The present number of the *Quarterly* contains two papers widely different in specific matter and treatment, yet both pertaining—the one directly the other indirectly—to the national theme. We feel a pride in the conviction that our periodical, as evidenced by the articles referred to, will be found equal to any of its contemporaries in the ability and fidelity with which it has answered the demand of

the times. The pamphlet named above gives us still another occasion to refer to "the war." We have read the pamphlet, as we do everything coming from the accomplished and felicitous pen of its author—a gentleman who deservedly takes a position in the front rank of our denominational writers. The first discourse amplifies the obvious point, that slavery is the essential cause of the great rebellion at the South; and is severe in its rebuke of the American Church as faithless and inefficient in its treatment of an institution pronounced even by a deist as "the sum of all villanies." Had the church been true to its trust, the people would never have become insensible to the sinfulness of slavery—and *insensibility* to the wrong is the root of the treason which now threatens the stability of the republic. The following paragraph is certainly unequivocal:

"The American Church was not equal to the emergency. It bent before the roaring beast it ought to have taken by the horns; and it apologized for the system which even a deist had pronounced 'the sum of all villanies.' That sacred institution which Jesus Christ had founded among men, as a refuge for the weak,—as the hope of the merciful,—as the means of breaking every yoke, and setting every captive free,—even *that* humbled itself before the arrogance of slavery, and held its peace; while liberty fell in the streets, and honor veiled her face. It was the saddest, most shameful, most perilous day of our history, when the Christianity of this land was bribed and badgered into submission to slavery. No—there was a sadder, more shameful, more perilous day even than that: the day that the most venerable bodies of the Church conspired to pronounce slavery divine, and to stigmatize as infidels the faithful men who suffered for freedom! I suppose it is now clear, to the minds of American freemen, that the Church committed a great error, if not a great crime, in having made any terms with slavery. If the pulpit and the religious press had refused to compromise with slaveholding,—if the Churches had excluded slaveholders from the communion,—if every minister, ordained to the service of Christ, had labored to array this wrong before men under the odium of Divine condemnation,—it could not have been perpetuated to this day. The voice of religion would have so ratified the moral convictions of our people, and lent such authority and vigor to the best feelings of our nature, that slavery would have been extinguished, peaceably and imperceptibly, by a process similar to that which eradicated it from England. With vigorous moral causes working for its removal, the subject would have entered less into our politics,—it would have had little or no opportunity to vitiate the government,—the rancorous hostility between the North and South

would have been averted, and treason would never have dragged our flag to the dust. The moment the Church consented to ignore or tolerate the enormous sin, slavery began to be dominant in our politics, and the government began to be prostituted to its purposes. In private circles, it became fashionable to apologize for slavery, and to deny or extenuate the abuses which the system involves. In public life, the path of ambition became the path of subserviency and compromise. This despotism came to possess the offices and the honors of the republic, and it dispensed them to those who could abase themselves most, as the tools of its wicked policy." (pp. 10, 11.)

In the second discourse, the author explains the mystery of slavery agitation—shows why neither party could let the question alone. We have room for but a brief extract:

"Now there are men, I dare say, who will never cease to marvel at the perverse obstinacy of the American people, in keeping up agitation. Why couldn't they let slavery alone? Why couldn't slavery let them alone? Why couldn't we have had peace? Why has no power been given us to put down this 'everlasting negro question?' Why won't men let it alone? and why, of all other men, won't our minister let it alone? The mystery is, doubtless, very great; but shall we not make an attempt, this pleasant morning, to look into it, and gain at least a clue to the reason? Suppose you plant Canada thistles on one side of your garden, and a bed of strawberry plants on the opposite side, and charge them not to meddle with each other! You will soon find that they will meddle with each other—not because they are wilful, but because each must obey the law of its own nature. Now slave society and free society have their peculiar instincts, and each developes agreeably to its own law. They must encroach upon each other, they must conflict, they must quarrel; and, what God and nature have thus made hostile, we cannot join together in harmony." (p. 21.)

The right and the duty of the clergy to discuss the moral and religious bearings of slavery have been stated so frequently, and the truth is so palpable, that we were hardly prepared to be interested by any further illustration of the point. Yet the subject is made fresh and somewhat piquant by the following paragraph:

"When you employ a lawyer to conduct a cause, do you undertake to instruct him how to extract his testimony, or how to make his plea? Or, do you concede that he is the best judge of his own business; and that any interference on your part would be both a reflection on his intelligence, and a damage to your interest? When you call a physician to minister to your malady, do you, at the same time, profess to understand the case better

than he does, or offer to dictate what remedies shall be employed? If you actually suppose yourself wiser than the physician, you would not send for him at all. Now you employ a man to stand in the pulpit, as a teacher of the Christian religion, and of the moral obligations of mankind. In engaging him to teach, you are supposed to believe him qualified to teach. You believe him qualified, because he has made religion and morals his special study. You have, yourself, general impressions and convictions on those subjects, (as you have general impressions and convictions in relation to law and medicine,) but you have not qualified yourself to be a teacher of one, more than of the other. And yet—(now mark your inconsistency,)—when that man, whom you have placed in the pulpit expressly to teach, happens to offend some of your prejudices, you tell him that he has made a mistake,—that he has no business to say such and such things,—and sometimes you even deny matters of fact, merely because they had not come to your knowledge. By this course, you reverse the relations of the parties; for, whereas you promoted me awhile ago to be your teacher, in relation to the specific subject which I had made my life study, you are now assuming to be mine. But, the worst phase of your censure is, that you assume to know my duty better than I know it myself, which is an aggression upon my personal liberty, to which I can submit on no account." (pp. 31, 32.)

With reference to the present crisis, a brief word of our own. The rulers at Washington can have but one purpose, and this *not* the abolition of slavery. The maintenance of the federal government in the enforcement of its laws, is all that has any right to engage their official attention. But the English revolution that brought the head of Charles the First to the block did not end where its first and "constitutional" movers intended it should; the American revolution was based upon a moderate claim; it issued in something essentially different—the demand for representation as the condition of taxation did not even look towards independence; the Nationel Assembly in France that simply demanded that all the landed estates should be taxed for the support of the government, had no thought of the levelling processes that were to abolish, for a time, royalty and rank. Our rulers and and our people can have, at present, only a constitutional aim. Something, however, assures us, that God has another and different purpose. Is this the utter eradication of the *cause* of our national calamity? In any event, may God's will be done!

4. Life in Spain: Past and Present. By Walter Thornbury. With Illustrations. New York: Harper & Brothers. 1860, pp. 388.

This belongs to the class of books which are all the better for what in most cases is a defect—a rambling style. The author gives an account of his travels in Spain, making each important sight or event a text illustrative of the past or present of that least known of European nations. He seems to have started without a settled purpose beyond that of pleasure, and is content to see what shall come before him, panorama like, as he rambles over Spain. Frequent experience in hotel life, suggests an amusing sketch of Spanish dinners and hotels. A visit to the "Merced, once a convent, now the picture museum of Seville," and "the choicest nest of Murillos in the world," inspires an instructive chapter on Murillo and his Picture Children." A sight of La Mancha of course introduces a sketch biographical and critical of Cervantes. This portion of the book contains fresh suggestions on novel writing, its history and uses. Only a careful and philosophic reader of fiction could have composed the chapter on "The Spain of Cervantes and the Spain of Gil Blas." The author's style is sometimes too flippant, and occasionally affects quaintness. On the whole, he has made a book richly worth reading.

5. The Wits and Beaux of Society. By Grace and Philip Wharton. With Illustrations from Drawings by H. K. Browne and James Godwin. New York: Harper & Brothers. 1861. pp. 481.

In its way, this is a history of England from the Restoration to the death of Sydney Smith. It presents the funny phase of English Society, from the ascendency of the eminent courtier, Villiers, the second Duke of Buckingham, to that of the eccentric Scotch divine whose sermons are dull and prosy, but whose ponderous review-articles and metaphysical essays are sometimes almost frivolous in the excess of humor. The stern and gloomy reign of the Puritans—during which neither joke, repartee, nor shadow of merriment was tolerated—by a necessary reaction, gave existence to a race of Wits whose scintillations sparkle all through the succeeding British annals. The "Royal Wit," who came with the Restoration, opens a new vein in the heretofore sullen and melancholy body of the English nation. Unfortunately, this otherwise agreeable variation in the experience of our ancestors, was too often at the expense of morality, religion, and sometimes even of the show of decency. It is painful to be compelled to smile at the pranks of Rochester, Beau Fielding, Hervey, and Sheridan. In our own age, and especially

in our country, wit and humor are very generally the allies of virtue—the foes of vice and hypocracy. Not so in the times of the Georges in England. The wits flourished in the sunshine of the Court. They were apologists for "reigning" vice, seldom its censors. Their career had much to do in giving direction to the current of English history. One's faith in an overruling providence must be strong to believe the world is better off because the "Wits and Beaux," sketched in the book before us, have lived in it.

6. The New American Cyclopædia: A Popular Dictionary of General Knowledge. Edited by George Ripley and Charles A. Dana. Volume XII. Mozambique—Parr. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1861.

The distracting cry of war that has put an embargo on nearly every book enterprise, does not prevent the prompt appearance of volumes due of the New Cyclopædia. It is one of the few works, that will find a market even in these times of peculiar business depression. Let us confess, that while the times found us profoundly ignorant in the literature of war, the Cyclopædia has done something towards educating us in that now quite essential department of knowledge. Such articles as "Army," "Navy," "Fortifications," "Gunnery" and "Militia," scattered through the twelve volumes thus far issued, have been peculiarly acceptable. The volume just issued has among the larger articles, those on "Music," "Mythology," "Naturalization," "Navigation," "Netherlands," "New York," "Ohio," "Pacific Ocean," "Papal States," "Paris." Two articles on "New Orleans" and "Mississippi River," are timely. Preliminary reading on the same subject somewhat qualified us to appreciate the accuracy and thoroughness of the article on "Nineveh." The New Cyclopædia sustains its reputation for fidelity, impartiality and discrimination. Our standing advice is, purchase the volumes as they appear.

7. Self Made Men. By Chas. C. B. Seymour. New York: Harper & Brothers.

Such a book is a spur to young ambition, holding before it models for example, and giving practical illustrations of the fruits of industrial energy. It gives the lives of over sixty distinguished persons who have attained eminence in spite of the adverse circumstances of birth and fortune. Parents should put the book into the hands of their sons. It might do them incalculable good.

Art. XXV.

The Religion of Zoroaster.

[Continued.]

It now remains to consider a few of those things in which the Parsees have imitated the Jews and Christians.

The earlier prophets of Israel put forth their admonitions in a direct and natural form, clothed indeed in a poetic and lofty style, abounding in figures and illustrations, yet so plain as to present few difficulties to an intelligent contemporary. The word of the Lord came to one, saying thus and so. We can never be certain what precise meaning they attached to this formula, yet it is not unreasonable to suppose their meaning to have been that the ideas constituting the burden of their message arose in their minds with a vividness that could only have resulted from the inspiration of the Almighty. But a great change came over the spirit of prophecy. The seer was no longer merely told the lesson he should publish, but was carried in the spirit here and there, shown mysterious pageants and enigmatical visions of horses, birds, beasts and monstrous creatures, with many heads, wings and eyes, which moved and were transformed with the celerity of figures in dreams, but with a purpose that to the uninitiated beholder was perfectly unintelligible. "The word of the Lord" no longer spoke; but an angel explained the mystery. The difference will be seen at once by comparing the prophecy of Zechariah, written after the captivity, with those of Isaiah or Amos. But the visionary style reached its full developement in the book of Daniel, a production which has always exercised a strange fascination over a certain class of minds. Among the ancients it furnished a model for many imitations, and in modern times has given unlimited exercise to credulous commentators. The principal books obviously formed after this model are five in number, the Book of Enoch, the Ascension of Isaiah, the Revelation of St. John, the Fourth Book of Ezra, and the Revelations of Ardai Virâf. The Book of Enoch is quoted in the canonical epistle of Jude and by many of the Fathers. It was well known to the

authors of the Book Sohar, in the tenth century; but then totally disappeared until an Ethiopic version of it was discovered in Abyssinia about the close of the last century. Translations were then published, in France by Sylvestre de Sacy, and in England by Professor, afterwards Bishop, Lawrence. Critics are by no means agreed respecting its date; but the prevailing opinion has been that it was written about thirty-seven years before the birth of Christ. The patriarch Enoch is there shown a series of visions representing the history of the world, or rather of the Jewish race, from the assumed age of the seer to the end of time, all of which are explained by an angel. The later portions, representing the times of the real author, are of course most fully elaborated. The chosen people are represented by sheep, as in Matthew xxv., most cruelly pecked and pillaged by eagles, ravens, vultures and other birds of prey. At length a deliverer is raised up for them. A long and desperate conflict ensues in which the hero is at last completely victorious, by the help of "the Lord of the sheep." All the enemies are gathered together, and the last judgment ensues. They are condemned and sent down to hell, and the earth closes over them. The angels of old, "who kept not their first estate," are also judged. Then "all the beasts of the field and the fowls of heaven" come together, are transformed into "white cattle," and adore the great chief of the herd forever. In this manner is foreshadowed the millennial age of universal blessedness.

The book contains a minute account of the fallen angels, and of the origin and fate of the demons. It has a good many incidental points of agreement with the later doctrines of the Parsees; and is valuable for the illustration of the New Testament, particularly of the Apocalypse.

The Ascension of Isaiah was known to Origen, Epiphanius, and others of the Fathers, but disappeared from the fifth to the eleventh century, when it emerged to notice for a short time, and again vanished. It was recovered in the present century in the same manner as the preceding, translated and published in the year 1819, by Professor Lawrence at Oxford from an Amharic version. The book is evidently the production of a Christian Jew, and written as late at least as the reign of Nero. Lawrence placed its date about A. D. 64. It may perhaps be somewhat later.

According to the argument of the book, King Hezekiah summons together all the people and the prophets, and in their presence Isaiah unfolds to the king the great truths of religion. The soul of the prophet is then temporarily separated from his body and conducted away by an angel to see things never beheld by the natural eye.[1] He is first taken up to the firmament where he is shown Samael and his arts, and a parallel of the contentions and wickedness that prevail on earth. The angel informs him,—"This state of things has been from the beginning of the world, and will continue till he shall come whom you shall see; then it shall cease." He is next conducted through the first five heavens, each of which is more splendid than the preceding. In each there is a throne, with angels standing on the right hand and the left. In the sixth heaven there is no throne; the angels are all equal in splendor, and all praise God the Father, Son and Holy Ghost. In the seventh, he sees Christ himself and the Holy Ghost, and reads in a book the wonderful birth and suffering of the Son of God. Above all he is told of the coming of Antichrist, the second advent of the Messiah, and the overthrow and punishment of the devil and his angels. "And after a thousand three hundred and thirty-two days the Lord will come with his angels, and the power of his saints, from the seventh heaven, and in the glory of the seventh heaven, and shall cast down Berial and his powers to Gehenna." On his return to natural consciousness the prophet recounts his vision to the king, and it is published to the people.[2] Now this curious book served the Parsees for the immediate pattern of the Ardai Virâf Nameh, the story of which is thus told by Persian writers. King Ardeshir, about A.D. 230, being zealous to restore the ancient religion, called a great œcumenical council of forty thousand Magi to correct errors and publish the faith anew. This multitude was reduced by repeated elections successively to four hundred, forty, seven, and one, the final choice falling on a young

[1] Compare 2 Cor. xii. 4.

[2] "Ascensio Isaiae vatis, opusculum pseudepigraphum, multis abhinc saeculis, ut videtur, deperditum, nunc autem apud Æthiopas compertum, et cum versione latina anglicanaque publici juris factum a *Ric Lawrence*." Gfrörer's Urchristenthum 1-65. Spiegel's Avesta 1, Einleit 21.

priest of eminent piety, Ardai Virasp, or Virâf. He, after the requisite formalities, a part of which consisted in emptying three times the wine-cup of Vistaspa, fell asleep. His soul departed from his body for seven days, during which the assembled Magi recited the ritual. The Ized Serosh accompanied the seer on a tour through the seven heavens and explained the various visions seen on the way, some of which were to be understood literally, while others were highly metaphorical. On the eighth day Ardai Virâf awoke and, in conformity with a command received in heaven from Ormazd, related all that had been communicated to him, which was written down from his lips, and became one of the chief text books of the restored Magism. This story of the origin of the book is, of course, in great part a fiction in imitation of the account of the pseudo-Isaiah; yet so much is clear, that the Revelation of Ardai Virâf is one of the most important authorities for the later Parsism, that it is in its plan an obvious copy of the Ascension of Isaiah, and that it was professedly written long after its Christian prototype. Of the two remaining works of this class the Book of Revelation is familiar to every one, and the fourth Book of Ezra so closely resembles it in form and purport as to necessitate the conviction that either the one served as a model for the other, or that both were the common product of the same circle of ideas. These two books, however, although highly important, each for the elucidation of the other, and both as records of opinions and expectations prevalent in the latter part of the first century, do not immediately concern our inquiry, and so may be passed without further examination.

We shall now be able to understand why there are so many points of coincidence between our Scriptures and the *later* Parsee books. Many of these we have already adverted to in our analysis of the Magian system, and a full enumeration of them is not necessary. Yet for the sake of placing the subject in a clearer light, we may recapitulate a few of the more prominent coincidences. We may notice the creation of the world in six successive periods, with almost the same distribution of work as in the first chapter of Genesis, the resting of the Deity from his labors, and the institution of religious festivals commemorative of that rest. There is next the entrance of the Evil One into the world

in the disguise of a serpent, and his temptation of the first pair by the offer of fruit; and the clothing of skins which they made themselves. It may well be questioned whether the frequent recurrence of the number seven, and even the doctrine of the seven Amshaspands, and the corresponding seven chief devils, be not a derivative of the same source. Certain it is that in the Vendidad and Yasna, which alone have any title to be considered ancient, there are not seven archangels, but *six*, and no stress is laid on the particular number. It is after the Christian era that Serosh is added to make the number seven. Now the doctrine of seven archangels, or angels of ministration, is old among the Jews. The angel says to Tobit (xii. 15,) "I am Raphael, one of the seven holy angels who present the prayers of the saints, and enter in before the glory of the Holy One." So also the Pirke Eliezer,—"A veil is extended before the throne of God, and the seven angels who were first created, minister before the veil."[3] And in relation to the seven arch-fiends, the Book of Enoch makes the leaders of the fallen angels seven in number, bearing the double character at once of seven spirits and seven stars. The Ulema-i-Islam takes this idea and amplifies it after the usual manner of a later paraphrast. "The dwellers in Paradise bound Ahriman in hell, and the seven deevs in heaven. These are called Sireh, Nireh, Naenkish, Tarmad, Heshem, Sibih, and Batsir. Ormazd formed out of each of these seven an orb of light, and gave them divine names; thus were formed the seven planets, Saturn, Jupiter, Mars, the Sun, Venus, Mercury, and the Moon." Here, too, we have the idea of a war in heaven between the celestial host on the one hand and the Devil and his angels on the other, and the expulsion and binding of the latter, all of which had been already announced in the Revelation of John.[4] We may also include here the sevenfold distribution of offices in the church, common to both the Parsees and the Christians of the East, and a number of peculiar usages.[5] The expectation of a great prophet near the end of the world, to be born of a virgin, to be preceded by two special forerunners, and great moral and physical commotions, and who shall ultimately raise the dead; and the belief in a final judgment are also Jew-Christian ideas transplanted into a foreign and fertile soil.

[3] Gfrörer's Urchristenthum i. 361, Rev. i. 4, iii. 1, iv. 5.
[4] Rev. xii. 7, xx. 1. [5] Spiegel's Avesta 11, Einleit. 120.

These and other points common to the Jews or Christians and the Parsees indicate a unity of origin for many things; and after what has been said it can hardly be doubted to which people the original belongs. The Judæo-Christian and Zoroastrian scriptures are, to a considerable extent, parallel, but by no means conterminous, lines. Even conceding that many parts of our scriptures are much less ancient than has generally been believed, still the series reaches vastly farther into the remote past than does the Avesta. So almost, if not quite everything common to, and distinctive of, both systems may be traced to a higher antiquity in the Jewish line than in the Persian. The Parsee, then, has followed the Jew. Some ideas and influences may indeed have passed in the opposite direction, but this is mere conjecture; and if such there be they will be likely to be found in the Talmudic writers, or possibly even in the New Testament, and by no means in the Old. The Persian doctrines concerning evil spirits may have had some effect on the superstitions of the Jews. This was the side most open to innovation, and if such an influence could be proved, there would be no difficulty in believing that it might have helped to give shape to the ideas prevalent in the time of Christ concerning demons and demoniacal possession. But of this, as we have said, we have thus far failed to find any distinct evidence.

In examining the connection between the religions of Jehovah and of Ormazd, three points seem worthy of more particular consideration,—the doctrine of the Devil, the doctrine of the Resurrection, and the Manichean heresy.

According to the current Jewish belief, in the century preceding the appearance of Christ, as evidenced by the Book of Enoch, the heavenly watchers, to the number of two hundred, became enamored of the beautiful daughters of Cain and descended to the earth. They thus forfeited their rank and their holy estate. They were arrested and confined in chains and darkness to the judgment of the great day.[6] These heavenly watchers, moreover, were stars conformably to Job xxxviii. 7. The principal ones were seven in number. The chief of all had many names, as Samiaza, Samael, Satan, Berial, &c. Thus the Pseudo-

[6] Compare 2 Peter ii. 4 and Jude vi.

Enoch relates, "I perceived a place which had neither the firmament of heaven over it, nor the solid land beneath it, nor water over it, nor anything around it, but the place was desolate. And there I saw seven stars, like great shining mountains, and like spirits beseeching me. Then said the angel, 'This place is to be the prison of the stars of the host of heaven until the end of heaven and earth. They are those who transgressed the command of God before their time was come; for they came not at the right time. Therefore his anger burned against them and he bound them until the end of their time of punishment in the hidden year.'"

A somewhat different doctrine is known to have prevailed about the same time, according to which these great spirits of evil reside in the higher regions of the atmosphere. So, in the Ascensio Isaiæ, Christ in descending to become incarnate passed under an incognito through the territory of the spirits of the air.[7] This idea of the fiends having their dominion in the atmosphere, and there exercising great power is one that often recurs in the New Testament.[8] There were also various other opinions which it would be a waste of time to try to harmonize.

The incarcerated or banished angels, however, left behind them on earth a remembrance in their half human, half angelic progeny, the *nephilim*, or giants—the Pseudo-Enoch reckons the *nephilim* the children of the giants. The descendants of these again were the *gibborim*, or mighty ones. When these had perished by war and by the waters of Noah, their souls, inheriting the malignity and peculiar vitality of their fathers, became the wandering *Shedim*, *Daimones*, or *Devils*, which have figured so largely in the superstitions of the East. A Talmudic writer says of them: "Six things are said of the Shedim, in three of which they agree with the angels of ministration, and in three resemble men. The three particulars in which they are like the angels of ministration are, that they have wings like the angels, that they fly from one end of the world to the other like the angels, and lastly that they know what is to happen in the future. What! do you mean that they know the future? Not so; but they hear it behind the veil, like the angels. The three things in which they resemble men are these,—that they

[7] Cap. x. 29. [8] Ephes. ii. 2, vi. 12. Col. i. 13. John xii. 31, xiv. 30, xvi. 11.

eat and drink like men, that they are fruitful and multiply like men, and that they die like men."[9] Their number was supposed to be enormous. "Rabbi Afai said: they are more numerous than we, and they surround us continually as the upturned earth the holes in the vineyard in which the vines stand. Raf Huna conjectures, each human being has 10,000 such spirits on his right hand and 1000 on his left."[10] These demons cause all conceivable mischief, including many kinds of sickness and infirmity. They delight in old ruins, burial places, and depositories of filth and offal. They have the power of entering into and maintaining possession of houses, persons, and even animals. This possession in the case of persons is evidenced by lunacy, dumbness, deafness, epilepsy, curvature of the spine, carditis, or some other peculiar and distressing malady. In animals, hydrophobia was the most decisive symptom. How widely spread and deeply rooted this belief in demons was, and still is, must be familiar to every one at all acquainted with eastern opinion. In most particulars the character here given of the demons agrees with what has already been said of the *deevs* and *drukhs*, or *daroudjis*. The similarity between the Jewish and Persian notions is so great that we are compelled to suppose some connection, for which we know there was ample opportunity, yet it is not easy to determine which people had the priority. Most probably the influence was mutual. The doctrine of demoniacal possession, the most common form of demoniac manifestation believed in by the Jews of Palestine in the time of Christ, does not occur in a distinct form in the Vendidad, compiled say two hundred years earlier; nor do we know anything to prove that the Persians held the doctrine at or before that time.

We come, then, to the question, How old is the belief in evil spirits among the Jews? And here it is well to distinguish between demons, or devils, in the plural, and the Devil, or Satan, in the singular. The former are a very promiscuous multitude, while the latter is a single, distinct personage of high, unholy eminence.

Perhaps there never was a people, especially in the olden time, without a belief in supersensuous intelligences of a

[9] Tract Chagigah Babylon, fol. 16, a. [10] Tract Berachot Babylon, fol. 6, a.

malevolent character. At least we cannot show a time when the Hebrew race did not believe in such beings. The images which Rachel hid, the golden calves of Aaron and Jereboam, the molten image of Micah, the teraphim, Baalim and Astaroth, all represented invisible, supernatural powers, not only unconnected with, but hostile to, Jehovah and his angels. The misconception persisted in by many Jews and Christians, that the metallic, wooden, or stone figure itself was the god, was the mere offspring of ignorance and sectarian prejudice. There is as little sense and justice in saying that the Greeks believed the gold and ivory figure at Olympia to be the chief and father of gods and men as there would be in saying that the Americans fancy the bronze statue of Jefferson to have written the Declaration of Independence. The Jews themselves, in more earnest moods, acknowledged the foreign gods to be real beings, while they stigmatized them by odious names. "They sacrificed to devils, not to God, to gods whom they knew not," says the book of Deuteronomy;[11] and the accusation is repeated by the apocryphal Baruch, and by the apostle Paul. Moses is commanded to say to the children of Israel that "they shall no more offer their sacrifices unto devls;[12] and the Psalmist recounting the errors and sins of his people, declares that they were mingled among the heathen and learned their works, and they served their idols (*atsabeihem*) which were a snare unto them. Yea they sacrificed their sons and their daughters unto devils," (*shedim.*)[13] The writer of the books of Chronicles, while setting forth in his usual strong manner the sins of the first Jereboam, says, "And he ordained him priests for the high places, and for the devils, and for the calves which he had made."[14] We will not stop just at this point to try to determine the date at which each of these passages was written, or to quibble over the precise words of the original. No sound criticism will invalidate the position that, so far as the testimony goes, the Hebrews from the first habitually believed the gods of their neighbors to be real beings, whom they called by very naughty names.

There were also the familiar spirits (*oboth*) of which we know so little. For although they are often mentioned, it

[11] Deut. xxxii. 17. Baruch iv. 7. 1 Cor. x. 20. [12] Lev. xvii. 7.
[13] Ps. cvi. 25. [14] 2 Chron. xi. 15.

is in a manner too cursory and incidental to give much information; and probably the belief in them was not very consistent or definite. From a comparison, however, of all the passages, it would seem that they were conceived of as spiritual beings whose peculiar attribute was foreknowledge. The *ob* seems to have been sometimes regarded as a shade or ghost issuing from the ground. Thus Isaiah (xxix. 4) says to Egypt,—"*vehajah cheob mëerets kolcha,—and thy voice shall be like that of an ob out of the ground.*" It seems also to have been conceived of as possessing or inhabiting a person. So we read (Lev. xx. 27) of an "*ish o ishah chijihjeh bahem ob,—a man or woman in whom is an ob;*" and Saul said to his servants,—"*Bakshu-li esheth baälath ob,—seek me a woman in whom is an ob.*" This idea of a foreboding spirit having its habitation in a human being, who serves as its mouthpiece, is especially corroborated by the story in the sixteenth chapter of Acts, where Paul "turned and said *to the spirit*, I command thee in the name of Jesus Christ to come out of her. And *he came out* the same hour." The Septuagint translators incline to consider the dealers with *oboth* as ventriloquists, which some of them may well have been in reality; but what they were in fact is one thing, and what they were popularly believed to be quite another. We are at present concerned only with the history of opinions.

Of the *Lilith* we have spoken already.

There are two words in our Hebrew Bibles commonly rendered *devil* or *devils*—*Shed* and *Sair*. According to Gesenius, *Shed* means primarily *Lord*, and is thus precisely equivalent to *Baal*. The secondary meaning is that of a foreign or heathen god, and finally an evil spirit, which signification it has also in the Syriac. It is used, however, only in the plural, and occurs twice in the Old Testament, (Deut. xxxii. 17, Ps. cvi. 37) in both which cases it is rendered *devils* in our English version. As we have seen, the rabbins make frequent mention of the *Shedim*, and always as evil spirits. The designation of the *Saïrim* starts from a wholly different point of view. With a passing bow to the orthodoxy of the old Hebrew grammars, we would beg to suggest the following order of derivation. First there is the noun *sear*, *hair;* then the verb *saär*, to *shudder*, either from cold or terror, evidenced particularly by the bristling

up of the hair; and lastly the adjectives *seir* and *sair*, *hairy*, *rough*, *shaggy*, of frequent occurrence and quite general application. The term is especially applied to goats, both as an adjective and substantive, thus "*Seir izzim, a buck of the goats*" (Gen. xxxvii. 31, Lev. iv. 23, xvi. 5, &c.;) "*Seir hachattath, the goat of the sin-offering*" (Lev. ix. 3–15, x. 16, &c.) It is next applied to some unknown beings that haunt desolate places and ruins, precisely in accordance with the current belief in evil spirits. Our English Bibles render it in this connection *satyr*, in conformity with a widely prevalent belief in goblins having more or less the form of the goat. In this sense the word occurs only twice. Isaiah, predicting the utter desolation of Babylon, says, (xiii. 21) "and their houses shall be full of doleful creatures; and owls shall dwell there, and satys (*saïrim*) shall dance there." The Jews, from a time when they were very competent judges of the meaning of their own language and superstitions, left for us little doubt as to how they understood the passage. The author of the book of Baruch, evidently with this prophecy in his eye, says of the same city, "For fire shall come upon her from the Everlasting, long to endure; and she shall be inhabited of devils for a great time" (iv. 35.) The same comment is repeated by St. John, Rev. xviii. 2. "Babylon the great is fallen, is fallen, and is become the habitation of devils and the hold of every foul spirit." The other passage occurs in Isaiah's prediction of the doom of Edom (xxxiv. 14) where the *saïr* is named in connection with the *lilith*. "The wild beasts of the desert also shall meet with the wild beasts of the island and the *saïr* shall cry to his fellow; the *lilith* also shall rest there." Finally the word is twice distinctly used to denote gentile deities, and translated "devils" in passages already referred to (Lev. xvii. 7, 2 Chron. xi. 15.) We are quite confident that in all these instances the authorised version correctly expresses the sense of the original word. We have first the general idea of anything hairy, or shaggy, secondly a goat, thirdly a preternatural being with horns and hoofs, and hirsute capriform aspect, haunting deserts and old ruins, and lastly the notion of fiend in general, applied to the gods of the heathen.

In this connection we might mention the term *Azazel*, a word made only more doubtful by a vast amount of con-

flicting interpretation, much of which, however, has been influenced by the foregone determination not to interpret anything so as to conflict with the doctrines of the Church. The Arabs understood Azazel to be a demon dwelling in the desert. The word occurs in the Bible only in the 16th chapter of Leviticus, where its usage is very singular, but its peculiarity is entirely lost in our translation, which invariably renders it scape-goat. It is four times repeated, always preceded by the preposition *la*, *to* or *for*, and twice placed in contrast with the name of Jehovah. This will be shown by leaving the word untranslated. "And he (Aaron) shall take the two goats and present them before the Lord, at the door of the tabernacle of the congregation. And Aaron shall cast lots upon the two goats; one lot for *Jehovah*, and the other lot for *Azazel*." According to Maimonides,[15] the two lots were inscribed, *pro Domino* and *pro Asasel*.— The statute proceeds: "And Aaron shall bring the goat on which the Lord's lot fell, and offer him for a sin-offering. But the goat on which Azazel's lot fell shall be presented alive before the Lord, to make an atonement with him, and to let him go to Azazel into the wilderness." (v. 7–10.) The animal was then sent away by a messenger into the desert; and it is added in the twenty-sixth verse,—"And he that let go the goat to Azazel shall wash his clothes, and bathe his flesh in water, and afterwards come into the camp." Some of the Rabbins frankly admitted that the goat was offered to Sammael as a bribe, that he might not report before the Lord the sins of the people of Israel.[16] Gesenius and several eminent scholars find in the institution the relic of a very ancient devil-worship, retained with little alteration, but probably with a change of purpose in the established religion of the Jews.[17]

One of the most noticeable features of all religions is the gradual retiring of the Deity into the background, and the substitution of a multitude of subordinate agencies. It is rarely that a divinity appears to an orderly and civilized

[15] In Pfeiffer's Dubia Vexata 260. [16] Shalsheleth Haccabala, fol. 6.

[17] See more in Calmet's Dictionary, Meninski's Arabic Lexicon and Gesenius' Heb. Lex. sub voce; Gesenius' H. Thesaurus, p. 1012; Spencer de Leg. Hebraeorum ritualibus iii. Diss. viii. p. 1039; Reland de Religione Muhammed 189; Bochart's Hierozoicon P. i. p. 651; Suicer Thes. Eccl. i. p. 468; Ghillany's Menschenopfer.

community. When Hecataeus boasted to the priests of Thebes that he was descended in the sixteenth generation from a god, they showed him the statues of their high priests, numbering three hundred and forty-five, each of whom was a man, the son of a man, his immediate predecessor, and they refused to believe that any man was ever born of a god. They declared that in all the time occupied by those many generations no god had ever appeared in human form.[18] If it be urged that it is only in periods when human culture is low or human affairs calamitous or chaotic that divine manifestations are needed, we have to reply that this is at least admitting those celestial visits to occur mostly under circumstances where human testimony is least reliable. God is represented as walking in the garden of Eden in the cool of the day, eating the veal and cakes of Abraham, wrestling with Jacob, and exhibiting his person to Moses among the rocks of Horeb; but such familiarities would not have been thought of in the days of Hezekiah. An angel was then thought sufficient for the overthrow of an imperial army. The first idea of Satan seems to be due to this principle. He is an agency devised to relieve the Almighty of work unbecoming the immediate hand of the Deity. The doctrine is a comparatively late one, but almost the whole angelology and demonology of the Jews is a late development; and the same developing process is observable in all religious systems. There was certainly a time in the history of the Jews when the Devil was not yet installed and fully recognized. Nay, his office seems to be expressly denied. Jehovah says in Isaiah (xlv. 7,) "I form the light and create darkness, I make peace and create evil; I, the Lord, do all these things;" and again, "Shall there be evil in a city, and Jehovah hath not done it?"[19] Nothing could be more at variance with the character of Ormazd than the claim here put forth; and as the declaration in Isaiah is part of an address to Cyrus, it looks much like an intentional disavowal of the Persian dualism. Job, too, in all his afflictions attributes his suffering to the Almighty, "Shall we receive good at the hand of the Lord, and shall we not receive evil also?" The historian of the Kings relates how Jehovah was angry with Israel, and moved

[18] Herodotus ii. 142.

[19] Amos iii. 6.

David to number the people, that he might have an opportunity to do them a mischief; but the later Chronicler softens the narrative by interposing the agency of Satan.[20]

The passing notices of Satan in the Bible afford but scanty information concerning his history, character, and sphere of action; a remark which unfortunately applies to a great many other subjects. The hasty hints might be plain enough to those who heard them and were familiar with contemporary belief; but they are dark and dubious to us who are parted from the writers by so many thousand years, so many leagues of land and ocean, and such an arid wilderness of controversy. The idea, too, was undoubtedly a mutable and growing one, assuming from time to time very various forms. It is clear, however, that in the very early times the agents of evil were not conceived of as separate from and hostile to Jehovah. They were his ministers, doubtless estimated according to the nature of their work. Saul's melancholy is attributed to "*an evil spirit from the Lord.*" Such parasites were supposed to hang about the celestial court willing to do dishonest jobs which purer spirits declined. In this respect the narrative in the first book of Kings, chapter twenty-second, is of peculiar interest. The kings of Israel and Judah undertake a joint expedition against the Syrians, but, like all leaders in those ages, wish to consult the oracles concerning so important an enterprise. The prophets of Israel, "about four hundred men," unanimously predict a splendid victory; but Jehoshaphat wishes to hear Micaiah. That prophet is sent for and gives a discouraging response. In reply to a remark of Ahab he proceeds to disclose a wonderful secret of transactions behind the scenes. No hint is given that what he here relates is a mere apologue in the manner of Esop. He declares it directly as "the word of the Lord." Either Micaiah flatly lies before the two kings or he has really seen what he tells. But if he is merely uttering a pungent sarcasm in the form of a fable, that does not in the least affect our argument as to the ideas then held by the Jews. The fabulist forms his groups out of figures already well known and his plots from familiar incidents; else his lessons would lose all their point and value. His foxes are always cunning, his wolves voracious, and his magpies garrulous; and

[20] Compare 2 Sam. xxiv. 1 with 1 Chron. xxi. 1.

his hogs are never so absurd as to seek for acorns under the elms. So if the prophet were merely weaving a fable whose scene was heaven, it would still be the familiar heaven his hearers knew and believed in. But he proceeds in most solemn form,—"Hear thou the word of the Lord: I saw the Lord sitting on his throne, and all the host of heaven standing by him on his right hand and on his left. And the Lord said, Who shall persuade Ahab, that he may go up and fall at Ramoth-gilead? And one said on this manner, and another said on that manner. And there came forth a spirit, and stood before the Lord, and said, I will persuade him. And the Lord said unto him, Wherewith? And he said, I will go forth, and I will be a lying spirit in the mouth of all his prophets. And he said, Thou shalt persuade *him*, and prevail also: go forth, and do so." The view here given of heaven is the common one of that age and country,—the reflex of an eastern court, with the monarch on his throne surrounded by a host of officers and retainers—with the addition of one attendant more obsequious than honorable. The result is a close counterpart of the second book of the Iliad, where Zeus sends to Agamemnon a lying dream to deceive him to his hurt.

A somewhat similar scene is presented in the prologue to the Book of Job. Let it be premised, as accurate enough for the present purpose, that this is a strictly Hebrew book, written some time in the seventh century before Christ, by an Israelite inhabiting, or at least familiar with, the pastoral country stretching away eastward from the Jordan towards the Euphrates. The book is obviously a work of fiction; but that does not in the least affect the fidelity of its representations. The purport of the opening scene, as we understand it, is as follows. The celestial dignitaries came on a a high court day to tender their respects to, and hear the behests of, the divine majesty. "And Satan came also among them." No history or pedegree of this personage is given, as every reader is presumed to know him perfectly well. The writer tells who Job was and all his friends; but Satan needs no introduction. His appearance at the public reception occasions no surprise or alarm. There is a good understanding between him and the sovereign, and he speaks his mind with remarkable freedom. He bears considerable resemblance to the king's fool of the middle

ages, who alone is privileged to say saucy things to his lord. But he is ill-minded, moody, snarling and discontented, as if he had undergone some great disappointment that had soured his temper forever. His trade is to find fault, and for the best actions he insinuates always some selfish, ignoble motive. The Deity is indulgent to his acrid temper, and wishes to convince him that he is mistaken in thinking everybody bad at heart, and calls his attention to the virtuous, generous and pious Job, as an example sufficient in itself to convince him of his error. Satan, in his Mephistophelean way, replies in effect, "No doubt, Job knows on which side his bread is buttered. He is well paid for being good; but try him with trouble, and see if he don't curse you to your face." The lenient reply is,—"Satan, I am sure you are mistaken; indeed so confident am I of this, and so anxious to cure you of that uncharitable notion of yours, that I am willing for you to make the experiment yourself. You will see that Job will maintain his integrity." So Satan sets out and musters the most terrible agencies of ruin. Tornadoes and lightnings, bands of Sabeans and Chaldeans slay the sons and servants of the blameless man, and kill or drive off his cattle. Still "Job sinned not, nor charged God foolishly."

On the next court day Satan comes again among the others. The Lord addresses him as well as to say, "You see, Satan, I was right. All your trials have not detected the least flaw in my faithful servant." But the incurable cynic has an answer at hand: "A man will do anything to save his life. He is afraid to provoke you now, for fear you should kill him outright; but make him so sick that he thinks he shall die anyhow, and you shall see." Even this malicious suggestion is complied with, but the fault-finder is charged to spare the life of the victim experimented on, in order that amends may hereafter be made to him.

The exordium to the Book of Job is the only part of the Old Testament that affords any considerable materials for the reconstruction of the popular idea of the Hebrews, before, and about the time of, the captivity, respecting the Devil. It is quite at variance with the Arian doctrine of Ahriman, who is equal in rank to Ormazd, while the two are kept far asunder by mutual antipathies. The idea here presented is equally at variance with modern Christian be-

lief. The Satan of the Old Testament is in some sort the minister of the Almighty. The idea was no doubt constantly undergoing a gradual change and developement. A wide difference is observable between the earliest and latest notices. The first of the series remaining, we believe to be the story of the lying spirit sent to deceive Ahab; the last, the vision of Zechariah. The idea of Satan being an officer of the divine government may sound strange in modern ears, but it is familiar enough to the East. The Devil-worshippers of the Kurdish mountains justify their rites by saying that Satan is a courtier who has lost favor with his sovereign, yet who knows but he may still maintain a correspondence with the court, and may some day be restored? Will he not be very grateful to us then for remembering him now? [21]

The Satan of the twenty-first chapter of first Chronicles is but a slight advance on the "lying spirit" that tempted Ahab to his death. In second Samuel (xxiv. 1) it is explicitly stated that "the Lord's anger was kindled against Israel, and he moved David against them to say, Go number Israel and Judah;" the Chronicler says as plainly that "Satan stood up against Israel, and provoked David to number Israel." Now either Satan is here the agent of the Lord, like the lying spirit that deceived the prophets or the two statements contradict each other. The reader will choose the alternative he thinks most probable.

The passage in the third chapter of Zechariah purports to have been written at least as late as 515 B. C., probably over a century after the Book of Job. The prophet sees in one of his visions "Joshua, the high priest, standing before the angel of the Lord, and Satan standing at his right hand to resist him." One can only suppose the picture to represent Joshua pressing some request before the representative of the Deity, and Satan using whatever art and influence he had to dissuade the angel from granting the petition. But the celestial satrap is very decisive, and answers the adversary with proper severity. Slight as the notice here is, it indicates something of the change going on in the Jewish mind. We notice the greater use made of angels, and a widening of the breach between Satan and the powers divine. In the Book of Job, Satan appears before the Al-

[21] Kleuker Anhang zum Zendavesta ii. 1-49.

mighty himself, and his cynicisms are not answered by a single unkind word; but here a mere angel stops him with a very severe reproof. It is doubtless but a repetition of the same idea that the archangel Michael is represented as entering into no argument with Satan, but cutting him short with the very words in Zechariah—"the Lord rebuke thee," (Jude ix.) The passage in the Psalms (cix. 6) is exactly parallel to the one in Zechariah, if indeed it relates to Satan at all, which may be doubted. Both may well have the same date and the same idea, for the psalms are of very various dates, the ninetieth being attributed to Moses, and the hundred and thirty-seventh written in the captivity.

The querulous and fault-finding temper of Satan is well suited to the odious office of government spy or informer in which he is so often represented. So the Rabbins asserted, as we have seen, that the goat was offered to him on the day of atonement to prevent his reporting before the Lord the misdeeds of the Jews. The Jerusalem Targum to Lev. ix. 23 makes Moses say to Aaron, "Take thee a calf for a sin-offering, that Satan may not lodge a complaint against thee because of the calf which thou madest at Horeb—and say to the children of Israel: Take a he goat, because Satan is transformed into a he goat, lest he complain of you." To the same effect speaks the Shemoth Rabba (fol. 117,)—"Dixit Rabbi Jose, Michael et Samael similes sunt *sunegor* et *kategor*, qui in judicio stant, uterque loquitur et sermonem absolvit. Si Advocatus novit quod victoriam reportaturus sit, celebrat judicem, qui sententiam prolaturus est. Accusator etiam verba quædam addere cupit, sed huic statim dicit advocatus: tace et audiamus effatum judicis. Sic quoque Michael et Samael stant ante thronum Shechinæ et Satanus accusat, Michael vero merita Israelitarum proponit, Satanas plura loqui cupit, sed Michael ei silentium imponit." The same idea again recurs in the Revelation of St. John (xii. 10,)—"The accuser of our brethren is cast down which accused them before our God day and night." That the idea is the same throughout is further evidenced by the fact that some of the best manuscripts, instead of the regular form *kategoros*, *accuser*, in the passage from the Apocalypse, have the corrupt rabbinical form *kategor*.

It was a very natural result of this extreme perversity attributed to Satan that he was soon conceived of as turned out of heaven altogether. That this was a very general belief about the time of the establishment of Christianity, perhaps no well-informed person questions. The testimony of the Rabbins and of the Fathers is manifold and explicit as to their belief it it. And where an idea prevails almost universally among both Jews and Christians, while mutual animosities cut off all intercommunication, it is very safe to infer that the idea is older than Christianity. Also where the statements of the Rabbins and the Fathers are full and clear, and where passages of Scripture bear plainly on the face of them the appearance of relating to the same subjects and asserting the same things, there arises a strong presumption that the import of the two classes of authorities is the same. Hence the present writer cannot escape the conviction that all those passages which speak of war in heaven, and especially of a contest between Michael and the Devil; of the Devil's being cast out and falling from heaven, do relate to that well-known idea, as familiar to the ancients as to us,—of the expulsion of Satan for bad conduct. He even thinks that Isaiah xiv. 12 refers to him who was "Archangel once, but ruined now," and that the words of Christ, (Luke x. 18,) "I beheld Satan as lightning fall from heaven," are a commentary and confirmation of that disputed passage.

Finally, we think from all the information we have that the doctrine of the Devil is indigenous among the Jews, as much as any part of their religion. There is indeed a resemblance to the symbolism of many peoples, in particular to the Egyptian Aphophis, or Typhon, the great serpent, the representative of Sin and Evil, also to the Babylonian Hea, the serpent, the lord of the great deep, and of understanding, as well as to Ahriman. But the Satan of the Jews is as distinct from each of these as they are from each other, and may fairly be considered an independent idea of native growth. S. R.

Art. XXVI.

Difficulties Surrounding the Doctrine of the Resurrection.

The Quarterly for April last has an article upon "The Resurrection." Its first words are, "The doctrine of the Resurrection is surrounded with many and great difficulties." The present article has grown out of a thought which sprang up in our mind on reading those words,—the thought that most of the "difficulties" attending the Bible doctrine of the resurrection *are its mere surroundings*, and are not at all inherent in the subject.

Scarcely any one approaches the subject of the resurrection without bringing to it the doctrine of the "immortality of the soul." All such might do well to consider that the Holy Book says nothing of any such doctrine, no scripture writer ever affirming or denying that the soul or spirit of man is, or is to be, either mortal or immortal. We do not overlook the Bible declaration, that the *soul* that sins shall die; but every intelligent person is aware that, in that passage, the word "soul" signifies *person*, and is not used in the sense it bears when we speak of the soul's immortality; also, that *death* therein denounced is the wages of sin, and has no special reference to dying in the ordinary sense. Nor are we insensible to the fact, that, from our preconceptions, the doctrine of the soul's immortality rather seems to be *implied* in several scripture texts. What we now affirm is, that that doctrine is not taught in the Scriptures in direct terms.

Man's mortal part is clearly his earthly body, scripturally denominated "a natural (or animal) body;" and what could be more philosophical than for immortality to be affirmed of the heavenly, or spiritual body? "There is a natural body," says Paul, "and," he adds, "there is a spiritual body."[1] The former he elsewhere speaks of as "our earthly house of this tabernacle,"—which is to say a temporary earthly residence for the spirit; the latter he characterizes as a permanent heavenly habitation, denominating it "a house not made with hands, eternal in the

[1] 1 Cor. xv. 44.

heavens."[2] The earthly and the heavenly, the natural and the spiritual, the temporary and the permanent—what *are* these, if not the mortal body on the one hand, and the immortal body on the other?

When the Saviour affirms concerning the raised, "Neither can they die *any more*," his language *implies* that these *had* died, even as those concerning whom the Sadducees' question was put, were expressly *said* to have died. But the death they had experienced was unquestionably that of the body; hence the Saviour's affirmation clearly is, that the subjects of the resurrection can no more die a bodily death. And since we are to have bodies in the resurrection state as truly as we have bodies here, what less does the Saviour teach then that the resurrection organism is truly immortal?

The doctrine of the soul's immortality was unquestionably held by heathen philosophers long before the advent of the Saviour; and it is certain from Josephus, that the Pharisaic Jews held the doctrine in his time, if not earlier;[3] but it does not hence follow, by any means, that the immortality of the soul is a fundamental doctrine of genuine Christianity. And the assumption that it is, might rather naturally be expected to involve the whole subject of the resurrection in "difficulties" neither few nor slight. Let our meaning not be misapprehended. The question we have been having in hand is—not whether the soul *is* immortal, but—whether the soul's immortality is truly a scripture doctrine, and thus necessarily and intimately connected with the scripture doctrine of the resurrection.

Many, in considering this subject, encounter "difficulties" from not keeping in mind the natural distinction between existence and life—between existence and a *mode* of existence. Existence is properly simple being; life, on the other hand, is a mode or manner of existence or being. The present life of man and his future life are by no means the same, nor does it seem likely that they are very similar; but our existence, in this life and in that, must be all of a piece. Our present life is our existence in these gross bodies; the future life of man is an existence in bodies far more refined that these, and probably differing from these in very

[2] 2 Cor. v. 1. [3] Antiquities of the Jews, book XVIII., chap. i. sec. 3; Jewish War, b. II., chap. viii. sec. 14.

many respects. Hence, though our *mode* of existence is destined to interruption,—though it must change from corruptible to incorruptible, from mortal to immortal, from animal to spiritual, and so of the rest,—our existence itself must be changeless and uninterrupted—the thread of our being be constantly unbroken and unattenuated. From failing to keep the above distinction in mind, death, which is but the cessation of a *mode* of existence, has been spoken of as though it were a cessation (temporarily) of existence itself; and the new life, or future mode of existence, has had language applied to it naturally conveying the idea that such life is actually a new existence. It is perhaps possible that vagueness of language like this may not proceed from vagueness of ideas in the mind of the writer; but admitting such a state of ideas to be present in the mind of a reader, the perusal of such language would seem illy calculated to remedy the evil.

The christian world in general regard the resurrection as specifically the re-uniting of soul and body. Starting from this point, the resurrection of the earthly body is of course held; and "difficulties" seemingly insurmountable have been encountered in the attempt to explain how it can be possible for each individual to have the same body in the future life as in this. Universalists in general have quite outgrown this absurd dogma; yet it may not be altogether useless to observe that though the *Latin* from which the English word *re*surrection comes may perhaps import a *renewal* of life, and so may favor the popular idea as to what the resurrection is,—yet *anastasis*, the Greek term translated "resurrection," is quite as applicable to the reasonable doctrine of a *new* life as it is to the unreasonable one of a renewal of a former life.

Some appear to suppose that the rising, raising, or resurrection of the dead, as taught in the New Testament, is specifically an upward movement, like that of a balloon in a quiet atmosphere—in other words, that such rising is a going up to a more elevated locality. Accordingly, with such, the most that is deemed necessary in order scripturally to establish a certain point relating to the resurrection, is to refer to the remark of Peter, that "David is not as-

cended into the heavens,"[4] as if that were indisputably equivalent to saying, "David has not been raised." But the expressions ascend, ascended, caught up, &c., in the English version of the New Testament, are by no means *from the same* in the original as are the words rise and raise; nor have the two classes of expressions any very great similarity of import. It is easy to see that the resurrection of Christ and the ascension of Christ are very different things; and a similar difference exists between rising and ascending in general.

The Greek words rendered "rise" and "raise" are indeed verbs of motion—the one primarily so, the other so by usage; but the specific movement expressed or implied is—not an elevation of the entire person, but—a getting up, or being assisted up, from a reclining posture to an erect position; as when Luke tells us that Saul of Tarsus "fell to the earth" on beholding the glorified Saviour, and that the Saviour said to him, "*Arise*, and go into the city;" or, as when he tells us that Cornelius *prostrated* himself before Peter, and that "Peter *took* him *up*, [literally '*raised* him,'] saying, *Stand up;* I myself also am a man."[5] The primary ideas expressed by what we call rising and being raised, (when the dead are in mention,) are thus *getting up* on to one's feet and *standing* and erect, *being helped up* on to one's feet and *caused* to stand erect. A dead body being incapable of standing, dead persons were, in the early times, conceived of as *lying prostrate*, and were spoken of as having fallen into that position from being unable to stand, or else as having lain down, and so taken that position voluntarily. A reclining posture being thus used to symbolize a state of death, it was entirely natural that living after death *and* being caused to live after death, should be represented as getting up and standing erect *and* being helped up and caused thus to stand—in brief, as rising *and* being raised.

Some argue as if they supposed that the resurrection *of* the dead and the resurrection *from* the dead are convertible expressions in the Scriptures, only that in their view the latter is somewhat the stronger of the two, being equivalent (so they seem to suppose) to saying "the resurrection from death." Accordingly, the position which the common ver-

[4] Acts ii. 34. [5] Acts ix. 4-6; xxii. 7-10; xxvi. 14-16; x. 25, 26.

sion makes to have been taken by Paul before Agrippa, that Christ was the first that rose from the dead, is triumphantly appealed to as proof positive that until after our Saviour's resurrection no one had ever arisen at all, that is, to an immortal life. A few facts bearing upon this point, are hereby commended to the candid consideration of all.

1. Some of the Jews in our Saviour's day seem to have held a resurrection into this mortal state, each subject thereof emerging from a land of bodiless souls, and again taking on an earthly body, to be at length relinquished at death, in like manner as he or she was supposed to have done at least once before. Witness what is related in the gospels, that John the Baptist was said to have arisen from the dead; as also, that some one of the old prophets was said to have arisen. Such supposed risings were each (supposedly) the rising of a dead person *from the dead*, that is, out from among them—hence, probably, the phraseology in question.

2. Scripturally, with one or two *apparent* exceptions, the dead in general are never said to rise *from the dead*. Christ arose from the dead; but the dead in general simply rise or are raised.

3. Those few persons who were raised from the dead in bible times, were all raised to mere mortal life, Jesus Christ only excepted. He, therefore, is not merely the First, but also the Last, and of course the *only* one, ever raised from the dead to an immortal life.

4. The scripture expression "the dead" is by no means synonimous with death, or a state of death—on the contrary, it is a *plural* expression, generally a personal one, and in general exactly equivalent to the phrase "those who have died."

It must be seen from the above facts, that a rising from the dead is a rising from those having died. The employment of such language by the scripture writers is to be accounted for not alone by the probable fact that such language was in common use, but in part also by the consideration that the dead in general are not *seen* by us after their decease, and so when a raised individual (really or supposedly raised) *was* seen after his decease, he was conceived of—not as having arisen simply, or *along with* the dead in general, but—as having arisen out from among the dead, or

separately. It would seem that the "difficulties" encompassing the doctrine of the resurrection might, in many instances, be very considerably lessened by a proper attention to the above facts.

From the arguments of some (and those not illiterate persons either,) one would almost suppose that they take the Scriptures to have been written in the English tongue, yea even in the exact terms of the common version, supplied words and all. Thus in order to prove, scripturally, that Jesus Christ is *the procuring cause* of the resurrection for man, this text has been confidently adduced: "For since by man *came* death, by man *came* also the resurrection of the dead." [6] But is it not apparent here, that the force of the text in proving that point, depends mainly —not to say entirely—upon the *italic* word "*came*"? Yet this, in each member of the sentence is supplied, the text literally being,—"For since through a man, the death, through a man, also, the resurrection of the dead."

If the supplied words in the text just cited are really authoritative, we are certainly under obligation to believe, as a scripture doctrine, that Christ has truly procured immortality for us,—or, at the least, that it comes through his agency. Nor this alone. We are equally under obligation to believe that some other man has by some means rendered us mortal! If it were not for Christ, men would have no resurrection to immortality; and—strange to say—were it not for some other man, men would have been immortal on earth! But (not to press the question in relation to Christ) how was it possible for that other man to effect a radical change in the essential nature of our entire race? This difficulty, in both its parts, is wholly avoided by simply considering that whether the common English version of the Scriptures is an inspired work or not, the supplied words in it make no pretensions to inspiration.

The apostle's idea may not have been that the death and the resurrection of mankind were *caused*, respectively, by two men,—but simply that by or through these men were those events revealed.

It may not be amiss to state that in no text of Scripture,

[6] 1 Cor. xv. 21.

except the one above cited, are those ideas put forth which the common version there makes to have been put forth by the Apostle. We read, indeed, that Christ "hath abolished death;" but the remainder of the text is far from even intimating that by such abolition, man's essential nature became changed, so that we now pass from this into a mode of existence we could never have inherited had not that abolition been effected. After saying that Christ "hath abolished death," he does not add, "and hath brought life and immortality into being;" but his words are, "Who hath abolished death, and hath brought life and immortality to light," —that is to say, hath *revealed* them.[7]

To the early Christians, death was abolished in much the same manner as was *the ceremonial law* to those of them who nationally were Jews. A goodly number of years before the actual passing away of the old dispensation, all that was perishable in the Mosaic system became null and void to the christian Jews—was, in effect, "abolished" to them; and yet the unbelieving Jews were still as firmly bound by it as ever, they seeing not, as did the Christians, its general transitoriness, but holding it to be in all its parts perpetual.[8] In like manner, *death* was always, intrinsically, just what it has been since Christ's time,—the termination of simply this *mode* of existence; yet it had always seemed to be what it was not,—the termination of existence itself; and it was only by the reception of the *genuine* doctrine of immortality, through faith in Christ, that death came to be viewed in its true light, and thus virtually abolished.

By the death of the first man that was known to have died, was clearly foreshown, in the early times, the death of mankind in general; so, also, by the rising of the first man that was known to have arisen, was afterward shown, with like clearness, the rising of all that had died, or that should thereafter die. "For since through a man, [was shown] the dying [of the alive,] through a man, also, [has been shown] the rising of the dead."[9]

The raising of the dead and the quickening of the dead, though doubtless nearly related to each other, are nevertheless spoken of by the Saviour as separate operations,—in like manner as the making of Adam to be a living soul or

[7] 2 Tim. i. 1. [8] Eph. ii. 15; 2 Cor. iii. 13, 14. [9] Proposed rendering of 1 Cor. xv. 21.

creature, is described by Moses as the constructing of an earthly body, and the subsequent inspiring of that body with animal life: "The Lord God formed man of the dust of the ground, *and* breathed into his nostrils the breath of life," says Moses: "The Father raiseth up the dead, *and* quickeneth them," are the words of Christ. It would thus seem that the *quickening* process, as connected with the future life, has a direct relation to the resurrection body,—has much the same relation to it as the infusing of the breath of life into Adam had to his earthly body. Animal, earthly, mortal life appears to have been bestowed in the one case; spiritual, celestial, immortal life seems to be imparted in the other. But in like manner as the breath-inspiring process is not often adverted to in the Scriptures, it being, for the most part, taken to be included in being created,—so, also, the quickening process is seldom mentioned by the scripture writers, it being in like manner taken to be included in being raised. In a few texts, however, quickening is mentioned as inclusive of the resurrection. It is true also, that, as with the resurrection, so with the quickening process,—it is frequently applied, in the Scriptures, to the subject of christian experience in this life.[10]

The raising of the dead is never, in all the Scriptures, ascribed to Christ; while, on the contrary, it is expressly and frequently ascribed to God. Witness the following text, with sundry others: "God hath both raised up the Lord, and will also raise up us by His own power." But the *quickening* of the dead (in some sense) he *participates* in, and as an active agent, notwithstanding the fact that he himself has been the passive subject of the same process. ("Put to death in the flesh, but quickened by the spirit:" literally, "in the spirit.") Thus our Lord expressly affirms that, "As the Father raiseth up the dead, and quickeneth them, even so the Son quickeneth whom he will." And the apostle styles him "a quickening spirit."[11]

The text, "For as in Adam all die, even so in Christ shall all be made alive," has direct reference to the quickening process. (The latter part were better rendered, "shall all be quickened.") The affirmation is not, "shall all be raised," nor is it exactly equivalent to that. But if

[10] Gen. ii. 7; John v. 21; Rom. iv. 17; Eph. ii. 5; Rom. viii. 11.
[11] 1 Pet. iii. 18; John v. 21; 1 Cor. xv. 45.

it were, the text could not teach that all are to be raised *by* Christ, or even through the agency of Christ, in such manner as that we, without such action or agency on his part, should have no resurrection,—because, then, it must, of necessity, also teach the absurd idea that all die the death of the body by—or through the agency of—Adam, and that were it not for his action or agency in the case, we should all of us be immortal in this life—in these bodies of flesh and blood! Nor does it (any more than it teaches this last) teach that by—or through the agency of—Christ, *all* are to be quickened.

The text in hand, as also the preceding verse, obviously recognizes some established connection between Adam and us, and between Christ and us also. What, now, is it that so connects us, if it is not the bond of a common nature? Connected thus with Adam, all die, even as Adam died; connected thus with Christ, all will be quickened even as Christ was quickened. "For even as all die [in connection with] Adam, so, also, shall all be quickened in [connection with] Christ." [12]

It sometimes happens that in having to do with the scripture testimony concerning the resurrection, very little regard, if any, is had to the palpable fact that the words rise, raise, &c., in the Scriptures, are not always employed in the same sense. It may not, indeed, be denied that those terms have some diversity of application; but then it is quietly *assumed* that in the texts cited, just that sense of the terms is actually present which it is indispensably necessary should be present in order to prove the point then in hand. The following example of Shaker-like logic may serve to illustrate this very convenient method of proving a proposition:

"*Marriage* is of anti-Christ. All true Christians are actual subjects of the *resurrection;* and 'the children of the resurrection' enter not into matrimonial relations. The scripture writers aver and exhort, 'We know that we have passed from death unto life.' 'God . . . . hath quickened us together with Christ, ... and hath raised us up together, and made us sit together in heavenly places in Christ.' 'Buried with him in baptism, wherein also ye are risen with him.' 'If ye then be risen with Christ, seek

[12] Proposed rendering of 1 Cor. xv. 22.

those things which are above.' 'Yield yourselves unto God, as those that are alive from the dead.'[13]

"Says the blessed Saviour, 'In the resurrection they neither marry, nor are given in marriage, but are as the angels of God in heaven.' 'The children of this world marry, and are given in marriage; but they which shall be accounted worthy to obtain that world, and the resurrection from the dead, neither marry, nor are given in marriage; neither can they die any more; for they are equal unto the angels, and are the children of God, being the children of the resurrection.'[14]

"What can be clearer, hence, than that marriage is contrary to Christianity,—is inadmissible to christian men and women,—is incompatible with a true christian life?—and this the more, seeing that the Scripture verily exhorts, 'Be not conformed to this world;' yea, it in truth declares, '*Now are* we the sons of God,'—and, 'The Spirit itself beareth witness with our spirit, that we *are* the children of God.'"[15]

The above reasoning in regard to marriage is openly fallacious—so *we* think—but whence the fallacy? Manifestly, for the most part, from the assumption that in the texts quoted from the gospels, just as in those brought from the epistles, the resurrection described belongs certainly to the earthly state. Apropos to the above, suppose the passage mentioning "the resurrection of damnation," be quoted as referring to the immortal state, or that this, that, or the other text which teaches the rising of all the dead, be quoted as proving, *per se*, the final holiness and happiness of all.

The scripture terms and phrases expressive of a resurrection, are applied, in the Scriptures, to several somewhat different operations, over and above that of a literal, mechanical rising, such as was meant when the Saviour said to Saul of Tarsus, "Arise," &c., as already quoted. But these different resurrections are quite distinguishable from one another—can be sorted out rather easily. The several varieties may be stated thus:

1. A simple revivification of the earthly body to mere

[13] 1 John iii. 14; Eph. ii. 4-6; Coll. ii. 12; iii. 1; Rom. vi. 13.
[14] Matt. xxii. 30; Luke xx. 34-36.
[15] Rom. xii. 2; 1 John iii. 2; Rom. viii. 16.

mortal life, as in the case of those raised from the dead in the early times.

2. The taking of a purely spiritual organism by Christ, immediately upon the event of his bodily death, ("being in flesh put to death, indeed, but in the spirit quickened, in which also he went" &c.,[16]) *and* his subsequent rising *from* the dead, by the act of putting on his earthly organism over the spiritual one, so that he could truly and properly say, "Behold my hands and my feet, that it is I myself; handle me, and see."[17]

3. A sort of transmigrational rising—a *supposed* passing of the soul into an earthly body; as when *Herod*, on hearing of the Saviour's works, concluded that the Baptist had arisen; or as when, at about the same period, "the people" said that Christ was Elias, or that at least some one of the old prophets had "risen again.)"[18]

4. A moral or religious change for the better, as in several of the texts already cited, (at 13,) and in many others, particularly the following: "Awake, thou that sleepest, and arise from the dead, and Christ shall give thee light."[19]

5. A figurative getting up and standing for *judicial* purposes, as of a witness to testify against a prisoner, or of a prisoner to hear the verdict of the Judge, whether of acquittal or condemnation: "The men of Nineveh shall *rise* in judgment with this generation, and shall condemn it." "They that have done good, to the resurrection of damnation."—(Properly, "of condemnation.")[20]

6. The after-death life, or existence in a spiritual organization: "Now that the dead are raised, [that is, 'are caused to have another life,'] even Moses showed." "How say some among you that there is no resurrection of the dead?" (That there is no living again of those having died?) "God hath both raised up the Lord, and will also raise up us." (Will also give to us another life.) "Why should it be thought a thing incredible with you that God should raise the dead?" (Rightly, "that God raises the dead?"—which is to say, That God gives to the dead another life?)[21] And so of the rest.

It may now be said, If there are so many kinds of risings,

[16] Literal rendering of 1 Peter iii. 18. [17] Luke xxiv. 39.
[18] Luke ix. 7, 8, 18, 19. [19] Eph. v. 14. [20] Matt. xii. 41; John v. 29. [21] Luke xx. 37; 1 Cor. xv. 12; vi. 14; Acts xxvi. 8.

how are we to determine in a given passage what particular kind of rising is taught? I answer, There are no great difficulties here. We must first note correctly what the topic of discourse is—the rest is easy.

In the historic accounts of one and another's having been raised by miracle, the rising of the earthly body is, of course, taught; and the same may be said in regard to that text of somewhat doubtful authenticity which sets forth that at Jesus's death, in full view of the soldiers who crucified him, and yet not till "after his resurrection," "many *bodies* of the saints which slept, arose, and came out of the graves."[22]

The resurrection of Christ being in several respects *unique*, is not likely to be confounded with any other.

The supposed rising of John the Baptist and others, as thought to be exemplified in the person of Jesus, was of a character not easily mistaken. And it can scarcely be doubted that the resurrection held by the Pharisees was of a character precisely similar.

In that large class of texts wherein the resurrection is connected with christian experience,—with the faith, feelings, conduct and character of the early Christians, the rising meant is clearly a religious or morally elevating process, or sometimes the religious or morally elevated state to which they had attained, or after which they were striving. See several texts already cited, (at 13,) as also various others, especially the following: "If by any means I might attain to the resurrection [literally, 'to the out-rising'] of the dead."[23]

In those three or four texts where rewards and punishments are set forth in connection with a rising, the rising is, of course, to be taken as part of a judicial formula, but not to be taken as part of a literal proceeding. For in like manner as it is not to be supposed that Christ's *judgment-seat* is a literal piece of cabinet work, so neither can it be reasonably supposed that in his judging of mankind, the forms and processes of ordinary tribunals are at all observed. Nor is there any necessity of supposing that the judgment can take place only in the invisible world. Paul, at Cesarea, properly said, "I stand at Cesar's judgment-seat," although the Emperor was probably at Rome; (certainly not at

[22] Matt. xxvii. 50–54. [23] Phill. iii. 11.

Cesarea;) so wherever Christianity is, men may truly, "stand before the judgment-seat of Christ," although Christ, personally, is in heaven.[24]

In our Lord's conversation with the Sadducee doctors "touching the resurrection of the dead," the matter in debate was a question—neither of judicature nor of morals, but—of life and being. It had direct relation to the mode or manner of after-death existence, as also to the pre-eminently important point whether such an existence is. Accordingly, when he averred that the subjects of the resurrection are as the angels, he could scarcely have had reference to the moral character of the angels, but only to their mode of existence, particularly as not being liable to die, and so not needing to have their numbers replenished by offspring. As to a judgment, he is entirely silent.

A similar strain of remark is applicable to the most of Paul's language in the xvth of 1 Corinthians: thus,—

He argues pointedly against those who said that "there is no resurrection of the dead;" but not particularly against those having merely wrong views of it.

He teaches "with what *body*" the dead come, instead of with what grade of moral character.

He speaks of that which is raised as being "raised in *glory;*" yet he makes glory to be an attribute of also the sun, moon, and stars, yea, even of "bodies terrestrial."

Though he makes use of the word "spiritual," he employs it—not in a *religious*, but—in a mere generic sense, applying it exclusively to the resurrection organism, which he twice denominates "a spiritual body."

Concerning the dead being brought together for judgment, he says not a word.

He treats somewhat upon purely moral and religious topics, adverting to the influence which the doctrine of the resurrection had and ought to have upon the minds and conduct of believers, in advance of their actual experience of the process; he announces a perfect triumph of Christ, previous to "the end," in the putting down of all rule, and all authority and power, and the bringing of all human beings to be joyfully subject to his sway; yet he does not teach that all this is to be effected by the power of the resurrection as a direct means to the result;—on the contrary,

[24] Acts xxv. 10; Rom. xiv. 10.

his position is that it is to be brought about by the continued *reign* of Christ in his kingdom "till" the desired result shall be fully accomplished. "For he must reign *till* he hath put all enemies under his feet."

From the foregoing and other considerations, the writer of this is morally certain that by the resurrection, *in the after-death sense*, both the Saviour and Paul, his inspired apostle, intended simply the investing of human beings with the after-death organism celestially quickened,—by virtue of which operation, we, who have borne the image of the earthly One, Adam in the flesh, shall thereafter bear the image of the heavenly One, Christ, in the spirit.

The impression is well-nigh universal among Christians, that the resurrection is exclusively a future event,—that it is future as well to those who died long ago, as it is to us who are still in the flesh,—is future as truly to Adam and Abraham and Washington, and each other of the dead, as it is to the dead *in whole*, including all that *have* died and all that *are* to die. Yet how this idea first gained credence, is a question not easy of solution. The Scriptures certainly favor a very different view.

The present tense of verbs is scripturally applied to the resurrection process much oftener than is the future—more than twice as often. And whenever the future tense *is* thus applied, one of two circumstances is always—or nearly always—present:—either living mortals are addressed; or else the dead in general are spoken of, many of whom have not yet lived, much less died, not to say been raised; and in either of these circumstances, the future tense—and only this tense—is clearly the proper verb-form to be used, seeing that the rising of the now alive, and of the human family as a whole, is manifestly future, if ever. The following is a sample of the texts alluded to—they are the principal ones, indeed, concerning which it can not be readily shown that they relate to something in this world:

"Because I live, ye *shall* live also." "God hath both raised up the Lord, and *will* also raise up us." "As we have borne the image of the earthy, we *shall* also bear the image of the heavenly."[25]

"There *shall* be a resurrection of the dead, both of the

[25] John xiv. 19; 1 Cor. vi. 14: xv. 49.

just and unjust." "As in Adam all die, even so in Christ *shall* all be made alive." "The dead *shall* be raised incorruptible, and we shall be changed." [26]

In his conference with the Sadducees, our Saviour certainly set about to prove "as touching the dead, that they rise"—in the present tense. And what less was this than representing the resurrection to be a current event, even as is death, or natural birth? "As touching the dead, that they rise," said he, "have ye not read in the book of Moses?" &c. "Now that the dead are raised, even Moses showed at the bush," &c.[27] And the way he makes it appear that the rising of the dead was shown by Moses, (he does not speak of its being *fore*shown, as though altogether a future event,) is by adverting to the fact that Abraham and others were shown to be *alive* after having died, in that the Lord, through an angel, declared himself to be their God at that time, as He had been before their decease. But how did this show the rising of the dead in the sense of their being destined *to* rise many thousands of years thereafter?

To conclude, "the dead *are* raised;" *we* also *shall* be; *all* the dead *will* be. And the writer of this is entirely confident that when the conviction shall have become general, (as he is certain it by and by will,) that the *time* of the surrection is, has been, and will be, constantly present,—also, that the Scriptures reveal no existence for a human spirit except in connection with a bodily organism,—the "difficulties" which seem to cluster so thickly around the subject when viewed from a different stand-point, will have mostly, if not wholly and for ever, disappeared.

J. L.

[26] Acts xxiv. 15; 1 Cor. xv. 22, 52.
[27] Mark xii. 26, 27; Luke xx. 37, 38.

Art. XXVII.

The Promise to Abraham.

The place of Abraham's nativity was Mesopotamia, that region of country which lies between the Euphrates and Tigris, large rivers of Asia. The high plain lying between these rivers supported a dense population at an early period of the world's history. Here one of the most powerful empires of antiquity grew up; and here two of the most renowned cities of olden time were located, Nineveh and Babylon. This seat of ancient civilization was probably not far from the Eden of the Scriptures, where the first pair dwelt in Paradise. But society in Mesopotamia became corrupt at that early period when Abraham dwelt there, a young man; yet he was distinguished for those virtues and graces which are ornaments to society and commend one to God. Indeed, the whole family, Abraham with his father and brothers, seem to have been worthy and good. Haran, the youngest, died at an early age in his native land, leaving one son, Lot, a prominent name in the early history of the Jews. Tereh, resolving to leave that country and locate in Canaan, took Abraham, Nahor and Lot, his grandson, and journeyed westward. There are evidences that all the tribes and nations of the earth are descended from a parent stock whose home was in the interior of Asia, not far, perhaps, from the sources of the river Indus. Tereh, while making his westward journey, halted in Haran, where he died at the advanced age of two hundred and five years. After his burial, "the Lord said unto Abram, Get thee out of thy country, and from thy kindred, and from thy father's house, unto a land which I will show thee: and I will make of thee a great nation, and I will bless thee and make thy name great, and thou shalt be a blessing. And I will bless them that bless thee, and curse him that curseth thee; and in thee shall all the families of the earth be blessed."

Obedient to this command, Abraham took Lot, his brother's son, and proceeded on his journey westward, with all his possessions, till he arrived in that part of Canaan which

was afterwards called Samaria. Being a religious man, he erected an altar there in Sichem, and worshipped God according to the manner of those times. But he seems to have continued only a little while in Sichem, for the next statement respecting him is, that he proceeded southward near to Bethel where he sojourned and erected an altar for worship. We must not assign to Abraham, at any period of his life, a fixed habitation; for, being a herdsman, he journeyed almost continually from place to place, seeking pasturage for his numerous flocks and herds. He built for himself no house, but dwelt in a tent where it suited his convenience. There were, at that time, various tribes inhabiting the country, yet it appears that they offered no resistance to Abraham, but permitted him to dwell among them in peace. It is probable that the tribes which occupied the country before Abraham's entrance into it, were nomadic, gaining a subsistence by tending flocks and herds, which they pastured in any locality where they could find the best feed. In this manner, a wanderer amidst wanderers, lived the patriarch Abraham; yet he had the promise that all that land should be given him and his posterity for a lasting possession.

Thus Abraham lived, trusting in God that all his promises would be fulfilled. But when he was advanced in years, and was without child, it seems he began to despair of having a numerous posterity. In this season of despondency, "the Lord came unto him in a vision, saying, Fear not Abram; I am thy shield, and thy exceeding great reward. And Abram said, Lord God, what wilt thou give me, seeing I go childless, and the steward of my house is this Eliezer of Damascus?" "And the Lord brought him forth abroad, and said, Look now toward heaven, and tell the stars, if thou be able to number them. And he said unto him, So shall thy seed be. And he believed God, and it was counted unto him for righteousness."

When he was an hundred years old a son was born to him according to promise, yet he was commanded to offer him, when a youth, in sacrifice on mount Moriah. The patriarch proceeded to obey this command, and having bound his son was about to slay him, when a voice from heaven called him to stay his hand, and pointed out a suitable victim as a substitute for the youth. Then "the angel of the Lord called unto Abraham out of heaven, the second time,

and said, By myself have I sworn, saith the Lord; for because thou hast done this thing, and hast not withheld thy son, thine only son, that in blessing I will bless thee, and in multiplying I will multiply thy seed as the stars of the heaven, and as the sand which is upon the sea-shore; and thy seed shall possess the gates of his enemies, and in thy seed shall all the nations of the earth be blessed; because thou hast obeyed my voice." Thus on several different occasions, was the promise made to Abraham that he should be the father of a numerous posterity, and that in him should all the nations of the earth be blessed. We know that a numerous posterity proceeded from him, constituting a large and powerful nation among the surrounding tribes; and that nation, even to the present time, has cherished his name with reverence, and has been ever proud to call him their father.

The questions which specially concern us are, Is this blessing to be universal in the sense of including every individual of the human family? or, in the sense that the blessing shall become common in the world? And in what does the blessing consist?

It may be claimed with some show of reason that the blessing was promised to every individual of the human race, on account of the form in which it was made, and repeated to Isaac and Jacob. Embracing these several forms in one, it will appear that all the nations, families and kindreds of the earth are to be blessed in Abraham and his seed. It may be confidently affirmed that all the nations, families and kindreds of the earth, embrace every individual of the human race. But phrases do not always mean what, on a superficial reading, they seem to mean. And this phrase which has sometimes been understood as teaching that every one shall participate in the blessing promised, or shall come into the possession of it in the future life, may not really teach such a doctrine, nay, may not contain any allusion to it.

The words family and kindred are nearly or quite synonymous, or the words in the original are; hence two forms only remain for examination; only nations and families are included in the promise,—In thy seed shall all the nations and families of the earth be blessed.

What, now, is a family, in the scriptural sense of the

word? Does it consist only of parents and their children, including domestics, perhaps? No; what we call a family is, in the Scriptures, usually called a household; and the father or head man is called a householder. But the word translated family, in every instance in which it is used in connection with the promise to Abraham, is a different one, never meaning family or household, as we use these words, but tribe or lineage; and bears a relation to patriarch like that which family, in English, bears to father. When a man became eminent his decendants for a long time, perhaps for all time, called him patriarch, while his posterity were called his family. Abraham, Isaac and Jacob were patriarchs. Jacob had twelve sons, each of whom may also be regarded as a patriarch, being the head of a distinct division of the Hebrew nation. These several divisions were tribes or families. And when any particular man greatly distinguished himself, and became eminent in his tribe, he was honored with the name of patriarch, and his descendants, to the latest posterity, were his family. In reading the Old Testament we find this to be the common usage, a usage, indeed, from which there is seldom if ever a departure. Thus David is called a patriarch; and Joseph, the reputed father of Jesus, is said to be of the family of David. He was a lineal descendant of the king, and in this sense a member of his family.

It thus appears that family, as used in the Scriptures, has considerable latitude of meaning; sometimes denoting all the posterity of a highly eminent man, in which case family is equivalent to nation, or tribe—in this sense all the Hebrew people constituted the family of Abraham,—and sometimes denoting the posterity of a certain man of this great family, who, for some cause, became distinguished; in this sense the descendants of Jacob's twelve sons were called their families, and all who could trace their lineal descent to David were called his family. When the Jews are spoken of as descended from Abraham, a common sire, they may be called indifferently a family, tribe, or nation; but when spoken of as descended from different patriarchs, the descendants of each patriarch would be called a family, but not a nation; it might require several of these families to constitute one tribe, and several tribes to constitute the whole nation. A family may be either a whole tribe, or a

part of a tribe; the subdivision of a tribe into families might be carried to an indefinite extent, every distinguished man in the nation becoming a patriarch whose descendants constitute his family.

From this brief examination we learn that the nations, families and kindreds of the earth to be blessed in Abraham, are the nations and tribes of the earth. The promise does not necessarily include every individual of the human race, but simply the nations of the earth; and it will be fulfilled to the letter when the nations of the earth shall, as nations, not as individuals, participate in the blessing promised. Hence we conclude that the promise is general, not particular; that it does not necessarily include the whole race, taken as individuals; yet it gives the assurance that the blessing promised shall in due time be possessed by the nations; no nation shall be a stranger to it, or be denied the privilege of participating in it.

Another question of deep interest is, What is the blessing promised to the nations of the earth through the seed of Abraham? In what does it consist? This can best be answered by ascertaining how those to whom the promise was made, and were directly interested in it, understood the matter.

I. What did Abraham understand the blessing to consist in? We can best answer this question by consulting the statements of Scripture made in connection with the promise. While Abraham was dwelling in Haran, the Lord said to him, "I will make of thee a great nation; and I will bless thee; and make thy name great; and thou shalt be a blessing, and in thee shall all the families of the earth be blessed." In such connection it is evident that Abraham was to be blessed in being highly prospered, in gaining a great name, and in being the father of a great nation. Probably no one would affirm that this statement of Scripture declares that the blessing promised to Abraham consisted in anything essentially different from the particulars just mentioned. And there is no evidence that Abraham regarded the promised blessing as consisting in anything really different. It seems that Abraham became desponding at length, as he became old and had no son. For at one time he said, "Lord, what wilt thou give me, seeing I go child-

less, and the steward of my house is this Eliezer of Damascus? Behold, to me thou hast given no seed; and lo, one born in my house is my heir." To reassure him, the Lord bade him count the stars, if he were able, saying, "So shall thy seed be." He believed God, and it was counted unto him for righteousness. Afterwards when he was ninety-nine years old, and still had no son, no legal heir, he was again reassured. In a vision God talked with him, saying, "Behold, my covenant is with thee, and thou shalt be a father of many nations. Neither shall thy name any more be called Abram, but thy name shall be Abraham; for the father of many nations have I made thee. And I will make thee exceeding fruitful, and I will make nations of thee; and kings shall come out of thee. And I will give unto thee, and to thy seed after thee, in their generations, the land wherein thou art a stranger, all the land of Canaan, for an everlasting possession; and I will be their God."

We think Abraham would understand this language as relating simply to temporal blessings; to general prosperity; to the honor of being the father of a great and prosperous nation who should revere him as an eminent man and servant of God. We think it is evident that Abraham must have understood the promised blessing in this way, and in this alone. How could the nations of the earth be blessed in him except by participating in the blessings which he enjoyed? He could not impart or bequeath to any one a blessing which he did not possess. Neither could his posterity obtain that through him which he did not have. What he possessed was prosperity and the favor of God to whom he was obedient. And what his descendants, the Hebrew nation, obtained, was national prosperity and the favor of God, to whom they promised obedience. As many as participated in this blessing, entered into the enjoyment of the same which Abraham possessed. We think there is no evidence that the patriarch expected to enjoy a different blessing himself, or anticipated that one of a different kind would be secured through him to his posterity.

II. How did the Jews understand the blessing promised to Abraham—especially the Jews in the time of Christ? Space will permit only a brief examination of Jewish opinions on this point. The superficial reader even of the

New Testament, will not fail to see that the Jews were expecting the coming of a Messiah who would be a national prince, under whose reign they would become great and powerful. Their hopes all centered in a temporal king, and they thought only of national prosperity and renown. Zacharias, at the birth of his son, John the Baptist, was filled with the Holy Spirit and said, "Blessed be the Lord God of Israel; for he hath visited and redeemed his people, and hath raised up a horn of salvation for us, in the house of his servant David, as he spake by the mouth of his holy prophets which have been since the world began; that we should be saved from our enemies, and from the hand of all that hate us; to perform the mercy promised to our fathers, and to remember his holy covenant; the oath which he sware to our father Abraham, that he would grant unto us that we, being delivered out of the hand of our enemies, might serve him without fear, in holiness and righteousness before him, all the days of our life."

From this it plainly appears that Zacharias understood the oath to Abraham to mean that the Jews should be delivered from the power of their enemies and oppressors, and, advanced to a highly prosperous condition as a nation, should serve God all the days of their life. John the Baptist being the forerunner of Christ, his birth was regarded as the early dawn of that day of glory which the Jews were to enjoy under the Messiah's reign. Hence Zacharias says of John, "Thou, child, shalt be called the prophet of the Highest, for thou shalt go before the face of the Lord to prepare his ways; to give knowledge of salvation unto his people, by the remission of their sins, through the tender mercy of our God; whereby the dayspring from on high hath visited us, to give light to them that sit in darkness and in the shadow of death, to guide our feet in the way of peace." The birth of John indicated that the morn of the happy day was approaching when the Hebrew nation should enjoy independence, prosperity and renown under the everlasting reign of Messiah.

And when the aged Simeon took the child Jesus in his arms, he said, "Lord, now lettest thou thy servant depart in peace according to thy word; for mine eyes have seen thy salvation, which thou hast provided before the faces of all people, and the glory of thy people Israel." Here the

common belief of the Jews appears in representing Christ as the glory of Israel. The glory and renown of the nation were closely associated in the common thought of the people with the coming of Christ. It was to result in the glory of Israel as a nation, agreeably to the promise to Abraham and the declarations of the ancient prophets. No sooner had Simeon spoken these words of promise and encouragement to the Jews, than Anna, a prophetess, came in, and "gave thanks likewise unto the Lord, and spake of him to all them that looked for redemption in Jerusalem." Here again we find the idea of redemption of the people from the power of their enemies, and the establishment of Messiah on his throne in Jerusalem. It was no other kind of redemption for which the people were looking, as is shown by the multitudes regarding him as a king, because they believed him to be the Messiah who should come. There were times when the people who thronged the Saviour thought he was about to assert his royal authority and enter upon his glorious reign. More than once they would take him by force and make him king. At his triumphant entry into Jerusalem the excited multitudes thought their cherished hopes were about to be realized. We also find that the disciples even entertained similar ideas respecting the reign of Christ, and often "disputed which should be the greatest in the kingdom of heaven." "The mother of Zebedee's children" actually presented herself before the Saviour to prefer this request, "that her two sons might sit, the one on his right hand and the other on his left in his kingdom." They confidently expected that the Messiah was to be a great and powerful king, and believing that Jesus was Messiah, they wished to secure places of honor under him as king. Thus the blessing which they expected to gain through Abraham was national prosperity, greatness and glory under the reign of a wise and powerful prince.

III. What views did the Saviour and the apostles, after the illumination enjoyed on the day of pentecost, have of the blessing promised to Abraham? We know that Jesus claimed to be the promised Messiah, that he spoke of his reign and his kingdom. We know also that he laid no claim to the throne of David in a literal sense; but affirmed that his kingdom was not of this world. It was a moral or

spiritual one, having for its object the moral improvement, the religious culture of men. All the true subjects of his reign became characteristically the children of God. Jesus' language is so explicit, and is repeated in such varied forms, that it need not be quoted in proof of the statements just made,—for all must be familiar with it.

The apostles were equally plain in their discourses to the people, and in their letters to the churches. On the day of pentecost, when the Holy Spirit was poured out on the disciples, Peter, under the inspiration of the hour, said to the multitudes of wondering Jews present: "Ye are the children of the prophets, and of the covenant which God made with our fathers, saying unto Abraham, And in thy seed shall all the kindreds of the earth be blessed. Unto you first, God, having raised up his Son Jesus, sent him to bless you in turning away every one of you from his iniquities." Here we are told that the promised blessing consists in turning men from their iniquities; or, in making them moral and religious. When one turns from the love and practice of sin to the love of God and the practice of righteousness, he is turned from his iniquities. He then ceases to be a child of sin and becomes a child of God. And the happiness, the enjoyment upon which he enters constitutes the blessing promised. He who has entered upon the Christian state knows by happy experience what the blessing is; while he who is a stranger to the Christian state, is also a stranger to the blessing.

St. Paul discourses on this subject with his usual clearness and force, saying, "Abraham believed God, and it was accounted to him for righteousness. Know ye therefore that they which are of faith, the same are the children of Abraham. And the Scripture, foreseeing that God would justify the heathen through faith, preached before the gospel unto Abraham, saying, In thee shall all nations be blessed. So then they which be of faith, *are blessed* with faithful Abraham. Christ hath redeemed us from the curse of the law, being made a curse for us, that the blessing of Abraham might come on the Gentiles through Jesus Christ; that we might receive the promise of the Spirit through faith. Now to Abraham and his seed were the promises made. He saith not, And to seeds, as of many; but as of one, and to thy seed, which is Christ." The apostle sums

up his argument in these words; there is neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither bond nor free, there is neither male nor female; for ye are all one in Christ Jesus. And if ye be Christ's, then are ye of Abraham's seed, and heirs according to promise. They which be of faith, are blessed with faithful Abraham.

We learn from this brief examination that Abraham understood the blessing promised to him to consist in temporal good; and also that the Jews in our Saviour's time entertained similar views. They thought that Christ, the seed of Abraham, through whom they were to receive the blessing, would be a temporal prince, and would raise their nation to a higher state of prosperity and glory than it had ever enjoyed before. Under Messiah's reign they were to be great and powerful among the nations of the earth. Jesus professed to be the Messiah who should come, but taught that his kingdom was a moral or spiritual, not a temporal one; and that the blessings which men were to receive through him were of a moral or spiritual nature. The apostles taught that they who exercised faith in Christ, had attained to the blessing promised. Hence the blessing promised to all nations through Christ, the seed of Abraham, is the blessing which the Gospel confers; or it is the blessing which men attain to through faith in Christ. All nations are included in this promise, because the Gospel, or Christianity, is designed to be a universal religion, and all nations will in due time come to a knowledge of it, and receive the benefits which it bestows. The Gospel is designed to be a universal religion, and it is adapted to the needs of all nations, conditions and classes of people, so that in the plan of mercy there is neither Jew nor Greek, neither bond nor free, but all are one in Christ Jesus our Lord. The good Father is no respecter of persons in the administration of grace. The Gospel is equally suited to all, and every one who will believe, and through faith appropriate its truths to himself, shall enter upon the enjoyment of the blessing promised; enter upon the enjoyment of it as soon as faith becomes sufficiently strong and operative to work its proper effect upon the heart and the life. W. R. F.

Art. XXVIII.

Christianity and the War.

A large portion of the christian community have, under the test of a great national crisis, recently undergone a change of conviction, or at least of feeling, on the subject of War. We do not wish to hide, nor to explain away, the fact, that, in our own case, the change has been both profound and sudden. We have entertained views on the necessity of physical resistance to evil doers that no longer seem to us either philosophical or practicable. A year ago, a military parade was to us an occasion of annoyance if not of disgust. The State appropriations for muster encampments seemed to us worse than a waste of the people's money. Though not prepared to do away wholly with fortifications, ships of war, military schools, navy-yards and arsenals, such things, nevertheless, seemed to us quite as likely to provoke as to put down hostilities. We not only believed in peace as a good thing, but as something practicable. We had faith in the efficacy of the doctrines of peace. We thought well of the aphorism, "It takes two to fight,"—an aphorism implying that if one party would not resist, the other party would be too good to aggress!

In our notions on the subject of war, we made our appeal to Christianity. We could see nothing in the Sermon on the Mount that called for, or would tolerate, the measures of war. To shoot enemies we could but regard as a strange way to love them. Our logic was embarrassed by all attempts to reconcile the policy of thrusting bayonets at the foe at the same time that we turned toward them the other cheek. To pray for those who despitefully use us, and at the same time strike them to the earth, seemed as palpable an absurdity as can well be imagined. Then there was the example of the Master, quite as authoritative as his words, in every instance, as we were inclined to see it, a sanction of the most unqualified doctrines of peace. Christ did not resist his enemies, would permit no violent measures to rescue him from the effects of their malice, but meekly suffered them to put him to a cruel death; while his lips breathed for them the sublimest words in all literature—a prayer of forgiveness.

Yet we have never formally avowed faith in the doctrine or the policy of "non-resistance"—have never felt entire confidence in the practicability of principles which in every case eschewed a resort to physical violence. Though it seemed eminently Christian when the case in supposition was that of a man meekly giving up his life rather than kill or maim his assailant, it had a different aspect when the man sacrificed not only his own life, but that of his wife and children. There was always an instinct, that, whatever might be a man's duty when his own life was in peril, he ought certainly to defend those who had claims on his protection. We have always believed in the necessity of police regulations, and of some kind of physical restraint upon the inclinations of evil men. Common sense appeared to demand so much. Since the period of our majority, we have in every instance, unless for the time disqualified, voted for presidents, governors, and mayors or select-men; and have thereby given our adhesion to State constitutions and policies, which, in the last resort, rest upon the sword.

Let us confess, that in these respects our course has not been altogether consistent. We have always had an ill-defined impression that our notions on questions of war and peace clashed somewhere! But our excuse, if not formally expressed, yet actually cherished, has been that we could not help the contradiction. In the argument, the non-resistant always seemed to come off triumphant. His premises were generally admitted, and his conclusions seemed logical. But there was another set of premises, based upon certain instincts and what is called "common sense," which called for different conclusions. Both sets of premises, though apparently antagonistic, have seemed equally palpable. It has been on the relative claims of war and peace principles, the same as many of us have been led to think in respect of the claims of "free-will" and "necessity," commonly so called. To the finite intellect, both of these, as we now look at the matter, though seemingly at disagreement, have nevertheless each an impregnable basis of *fact*. Hence, we feel at liberty to accept both without obligating ourselves to reconcile their apparently hostile claims. We assume a right to wait for a higher experience to harmonize what now seems irreconcilable. Now we have never been guilty of a greater inconsistency as respects the relations of Christianity

and War. Logic seems to educe an unqualified peace conclusion from certain premises taken from the words and works of Christ; and it also seems to get a somewhat different conclusion from certain instincts and from common sense.

The real difficulty has been that we have not felt the necessity of *determining a practical position* on the subject. And as it has been equally easy to take either position, we may have been too much influenced in our choice by *the pressure of events*—sometimes inclining more towards the one, sometimes more towards the other, and perhaps generally trying to satisfy ourselves with an incongruous mixture of the two.

We give our own experience on the subject under consideration in the belief that it reflects the experience of a large number in the Christian community, and this without much regard to sectarian relations. We suddenly find ourselves without any *matured* principles to guide us in the most trying crisis in the history of the nation; and we can recall instances in which, with more or less of explicitness, we have committed ourselves to a policy which a severe test assures us to be wholly inadequate. Hence the change of conviction and, to a much greater extent, of feeling which has come over us.

We are free to confess that we have been in the habit of over-estimating the civilization of the age and the country in which we live. Years ago we learned from Gibbon what might be expected of barbarians. But we indulged the hope that the Goths and Vandals belonged only to the early time. We did not expect that an Alaric could come from the land that had given birth to a Washington. The humiliating fact of slavery, of property in man, was indeed before us; and a class of teachers insisted with tolerably severe logic, that a man who would appropriate to his own use the unpaid toil of another, could scruple at nothing. But we had personal acquaintances among slave-holders, and knew that such an inference, however conclusive as a matter of logic, was not just in point of fact. We could give the names of slave-holders who, aside from what is involved in the fact of being slave-holders, would neither lie, nor steal, nor do an inhuman act.

Hence we have admitted the distinction between the

simply holding of slaves and the *extending the area of slavery.* It has not seemed strange that persons who have been educated in the midst of slavery, who have inherited slave property, who have been in the habit of presuming that the population held in slavery is unprepared for freedom, and "better off" as it now is, and who fancy they see serious difficulties in the way of emancipation,—it has not seemed strange that such persons could hold a class of their fellow men in bondage, and nevertheless, in other particulars, be exemplary men. We have heard the slave-holder say, that if there were not a slave upon the continent, the man who would first introduce one here, must be a fiend. But as the matter actually stands—the slave being here and not by his act,—he finds his hands tied. Slaves have come to him by inheritance; and the whole social system virtually compel him to keep them in the condition in which he found them. Or, if any scheme of emancipation is to be entertained, the only practicable measure must be exceedingly slow in its operation. We are not saying that this is good reasoning. To our notion, it is far from being so. We simply say, that a man might satisfy himself with such reasoning and, nevertheless, be, in other matters, a very worthy citizen and neighbor. But the matter of *extending the area* of slavery—of voluntarily establishing the institution upon territory now free—is a different matter. For this there can be no excuse; and no man can advocate such a policy except on the supposition that slavery is not only right in itself but beneficial and expedient. Of such a policy none of the early great Statesmen of the South so much as dreamed. It is certain from the writings and the acts of Washington, Jefferson, and Madison, that they would have listened to such a measure with abhorence. We have been painfully impressed with the fact, that a change has rapidly come over the Southern States with regard to the spread of slavery. A very different class of politicians and statesmen have risen to take the places once filled by those who took part in framing a constitution in which the mere word slave is studiously excluded. A year ago the purposes of leading men at the South to extend the area of the "peculiar institution" was palpable to the most casual observer. But we did not suffer ourselves to think that the moral and social deterioration had gone so

far that the verdict of the people adverse to the special claims of the South, as expressed in the late presidential election, could prove an occasion of armed insurrection.

We have been accustomed to great political excitements accompanied with threats of dissolution, yet always passing away so soon as the decision made at the ballot-box was made known. The prospect a few years ago of the election of Mr. Banks, as Speaker of the House of Representatives, was made the pretext of dissolution, the moment the "deed was done." Yet a wealthy slave-holder, and from South Carolina, too, courteously introduced the successful candidate to the chair; and all parties and factions were at once quiet. We thought that a reverence for the ballot-box had become integral in the hearts of the American people. The circumstance that any evil or wrong done through the ballot-box may always be remedied by the ballot, in connection with judicial safeguards, and the obstructions to unjust legislation in the admirable system of "checks and balances," so inherent in our form of government, it seemed to us must satisfy the most fastideous people. We knew that Southern politicians were impulsive and rash, but we did not think them insane. We gave them credit for loyalty at heart, however perverse and defiant amid the contests of a political campaign. When the great historian of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire congratulated the world that another irruption of barbarians was an impossibility, we credited his words in the sense in which he used them. It had not occurred to us that our own land was destined to prove the fallacy of his prediction. Our notions on the efficacy of peace principles and measures, so far as they have had a determined form, have been cherished in the belief that the world was ready for their practical application. The events of the past year have assured us that we were greviously in mistake.

Of the large number of professed Christians whose convictions and feelings in regard to war have undergone a a sudden change, it is but justice to say, that, with rare exceptions, they have never claimed that anti-war principles are adapted to every phase of human society. Most of these are believers in the Old Testament, and have admitted the justice and expediency of the wars waged by the Israelites, on the ground that only severe measures are practicable in

dealing with a barbarous people. The course of history, happily styled "the logic of events," clearly shows that mild measures will not be effective among a people as yet uncivilized. It is not a historical date, but a point of culture, that divides the period in which men are under the law, from the period in which they are under the gospel. In our times, the conviction has been somewhat general, that human society, in nations nominally civilized, have reached this point of culture. In our country, at least, we supposed that the war of the ballot had forever rendered impossible the war of the bullet. But we are startled on learning that in this fond expectation we have hugged a delusion. The old contest between barbarism and civilization is seen to be no longer one of the things that were but are not. In our own day and in our own land the strife of ages is renewed. We must put down the enemies of man by such measures as will be effective. We grieve to say, that we see no alternative other than the terrible one of the sword.

We come now to the practical question, What is our duty *as a Christian people* in the present national crisis? In resolving to put down the rebellion by resort to the sword and bayonet, must we give up our religion? In this severe ordeal must we choose whether to obey Christ or to obey the government? Is it possible to be loyal to our government and fight its battles, and at the same time be loyal to "the Captain of our Salvation?"

In every form of phraseology, we have rejoiced to believe that the Gospel of the New Testament is adapted *to every possible condition of Christian men.* It will be lamentable indeed if we have now reached a condition in which the words and spirit of Christ can no longer avail. The millions whom the religion of Christ has blessed and comforted, would find it hard indeed if a crisis is reached in which they must no longer call him Master in case they would be true to their country in its hour of peril. We must hope that this alternative before us is not this.

Another preliminary word before coming directly to the question before us. We have said, that hitherto we have formed our notions of the subject on war without the expectation that we should have occasion to practice them. Our interest in the subject has been speculative. We have sought a metaphysical entertainment, and have not so much

as dreamed that our fine-drawn theories must be put to a practical test. We trust that this practice has passed away. We must henceforth have opinions that we can use. We must no longer fashion mere speculations for metaphysical diversion, but solid weapons for actual service in the battle of life. And while we define our position, we must *fix* it. Let us not again be found with notions which we must drop the very moment we are called upon to act. We must be ready hereafter for every possible emergency. It is easy enough to chant the praises of peace and the measures of peace, while war's "rude alarm" is no longer heard in the land; but we shall be remiss in duty if a second emergency finds us without the proper mental as well as physical equipments for actual service. Never till recently, have we appreciated the wisdom of the aphorism, "In time of peace prepare for war"—an aphorism not less applicable to the necessities of the mind, than those of the body.

We must add, that there is a special reason why we should attempt to define a position now, and with great caution, for we fear that in the reaction which our minds have undergone, there is the natural danger of *extremes*. We have noticed that the severest epithets bestowed upon the rebel leaders, come not from the military profession, nor from politicians, but from the occupants of pulpits. The cry, "Hang the traitors!" came from a Christian minister, and a member of the American Peace Society! Most of us are safely delivered from the impracticable notions of what are called peace-doctrines; but there will be a strong temptation to push too far the sanguinary methods of war. To reach the true mean, and to ascertain the principles and methods that shall be effective in crushing rebellion, and yet not needlessly sacrifice the Christian obligation of charity,—if there is such a mean,—must be our object.

In the discussion of most questions, words are needlessly wasted simply from the neglect to define what is really meant. On the supposition that war is justifiable, let us determine what thought we wish this language to convey. The common remark, "I am opposed to war," is very ambiguous. Does the person who uses this language mean

that he is opposed to war *as war?* Who or what but a fiend would not be opposed to war in such a sense of the words? What nation ever declared war against another for the sake of having a war? We shall not insult the reader's understanding or heart by attempting to show that war carried on for the sake of war, is unjustifiable and unchristian. As a general principle, and merely for the sake of the practice, we are not in favor of amputating human limbs; yet there are individual cases in which it is wise and humane to perform such operations.

No person pretends to justify war except as a last resort. Every other method consistent with the vital principle involved must be attempted, and proved inefficient, before the dreadful appeal to the sword. No one will pretend to justify war except in this very limited sense of the words. In the case of a nation threatened in its rights, liberties, or existence, two questions present themselves, Are there alternatives other than war by which, in every conceiveable case, a nation may protect itself against such threats? In case it be admitted that in a given instance a nation cannot shield itself except by resort to the sanguinary measures of war, is it the *Christian* duty of such a nation to sacrifice its rights, liberties, or existence rather than resort to the terrible alternative of armed defence?

There are a few very excellent people who have unquestioning confidence in the *success* of what we may call unqualified peace doctrines, as well as in the obligation of a Christian people to trust in no other. They reason that no nation could nerve itself to fight a people that will not fight in return; and that human nature is not so depraved as to commit aggression upon persons who have not the spirit to oppose a physical resistance. There is, we have no doubt, more of practical wisdom in such convictions than the world is, as yet, able to appreciate; still there is a great fact in proof, that a pacific disposition is not an infallible preventive of assault in every instance. We must confess that the example of Christ—whether or not intended to be authoritative in its application to nations—was that of non-resistance. It is nevertheless true, that he was "taken by wicked hands and crucified and slain." It may be a question, whether the example of Christ *obligates* his disciples to feel and act upon non-resistant

principles; but so far from proving the efficiency of such principles, *considered as a means of protection*, it is simply an instance of their inefficiency.

It strikes us, however, as something absurd to urge non-resistant principles as expedients. To be good at all, one must be good for the sake of goodness. Even the aphorism, "Honesty is the best policy," is a contradiction in terms, for honesty is not policy in any sense of the word. The idea of loving one's enemies as an expedient for warding off injuries at their hands, makes a very near approach to the ludicrous. A good act performed for its own sake is a good example; but if performed for the sake of an example this very motive prevents it from being such. The good example of a deed is always and necessarily *incidental* to the good deed. And so, gentleness of disposition and a forgiving spirit may often disarm malice and avert aggression, but these beneficial results are possible only on the supposition that they are *unsought*—that the gentle disposition and the forgiving spirit are *real*, and not mere pretenses for the sake of beneficial results. To transform a virtue into an expedient is simply to destroy the virtue. It seems to us, that the question, whether peace-measures, in the unqualified use of these words, are not sufficient to save a people in every conceiveable case, is disposed of.

We must here expose a fallacy in the use of words which is very common in treating questions kindred to the one now under consideration. The question is sometimes raised whether a government has a right, on Christian principles, to resort to the methods of war in defence of its rights and liberties under any circumstances. But, in the nature of the case, there can be no such question. The only question is, have people a right to *government?* What is a government? It is a system of laws for regulating certain affairs of a people *as a people* in their social and their external relations; and the distinctive attribute of a government is in the fact that their laws are coercive, that they rest upon physical force, in the last resort upon the sanguinary methods of war. We think it an open question, whether certain men in this nation have a right to live; but if we *concede* their right to live, we do not feel at liberty to raise the question, whether they have a right to *breathe!*

The *essence* of government is force. Representatives and

senators may enact laws, and presidents approve, and judges sanction; but up to this point the vital fact of government is not touched. For all this, citizens may disobey, withhold taxes, and talk treason. Written constitutions and laws and judicial decisions are but portions of the machinery of government; the real government shows itself only when the power is reached which compels obedience. It is true, the cases are rare wherein the vital exercise of their power is requisite. Loyalty, which, to some extent, is natural, habits of obedience, the feeling that the edicts of government are to be obeyed as a "matter of course," render unnecessary a direct exhibition of the coercive element. It is said that trained cavalry horses will continue to "form into line," even after their human riders are shot from their backs. But loyalty, reverence for law, habits of obedience would rapidly fade from the hearts of the people were the fact not always present, that in case of need, the power to force obedience will promptly appear. And let the fact be kept in mind, that this power to compel is *physical*, and this, in the last resort, the power of the sword. The right of the people to have a government admitted, the right to make war, in certain contingencies, is admitted.

Non-resistant principles are essentially no government principles. Coming from a person who, in any way, acknowledges the right of government, they are absurd and powerless. The advocate of such principles must take his true position outside of government. Not by thought, word, or vote may he concede its legitimacy. So far as it is possible for a person living in the midst of government to avoid recognition of its rightful existence, he must abstain from giving it countenance, or his non-resistant doctrines will be as inconsistent as exhortations to temperance from the mouth of an inebriate. When, in November last, you voted for a President of the United States, you voted for him to compel obedience to the constitution and the laws, if need be at the point of the bayonet; you voted for him, in case of armed rebellion, to summon the military force "armed and equipped;" and, provided the order to disperse were not obeyed by the rebel horde, you voted that he should, if possible, shoot every rebel to the earth. Your vote, last November, committed you to all this. By that vote, you said that the President ought to disperse rebels—"peaceably

if he could, forcibly if he must." Do you now, on what seem to you Christian grounds, question the right of the Chief Magistrate to shoot rebels? If so, repent of the vote you gave in November, repent of every vote you have cast under the constitution, repent of every voluntary act whereby you have conceded the right of government, and take your true position, as one who denies the right of a people to have any government whatever.

We submit that the only question for us to answer is, Have a Christian people a right to a government? Does the New Testament, in spirit or letter, prohibit the existence of government? We are not to show that Christianity gives its sanction to any particular form of government, but that it recognises the *idea* of government. On this point, it seems to us that there is little room for doubt. Christ could not have said, "Render unto Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's," (Matt. xxii. 21.) without intending to concede that some things do really belong to Cæsar. It is very probable that Cæsar claimed some things that did not belong to him—he may have claimed some things that belong only to God; but the language of Christ is equivocal except on the supposition that to Cæsar, as the representative of government, some things were really due.

The words of Paul in Romans xiii. 1-7, so familiar that we need not quote them here,—not merely concede, but positively assert, that government is the ordinance of God. By the words, "The powers that be," he may not have meant, in particular, the Roman form of power, or Nero's administration of it; we do not believe that he did mean all this; but he certainly meant to include as much as the fact of government; and his language is explicit that so much is "ordained of God." Not less explicit is the direction of Paul to Titus, "Put them (the Christians in Crete) in mind to be subject to the principalities and powers, to be ready to obey magistrates." (iii. 1). Peter, in his First Epistle, is even more particular than Paul in enjoining allegiance to the civil power. "Submit yourselves to every ordinance of man for the Lord's sake; whether it be to the king, as supreme; or unto governors, as unto them that are sent by him, for the punishment of evil doers, and for the praise of them that do well, *for so is the will of God*, that with well-doing ye may put to silence the ignorance of foolish men." (ii. 13-15.)

There is indeed a valid distinction between doing wrong, and submitting to wrong. It may be Christian meekness in the bondman to submit to the hard yoke his tyrant imposes upon him. But the explanation of such passages as we have quoted, that they merely enjoin *submission* to the decrees of rulers and magistrates, is gratuitous; for it assumes the only point in dispute, that government *is* necessarily unchristian. Besides, the language is not a recommendation, but a *direction*, to obey "the powers that be;" and the reason for obedience,—the powers that be "are ordained of God,"—can hardly be construed as calling for submission to unjust decrees rather than active allegiance to a just authority.

There is, however, a different style of argument, in which the claims of our subject may be treated. We assent most cordially to a reasonable interpretation of the words, "The letter killeth, but the spirit giveth life."(2 Corin. iii. 6.) We say most sincerely, that there is little liability to misapprehend the spirit of the New Testament; while we may wrongly interpret isolated passages, the special meaning of which may be largely determined by circumstances of time and place and occasion—circumstances not always within our means of precise knowledge. We regard it a sound formala of interpretation, that, provided due care has been taken to determine the spirit of the New Testament, no interpretation of special passages which militates with this spirit can be allowed. There can be no schism in the word of divine truth—the spirit and the letter must agree; and in case of seeming incongruity the letter must be interpreted into an accordance with the spirit; the spirit must never be forced to agree with any particular interpretation of the letter. So palpable is the justice of this rule, that in numerous cases we apply it almost unconsciously. For example, take the words of Christ, "I came not to send peace but a sword. For I am come to set a man at variance against his father, and the daughter against her mother, and the daughter-in-law against her mother-in-law," (Matt. 10. 34, 35.) In all Christendom, what man was ever insane enough to follow the letter of this language? Instinctively, we see the spirit of Christ's words and almost unconsciously we adapt the letter thereto.

It is then the vital question, Does the spirit of the New Testament permit the existence of government, and so of the existence of that power of physical coercion—in its last resort, the power of the sword—in which the essence of government consists? We shall be told, that the spirit of Christianity is embodied in the following words: "Ye have heard that it hath been said, An eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth. But I say unto you that ye resist not evil; but whosoever shall smite thee on thy right cheek, turn to him the other also. And if any man will sue thee at the law, and take away thy coat, let him have thy cloak also. And whosoever shall compel thee to go a mile, go with him twain. . . . Love your enemies, bless them that curse you, do good to them that hate you, and pray for them which despitefully use you and persecute you." (Matt. v. 38-44.)

We concede that in these words the spirit of Christianity is embodied. But we must notice in the outset—for the style of argument with which we are now dealing requires us specially to notice—that this spirit is expressed *in words*. Here, also, as well as in the words before quoted from Paul and Peter, we have a *letter* to interpret. Surely, it would be very unreasonable to evade the force of Paul's declaration, that government "is ordained of God," by appealing to the distinction between the letter and the spirit; and then, in dealing with the words just quoted from Christ, deny the justness of such an appeal. Is there, then, any distinction to be made between the letter and the spirit in the passage now before us? A moment's attention will show not only that this distinction holds, but that, to a great extent, everybody spontaneously presumes upon such a distinction.

One item of the letter specifies, that if any one smite us on the right cheek, we shall turn the other towards him, that, if he so choose, he may smite that also. Does any one understand Christ as really meaning this? Would not such an interpretation be a very marked example of killing by the letter? Again, another item of the letter is, that if any one forcibly take from us our coat, we shall carry our submission to the point of giving him our cloak. Is there an inmate of Bedlam, even, that, in this particular, would fail to distinguish between the letter and the spirit?

Once more, the letter directs that if compelled to go with a person a mile, we shall voluntarily add another. The letter makes no exception for the possible contingency, that the person who deals so compulsively with us, may not have occasion to travel two miles, or, in case he did have such occasion, that our company might not prove agreeable to him for the whole distance! A strict adherence to the letter, even in the words that, more comprehensively than all others, embody the spirit of Christanity, it may thus be seen, will make nonsensical the most beautiful and touching language in all literature.

What then is the spirit of the passage? The answer is, in a word, *Love*—love to everybody, and so to our enemies; and, hence, implying a course of conduct in all respects consistent with this divine spirit. But do we love our enemies when we shoot at, and maim, and kill them? It is very clear that if we do such things for the sake of doing them; if we make a pastime out of the maiming and killing our foes; or if we do this as a convenient and summary way of disposing of them, when by other methods we could protect ourselves from them,—in such and similar cases, we do anything but obey the spirit of the New Testament. But here is the question, and the only question, Is there no possible contingency in which we may resort to the terrible alternative of destroying our enemies, except on the supposition that we hate them? Is the idea of loving the very person we seek in a certain emergency to maim or kill, an absurdity? The Federal government is in arms against the rebels of the South,—does it follow that the President at whose order the armies are in the field, and that every person responding to his call for volunteers, is actuated by a malignant, retaliatory spirit? We believe, and the fact is at least supposable, that in the present national struggle, the South is the aggressor; that the North has carried patience and forbearance to the last point of endurance; and that the proclamation of the President summoning volunteers to the defence of the government, was a "last resort." Now is it a *contradiction in terms* to suppose that the President has ordered out the military force with reluctance, that he pities the very persons against whom he directs the deadly missiles? Is it a contradiction in terms, to suppose that he

may strike for preservation of the government without a particle of hatred towards the persons he is compelled to strike?

We have now reached the core of our subject;—we touch the precise spot, where the fallacy of the unqualified peace-doctrine takes its start. *It is assumed*, that in every possible instance wherein a person strikes another, he is governed by a spirit of hatred. *It is assumed*, that love towards an enemy and violent resistance against his assaults —resistance sometimes necessarily pushed to the point of a deadly blow—are utterly incompatible things. *It is assumed*, that love towards an enemy necessarily involves submission to whatever he imposes upon us, no matter what the consequences to ourselves or to others. And these points are assumed as if they were self-evident—as if no one would presume to question them—as if they belong to the class of postulates against which it is impossible to imagine an argument.

We have given these several points careful consideration, and we reach the conclusion that they are invalid. We now believe, that there are contingencies in which a person may strike another and yet love him; that there are contingencies in which he may carry the point of resistance to evil doers to a deadly-blow and yet have no unchristian feeling in his heart; that there are contingencies, in which submission to the assaults of our foes, may perhaps be an exhibition of an amiable disposition, but nevertheless be not only unmanly but positively unchristian. And we believe that a national crisis has been reached in which the soldier in the army of freedom may consistently carry the New Testament in his pocket, have the spirit of the New Testament in his heart,—indeed be all the better soldier for being a Christian,—and in the deadly onset lift a prayer to the Father and Friend of all, that the fearful missile may go straight to the mark!

We are not unmindful of the fact, that war waged for any cause, however justifiable, is almost sure to bring into play the worst passions of the unsanctified heart. Nor do we forget the certain demoralization of a people under the influences attendant upon the mere fact of being in a state of war. Familiarity with scenes of carnage and blood, or even with the published records of such scenes, tends insensibly, yet

surely, to deaden the better feelings—to harden the heart—to blunt the moral perceptions, and the benevolent sympathies—in a word to barbarize a people. The demoralization attendant upon camp life, and this, in spite of discipline however rigid, is a fearful item to be taken into the account in assuming the responsibility of calling armies into the field. The mutilations of body and limb—worse to contemplate than instant death at the hands of the foe—with the attendant tortures and groans of the victims, and the speechless agony in homes once happy, but now robbed of the objects of their dearest affections, make a sum of horrors which prove that but one thing can be worse than war—the surrender of the cause in which war finds its necessity and justification.

But while these things prove the exceeding wickedness of war when carried on without sufficient cause, and while they indicate the almost crushing responsibility resting upon those who as rulers are called upon to take the initative act in the dread resort, they cannot weigh as insuperable if we concede the right and the duty of government to maintain its own existence. If such an objection were allowed to be decisive, not even Christianity could abide the test; indeed, the world has seen no other great movement, against which such an objection would be more potent. Among the occasions of strife, contentions, and war in its most terrific forms, the New Testament has been most prominent. Christ predicted as much in the words already quoted, "I came not to bring peace but a sword." But the sufficient answer to all this, is the fact that Christianity, in no sense, is the *cause* of strife; that this cause is in the depravity of the human heart and will; but that as the commands of Christ necessarily come in contact with the evil passions and schemes of men, it proves the *occasion* that brings the depravity of man into more palpable expression. It has been well said that even the devil would be amiable and peaceable if allowed to have his own way; he becomes furious only by being resisted; nevertheless the command is imperative, "Resist the devil." The rum-seller may be a most obliging neighbor and generous friend, if permitted to enrich his pocket by spreading ruin and woe without even a word of resistance. When, however, the strong arm of the law, sustained by the virtuous indignation of an outraged community, opposes

a barrier to his iniquitous traffic, he suddenly becomes defiant and quarrelsome. Whether our anti-slavery agitators have loved the slave wisely as well as zealously, we do not care to discuss in this connection. It is, however, certain that their labors have been among the *occasions* of the present national strife. But the view is narrow indeed which mistakes the occasion for the *cause*—which does not see the *culpable* cause in the domineering spirit and barbarous schemes of the self-constituted champions of the "peculiar institution." Words of truth and soberness, spoken to guilty men, will occasion strife, but nevertheless such words should be spoken.

It is enough that war carried on for a justifiable cause *need not* call into action a single unworthy passion. When the preservation of interests more precious than life renders it imperative that lives be destroyed, the order to destroy may come from a heart, and obedience thereto may come from hearts, in which not an unkind feeling is cherished towards a human being. Because, in a given contingency, we destroy our foes, it does not follow that we do not love them, but that a higher interest makes us the instrument of their sacrifice. Gladly would we escape a necessity so terrible—fraught with responsibilities so solemn. But if what we can but regard as the will of Heaven commands us, for the preservation of a priceless boon, to strike our brother, our obedience to the divine behest, rendered in sadness and pain, should not be attributed to an unbrotherly spirit. There can be no greater fallacy than that which assumes, that physical resistance, even though pushed to the last extremity, necessarily supposes that we cherish unchristian dispositions towards the human objects of our resistance.

In a world where human souls are sometimes compelled to choose between death and dishonor, there can be no question that some things are more precious than animal life. When the choice was presented to Latimer, Hooper and Ridley, either to recant their convictions or "give their bodies to be burned," they at once decided that their integrity was of more importance than their lives. The memorable words, "Give me liberty, or give me death," are to the same purport. To refer to the highest example, the scene on Calvary is simply an illustration of the worthlessness of life in the body, when obedience to the Divine Will de-

mands the sacrifice. In all this, we but repeat familiar truths. We know but little of the claims of the soul, if we even hesitate at the proposition, that there are realities infinitely more precious than animal existence.

The contest now is for the maintenance of government —our republican government—the free institutions under which we have been prospered as a people—a form of government, which, notwithstanding serious imperfections and glaring inconsistencies, is, as a whole, the most precious legacy the civil and political experience of the world has ever conferred upon a nation. Or, if it be denied that our government is all this; or, admitting so much, if it be denied that its existence is really imperilled even on the supposition of the success of the rebellion,—if these points be denied, it is sufficient for our present argument, that the people as a body, as represented by the rulers of their choice, *believe* what we allege. It may be too much to ask that a people shall act only from what they absolutely know; for absolute knowledge on the part of finite beings may not, in the things which the crisis involves, be possible. They have done all that can be expected of them, if they act from their convictions. With the great body of the people of the North, the conviction is profound and earnest, that the very existence of the best government the world has ever seen, is imperilled by the existing rebellion; and the believing of this is, for practical purposes, the same as if, instead of convictions, the people had absolute knowledge. To the question, whether such a government is worth the sacrifice of human lives, it ought to be a sufficient answer, that human lives were, at the outset, freely given to purchase it. The importance of *maintaining* the government cannot be less than that of originally *obtaining* it. Did the patriot fathers give too much for our institutions? If not, their maintenance at an equal cost, cannot be too great.

But, fixing our minds upon the *innocent* persons who must suffer from the prosecution of the war, persons who in limb and life are made the victims of a crisis for the origin of which they are in no sense culpable, it may be asked, How stands their case in the light of Christianity? Prove that the sacrifice of criminal instigators of the rebellion is just, is it Christian to put in peril the lives of the loyal and patriotic? Is it Christian that the innocent should suffer

because of the guilty? To this general question we have a ready answer: *It is a cardinal doctrine of Christianity that the innocent must suffer for the guilty.* The Author of this divine religion himself "suffered, the just for the unjust." "He was wounded for our transgressions, he was bruised for our iniquities; the chastisement of our peace was upon him; and with his stripes we are healed." Take from the Gospel scheme the single fact, that the life of Christ was sacrificed for the good of the sinner, and how much would what remains be worth? The familiar words, breathed in the prayers and the songs of Christians the world over, "He died that we might live," contain the very essence of Christian doctrine. The war to crush rebellion must cost the sacrifice of many innocent lives; but in this, certainly, there is *conformity to*, by no means departure from, both the spirit and the form of the religion of the New Testament.

If the question still linger, Is not the case of the innocent victims of even a just war a hard one? We answer that *if they are Christians* (and let it be remembered, we are discussing the subject wholly in the light of Christianity) they themselves will not regard their case as hard—they themselves, who certainly ought to be best qualified to form a judgment on the subject, will not feel that they have reason to complain. There is a quality in the faith of the Christian that makes him deem it a privilege to suffer, and if need be, to die for the true and right. The worldly, the frivolous, the selfish know nothing of this marvellous attribute of a sincere Christian faith; and such, of course, are incompetent even to reason in regard to it; but to those who put it to the test of experience, its power to cheer and sustain those who suffer for righteousness' sake is no longer a problem.

We have abundant confirmations of what we here affirm in the lives of faithful men in every period of Christian history. But we need not look outside of the authoritative record. "Blessed are they which are persecuted for righteousness' sake; for theirs is the kingdom of heaven. Blessed are ye, when men shall revile you, and persecute you, and say all manner of evil against you falsely, for my sake." An apostle had abundant opportunity to test the correctness of this promise. He tells us: "Of the Jews five times I received forty stripes save one. Thrice was I beaten with

rods, once was I stoned, thrice I suffered shipwreck, a night and a day have I been in the deep; in journeyings often, in perils of waters, in perils of robbers, in perils by mine own countrymen, in perils by the heathen; in perils in the city, in perils in the wilderness, in perils in the sea, in perils among false brethren; in wearyness and painfulness, in watchings often, in hunger and thirst, in fastings often, in cold and nakedness." Yet, with such a record, the same person could declare, that he counted "all things but loss for the excellency of the knowledge of Christ Jesus his Lord; for whom he had suffered the loss of all things;" and he could write the words, "Most gladly will I glory in my infirmities, that the power of Christ may rest upon me. Therefore *I take pleasure* in my infirmities, in reproaches, in necessities, in persecutions, in distresses for Christ's sake; for when I am weak, then am I strong." If the innocent who suffer because of the guilt of others, do not complain, there is no reason why others should complain for them; and if they affirm that in the consciousness that they have but done a high duty, they have found ample compensation for all their sacrifices, there can be no good reason why we should take them at their word.

Thus far, we have, for most part, treated our subject from a negative point of view,—our object being to show that war, in an extreme contingency, is not *forbidden* by Christianity. We must now add, that permission to act in such a contingency is substantially a *command* to act. There is no neutral ground in the world of morals. What we *may* do, we *ought* to do. The considerations which make it right that the ruling power shall appeal to the sword, are equally pertinent in making such an appeal a duty. Except in words—and here only as a convenient form of statement—there is no such thing as a negative gospel. Substantially, all the commands of Christianity are positive.

In the present war for suppressing the pro-slavery rebellion, we are anxious to determine not simply what we may do, but what we should do—not simply our rights but out duties. We should have very little heart in the work of destroying our foes, if we could reach no higher point than that of a *privilege* to do so. If the whole of duty were precisely expressed in the simple words, Christianity tells us

that we *may* destroy the enemies of our government,—on the supposition, understand, that a permission, in the Christian sense of the word, does not amount to a positive command,—we should feel that the armies of the republic could not be summoned from the field too speedily. Let it appear that we may take our choice between striking our foes and giving way to them, on the ground that either resort will be equally right and proper, and we should certainly have very little zeal in the work of human slaughter. But the supposition of a choice between such alternatives is monstrous. The killing of human beings can never, in any conceiveable contingency, be a matter of indifference. It is never that we may or may not, but that we should or should not, kill them. On such an issue, duty must be explicit and positive. Not a rebel should be shot, if duty will permit us to spare the sacrifice.

The question of positive duty will receive further answer, if we consider not alone *what it is* for which we war, but *for whom* we war. The good features of our form of government need not be enumerated—these are palpable. But were they exclusively our own,—were they the work of our own hands, were they designed to benefit only ourselves, to pass away so soon as the now living are gone from the earth,—were such the case, there might be plausibility in the pretence, that a Christian people should sacrifice them all, rather than shed the blood of their brothers.

But our free institutions are not our own—they are a *legacy in trust;* a legacy, the doners whereof are the heroes and the martyrs of all ages—the glorious host of mortals, who have given toil, and treasure, and limb, and life for the liberties of their kind;—conspicuous among whom are the bright names of Huss, faithful unto death; Luther, the emancipator of Europe from spiritual chains; "glorious Cromwell," who severed the head of tyranny; "the Father of his country," a name that need not be written. Perhaps we may do with our own as we will—surrender to the spoiler at the mere word of demand; but may we do so with a *legacy*—that which noble men have placed in our hands for *safe keeping?* May we betray a trust, and *such* a trust? Perish, the sacrilegious thought!

And for whom do we, the living of to-day, hold this

priceless treasure? For down-trodden man the world over, and for the generations unborn. If you think it Christian to do so, let the robber take *your* purse, but surrender not the treasures of the widow, the orphan, and the helpless. If we, as a people, tamely submit to the inhuman exactions of the barbarous horde that now seek the destruction of our glorious nationality—if without a resisting act, we suffer the tide of civilization to roll back its hitherto advancing wave,—if we submit to all this, we are not Christians *for we are not men.*

We have now, at some length, stated our convictions, accompanied, we trust, with sufficient reasons for entertaining them, that the people of the North, may, as a Christian people, crush the existing rebellion in the South, at any cost of life and limb. But our convictions must count for nothing, except upon the assumption, that in the Christian vocabulary, *may* and *ought* are convertible terms. We use the words, "*except upon the assumption,*" for we trust, that in this age of Christian culture we shall not be called upon to prove the point that we would assume. He that would ask for proof, that Christianity will permit its disciple to slay a human being, on any other ground than that they *ought* to slay, has not yet learned even the alphabet of Christian ethics. We do not feel called upon here to enter upon the details of any such proof.

Our position then is this: *Christian duty requires that we sustain the government in its efforts to crush the unholy rebellion.* To all who put to us the question, "Why do you make the appeal to the sword?" we wish to make answer: "We acknowledge the authority of the Gospel of Jesus Christ, and that authority commands us to use the sword—to use the sword because no other resort can be effective—to use the sword, not in a spirit of malice or retaliation, but in love and pity towards those whose infatuation compels the dread alternative." To the question, "Can you, even in such a contingency, be a Christian and fight?" we wish to answer, "*In such a contingency we cannot be Christians unless we fight.*"

In the ethics of war, the soldier has but one principle of duty—obedience to his superiors in command. He may not even criticise the measures of his general—the question whether they are right or wrong is not for him to consider.

He has no responsibility beyond that of obedience to orders. We are earnest in the conviction, that the present war as waged by our rulers, is not our own. We see not that we have any option in the premises. We did not desire it —we did not bring it on,—it came to us, and we must accept it. We feel that our duty is that of allegiance—allegiance to the rulers of our choice; but to them only as the subordinates of a higher authority; allegiance *directly* to them, but, in its last and final basis, allegiance *through* them, to the King of kings and Lord of lords. It is God's war; and we, the subjects of his government, have but to obey his will.

So far indeed from fearing that we cannot carry the war forward on Christian grounds, our real belief is that it cannot be carried *forward* or any other than Christian grounds. Our sole anxiety is in the fear that the war will not be made Christian. Would that every soldier of the republic were also a soldier of Jesus Christ. Let the spirit of the New Testament fill the hearts of our rulers, our generals, and our ranks, and the victory is achieved. Let our army become Christian, and "the wrinkled front of war" would soon be smooth; for against such a rock, the crusade in the cause of human bondage would quickly split. Fight in the name of the Prince of Peace—fight in the spirit of love—fight in that sense of obedience to the Divine Will, which makes every selfish fear vanish—fight in that love for human kind, which welcomes and gladly welcomes stripes, bonds, imprisonment, and death, provided the right shall triumph in the end,—fight not as hating or wishing harm to those you strike, but as obeying only Him who, as the Giver of life, has the right to take it when the welfare of His people demands the sacrifice,—in a word, *fight as a Christian people*, and not all the kingdoms of this world can break the arm of liberty, or even mar the glorious fabric of a republic in whose perpetuity and progress rest the hopes of civilized humanity. G. H. E.

Art. XXIX.

Poetry in Prose.

(Continued.)

Hugh Miller possessed a calm and clear mind, a warm and active imagination, and a singular force in his form of expression far above the learned flippancy of the schools. His art was the art of nature. His thoughts came with the weight and the succession of billows, agitating the depth of his soul by the weight of their movement, arousing all the latent fires to a glowing heat, and making all objects of nature which he touched big and active with intelligence. Miller was one of nature's noblemen, and it is better for Scotland that he has lived. His thoughts will carry pleasure to thousands, and his example a living energy to striving poverty and generous ambition.

We have quoted Humboldt and Miller as men having minds keenly susceptible of impressions from nature, keenly alive to her living beauties, with the power to reproduce them in simple, expressive, and dignified language. They both show great power in abstract thought and general conclusions; but in their investigations and culture they have confined themselves to the study and delineation of nature, and in this direction have expended the wealth and power of their imaginations. Physical beauty, flowing in the ocean, climbing up to sublimity in the mountains, resting upon the plain, or breathing sweetly out of the multiforms of the floral world, is exceeded by a higher and more exquisite beauty which lives in the expression of passion or feeling in the human face and attitude. Physical beauty runs and flows upon the surface of things, but this other and more subtle beauty lies deep and unfathomable in the secret springs of human nature, and is clothed with profound mystery and power which lies far off near the fountains of life, which move and dignify life in those few rare moments of existence when the true nobility of our natures asserts its kingdom. We have a genius more subtle than Humboldt and Miller, one who can penetrate deeper into the sources of being, and yet one who can feel nature in all forms and attitudes, and who can detect their nice alliances and affinities

with the sympathies of man. His is one additional power. Nature and human nature alike have been his study, and their salient points of beauty and perfection are both familiar to him. His "Seven Lamps of Power," and "Modern Painters" both attest this. The thin robe of light and azure in the clouds, the delicate tinting of the flowers, the monadic life undulating in the atmosphere, the grandeurs of nature in her greater forms, also the life that lives in the eye of a man, the character that can sit upon his lifted forehead, or faintly elude observation in the life and the passion that may come from the very soul of his being and animate his whole form, all alike have been under the close observation of Ruskin, and can be produced again by his living pen. Humboldt and Miller are types of the Homers of prose, but Ruskin suggest the delicacy of Keats, the humor of Shakespeare, and the many-sidedness of Goethe, in his studies of art and feeling, and wisdom and intelligence of men, in the sculptured stone or upon the breathing canvas. Earnestness and utility are decided characteristics in all his imaginative works. His most powerful passages are always weighty and warm with the humanitarian feeling. He mingles poetry and art, the beat of an impetuous passion with a desire direct and immediate for the highest possible elevation of the human race. "Modern Painters" deals more particularly with that secondary, the sensuous beauty of the world; in his "Seven Lamps of Power" he plunges boldly into unsustained and abstract regions of thought, and sees that divine beauty in man and the universe, which can only be felt, which cannot find embodiment or portraiture in material form.

In speaking of the portrait of a man under three different circumstances; the first, the ordinary expression of feature; the second at the moment of the highest mental excitement; and the third, when his secret passions and all his highest faculties were brought into play at once—he says,—

"The first gives the accidents of body—the sport of climate, and food, and time—which corruption inhabits and the worm waits for. The second gives the stamp of the soul in the flesh; but it is the soul seen in the emotions which it shares with many which may not be characteristic of its essence—the result of habit, of education, and accident — a gloze, whether purposely worn or unconsciously

assumed, perhaps totally contrary to all that is rooted and real in the mind that it conceals. The third has caught the trace of all that was most hidden and most mighty, when all hypocracy, and all habit, and all petty and passing emotion—the ice, and the bank, and the foam of the immortal river—were shivered, and broken, and swallowed up in the awakening of its inward strength; when the call and claim of some divine motive had brought into visible being those latent forces and feelings which the spirit's own volition could not summon, nor its consciousness comprehend; which God only knew, and God only could awaken."

This passage glows with that intense feeling that lies too deep for distinct expression. You see in it a life, a passion, a power, a warm breathing struggling existence, which, by force of the impulse living within it, and giving it power, leaps forward and struggles into the individualism of expression. But it is indistinct and imperfect, and so are all the glimpses which we have of the imperishable and of the infinite. It is not an effort of the imagination to give an added beauty to the flower, or the features of the landscape, but it is an effort of the soul to express a hidden thought, and breathe out a strong passion, which is nourished in those still depths that seldom heave up their treasures to the light of day.

In speaking of the old schools of art he says, "A man accustomed to the broad, wide sea-shore, with its light breakers and free winds, and sounding rocks, and eternal sensation of tameless power, can scarcely but be angered when Claude bids him stand still on some paltry, clipped and chiselled quay, with porters and wheelbarrows running against him, to watch a weak, rippling, bound and barriered water that has not strength enough in one of its waves to upset the flowerpots on the wall, or even to fling one jet of spray over the confining stone. A man accustomed to the strength and glory of God's mountains, with their soaring and radiant pinnacles, and surging sweep of measureless distance, kingdoms in their valleys and climates upon their crests, can scarcely but be angered when Salvator bids him stand still under some contemptible fragment of splintering crag, which an Alpine snow wreath would smother in its first swell, with a stunted bush or two growing out of it, and a volume of manufactory smoke for a sky. A man accustomed to the grace and

infinity of nature's foliage, with every vista a cathedral, and every bough a revelation, can scarcely but be angered when Poussin mocks him with a black round mass of impenetrable paint diverging into feathers instead of leaves, and supported on a stick instead of a trunk." This is strong with indignation at the shocking tameness of men who should see nature with the eye of the poet and the painter. To the dignity of the images which he conjures up, is added the dignity of the thought, and reason adopts the child to which imagination has given birth. He possesses the same lofty indignation against this tameness of the old masters that Bacon showed against the fallacies of Aristotle, and that Pitt hurled at his opponents in debate. Still it is possessed of an air of playfulness and ease in its dealings with nature, that indicates the man studious and appreciative of her works, the master in reproducing her spirit.

We cannot forbear quoting somewhat at length from what may be termed Ruskin's Paroxysms in his Modern Painters. He is comparing the scenes of nature with the genius of the old masters, and especially to Claude as an index of their deficiency in appreciating it.

Of Sunrise on the Alps he says, "And then wait yet for one hour, until the East again becomes purple, and the heaving mountains, rolling against it in darkness, like waves of a wild sea, are drowned or gone in the glory of its beaming; watch the white glaciers blaze in their winding paths about the mountains, like mighty serpents with scales of fire, watch the columner peaks of solitary snow, kindling downwards, closer and closer, each, in itself a new morning; their long avalanches cast down in keen streams brighter than lightning, sending each his tribute of driven snow, like alter smoke, up to the heaven; the rose light of their silent domes flushing that heaven about them and above them, piercing with purer light through its purple lines of lifted cloud, casting a new glory on every leaf as it passes by, until the whole heaven—one scarlet canopy—is interwoven with a roof of waving flame, and tossing, vault beyond vault, as with the drifted wings of many companies of angels; and then, when you can look no more for gladness, and when you are bound down with fear and love of the Maker and Doer of this, tell me who has best delivered this His message unto man?"

Again, "The spirit of the hills is action; that of the lowlands, repose; and between these there is to be found every variety of motion and of rest, from the inactive plain, sleeping like the firmament, with cities for stars, to the fiery peaks, which, with heaving bosoms and exulting limbs, with the clouds drifting like hair from their bright foreheads, lift up their Titan hands to heaven, saying, 'I live forever.'"

In this passage is easily discovered the secret charm of Ruskin. The mobility and the subtlety of his intellect is such that it gives life to all things it touches, that it will lift inanimate nature with its dead weight of inertia, into forms of beauty and power. It is like the sunlight pouring in suddenly upon a dark landscape, when every object is flooded with a golden life, with a charm that warms while it attracts, that leaves you sad and alone when it disappears. Few English poets have had his power.

As an illustration of his subtlety in seeing into nature, he says, "Standing for half an hour beside the fall of Schaffhausen, on the north side where the rapids are long, and watch how the vault of water first bends, unbroken, in pure polished velocity, over the arching rocks at the brow of the cataract, covering them with a dome of crystal twenty feet thick—so swift that its motion is unseen except when a foam globe from above darts over it like a falling star; and how the trees are lighted above it under all their leaves, at the instant that it breaks into foam, and how all the billows of that foam burn with a pure fire like so much shattering chrysoprase; and how, ever and anon, startling you with its bright flash, a jet of spray leaps hissing out of the fall like a rocket bursting in the wind, and driven away like dust, filling the air with light; and how, through the curdling wreaths of the restless, crushing abyss below, the blue of the water, paled by the foam in its body shows purer than the sky through white rain clouds; while the shuddering iris stoops in tremulous stillness over all, fading and flushing alternately through the choking spray and shattered sunshine."

Ruskin's is not mere word painting, a mere superficial descriptive power. He sees something more than the exterior objects and forms of nature, he plunges into their laws, and follows their developments, and discovers the great moral lessons which they teach. We have sometimes

doubted if his moral apprehensions, his abstract powers were not stronger than his descriptive, whether or not he were more at home with the moral than with the physical relations of the universe. He certainly possesses a wonderful power for conjuring up images of beauty from places that seem like solitary wastes to some minds, to most minds; and he will see history where most men will see nothing but a faded flower and a broken wall. Whenever he lights upon an object, it is not with a feeble grasp, but the subtle grasp of energeic power. The passages illustrative of his higher moral powers are frequent.

In contrasting memorable structures with quiet ones, he says, "In passive moments, and with thrilling influence, the images of purer beauty, and of more spiritual power, will return in a fair and solemn company, and while the pride of many a stately palace, and the wealth of many a jewelled shrine, perish from our thoughts in a dust of gold, there will rise, through their dimness, the white image of some secluded marble chapel, by river or forest side, with the fretted flower work shrinking under its arches, as if under vaults of late fallen snow; in the vast weariness of some shadowy wall whose separate stones are like mountain foundations and yet numberless." Again, "The life of a nation is usually like the flow of a lava stream, first light and fierce, then languid and covered, at last advancing only by the tumbling over and over of its frozen blocks." And again, "In the edifices of man there should be found reverent worship and following—not only of the spirit which rounds the pillars of the forest and arches the vault of the avenue—which gives veining to the leaf, and polish to the shell, and grace to every pulse that agitates animal organism—but of that also which reproves the pillars of the earth, and builds up her barren precipices into the coldness of the clouds, and lifts her shadowy cones of mountain purple into the pale arch of the sky; for these, and other glories more than these, refuse not to connect themselves, in his thoughts, with the work of his own hand; the gray cliff loses not its nobleness when it reminds us of some Cyclopean waste of mural stone, the pinnacles of the rocky promontories arrange themselves, undegraded, into fantastic semblances of fortress towers, and even the awful cone of the far-off mountain has a melancholy mixed with that of its own solitude, which is cast

from images of nameless tumuli on white sea shores, and of the heap of reedy clay into which chambered cities melt in their mortality."

Mr. Ruskin is a poet, an artist, and a philosopher. He is not pre-eminently great in either department, but he is superior in all. He has the patience to become a learned man, a patience that is an indispensable adjunct of genius, without which genius is only a transient meteor. His labor does not harden him, and destroy the flexibility of his genius, nor dry up its fountains. He can unbend himself from that study that gives him an accurate knowledge of the flower, or the column grown old in its position, and sport easily in the regions of imagination. He can stoop from his reasoning, and permit his imagination to take possession of all his faculties, and limber them into a surprising activity. It is then that the deep scrutiny which he has given to the forms of nature, to her innumerable delicate tints and colorings becomes available. He seizes nature by her deepest, quietest, strongest points of power, and by an epithet puts one in perfect possession of that point. He does not pause with seeing simply the fall of the water, nor its motion, nor its arch over the precipice, but he looks deeper, and discovers that "pure, polished velocity" which is the most delicate point of approach. This is one of the elements of his power, the power to give the products of reason into the hands of imagination, to make the results of laborious learning the swift imaginative arrows of truth, and to invest their beauties with the fire of his own soul.

It may be objected that as a pure poet, he is elaborate, that his passages are labored, so much so that the pure, hard pressing stream of earnestness is shattered and lost by the force of its own volume, from the want of the power of reason to control it. To some he appears to have the effeminacy of affectation, of a serene dogmatism. But we think that we always discover a basis of philosophy in what he writes, a reason in the wildest flight of his imagination. He has not the large, calm mind of that class to which Humboldt, Milton, and Miller belong. They were more familiar than he with the grander relations of life; they had more sympathy than he with the institutions of mankind. He is not the deep philosopher, nor the organizer. He is the poet-art-

critic, whose greatest power lies in the active imagination, more than in the deep and still one. Still, his thoughts have a long reaching philosophy in them, inasmuch as they have utility in their aim. His eye is better formed for seeing the exact beauty of everything in nature, he is more of a student of nature in her minor teachings, rather than of those greater lessons that are engraved on the frontlets of the mountains.

Enthusiasm is the first element of the poet, the first and most essential element of greatness. He who has a large reason and permits its legitimate operation, cannot move rapidly to a result. He sees all the collateral consequences and they check his impetuosity. The man of quick impulses and intense thought, conceives his purposes quickly, and bends all his being to their accomplishment. This is the element, the stream, the power of poetry in the man—it is the quick and lofty generalization, the fire of execution. Nelson upon his ship in battle, Napoleon upon the field, Burke on the floor of the Commons, and the blind Milton dictating to his daughter in his study, all were nerved and inspired in their moments of action by their poetic power, warmth and intensity of feeling, and impetuosity and oneness of purpose,—in this capacity was their greatness.

In this enthusiasm, Jeremy Taylor was a poet. He has no passage in which the still, strong fires of Milton burn. He never moves the procession of his thoughts with that heavy and irresistible force that distinguished the polemical old Puritan—his thoughts move with impetuosity rather than with dignity, and naturally clothe themselves in good language. His style is eminently racy. His learning is great, almost as ready as that of Bacon. It was always too ready and obtrusive; it broke the unity of his discourses, and abated the warmth of his intellectual fires. His multiplicity of images tax our scientific knowledge too closely to trace their analogy. An object of nature or a historical fact brought in to enliven a discourse should be so pointed as to suggest its real purpose at a flash; the moment the mind labors to comprehend the reason of its use, its effectiveness is destroyed. Taylor had much of the poetic power, enthusiasm and concentration. His imagination had greater facility than strength, greater freedom than accuracy. Its point of weakness lay in its fertility.

It flows, leaps, plunges, glides, is uneasy continually. It had so many views for each object with which it came in contact, that his writings became much more voluminous than weighty. Not possessing the power of concentration of feeling, he never seems on the rack of exertion—a quick, continuous, and lofty movement of thought was most natural to him. Consequently you find few of those passages in his writings that are powerful and striking, that give a more rapid movement to the blood, and drowns thought in the quick-sprung flood of feeling. He had not the power of reserving his forces, then letting them slip upon occasions, like the quick bolt from the cloud. In one respect he was like Dryden, and wrote too copiously to write well; he was prone to multiply expression rather than thought; had he written less he would have been more read.

In one of his funeral discourses he says, "We are as water, weak, and of no consistence, always descending, abiding in no certain place, unless when we are detained with violence; and every little breath of wind makes us rough and tempestuous, and troubles our faces; every trifling accident discomposes us; and, as the face of the waters wafting in the storm, so wrinkles itself, that it makes upon its forehead furrows deep and hollow like a grave; so do our great and little cares and trifles first make the wrinkles of old age, and then they dig a grave for us; and there is in nature nothing so contemptible, but it may meet with us in such circumstances, that it may be too hard for us in our weakness; and the sting of a bee is a weapon sharp enough to pierce the finger of a child or the lip of a man; and these creatures which nature hath left without weapons, yet they are armed sufficiently to vex those parts of men which are left defenceless and obnoxious to a sunbeam, to the roughness of a sour grape, to the unevenness of a gravel stone, to the dust of a wheel, or the unwholesome breath of a star looking awry upon a sinner."

The poetry of Taylor lies in the rapid and versatile movement of the thought; not in the concentration of feeling; in the isolated yet frequent recurrence of smooth and beautiful expressions, which have all the original and fresh impulse of a child in them. The great poet has a power and shows his genius in his choice of epithets. An epithet, like one skilful blow upon a stringed instrument, strikes

out the latent music in the soul of the reader, as well as that in the instrument; and the vibration will continue according to the strength of the blow. Taylor has ease and grace in his expression, but has not great skill in the use of epithets. Milton had this skill and his epithets sometimes move you like the deep sounding winds in a forest of pines. Shakespeare had this skill; they come from him like the notes warbled from a bird too full to be still. Ruskin has this skill; as an art-critic he possesses it in an eminent degree, and with his epithets he will touch the subtlest springs of human feelings, and put the painter and the architect, or the great Architect and Painter of nature, through their completed works, into close communion with the observer. Dickens possesses this power; especially in his descriptions of quiet scenes will be thrown out two or three words which crystalize the brooding spirit as it sits still and thoughtful, like a conscious being, over the scene.

It was not in Taylor's condensed epithets nor in the strong fires of his imagination, nor in the quiet energy of his passion that he so interested the world; it was in the extent of his learning, of his observation, the freshness of his mind, and the versatility of his fancy, in the meteoric showers of rhetoric which always accompanied the procession of his thoughts, as in the following:—

"Jesus did infinitely prevail; a religion that taught men to be meek and humble, apt to receive injuries, but inapt to do any; a religion that gave countenance to the poor and pitiful, in a time when riches were adored, and ambition and pleasure had possessed the hearts of all mankind; a religion that would change the face of things and the hearts of men, and break vile habits into gentleness and counsel; that such a religion, in such a time, by the sermons and conduct of fishermen, men of mean breeding and illiberal arts, should so splendidly triumph over the philosophy of the world, and the arguments of the subtle, and the sermons of the eloquent, the power of princes and the interests of the state, the inclinations of nature and the blindness of zeal, the force of custom and the solicitations of passion, the pleasures of sin and the busy arts of the devil; that is, against wit and power, superstition and wilfulness, fame and money, nature and empire, which are all the causes in this world that can make a thing impossible; this, this is to be ascribed to the power of God, and is the great demonstration of the resurrection of Jesus."

Again, in his funeral discourse on the demise of the Countess of Carberry, he says,

"Death is natural, and therefore necessary; it is become a punishment unto us, and therefore it is unavoidable; and God hath bound the evil upon us by bands of natural and inseparable propriety, and by a supervening unalterable decree of heaven; and we are fallen from our privilege, and are returned to the condition of beasts, and buildings, and common things; and we see temples defiled into the ground, and they die by sociellage; and great empires die by their own plenty and ease, full humors, and factious subjects; and huge buildings fall by their own weight, and the violence of many winters eating and consuming the cement, which is the marrow of their bones; and princes die like the meanest of their servants; and everything finds a grave and a tomb; and the very tomb itself dies by the bigness of its pompousness and luxury, and becomes as friable and uncombined dust, as the ashes of the sinner or of the saint that lay under it, and is now forgotten in his bed of darkness."

Description is not always the province of poetry, it is not always in the seizure and the disposal of material beauties with tenderness and with power; in shaking "hell's concave," nor in "smoothing the raven down of night till it smiles." Shelley possessed a wonderful power in poetry unconnected with the material world, in the world of moral powers and ideas; he saw the beauty and harmony of moral forces, of eternal principles, and toyed with them, or shook them, as tangible as the spear of Ithureal against the tyrannies of mankind. It was thus with Channing, though his was purely a devotional mind, while Shelley's was not. Channing's was the poetry of intangibility. It lay in the moral grandeur of his thought, in the delicate sensibility of his feelings. He said little of the eternal mountains, little of the far-sounding sea, little of those shadowy graces that are always half eluding the detection of man in the finer beauties and forms of nature. His nice sensibilities were open, like the face of still waters, to the shadows of the green blade of grass, and the tender flower bending over them; but, unlike the water, they were not reproduced again to the eye of the observer; they were rather absorbed, and incorporated with the spirit of his genius, to give it tone and subtlety of power. But for those influences more nearly allied to the heart of man, and which ally man to his God,

those that magnify the highest nature of man, that move the feelings and convince the judgment by an attraction and a force that presents no defined point of approach, and yet is felt as commanding and irresistable, that always appeal to the very fountains of animated being, and move them to greater purity and strength, that put the beaded diamond drop where muddy impurity threaded its thick foam before, that shake the imprisoning shell from the chrysalis and let it free, for these he had a boundless attraction, and the power to reproduce them in the most exalted manner, and with the purest of purposes. His was above the mere material sphere, above the sphere of sentiment and feeling which could be dissected and analyzed by the cold blades of thought; he was in that sphere of moral forces that harmonizes the ways of man to the eternal laws which, like beams from the sun, emanate from the forehead of the Creator. His spiritual grasp of thought may be seen in his article on Napoleon. Standing above, and superior to the mailed conquorer, he pronounces the judgment of an indignant history upon him. You feel the warmth of his indignation move you, until the monarch stands before you, shorn of his grandeur and his terrors, and with hands dripping with the blood of Europe, a criminal at the bar of mankind. He stands convicted, as having been bereft of all thought, aim, all feeling of tenderness and sympathy with his race, as endowed with the will of a demon and with his power of destruction, let lose for the ruin of nations. His thoughts of Christ, of Christianity, of society, were all ennobled by the same dignity of movement and comprehension. Under the light of his genius all things blushed with a warm life. He shows few of those suddenly illuminating flashes of eloquence, passages which you may cull out of the mass, as flowers from an over-shadowing wilderness of gloom. He goes here and there, inspiring the intellect, and warming the heart, and elevating the thoughts. In Milton, he comprehended the majestic beauty of his thoughts, and the unbending pride of his character; in Napoleon, he saw the selfishness of his aims, the subtlety of his intellect, and the ruinous grandeur of his enterprises; he saw the purity and nobility of an earnest self-culture that would elevate the man to the full stature of his development. He was a poet, as well as a spiritual

man, and a man of able intellect. The fire of his poetic genius still warms and long will warm cold embers into living flames.

Milton was the poet in his prose as well as in his poetry. You do not find in that all his mellowness of versification and language, but you do find the lofty spirit and powerful indignation of the strong old Puritan. In his attacks upon prelacy and royalty, you see the burning words of a quiet and yet a blazing anger that would consume all in its path. He says, in his "Reformation in England," "But what greater debasement can there be to regal dignity, whose towering and steadfast height rests upon the immoveable foundations of justice, and heroic virtues, than to chain it in a dependence of subsistency, or ruining, to the painted battlements and gaudy rottenness of prelatry, which want but one puff of the kings to blow them down like a pasteboard house built of court cards." Again he says, in the lofty spirit in which he was wont to speak, "Thou, therefore, that sits in light and glory unapproachable, parent of angels and men! Next, then, I implore, Omnipotent King, Redeemer of that last remnant whose nature thou didst assume, ineffable and everlasting love! And thou, the third subsistence of divine infinitude, illuming Spirit, the joy and solace of created things! One Tri-personal God-head! Look upon this thy poor and almost spent and expiring church, leave her not thus a prey to these unfortunate wolves, that wait and think long till they devour thy tender flock; these wild boars that have broke into thy vineyard, and left the prints of their polluting hoof on the souls of thy servants. Oh! let them not bring about their damned designs, that stand now at the entrance of the bottomless pit, expecting the watch-word to open and let out those dreadful locusts and scorpions, to re-involve us in that pitchy cloud of infernal darkness, where we shall never more see the sun of thy truth again, never hope for the cheerful dawn, never more hear the bird of morning sing." In the *Areopogitica* occurs the following passage: "I cannot praise a fugitive and cloistered virtue unexercised and unbreathed, that never rallies out and seeks her adversary, but slinks out of the race, where that immortal garland is to be run for, not without dust and heat."

The poetry of Milton's prose lies not so much in fre-

quent and felicitious images running like blazing lines of fire through the whole; not in a fanciful activity that went, touching here, touching there, with sweet verdured thought springing from each footprint, musical and redolent as rare creations; nor in the still Dantean heat, intensifying thought rather than making it rotund with dignity; but in that lofty indignation, that sweeping anathema, that proud assumption of superiority, that hurled defiance against the oppressors of the church, or of the people, against the corruptions of courts, the cupidity of rulers, and the moral degredation of states. The fires of his soul rolled deep, like the swell of the sea in the storm; there was a wide undulation in the movement, there was no rising, narrowing, and then breaking into fringing and confused lines of foam. The shadows upon his brow hung low and dark, and the light of his intelligence gleamed on the edges like a November sunset upon the evening cloud. The veins of prose and poetry were in different strata in his brain, not that one was higher than the other, but in latral strata, having wide regions between them. That of poetry was high and tuneful with all Saxon symphonies of language, the breathing of a sad, calm spirit chastened and humbled by a keen sense of its mortal short-comings, and its immortal destiny; a spirit, that goes, inevitably probing to your deeper feelings. The vein of prose ran hurling here and there the thunderbolts of his wrath, without compromise, without cessation, until the citadels of his enemies were demolished. He was domesticated within the fortress of his own power, and, sitting there conscious of the weapons within his wielding, he flung strong epithet and bitter scorn, where and at whom he pleased. The map of England, and all classical antiquity, all ocean currents and mountain lines, the flowers and grasses of distant fields, the creations of classical genius, the people of tropic heats and polar snows, all were domesticated with him, and added each of its kind to the power and the beauty of his thoughts. So great were his resources, so great were his abilities to use them!

Among the great poet-novilists is Dickens, with his wizard genius. He is eminently genial and melancholy. He goes, quietly stealing about touching everything with sombre shades and mellow tones; and he puts the heart in sympathy and good nature with all the flowers of the field

and with all birds of the air; with all spiders' webs woven in forgotten chambers; with oaken posts standing stiff in shady corners, which, under his touch, show a sly sensation and knowledge of queer things lurking in their odd carvings; with the broken and patched windows of poverty; with the paving stones squeezing each other and blazing in the sultry city sun; with the gruff lion and dog faces staring at you so bravely from gate-posts and door-steps; with everything scattered about us in our common life. He puts you in kindly sympathy with the poverty-stricken, and teaches you to respect their little world of hopes, loves, hates, ambitions, despairs; teaches you to brush as carefully by a ragged gown as a silken robe; to be as careful in intruding upon their meagre miniature kingdoms of treasure, as upon those that embrace continents and seas; he teaches you to respect the legitimate feelings and possessions of all human nature without regard to their magnitude or their position. He informs the feelings rather than the understanding—yet keeps the understanding continually upon a stretch of wonder that he can find find so many dramatic positions in these little lives of ours, and give interest to them all. In his descriptions of artificial or of natural scenes he endows the most inanimate with the most animated intelligence; not an artificial and unnatural life, distorting everything out of its proper aim, but with that life which is the most appropriate movement, and expression of the highest aim of its being. He is not strong, not deep, never intense in his passions; we can see him after writing one of his warmest passages, quietly drop his pen, with placid composure, smell of the rose at the window, throw a careless look at the sky, or, with folded arms, walk quietly about at peace with all disturbing emotions and unruly passions. His muse is like a warm sunbeam that goes running into all the forsaken corners of the earth, and leaves a green verdure where it goes.

In these times the world seems bereft of those grand old masters of thought and feeling, whose footsteps go sounding through the "corridors of time." Poetry has gone a-Maying, is loitering and sentimentalizing in the fields, when it should be setting on and nerving strong men in the great battles of the age. Tender sentiment has usurped the place of epic feeling—those who should be heroes are

dallying with the little things of the parlor and the boudoir. The excessively polite culture, and the harmonies of society, those delighting ears refined, and sweet to lips speaking in classic accents, has diluted and effeminated those strong tides of passion that come from the free man, from one who has not subdued and conquered himself into weakness from excessive self-control. Nature, left to herself, is luxuriant in her growths, multifarious in her suggestions, impulsive and rapid in her movements. When she attains one height she is not content without attempting the superior. At the first suggestion of wrong, her hatred and indignation grow, accumulate and burn to demolish the antagonism. Instinct teaches her to seize upon and use the most forcible and pointed forms of expression—she is intent only on force and effect, and does not see the delicate and secondary side consequences. In art she tends to power rather than to delicacy, she would see with the telescopic rather than the microscopic eye, would court the solitude of the mountains and the solemnity of the sea, rather than the flowers and multiformed grasses and weeds of the field; she seems to retreat into the recesses of the forests rather than become familiar in the haunts of men. In these piping times of peace from which we have just emerged, the large, terrible, comprehensive, strong, the paraphernalia of the epic element of song, have all been abandoned for our Mauds, Aurora Leighs, and Hiawathas; Jupiter and his Olympus, Michael and Satan, and Lear, and Macbeth, stand up as the demi-gods of a remote antiquity, the impersonation of ungovernable forces, daring ambitions, and dauntless courage. The modern muse, brooding over her quiet nest, gives life to the sweet, orderly, to those things that please people of quiet feelings, refined culture, and dignified deportment. This speaks a nation at ease by the fireside, a nation whose tranquillity is disturbed only by the incomings of the new to take the place of the old. Our refined poets, with their tender sentiments have stolen the march of the old heroes, and put them into the back ground, while they play in winsome measures to popular audiences. There must be brave men to write heroic poetry, poetry that crystalizes the great idea of the age, that sounds out the heart of the nations. Fear of creeds, of old policies, of honorable distinctions and customs, of old reasons which

a new state of society has rendered worthless, all these must be disarmed of their terrors before the poet can sing with all the full rounded power that is in him. Humboldt and Miller were free men, Ruskin is a free man, still their words jar somewhat upon the accepted refinement and propriety of their times. Men cry out "infidelity," "dogmatism," and "learning run mad," to frighten a scrupulous world away from them; still, the fire and force of their genius will live as an inspiration to millions. As Macaulay says, a man should become as a child before he can be a poet. When he has hardened into the consistency of manhood, the mobility and the artlessness of the child must tremble along his lines with whatever volume and force they may move. There must be an ignorance and unconsciousness of surrounding and acknowledged powers, which have authority from the historical acceptance which men have given them. He must be able to think freely, speak freely, and acknowledge no exterior trammels which check and effeminate the impulse of his thought and passion. By a strange organization of our natures, our first impressions are apt to have the more of truth in them than the reason can reach in an age of reasoning. This is why the early Edinburgh Reviewers and the statesmen of the last century in England attained such gigantic stature of intellectual power. It was a period of breaking away from old ideas, and established laws and opinions. The imagination and the passions entered largely into their labors, and became the controlling influences, when the genius of those men shot up, comet-like, into strange and unattempted regions. They were free men, with a decent balance of thought-culture to keep them within the bounds of practical common sense. They were the pure poets of civil polity, the motors of state progress; they gave an impulse and a fire to contemporary intellect which made Great Britain exceedingly great.

And shall we not have something of this in this great American Rebellion? Where is the fire and the genius of the Fathers of the Republic? Have they become smothered beneath a load of prosperity and wealth which two-thirds of a century has piled upon their shoulders? It cannot be that our ancient loftiness of purpose has sunken into lower channels, that we are plunging downwards, instead of ascending, in our national courses of thought. The days, and

the trials, and the responsibilities that awoke a Henry, a Hamilton, an Adams, an Otis into being, certainly were not more important than are our days; they did not call upon men for more decisive action, for more decided abilities, for greater self-possession, for a more careful husbanding of the abilities with which the God of nature has endowed us, than do these our times. Petty politics and the pursuit of wealth have too much absorbed our national thought; we have been groping with the muck-rake when we should have been pursuing a higher purpose, and attaining a calmer and a purer culture. The existence of the Great Republic is at stake. We must fight to maintain it. Man must write, and talk too. There is a public sentiment to animate, to keep up to the truly great and patriotic standard, which becomes the starting point and well sustained back ground and base of truly great and patriotic action. Then when Holt of Kentucky utters words worthy of a Henry, and of the crisis, words that burn with the deepest power of poetry and the loftiest indignation against those who would pull down the pillars of the Union, let us not cry "bombast," and "rodomontade," but accept them as the apt utterances of the times. I. D.

Art. XXX.

A Summary of the Early Conflicts of Christianity with Heathenism.

The opponents of Christianity in the early stages of its history divided themselves into two great classes,—Jewish opponents and Heathen opponents. The former were the more fierce in their opposition, the latter the more selfish. Giving our present attention to the latter, we propose a condensed statement of the early conflicts of our faith with Heathenism.

The conflicts of Christianity with Heathenism may be divided into two general classes,—conflicts with the philosophers, the learned, the educated; and conflicts with the

people at large, and through the people with national and local governments.

Of the first class,—the answer of Origen to Celsus, (a heathen who wrote against Christianity,) the Dialogue of Minucius Felix, the remans of Porphyry and other similar works, furnish instances. They exhibit more particularly the objections urged by cultivated men against the new faith; and in general the controversies resulting from the efforts of the early Christians to establish it. These objections differ widely in some respects, and yet there is a certain similarity running through them all. In fact they are not very dissimilar to the objections brought against new discoveries of truth in all ages.

According to one class of these objections, Christianity was, substantially, an old affair offering nothing essentially new, which its believers had no occasion to make so much account of; according to another class of objections, it was an interloper, and would have been given to men before had there been any such need of it as its apostles pretended. One party complained that the new faith inculcated *pride*, and elevated man unduly, by making him the centre for which the rest of the world was created, and to which all orders of animals must minister. Another party complained that it *lowered* the dignity of man, by demanding self-abasement, and proclaiming him an unholy and impure being in the sight of God. On the one hand, Christians were accused of elevating a man to godship; and on the other, of following one so weak that he could not save himself from the death of the cross. Christ himself was at once a designing impostor, and the innocent cause of delusion in his followers! A different class of objectors exclaimed, Christians *unite* against the national government, and at the same time they are split up into a multitude of sects.—So various, and in some respects, so contradictory were the objections urged against Christianity by the learned heathen. They all arose from a misapprehension of the true nature and mission of the new religion; a misapprehension, we must add, shared in by the Christians themselves, and fostered by them; and for much of which the heathen cannot be regarded as very blamable.

But it was not from opposition of this general character that the new faith had most to fear. Opposition, indeed, is

wholesome and beneficial, written opposition especially so—because it gives rise to careful inquiry into the grounds of faith, and so developes an intellectual activity which nothing else can do. It was from the other class of conflicts—the second class as we have divided them—that Christians had the greatest reason to apprehend danger and loss,—"conflicts with civil authorities and popular violence."

We class these under one head, for so history presents them. In all instances of persecution they seem to be united. One element may predominate, but both occur together. If a mob seize a Christian, they drag him before a magistrate. If a Christian is tortured by the government, the crowd stand by to help on the "good work." If laws are enacted against believers in the new faith, informers are ready, either to give information to the government or to be bribed into silence by the Christians. The rulers take up the cause of the people, that by catering to their prejudices they may retain a hold upon their affections; and the people gladly mob a sect obnoxious to the government. Nor does the fact that the authorities are often more lenient than the people, and strive to soften their fury, alter the general truth of this statement. The letter of Trajan to Pliny, and Hadrian's Decree are sometimes cited as exceptions, but they are not really such. Trajan instructs Pliny not to *seek out* Christians in order to punish them, but at the same time provides for their punishment, if brought before the magistrate and convicted. Mosheim says, (Vol. 1. p. 292-3,) "From the first part of this regulation we may reluctantly infer, that the emperor did not regard the Christians with an unfavorable eye, whilst, from the latter part, it is as adroitly to be collected that he was fearful of discovering too much lenity towards them, lest he should thereby exasperate the priesthood and the populace."

Hadrian's decree goes farther than Trajan's, and signifies that no Christian shall suffer death, unless "legitimately accused and convicted of some sort of crime." Mosheim (Comm. I. 298, i.) thinks, however, that Hadrian has received credit for more lenity than he ever intended to exercise, for even after the publication of this rescript, "Christians were continually put to death without having any other crime objected to them that of their religion"—that is, for professing a contempt for the gods, the worship

of whom was enjoined by the laws. On the other hand, when Nero accused the Christians of burning Rome, the people thought him *unjust* in his persecutions.

These facts do not invalidate the general assertion that "popular violence and civil authority" went hand in hand in Christian persecutions, although sometimes the one hung back and the other took the lead, and sometimes the reverse.

Two difficulties present themselves to a candid investigation of this subject. There are two prevalent errors regarding it. One error is the attributing all opposition to a rooted hostility to Christ. Orthodox writers are apt to fall into this error. They attribute all the trials of the faith to the depraved hearts of men. In reality, however, much antagonism resulted from *indifference;* and from that conflict in *little things* which would be the necessary accompaniment of family and social intercourse, when every-day life was so inwrought with the symbols and rites of paganism. For instance, the rejoicings on all festival occasions were so full of idolatry, that any member of the family, converted to the new faith, must cease participating therein with the other members of his family. The wife must refuse to bake the customary cake for her husband to offer his god, and hence there would arise dissension; yet there would be no direct hostility to *Christ.* An analagous case in modern times—one at least that approximates to it—is that of the Quakers. The early Quakers found the days of the week, the names of the months, and all the public and private forms of worship prevalent around them, to be parts of what they called *impure religion.* So it was with the early Christians. Father might be divided against son, and yet both might be amiable and loving in their family relations.

On the other hand, there is danger of looking too much at these little things, these trifling difficulties, and of forgetting, that notwithstanding the truth just declared, there *was* that in the religion of Christ which aroused opposition; that as there was a cross for Jesus, so there was a cross for his followers—a spiritual if not a material one. There is danger of forgetting the principle which Jesus himself enunciated. *The truth is a sword.* It ought always to be remembered that there was, and is, an iconoclastic, an *image-breaking* spirit in Christianity, which so assails all impurity

and evil, that society in which these exist must either confess its error, turn unto God and live, or *get rid* of the prophetic spirit which stands reproving it. We see the same essential thing in the South to-day. God's prophets speak, and as they cannot be answered or their arguments gainsayed, they are maltreated and persecuted. Let this truth be fully perceived in the discussion of our subject.

We pass briefly over the minor conflicts about comparatively unimportant matters; for example, the accusation of impurity, of child slaying, of bringing on natural calamities, of being misanthropic; we style these comparatively unimportant accusations, because untrue. We pass by these, that we may come to the real conflict—that of which these things just named were oftentimes only results, and as related to which, they were as bubbles on the surface.

At just this point we meet the objection, If the things we call unimportant were not the *great* matters of conflict, but only *trifles*, how is it that in the contests of the times, we find *these "trifles" dwelt upon while grander themes are ignored?* We reply, that it does not follow that all who engaged in the conflict understood the greatness of Christianity or realized the vitality of the contest. The illustration from the slavery question just referred to, is pertinent here. What are the topics discussed to-day—at least till quite recently? Not slavery itself; but John Brown raids, Republican parties, Presidential candidates, Kansas Investigation Committees, Election of Speakers, &c. &c. Some future reader may think this generation cared very little about slavery, but busied itself greatly about these things—undoubtedly the age is more *immediately* interested in these. The number, in every period, who dive to the bottom of the well for the truth lying there, is small. Yet we know very well that the underlying cause of all this political bustle, is slavery.

So in the early ages of our faith, the talk was about many unimportant doctrines and false charges, but the underlying cause of all was *the opposition of the pure spirit of Christianity to the impure spirit of the world.*

Let us come, then, to the heart of the contest; let us look at the thickest of the fight and not at the skirmishing merely; though skirmishing may show that a battle is not far off.

Neander, in his Church History (Vol. I. pp. 87, 88,) brings forward two causes of conflict: "1. It (the new religion) induced Roman citizens to renounce the religion of the state, to the observance of which they were bound by the laws, to refuse compliance with the '*cærimonias Romanas.*'" This is so obvious that it needs little more than a bare statement. "2. It introduced a new religion, not admitted by the laws of the state into the class of *religiones licitæ*, (religions permitted.)"

We do not find these things to be, in themselves, so great a cause of trouble as Neander implies. The trouble had deeper root. The objection would have applied equally to any *heathen* religion or to Judaism, prior to their recognition by law. Both of these causes, (alienation of Christians from the state religion, and introduction of an illegal faith,) are swallowed up in one grand cause, which was, that Christianity is an *uncompromising* faith; a faith which not only affirmed its own right to exist, but denied the right of any other to exist. Other religions might say, "*We* are right, and so are *you*;" but Christianity said, and always will say, "We are *right* and all others are *wrong*;" or in the language of Paul, "If any man love not the Lord Jesus Christ, let him be *anathema maranatha!*"

This characteristic, we must add, does not interfere with the principle of *love* which pervades the Christian faith. Though it comes not to condemn but to save, still, in its relation to sin and impurity and error, it is uncompromising. Though it wins and rules by *love* it admits of no half way work with evil. Thus says Celsus—a heathen opponent—as cited by Neander himself, "The Jews are a nation by themselves, and they observe the sacred institutions of their country, whatever they may be, and in so doing act like other men." So Judaism might easily be tolerated. To be sure it denounced idolatry and pronounced other religions idolatrous, but not with the same emphasis nor to the same extent. Judaism did not make strenuous efforts to proselyte.

If *Christianity* had only asked for admission on a par with other religions, such admission would have been granted. Even if Tiberias did not propose—as Tertullian says—to admit Jesus among the gods of Rome, it is certain that *Heliogabalus* did propose something similar. Neander truly says, "Had he ever proceeded to the execution of his

plan he would assuredly have met with the most determined opposition of the Christians." (I. 125.)

In confirmation of this position are some of the accusations urged against the Christians,—as that they did not obey the laws by attending pagan festivals, &c., and were not devoted servants of the country where they lived; for Christians taught the eternal truth, that might does not make right, and laws are unjust except as they conform to God's laws; that all earthly kingdoms must decrease before the Kingdom of Heaven. It is part of the prerogative of our faith, to assert the abomination of all unrighteousness.

Hence, the grand conflict of Christianity with Heathenism was not in externals only and in trifles; neither did it arise from the total depravity of man; but it came from the rooted antagonism between truth and error. It may be summed up in those striking words, "Truth is intolerant," be it material or moral. "What concord hath Christ with Belial!"

Christianity fought with philosophers, and there was no bloodshed; only wits were sharpened. But Christianity fought with principalities and powers, (for it is a practical, not merely a theoretical faith,) and the conflict was like that of those two Highlanders, who, meeting in a narrow pass among their native hills, must fight, arm to arm and shoulder to shoulder, with firm muscles, till one should conquer and the other be hurled to the valley beneath. Christianity can have no truce with its foes—can neither give nor receive quarter—must, in the end, make the conquest complete and universal, or itself perish. This is now the Christian *principle* of conflict; it was the same in the early conflicts with heathenism. J. H. W.

Art. XXXI.

The Unity of the Race a Bond of Sympathy.

The question, whether the unity of the human race is genealogical or ethnological, is comparatively of little practical importance. The practical question is, are the mem-

bers of the human family united by an identity of nature—of wants, aspirations, hopes, and interests? Is the unity practical as well as theoretical? *Is it a bond of sympathy?*

Every student of the New Testament will especially remember that extraordinary chapter, (1 Cor. xii.,) in which an apostle illustrates the relation which the several members of the early Christian churches sustained to each other, by comparing it to the vital connection which subsists between the several members of the human body. The eye, the ear, the hand and the foot are distinct members, and serve different purposes. Nevertheless, they belong to the same body, and so have a common interest. Each member needs the co-operation of every other member. Each is dependent on each; the welfare of any one is the welfare of all. "And the eye cannot say to the hand, I have no need of thee: nor again, the head to the feet, I have no need of you." "And whether one member suffer, all the members suffer with it: or one member be honored all the members rejoice with it." Having thus stated the vital and sympathetic relations which the several members of the body hold to one another, the apostle applies the illustration to Christian believers who then formed the church. "Now ye are the body of Christ, and members in particular." "For as we have many members in one body, and all members have not the same office; so we (the Christian believers forming the church,) being many, are one body in Christ, and every one members one of another." (Rom. xii. 4, 5.)

We should do the apostle's words injustice, if we neglected to state, that the comparison they contain had especial reference to the early church. The circumstances under which the first converts to Christianity professed their new faith, were calculated to unite them by a much closer tie, by a much dearer and a more sympathetic intimacy, than is possible under the circumstances of the present age. As a general thing, the converts made by the preaching of the apostles, came from the poorer and the humbler classes. Not many rich, not many noble, not many wise, in the worldly or popular sense of being wise, were chosen. The new doctrine was despised by the influential portion of the community. The first believers were every where exposed to severe trials of their constancy and sincerity. The malice

of Jewish bigotry, the indifference of Grecian refinement, and the scorn of Roman pride, made their position in society often one of great peril, and always one of peculiar hardship. As a matter of safety, it was often necessary to meet in secret places—in obscure rooms—sometimes in the catacombs of Rome, and not unfrequently in the caves of the mountains. Persons so situated would of course feel the warmest sympathy for each other—would take the deepest interest in each others welfare—would realize that the tie of fellowship which bound them together, as members of a religious body, had peculiar sacredness. A common danger, a common suffering, and all for a common faith, made the several members of the apostolic church feel that they were indeed one—one in weal or in woe, in prosperity or in adversity, in victory or in defeat; and if in any one of these respects, any single member of the church suffered, all the members suffered with him, or any single member was honored, all the members rejoiced with him.

At the present day the case is quite different. Christianity now is popular. The rich, the learned, the influential, all are eager to honor it, at least in name. Its profession and defence are attended with no severe trials. No common danger knits together the several persons who avow a belief in Jesus Christ. The very different circumstances which distinguish Christian believers now from believers in the time of the apostles, make the comparison, so forcibly put by Paul, almost pointless, if not really absurd, if we apply it to the members of the existing Christian church. He intended by his comparison to set forth the vital and sympathetic intimacy which united the suffering, toiling, persecuted believers of his own time; he could not have intended that the comparison should have equal force under the totally different experience which attends the Christian profession in the present age of the world.

But though the special application of Paul's illustration was limited and local,—concerning only the Christian church of his own day,—the *principle* of the illustration is universal, and applies to men without regard to the time in which they live, the circumstances which surround them, their historical relations, or their peculiar condition. This principle, as a bond of sympathy, inheres in the *one body*

of humanity, whereof each human being is a living member. All men are united by a common bond, a common interest, a common welfare. There are, indeed, innumerable varieties of men. There are diversities of appearance, of complexion, of intellectual and moral strength and attainment, of culture and refinement; in no one of these several particulars do any two individuals entirely agree; the distinct members of the great body of humanity count by many millions, and all have not the same office; and yet all men are one—as regards their highest welfare, their interests are "one and inseparable,"—the happiness of any human soul is in some measure, immediately or remotely, the happiness of every soul, and the wretchedness of any one in equal measure, and in the same way, the wretchedness of all. What Paul says of the church, may with equal pertinence be said of mankind at large, "And whether one member suffer, all the members suffer with it; or one member be honored, all the members rejoice with it."

It is true, that this vital unity or oneness of all human interests, is not obvious to every one. Very selfish men, who see only the immediate and palpable results of human conduct, will perhaps find it difficult to believe, that the welfare of any single human being is as vitally and literally bound up with the welfare of every other human being, as is the health or comfort of any eye, a hand or a foot connected with the health or comfort of every other member of the human body. That the well-being of an obscure individual in London is as truly and inseparably connected with the well-being of an obscure individual in New York, as the well-being of one hand is connected with the well-being of the other hand of the same body, is a statement which possibly not a few will promptly dispute.

It must be confessed that the unity of interests is not as palpable to sense, in the one case as in the other. The several members of the physical body are connected by ligaments which the eye can see and the hand trace. The arteries and veins through which the life-sustaining element is distributed over the system, all reveal themselves to the eye of the anatomist. And even the nerves which, ramifying over the whole system, disseminate pain or pleasure to every sensitive part, and so keep up a sympathy between all,

may, to a great extent, be laid bare by the hand of science and skill. The great body of humanity—the body whereof each man and woman and child is a lively member—does not indeed have this *physical* connection of parts. The material eye cannot see its ligaments, the material hand cannot trace the arteries and veins of its common life; nor does the hand of skill expose a system of material nerves, whereby the weal or woe of one member of the race, is communicated to the sensitive soul of every other member.

But what of this? Is nothing real that is not material? Does nothing exist except the eye can see, and the hand feel it? Can we have knowledge only of those things which the senses reveal? Will any one dispute the reality of every statement which cannot be verified by material tests? No physical eye ever saw, no physical hand ever touched, friendship; is there, therefore, no such thing as friendship? No eye ever saw, no hand ever touched, kindness, or justice, or brotherly love; is there therefore no such thing as kindness, justice, or brotherly love? The truth is, every moment of our conscious existence we are trusting in the reality of things and of principles which no material sense can ever perceive. Christianity itself—its essence, its spirit, its virtues, its joys and rewards—is a reality which no eye can see, or ear hear, or hand touch. It cometh to every soul without observation. God reveals it only by his spirit. The best, the noblest, the most durable things, are superior to the senses, and always elude their sight. The things that are seen indeed, are temporal; the things that are not seen, are spiritual and eternal.

The ligaments which unite in one body all the individuals of the human family are not physical—they cannot be perceived by any bodily sense. They are, however, none the less real. The spiritual eye can see them—the spiritual sense feel them. No one can see or touch the cord which binds in one the members of a family, and which makes the happiness of one the happiness of all. Yet no one presumes to deny that there is such a bond of union. The family tie which brings the sanctities, and affections, and sympathies of home, is felt and acknowledged by all, yet it is a tie which no material sense can ever detect. Now it is a distinctive doctrine of Christianity, that the human race is a family

—that all men are brethren—that God is the common Father. The tie which binds the great family is not less real than that which binds the small family, and in neither case is the tie less real than the material one which holds together all the various members of the physical body. However it may seem to a selfish and a short-sighted view, no proposition is more susceptible of proof—we might with more propriety say, no proposition has less need of proof—than the fact that man is made for society, and this in such a sense that his true interest is always in harmony with, and so promotes, the happiness of his brother man. No one can live by himself, isolated from all connection with other beings, without violence to his nature. There is, and can be, no such thing as an individual interest *wholly dissevered* from the general interest. No man can harm himself who does not, by the very act, harm his neighbors; no man can harm his neighbors who does not, by the very act, harm himself. We cannot confine the effects of our conduct to ourselves. The instant a deed is done—no matter whether a good or an evil deed—that instant it begins to diffuse itself far and wide, and no precaution can circumscribe its influence. When a poison is taken into the system, it does not confine its deadly effect to the part with which it came in immediate contact. It darts its baneful effects in every direction; and every fibre and nerve of the system is made to suffer the common pain.

Says Bishop Butler, in his First Sermon on Human Nature, "Men are so much one body, that in a peculiar manner they feel for each other, shame, sudden danger, resentment, honor, prosperity, distress; one or another or all of these, from social nature in general, from benevolence, upon the occasion of natural relation, acquaintance, protection, dependence; each of these being distinct cements of society. And therefore to have no restraint from, no regard to, others in our behaviour, is the speculative absurdity of considering ourselves as single and independent, as having nothing in nature which has respect to our fellow creatures, reduced to action and practice. *And this is the same absurdity, as to suppose a hand, or any part to have no natural respect to any other, or to the whole body.*" The slightest analysis of human nature shows that one class of man's propensities aim directly at his individual advantage; and

that another class of propensities aim directly at the public advantage. And yet these diverse propensities are so harmonized—are made so to interpenetrate and work together, that he who wisely seeks his own good, is really promoting the public good; and he who, from the promptings of his disinterested nature, seeks the public good, is really, though unintentionally, benefitting himself.

Human welfare is not so much an individual as a corporate affair. In every corporate body, the interest of each member is interlocked with the interests of all the members. There is in fact but one interest, for there is but one body. If stocks rise or fall, if dividends increase or decrease, in whatever case, the good or bad is shared mutually. No member of the corporation can single out and isolate his particular share. The interest is one and inseparable; and if any one member suffer loss, all the members suffer with him; and if any member realize success, all the members prosper with him. It is true that the mutuality of human welfare is not always *immediate* nor always *appreciable*. It may take, in many cases, a great length of time before an injury suffered by a single individual can diffuse itself over the community and the world. And even as regards injuries to the physical body, it is not unfrequently the case that much time is required to make the injury general. There are, for instance, poisons which are many years in diffusing their deadly virus through all the members of the physical frame. It may be a long period before a crime perpetrated in London shall be felt in New York — it may be almost a geological period before the success of an atrocious measure in Russia, can produce its natural effects in American society. These are extreme cases, but they cannot affect the operation of great principles. The largest river is made of drops, so that a single drop increases the whole bulk. The effect is not appreciable, but is none the less real. The body of humanity is one, and with this body all men are connected as organic members; and it hence follows, *as a principle*,—whether we can perceive the effect or not,—that no one member of the race can suffer, in the remotest degree, without all the members ultimately participating in the calamity.

The general truth which we have thus endeavored to

elucidate finds its most distinct expression in the New Testament. The common bond of sympathy underlies and suggests the precepts and the doctrines of Christ. We must distinguish a few points as examples illustrative of our general assertion.

1. First of all, those duties enjoined in the New Testament which make the nearest approach to *originality*—which are more *peculiarly Christian*—rest directly upon the great law of sympathy. The Christian disciple is commanded to cultivate sociable dispositions and is frequently reminded, that he lives not for himself, but for others. Hence the injunction, to "rejoice with them that do rejoice and weep with them that weep." The essential command is, "*Thou shalt love thy neighbor*"—a command resting directly upon, and deriving its force from, the doctrine, that human beings are "members one of another"—are one body with Christ for the living head. Hence the Christian obligation to be "courteous," to "look every man not on his own things only, but at those of others also;" the strong are reminded that they should bear the infirmities of the weak, and "so fulful the law of Christ." The character of Christ beautifully illustrates the social features of his religion. Sympathy was among the strongest feelings of his nature. Every reader of the New Testament will recall a special occasion, the death of Lazarus, and the sorrow of his sister Mary and her friends, when Christ "groaned in spirit also." The Apostle Paul enforces the exhortation, "Let every one of us please his neighbor for his good to edification," by reference to the example, "For even Christ pleased not himself."

An historical reference shows how naturally such an exhortation flowed from the spirit of Christianity. The heathen religions, which prevailed in civilized countries in the time of Christ, enjoined, in some sense of the term, love to God—the love of God, or of that multiplicity of deities which stood in the place of God. But with this love, paganism was exhausted. It made no provision for the love of *man*. The social, the sympathetic element was wanting. The pagan worship was for most part a ritual service—a service recognizing God, in a sense *that excluded* man. Forms and ceremonies of worship extending to the most minute particulars, regulating the dress, the posture

of the body, the gestures, the expression of the face, with a large number of other bodily movements, these made up the substance of religion. And it is hardly exaggerating the facts to say, that an Egyptian, a Greek, or a Roman might have performed all the duties of his religion without forming a new acquaintance — indeed without having an acquaintance! Christianity then, worked a revolution in the religious nature and practices of men, in so far as it made men feel, that while they owed supreme love to God, they, at the same time, owed universal love to men. The basis of this great social obligation, we repeat, is the sympathetic bond which makes the human family one.

2. Again, the truth that all men are vitally connected, making the best good of the humblest individual identical with, and inseparable from, the best good of all men, is *a clue to the principle of Divine retribution*, and is to be borne in mind when we are forming our conceptions of the proper conduct of God as the Sovereign of man. When, for instance, it is asked, Why does God punish the sinner? the principle we have endeavored to elucidate, determines the answer. It cannot be said that God punishes a sinner *merely* for his good; because, if the good of one soul is inseparable from the good of all souls, it is impossible that punishment should do the sinner good without at the same time being of service to other beings. Neither can it be said, that God punishes the sinner *merely* for the good of other persons,—in common phrase, the saints,—leaving the good of the sinner himself wholly out of the account; because it is impossible that punishment should benefit those who do not receive it, without, at the same time, benefitting those who do receive it. The justice of endless punishment for sin is often defended on the ground, that while it can do the sinner no good, it will nevertheless "enhance the bliss of the saints!" But such a notion supposes that one portion of the human family *can* be benefitted at the expense of another portion; and is wholly at war with the great and glorious truth, that if one member of the human race suffer all the members suffer with him, and if one member is honored all the members rejoice with him.

3. The same truth will also guide us in forming a conception of *the requirements of Divine justice.* No man can

sin without injuring others than himself—no man can sin without involving the innocent in the baneful consequences of his guilt. Even then if it could be shown that the just and holy God were under no moral obligation to prevent an individual from injuring himself, *on his own account*, it would still remain, that justice should interfere to prevent him from injuring himself *on account of others*—on account of the innocent who, for no criminality of theirs, are made to suffer. We trust that we are not guilty of irreverent words, when we say, that the innocent have a right to protection—that Divine justice owes this to them. The same Power that called them into being, does, by the act, obligate itself to shield them from undeserved harm. It may be kindness to permit the innocent to suffer for a season, to suffer for disciplinary purposes; but they have a right to final escape or relief. Justice therefore, justice to those who do no wrong, *Divine* justice must interfere to prevent man from permanently harming himself—from harming himself because in so doing he harms others.

In a limited sphere, everybody concedes this point. We do not think of the wrong the drunkard does himself so much as of the wrong he does his wife and children. When, a few years since, a distinguished professor in a Medical College, incurred the guilt and suffered the penalty of murder, more sympathy was felt for his innocent family than for himself. They, at least, were *entitled* to a better fate; and, on the supposition that no good could come out of their distress, justice must have shielded them from the blow. Justice, for the same reason, must *finally* put a stop to all sin, that the innocent may be spared.

4. Finally, the hope of the *ultimate restoration of all souls*, is in the eternal oneness and mutuality of human destiny. No soul can be forever shut out of the favor of God, without involving all souls, more or less directly, in the common doom. As well think to separate an arm from its body, and to provide for its comfort and health and vigor in its dissevered condition, as to imagine that human souls, all of them alike connected by the tie of fraternity and mutual sympathy, can be torn asunder, and the eternal wretchedness of one portion made to comport with the perfect and uninterrupted blessedness of the remainder. In the ultimate consummation of the purposes of God, there can be no

divided destiny. The portion of one, in spirit and in character, must be the portion of all. That in the last issue a single soul shall be able to rejoice in the redeeming grace of God, all souls must be restored, and so made to partake in the common bliss. To suppose a different issue, is to suppose an entire change in the affections of the human soul. That a portion of humanity may rejoice while others forever weep, would require the extinction of every affection,—the destruction of the common bond of sympathy, whereby the race of humanity is essentially one. Such cannot be the issue of the noblest scheme of God. In the end, there shall be no schism in the body of humanity. In the complete extinction of sin, in the perfect purity of every desire, hope, and aspiration, the happiness and exaltation of each soul shall be triumphant in the happiness and glory of all; and the great scheme of redeeming grace terminate in the holiness and bliss of every rational being. G. H. E.

Art. XXXII.

Literary Notices.

1. The Life, Labors and Character of Rev. Otis A. Skinner, D. D., a Discourse delivered in the Warren Street Universalist Church, on Sunday, October 6th, 1861. By Rev. Thomas B. Thayer. Boston: Abel Tompkins. 1861.

We have read with deep interest this faithful and affectionate tribute to the memory of a good man; one whom we had known to esteem and respect; one whose sudden death has filled us with sadness. As pastor of the society to which Dr. Skinner had ministered for many years, and where his memory is still fondly cherished, it was highly appropriate in Mr. Thayer to discourse upon his life, labors and character. The two men have from the first been contemporaries in our denominational history; have known each other intimately; have cherished mutual regard and affection. No one could speak of Dr. Skinner with a better appreciation of his worth, than the person who succeeded him as pastor of the Church and Congregation in Warren Street.

Dr. Skinner has filled so large a place in the esteem and

confidence of our brethren—his labors for the cause have been so conspicuous and so successful—that we are sure we shall gratify the wishes of our readers if we quote somewhat liberally from Mr. Thayer's discourse. We must confess, that our regard for his memory is largely personal. For years, we have enjoyed an intimacy with him beyond what is usual, or generally possible, towards one so many years our senior. But there was in him a frankness, a generosity, a fascination of manners that invited an intimacy which could throw off reserve. There was no exterior barrier of artificial dignity to keep one at a distance. He was so warm-hearted, so kind, so genial that we could approach him not only face to face but heart to heart. We were not prepared to hear of his decease. Indeed there were but three days of intermission between our first knowledge of his sickness and the news of his departure from earth. It is only with the lapse of weeks that we are able to realize that he is no more with us, and the passing away of each day but increases our sense of the loss we have experienced.

The Discourse gives a brief sketch of Dr. Skinner's early life, from which we extract what follows:

"Dr. Skinner was a native of Royalton, Vermont, and was born on the third of July, 1807. At the age of nineteen he commenced school teaching, which was soon followed by the additional labor of preaching, to which he was called by the wishes and solicitations of his friends. He continued in this double work for nearly two years, spending most of his time in Lempster, Marlow, Washington and neighboring towns. At the end of this period, in 1828, he made a pastoral engagement with the societies in Washington and Jaffrey, N. H., preaching half the time at each place. He remained with them for about the space of a year, when he accepted a call to the charge of the society in Woburn, Mass. After two years labor in this place, he was invited to Baltimore, Md., to which city he removed in 1831. . . . . For important reasons, he determined in 1836, to leave Baltimore, and return to New England; and accordingly accepted an invitation to settle with the society in Haverhill. But in the meantime the movement for the establishment of the Fifth Universalist Society in Boston had commenced; and Mr. Skinner, having preached to the congregation gathered for this purpose, was urgently solicited to become their minister. His engagement at Haverhill prevented for some time, but after remaining there for a year, during which he preached occasionally to the congregation at Boylston Hall, he finally consented to accept their unanimous invitation, extended to him Nov. 20, 1836, to take the pastoral charge; and Jan. 1st, 1837, he came to Boston, and.

settled among you as your religious teacher and pastor, and was installed on the 26th of the same month. His industry and ability, his pleasing manners, and entire devotedness to his duties as a minister of the Gospel, soon wrought a marked change in your condition; and the increase in numbers was so rapid, that it was deemed expedient and necessary to erect a church. Minister and people working together with heart and hand, this important object was speedily attained; and in a little more than two years from the commencement of his labors among you, this edifice was completed and dedicated, Jan. 30th, 1839."

In 1846, Dr. Skinner became pastor of the Orchard Street Church in New York city; returning however to his old parish in Boston at the end of nearly three years. He continued in this position eight years; and then, in 1857, removed to Elgin, Ill. He soon after accepted the presidency of Lombard University, at Galesburg, where the degree of D. D. was conferred upon him. The following year he removed to Joliet, and became pastor of the Universalist Society in this place. In connection with his pastoral duties, the labor of settling up the affairs of the estate of his deceased brother Samuel, devolved upon him. He died in Napierville, twenty miles from his home, on occasion of a pulpit exchange.

"The sickness which terminated his life was sudden and severe, and he was only able to go from the pulpit to the bed, which he never left. He died on the evening of Wednesday, Sept. 18th, and the funeral service was on the following Friday afternoon from St. Paul's Church, in Chicago. His body lies side by side with that of his brother Samuel, for whom he ever cherished a special affection."

Of Dr. Skinner's labors, Mr. Thayer says:—

"He was industrious beyond what his most intimate friends knew; and it was not till, since his death, I sat down to the preparation of this discourse, that I reached any thing like a just estimate of the man in this respect. And, in surveying the various fields of labor which he occupied, I confess to much astonishment at the great amount of work which he accomplished; while at the same time he freely gave himself to the calls of friendship and the demands of social intercourse. He was never a preacher or a pastor only; but always something more than these, always engaged in some kind of work outside of his profession. All his leisure hours, or what would have been leisure hours to most men, were devoted to some kind of employment for the benefit of others. Denominational labor, Temperance, organizations for the help of the poor, the religious journal or magazine, a doctrinal, devotional, or Sunday School book, the school or the college, or

business of some sort, was sure to be added to the work of the pulpit and the duties of the pastor."

Passing over what the Discourse says of his labors as an editor and an author—in both of which capacities he was a diligent and successful laborer—we pause over the acknowledgment of his *great labor*—the raising of the Tufts College fund.

"One of the most important and difficult labors of Dr. Skinner in the educational department, was securing the funds necessary to the endowment of Tufts College, amounting to $100,000. Many believed that, at that time, it would be impossible to obtain so large a sum for this purpose; but he entered upon the work in full faith, and continued to solicit and collect subscriptions to the fund in all parts of the country, for several years, in the face of indifference, discouragements and positive refusals, which would have discouraged most men; till the last round in the ladder of difficulties was reached, and he stood on the height of his aims and his ambition. In some respects he was peculiarly fitted for this labor—patient, persevering, hopeful, of pleasant address, ingenuous in presenting the claims of the Institution, never disheartened by denials, nor disturbed by discourtesy or rudeness; he succeeded in many cases where almost any other man would have failed. The friends of Tufts College will never forget the debt they owe to him who did so much in laying the foundation of its prosperity and usefulness; and his name will henceforth be closely and feelingly associated with its early history and struggles."

The merit of Dr. Skinner's success in this great enterprise is the greater, from the circumstance that he commenced it at a time when the denomination had received but little training in habits of giving for educational purposes. He was obliged to convert the brethren to a belief in the *necessity* of the institution; and in this, his efforts were often arduous and discouraging. Our own eyes and ears have been witness to his toil in this direction; and we can testify, that it was often discouraging in the extreme. Still he kept up courage; he persevered; and he succeeded. The name of Skinner is forever associated with those generous patrons of our infant college, Tufts and Packard.

The Discourse very justly selects as the distinguishing element in the character of Dr. Skinner, his *goodness of heart.*

"This goodness of heart showed itself in every way, on all occasions. He was genial and amiable in disposition, frank and cordial in his manners, kind in feelings towards all, helpful to every one who sought his aid, the companion and counsellor of youth, the comforter of the aged and the sick, the loving and laborious pastor, and the faithful minister of Christ and his gospel.

He was precisely the man to love. It is not of many men you can use this word *love*. You like them; you have a regard for them—but every body who knew Mr. Skinner well, *loved* him. Wherever he labored the people became attached to him; and he had troops of affectionate personal friends not only among his own brethren, but outside of society and denomination lines. Those who differed from him in religious belief, even when opposed, bore testimony to the kindness of his nature, the courtesy of his manners, and the purity of his motives. Ministers of the gospel, whether acquaintances or strangers, found a fraternal welcome to his home, which he and his amiable family never failed to make pleasant to all who came. But it was the pastoral relation which more especially revealed his goodness of heart, and the strength and delicacy of his sensibilities. In his visits to his parishioners, in the Sunday School, with the wayward and erring, in the homes of the poor, at the bedside of the sick and dying, Dr. Skinner was a man who had few equals; and that minister may be counted happy who, after he has gone hence, shall hold so large a place in the affections of the people among whom he has labored in holy things."

The Discourse closes with a description of the death-scene written by one who was present. Few can read those touching lines without emotion. We have room for but a brief paragraph.

"'Never shall we forget the impressive scene; never before had we so felt the dignity of death. The strong soul triumphed over the perishing body, and bore our departing brother onward through the valley of death, with the tread of a conqueror. There was no stir about his couch, for there was nothing to do but to watch with him till the Angel of the Land of Peace should seal his eyes in dreamless slumber; there were no loud lamentations around him, no clamorous grief, only silent tears wiped quickly away, lest they should cause a pang to the beloved husband, father and friend; and the few brief, whispered words were those of affection to the dying, or of strength and consolation to the living, suffering the anguish of separation. To the very last moment our brother retained his consciousness; and peacefully passed on beyond mortal vision, out of suffering into rest—out of death into life.'"

"So lived, and labored, and died, 'a beloved brother, and a faithful minister and fellow-servant in the Lord.' He has gone in the strength of his manhood, in the meridian of his days, in the midst of his usefulness. His death is a serious loss to our denomination, in the work of which no man was more active. The men of reputation, the strong men among us, are continually

falling at the post of duty. Within the year three of the most laborious, and the most weary, of our workers have gone to their rest—Dr. Whittemore, Dr. Ballou, and now Dr. Skinner. We who remain a little longer, must toil all the more diligently while the day lasts."

2. History of Civilization in England. By Henry Thomas Buckle. Volume II. From the Second London Edition. To which is added an Alphabetical Index. New York: D. Appleton & Company. 1861. 8vo. pp 476.

A writer may be presumed to have extraordinary gifts who makes such grave topics as history and philosophy not merely instructive, but also fascinating. And if he continues to fascinate, while he shocks not only our prejudices, but our moral instincts, and also our sense of logical propriety, and of the necessity of caution in generalizations, the evidence of unusual gifts is so much the more conclusive. We read every word in Mr. Buckle's first volume, and to the end our interest was unbroken. We find the second volume not less attractive. We do not recall a paragraph that we should characterize as dull, as commonplace, as sinking to the level of mediocrity. His style is wonderfully fresh, always forcible, frequently eloquent. His sentences are burdened with matter, but they are never heavy. His faculty to give an air of novelty to familiar thoughts is, so far as our reading goes, unrivalled. And there is a tinge, sometimes a large tinge, of the romantic in his forms of statement and illustration. He instructs, edifies and amuses as few writers on sober themes have been able to do. But the defects of this wonderful writer are as numerous and as palpable as his merits. His reading has been too general and varied, to be profound. He has made himself familiar with so many branches of knowledge, that it is mentally impossible, that he can be a master of any one. The same intellect cannot at once command history, poetry, theology, metaphysics, and all the physical sciences. Yet, Mr. Buckle undertakes to put all these departments of knowledge under contribution with a view to a theory of civilization. We are not surprised therefore to find in his volumes gross misapprehensions, almost childish generalizations, specimens of logic that force a smile, and assumptions which sometimes stir a feeling of indignation. For example: Spain is a mountainous country, is troubled with earthquakes, and other phenomena that excite the imagination. These physical characteristics incline the population to superstition, and so dwarf the intellects and make them the victims of priestcraft! The historical fact that Spain has ever been a priest-ridden nation—that it gave birth to the order of Jesuits and the Inquisition—has thus a *philosophical* explana-

tion! Again: Scotland has been a land of intense bigotry though in a Protestant form. Mr. Buckle has a ready explanation of the fact. The Scotch philosophy is *deductive;* the deductive method of thought tends to bigotry; and in Scotland the style of philosophizing has infected the dominant theology!

It will be seen, that our author has a poor opinion of the deductive method. *He* is Baconian—facts, he tells us, will explain everything. Yet he formally commences his great work with a statement of a *theory;* and then proceeds to ransack all departments of knowledge *with a view* to confirm and illustrate his theory! We cannot name an instance more glaringly deductive—one less Baconian. Finally, our author writes about civilization. Of course, he means civilization among *men.* Yet his two volumes do not recognize the existence of such a being as *man.* That is to say, his theory supposes man to be a thinking vegetable; and the same as a gardener would speculate about the growth and quality of a cabbage, referring everything to soil, air, and other "circumstances," so the growth and character of man will be arbitrarily determined by such circumstances as mountains, volcanoes, influences of the sky, the atmosphere, and so on. There is no such thing as will—a cause—a power—in his theory of man. Of course, there is no place in such a theory for religion, faith, worship. Sometimes these things get a left-handed recognition, but generally they come under the head of ignorance, superstition, or priest-craft. Mr. Buckle worships the intellect—his great emancipator and saviour is knowledge, the knowledge of facts. Years ago, we read somewhat in Hobbes—enough to identify the source, direct or indirect, in the inspiration which glows with such intensity in the brilliant pages under notice. Indeed, Mr. Buckle gives ample proof that while he may have read Reid, Stewart and Hamilton, he has *studied* authors of the materialistic school. His argument against the testimony of consciousness simply moves our contempt. He is unable even to define the term. Yet with all his faults, and such faults, Mr. Buckle is a man of *genius*—has very rare faculty as a writer—and will have for readers, men of intelligence and culture. We have but room to add, that his second volume is mainly devoted to characteristics of the Scotch intellect.

3. The Gospel Psalmist; A Collection of Hymns and Tunes, for Public, Social and Private Devotions. Especially designed for the Universalist Denomination. By J. G. Adams and S. B. Ball, Boston: J. M. Usher. 1861.

In connection with this volume of Hymns and Music, is another volume containing the Hymns *without* the Music; thus

leaving it optional with the purchaser to take either. Of course, the Hymns are numbered the same in both editions. The especial purpose of the new collection, is to provide the means of Congregational Singing. The compiler has, of course, made selections from the hymns of Watts, the Wesleys, Cowper, Mrs. Steele, Montgomery and Bowring: also from authors of a much earlier date, both Catholic and Protestant; and, as a feature somewhat new, from German authors. Due regard has been had to the reformatory manifestations of the times; and special prominence is given to the destinctive doctrines of the denomination. Whenever practicable to do so, hymns of denominational authorship have been selected. The number of hymns—nine hundred and ninety-six—is sufficient for ample variety; every taste, if not unreasonably fastidious, may easily select from the collection. The compiler has evinced good judgment and patient industry in his difficult task. We are pleased to notice, that most of the hymns are short—we recognize few exceeding five stanzas. There is a large collection of Closing hymns and Doxologies—a very convenient as well as useful feature. Of the Music we can say but a word, for here our taste is not critical. We need no one to inform us respecting the merits of Duke Street, Old Hundred, Balerma, Dundee, Pleyel's Hymn, and kindred tunes inwrought with our earliest recollections of sacred song, and which no musical compiler for devotional purposes will ever feel at liberty to omit. But we recognize many tunes with which we are not familiar; and these we must hear before we can appreciate. We may say, however, that the compiler ranks among the first in his profession; that he is reputed for his skill as a composer, and for his success as a teacher of sacred music. We can defer to his judgment with confidence. The mechanical execution of both volumes is excellent. Handsome, sound type, clear white paper, and substantial binding make then all that could be asked. Both volumes will commend themselves.

4, The Southern Rebellion and the War for the Union. New York: 1861.

A condensed history of the War as it progresses—comprising the salient features of the rebellion, and the characteristic events. We think highly of the plan and purpose of this work. To select from the numerous details with care, and to distinguish between the authentic and the doubtful, is the editor's task, and we think he performs it with discretion.